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Forward and Acknowledgments 
While working as a financial consultant, I became aware of the problems that the small technology 
companies were having with respect to monetising the use of their intellectual property. Usually 
this involved a multinational technology company using their technology without their 
permission. The directors of the companies explained to me that there was little that they could 
do about it, since they had neither the financial or legal resources to pursue protracted litigation. 
Looking for information on this problem, I became aware of another problem which was 
dominating the discussion in the field of intellectual property law. That problem involved 
intellectual property owners using the threat of injunctive action to coerce those same 
multinational technology companies into paying excessive licensing rates. Instinctively I came to 
believe that these two problems generally referred to as “patent holdout” and “patent holdup” 
were related.  
To gain a better understanding of these problems, I enrolled in online courses at the University 
of London "Queen Mary" where I finished a Diploma in Law focused on intellectual property. 
Shortly after I finished those studies I made a presentation at an IP conference in Helsinki about 
how patent holdup exemplified a "Tragedy of the AntiCommons" as described by Heller in his 
recent book "Gridlock Economy". In attendance at that conference was IP Professor from the 
University of Helsinki and he asked if I would consider joining their doctoral program, as I had the 
multi-disciplinary back-ground they were trying to promote at the University. Having this become 
increasingly intrigued about the prospect of solving these problems, I applied and was duly 
accepted. 
The research for this doctoral program commenced with an analysis of several conventional 
solutions to the problems. These included; applying the essential facilities doctrine, expanding the 
patent misuse doctrine, FRAND enforcement, patent pools, and redefining patent rights according 
to the works of Lemley and Shapiro. The conclusion drawn from this research was that none of 
those proposed solutions provided a solution which was both workable and equitable. To the 
contrary it became clear that the leading solution which dramatically redefined patent rights, 
created an even greater inequity because it intentionally limited royalties of all patent owners to 
a fraction of their true value their property. Obviously, this meant that a new solution would have 
to be sought.  
The search for a new solution began with detailed review of the history of property rights. This 
review was initiated in the expectation that it would reveal the underlying historical justification 
for the absolute property rights which formed the foundation of intellectual property law. This 
review included an examination of Locke's theory of property which provided a compelling 
argument in favour of the absolute property rights, which were the initial foundations of 
intellectual property law. The problem was that its unrealistic and overtly optimistic assumption 
did not conform to my knowledge of history. To rebut this theory that I decided to spend some 
II 
 
time researching and thinking about the evolution of property rights, which eventually resulted in 
the theory of the property continuum which is included in this thesis. 
After gaining a better understanding of the history of property, I returned to my search for the 
solution to "patent holdup" and "legal attrition". Disillusioned with the prospect of finding 
solutions in competition law or intellectual property law, I started research in other bodies of law. 
Specifically researching within bodies of laws which were covered in examples of an anti-
commons tragedy mentioned by Heller. The expectation being that those bodies of law must 
contain a solution to the problem identified by Heller. This led me to natural resource law and 
eventually to water law, where I discovered the “correlated rights doctrine”, which can be defined 
as follows: 
'When multiple parties have individual property claims on an inherently integrated property 
each is legally entitled to their proportional share of the total value of that property and the 
law should protect that share from being appropriated by others, including other owners 
and users. 
I immediately recognised that this was an equitable and pragmatic solution to the problems of 
both patent holdup and patent holdout. Moreover, it was an ideal solution because it could be 
used to replace rather than restrict the historically intellectual property foundations which 
established that all inventors should be granted relatively absolute and exclusive rights to their 
inventions. The premise being that while the old foundation is perfectly reasonable when a single 
inventor has created a standalone invention. Its reasonableness could be challenged when an 
invention is the result of multiple inventors contribute their individual innovations to an 
integrated technological product. This challenge resting on the correlated nature of modern 
“integrated innovation”, wherein every contribution to an integrated technological product relies 
on the innovative contributions of others to create value, and the licensing behaviour of individual 
contributors will have a spill over effect their fellow contributors.  
Because research on this doctrine and its application in integrated innovation disputes 
displayed such promise, a decision was taken not yield to the temptation of theoretical 
equivocation, but rather write a thesis which embraced an unapologetic proposition in favour of 
applying correlated intellectual property rights in intellectual property law. A decision which 
would need to be defended by providing a comprehensive assessment of the theoretical, legal 
and practical implications of applying the correlative rights doctrine in intellectual property law. 
This comprehensive analysis being essential to the acceptance of a thesis which challenges the 
dominant views on the subject and seeks to establish a new foundation for intellectual property 
law. 
The supervisor for this thesis were Professor Petri Kuoppamäki and Professor Taina 
Pihlajarinne, the pre-examiners were Dr. Ilkka Rahnasto and Ph.D. Rosa Maria Ballardini. PH.D. 
Ballardini also acted as my opponent during the defence of this thesis. I would like to sincerely 
thank each of them for their efforts to see this thesis through to its defence. Given the contrarian 
nature of the thesis, the economic and sociology content contained within it, its global analysis 




I would like to especially thank Professor Samuli Miettinen for his advice on EU law and 
Professor Sabine Frerichs for her advice on Law and Society. Their advice provided a 
valuable contribution to the contents of this thesis. Special thanks also go to Professor 
Tuomas Mylly who expressed early and continued support for the work include in this 
thesis. 
I would also like to express my appreciation to; Chief Judge Randall R. Rader, Theresa 
Yuan & Judge Richard Posner, Professor Michael Heller, Professor Carol Rose, Professor 
Michael Abramowicz, Professor Andrew Lang, Professor Graeme Dinwoodie, and 
Professor Alan Dershowitz for expressing varying degrees to interest in the concept of 
applying correlated rights in intellectual property law. The expressions of interest by these 
international scholars has sustained me through times when this work was disparaged for 
being too far outside the prevailing consensus on how to solve the problems of patent 
holdup and patent holdout.  
Also deserving of appreciation are Beata, Katri, Partick, Juha, and Toni who were 
members of the study group on competition law which I had the privilege of belonging to 
when I first started on this project. Even though our views may have diverged as to the 
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1. Introduction and Thesis Structure 
Not only do we live in an age of astonishing technological advances, we live in an age where 
those advances appear to be occurring at an ever-increasing pace. However, this increased pace 
is not the only, nor the most significant change which makes these advances different from 
earlier advances. The most significant change has to do with the fact that the overwhelming 
majority of the recent advances are now derived from the integration of sequential innovations, 
provided by a multitude of innovators, which is built on existing technologies, to created ever 
more complex technological products. This inherently integrated method of innovation which 
results in correlated intellectual properties, stands in stark contrast to historical and common 
perception of innovation, which presumes that technological advances were and are primarily 
generated by a single innovator developing their own standalone intellectual properties.1 
Evidence of the predominately inherently integrated innovation process is provided in the 
reports of western patent authorities, which reveal that the majority of patent applications 
received over the last ten years relate to industries where there are established standardisation 
organizations dedicated to ensuring that new innovations are compatible with existing 
innovations.2 This tend towards an integrated innovation process has been recognised by legal 
scholars, who refer to the external effects which are inherently in standardized technological 
products.3 Obviously when industries are subject to these sorts of standardization procedures, 
it must be regarded as self-evident that their new innovations must be built upon earlier 
innovation which have previously been adopted as part of the standard, for if they were not 
they would not be compliant with those standards. 
There are several observations about this change and the challenges to the validity of 
historical perceptions they represent which are worth noting. The first of these is that this 
change is the direct result of greater educational opportunities, which have led to exponential 
increase in the number of educated innovators. This increase in educated innovators 
representing a global phenomenon which has been driven by dramatic rises in educational 
standards in almost every country in the world. However, it is not just that there are more people 
receiving education, another significant factor is that the education itself is often much more 
specialized. Evidence of this can be found in the dramatic rise of post graduate degrees in the 
various sciences. What this means is that; not only are there more people capable of innovation, 
                                                          
1 While the term "intellectual property" is broadly referred to as a work or invention that is the result of creativity, 
this thesis will use the term primarily as it relates to "patented inventions". 
2 See e.g.: U.S. Patent Office, Patent Report 2012, which indicate that over 65% of the patents applied for in 2012, 
were in technological fields which have established technological standards. Similar results can be found in the 
records of patent authority in Europe and Japan.  
3 See for example: Ilkka Rahnasto, Intellectual Property Rights, External Effects, and Anti-Trust Law, (Oxford 






they are more capable of complex innovations. A trend which is certain to continue into the 
foreseeable future.  
From an industrial prospective this increase in the supply of highly educated and specialized 
innovators has been critical for the advancement of technologies used to create high technology 
products. This is because these technologies have become so complex that no single person, nor 
individual company, can entirely master the technology in a manner which would ensure the 
same level of innovative advancements. This is also why these high-tech industries represent 
the best examples of how advances are derived from; the integration of sequential innovations, 
provided by multitudes of innovators which build on existing technologies, to created ever more 
complex technological products.  
Further while high tech industries may have been the main beneficiaries of this educational 
expansion, evidence of the impact of more and better educated innovators is visible in almost 
all industries. Whether it is in mining or bicycle manufacturing; new machines, new processes 
and new materials are also revolutionising almost every industry. Even in industries where there 
is the possibility that the technology can be understood by a single person or company, this does 
not take away from the fact that the innovations coming into those industries are also being 
generated by a multitude of innovators, who inevitably are building on existing technological 
advance. Regardless of the nature of the industry there can be no question that the rise of a 
more and better educated innovators will continue, and no industry will be immune from the 
innovative competition which they provide. 
The next observation of note is that this shift in the innovation process represents an 
evolutionary rather than a revolutionary change. Although it is commonly assumed that 
integrated intellectual property is a recent trend, there is an abundance of anecdotal evidence 
which suggest otherwise. From a chronological prospective some of that evidence would be as 
follows;  
 A driving force behind the industrial revolution was the ability to generate reliable power 
from a steam engine. However, while the first reliable stream engine was built and patented 
by James Watt in 1765, the first patent granted for a steam engine was issued in 1698 to 
Thomas Savery and it has long been recognised that Watt built his engine on the work of a 
subsequent inventor by the name of Thomas Newcomen, who patented his "Atmospheric 
Steam Engine" in 1712. 4  
 While the Wright Brothers may have been the first inventors to achieve a motorized flight in 
1903, there can be no disputing the fact that their Wright Flyer was built upon a multitude of 
earlier inventions provided by a multitude of innovators which they improved upon to 
achieve their remarkable success.5 
 From a more modern context it ought to be obvious that Apple is not the standalone inventor 
of the mobile phone and that the advanced innovations incorporated into its iPhones are 
built upon a multitude of earlier inventions by a multitude of earlier innovators.  
Once it is accepted that inherently integrated innovation has always being part of an 
evolutionary innovation process, the strategic question becomes: when did it become the 
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dominant method of invention? To answer this question involves finding answers to two 
additional questions; the first seeking to clarify what makes an innovation into an invention and 
the second seeking to clarify how long that innovation maintains its categorization as an 
invention. Conveniently, answers to both these questions have already been addressed 
provided by existing intellectual property law. What most intellectual property laws require is 
that the invention be; new, useful and none obvious. And when those criteria are met the 
innovation is provided with twenty years of patent protection. These answers can be used to 
conclude that any invention which builds on inventions which are less than twenty years old is 
a "correlated inventions", whereas any inventions which are unrelated to earlier inventions or 
built on inventions which are more than twenty years old are "standalone inventions". As the 
determining factor in this form of differentiation is effectively the speed at which the follow-on 
innovations are developed; it can be further concluded that the period in which the innovation 
process evolved from; being predominately a standalone process to a predominantly inherently 
integrated process, would be a time in which there was a surge in innovation. While it is entirely 
possible that this may have happened during the industrial revolution; it is also entirely possible 
that this may have reverted to a predominately standalone process during subsequent years. 
However even if this change was reversed during the 19th century; it is clear that towards the 
end of the 20th century correlated innovations would have once again represented the majority 
of all new innovations.  
This transition is particularly evident in the field of information technology, where Moore's 
law predicted that the number of transistors in a dense integrated circuit has and will doubled 
approximately every two years.6 Two other fields experience similar if not faster rates of growth 
include the mobile telecom industry, and the manufacturing automation industry, both of which 
are in no small part also reliant on recent innovations in the information technology for their 
exponential growth. Obviously, such rates of growth would not be possible if new innovations 
relied on twenty-year-old technology rather than more recent advances.  
The recognition that it was an evolutionary change is important because a slow evolutionary 
change can often go unnoticed for a long time, which can will allow a legal system maintaining 
the status quo long after changes should have been adopted. Which is to suggest that if the 
changes were of a more rapid or revolutionary in nature; they would be immediately recognised, 
which would allow for appropriate adjustments to be made on a timely basis. Absent this 
simultaneous evolution, it is almost inevitable that a disconnect between the subject of the law 
and law will emerge. In the worst case that conflict will frustrate the objective justifications of 
the law rendering its enforcement; unproductive, unreasonable and unjust. To a certain extent 
this is what has happened in intellectual property law. Because the process changes were 
evolutionary, the legal system appeared to maintain the status quo until the resulting decisions 
became so unreasonable and unjust, that their unreasonableness and unjustness could no 
longer be ignored.  
This observation denoting the proposition that recent changes to the application of 
intellectual property law have been driven by a desire to avoid unreasonable and unjust 
outcomes, rather than a practical recognition that there was been a fundamental shift in the 
innovation process which required a proactive change in the law. Furthermore, it can be argued 
                                                          







that this treatment of the symptom rather than the cause, provides a coherent explanation for 
the ongoing confusion and resistance to recent changes in intellectual property law. For when 
the law is changed without a foundational justification, those changes will frequently be 
incongruent and therefore appear somewhat arbitrary. To the extent that they are incongruent 
or viewed as arbitrary, this will inevitably detract from the authority of the legal system.  
Which is not to suggest that the reactive changes adopted to avoid injustice are not necessary 
or desirable. After all this is the most common manner in which judges change the law. As Judge 
Posner points out in his paper on judicial methods;  
'judges are usually too busy trying to find the most practical and just solutions to 
the cases, to spend much time deliberating over theory.'7 
Judge Posner further suggesting the development of the theories related to fundamental 
changes in the underlying subjects and "extracting" a doctrine from those judicial decisions is 
the task of legal scholars. He suggests it is their task because unlike judges, legal scholars have 
the luxury of time and resources to dedicate to developing the theory, in particular they have 
the opportunity expand their research well beyond the specifics of individual cases in the search 
for a more comprehensive understanding of the situation.8 In the best circumstances this 
research will allow those scholars to identify the underlying changes which has driven the 
reactive change in the law, and uncover established doctrines in parallel bodies of law which can 
be migrated to or "extracted" from existing case law. This is the best circumstances because that 
research provides a logical justification for changing the law and a legally tested doctrine which 
can be proactively applied in a congruent manner to future cases. Obviously finding logical 
justification and legally tested doctrines contributes immeasurable to both the clarity and 
authority of the legal system.  
Hopefully this thesis will be recognized as an example of that kind of scholarly research. For 
not only does it; recognises a fundamental change in the innovative process which compels a 
reassessment of how intellectual property law is applied, it has also uncovered an established 
doctrine which can be extracted from recent intellectual property case law, that has been used 
to settle correlated property right disputes in other bodies of law for over one hundred years. 
The application of which would facilitate an increase in the congruency of adjudication of future 
case, as it would establish a doctrinal foundation to those decisions. This doctrine is called the 
correlative rights doctrine and representing a legal principle which holds that; 
'When multiple parties have individual property claims on an inherently integrated 
property each is legally entitled to their proportional share of the total value of that 
property and the law should protect that share from being appropriated by others, 
including other owners and users.'9 
Obviously accepting Judge Posner’s definition of scholarly work creates its own requirements 
with respect the content and structure of this thesis. This is particularly true as the concept of 
applying the correlated rights doctrine in intellectual property law is not being pursued in other 
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legal scholarship, and because its adoption would represent a fundamental change to the 
foundations of intellectual property law. As such this thesis will include a thorough examination 
the current nature and underlying rational of intellectual property, an explanation of the origins 
of doctrine, why it was appropriate to apply it in intellectual property law, how it could be 
applied, an analysis of its compatibility with existing law and an explanation of its benefits, and 
extensive examination of the relevant case law.  
As part of this examination, chapter two will more clearly define the research problem and 
thesis objective. 
Chapter three will fully describe the anticipated solutions which were considered and 
rejected before the correlated rights doctrine was discovered. 
Chapter four will analyses of the justifications for intellectual property law and an assessment 
of whether those justifications are still valid given recent of changes in the innovation process. 
This analysis is essential as the free intellectual property movement indicates that there are 
many who no longer accept that any intellectual property rights are justified.10 What will be 
shown in this chapter is that while the justification remain valid for correlated innovations, their 
objective can only be achieved when some form of correlated conditionality is applied by the 
courts. 
Chapter five will include a comprehensive analysis of the economic illusions and realities 
underlying intellectual property. The chapter is provided because the correlated rights 
foundation for intellectual property law is not compatible with the neo-classical economic 
theories which tend to support "absolutist intellectual property rights". Absolutist intellectual 
property rights being defined herein; as an absolute right to exclude others from the use of the 
intellectual property.11 As such without challenging those theories and providing new ones it 
could be difficult to get the judiciary to accept this new foundation.  
Chapter six will focus on providing a detailed history of the evolution of the correlated rights 
doctrine in the two bodies of law where it is currently applied. These bodies of law being the 
water law and oil and gas law. As well as introducing the correlated rights doctrine the history 
will show that there are significant similarities between the ownership, integrate nature of these 
underlying properties, as well as the historical perception of the rights which should apply to all 
three forms of property. The goal is to show that given these similarities, it is entirely appropriate 
to apply the correlated rights doctrine in intellectual property law. 
Chapter seven will re-examine the problems which arise in intellectual property by providing 
an historical example of how they arose in the aviation industry. The purpose of this chapter is 
to provide a real-life example of issues facing intellectual property owners, and how they are 
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opposed to, the free intellectual property movement which seeks the abolition of intellectual property protection in 
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presumptions that innovators can monetize their inventions through first to market competition, the advocacy of 
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11 To the extent that absolute/exclusive intellectual property rights were the foundation for intellectual property 
law, it is this doctrine which will be juxapositioned against the possibility of adopting a new correlated rights 
foundation. Today this absolute right is typically provided when there is a general rule which grants automatic 
injunctive relief whenever an infringement is found. This automatic right being founded on a presumptive provision 






resolved. The method that they were resolved in this industry being consistent with the 
application of the correlated rights doctrine, even if the doctrine itself was not used.  
Chapter eight will begin by analysing the comments the senior judges have made with respect 
to the short comings in the current treatment of intellectual property. It will continue by 
explaining how these problems can be addressed by divided intellectual properties into four 
categories, including two correlated categories. This will be followed by a construction of a 
correlated rights definition which is proposed by this thesis for correlated intellectual properties. 
This construction will also include a summary of the rules would likely need to be utilised to 
facilitate an application of the correlated rights doctrine. 
Chapter nine can be considered the core of the thesis, as included in it will be a description 
and analysis of the two most important precedent setting decisions which altered the perception 
of how patent law was to be applied to correlated properties on either side of the Atlantic: eBay 
v MercExchange12 and the Orange Book case.13 The analysis will focus on why those cases 
represent milestones on the path to correlated intellectual property rights, why they do not fully 
conform to the application of correlated rights This will be followed by an analysis of how these 
milestone, as well as other cases; represent both steps on the path backwards and forward for 
ensuring correlated property rights are more fully applied in intellectual property law. This 
analysis will address the two separate but related issues which are: the availability injunctive 
relief and what determines running royalties in the event that injunctive relief is not granted.  
Chapter ten will analysis of the compatibility of the correlated rights doctrine with existing 
global intellectual property legislation. Because it would be impractical to examine the 
legislation in every country, it will focus on the international legislation as well as a selection of 
countries. This analysis will be done by attempting to establish if there are any provisions in 
those international or national legislation which would prevent the application of the rules 
needed to apply the doctrine. What this analysis will show is that the correlative rights doctrine 
is both consistent with a strict reading of the legislation, and essential to the attaining the stated 
objective goals inherent in the preponderance of the legislation which was reviewed. 14 All of 
which means that the application of the correlative rights doctrine is not only permitted but may 
be required by the legislative intent included therein.  
Chapter eleven will examine the legal obligations included in hierarchical superior European 
Union laws which may; require courts to apply the correlative rights doctrine when adjudicating 
any integrated property disputes, and mandate that such disputes should be adjudicated in 
timely manner. These requirements coming from the Treaty on the Function of Europe and 
European Charter of Fundamental Rights. While this analysis has yet to be tested in the courts, 
there does appear to be a high probability that an application of the doctrine or something very 
similar to it, is required by these hierarchal superior European Union laws. 
Chapter twelve seeks find recent literature which can be interpreted as supporting an 
application of the correlated rights. Because this is a unique proposal; this implied support is 
derived from articles which either rebut patent holdup solutions and/or focus on the issue of 
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patent holdout, rather than articles which directly address correlated intellectual property 
rights.  
Chapter thirteen will depart from the doctrinal method, to provide a discussion of the 
practical implication for societies of either negating or applying correlative intellectual property 
rights. Specifically, this chapter will address the larger economic and social consequences of not 
protecting the correlative rights of innovators, and how that will impact the structure of 
technological industries. While this non-doctrinal method is generally used to motivate legislator 
to change legislation, it is included here because it needs to be understood why applying the 
correlative rights doctrine is not only a legal imperative, but also an economic and moral 
imperative.  
Chapter fourteen provides an analysis of the evolution of property rights over time along a 
theoretical property continuum. This continuum begins in the stone age and moves through 
various phases and stages ending with an explanation of how correlated property rights could 
become the dominate form of property rights in the not too distant future. While the creation 
of new property rights continuum might be regarded as a disproportionate response to the 
challenge of convincing readers that there is a need to alter how intellectual property laws are 
applied, this author would argue that its creation and inclusion are not only justified but 
necessary. The first reason why it is necessary is that it indicates that despite short term 
prospective which tend to consume much legal thinking, property rights and the laws that 
support them are not a static and have changed significantly over the millenniums. The second 
reason is because it indicates that there is a historical path which is moving towards correlated 
property rights. The third because it provides a much-needed mechanism to allow the dating 
and validating competing legal doctrines. And finally, it is needed because it provides a link 
between social structure and property rights, which can be used to determine the nature of 
society which will exist based upon what kind of property rights are provided to that society. 
Thus, making the choice of property rights a defining aspect of social change. 
The conclusion of the thesis will provide a brief description of the rational for the various 
chapters in the thesis, and a short list of the some of the most significant advantages of applying 









2. Defining the Research Problem and Thesis Objective  
During the last decade there has been dramatic shift in the definition of intellectual property 
rights. Whereas it was earlier accepted the intellectual property owners had an absolute or 
exclusive right to determine who could use their properties and how much they would charge 
for that use; 15 in recent years the courts have severely curtailed those rights by either redefining 
them or imposing competition law constrains on the exercise of those rights. For the most part 
this change has been driven by a desire to prevent what is referred to as "patent holdup".16 
Patent holdup can be defined as a method under which intellectual property owners coerce 
manufacturers of technological products which rely on intellectual properties contributed by a 
variety of intellectual property owners, to pay royalties in significantly in excess of the value 
contributed by their intellectual property to the technological product. This is achieved by 
threatening to take or taking injunctive action against technology manufactures, unless a license 
which included that excessive licensing demands is agreed. This abuse is well documented by 
                                                          
15 See e.g.: Adam Mossoff, Exclusion and Exclusive Use in Patent Law, 322 (Harvard Journal of Law and Technology, 
Spring 2009) at 8 "Wherein there is a description of a change in theory of patents from one focused on the right to 
use, to one focused on the right to exclude, which indicates the presumptive right to exclude is still theoretically 
absolute and implying this is why blocking patents persist as an issue. Citing: John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The 
(Unnoticed) Demise of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 59 STAN. L. REV. 955, 958 n.10 (2007) (“[T]he patent right is a 
negative one—the right to exclude others from making, using, selling, offering to sell, or importing the patented 
invention.”); Dan L. Burk patent gives an inventor the right to exclude others from making, using, and selling the 
invention for a limited term . . . .”); Shubha Ghosh, Exclusivity—The Roadblock to Democracy?, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 
799, 806 (2006) (“Patents, for example, grant a strong right to exclude in exchange for complete disclosure of the 
invention to the public.”); F. Scott & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1597–99 
(2003), at 1665 (“[T]he patent right to exclude has been regarded as a nearly absolute property rule . . . .”); 
Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Law Viewed Through an Evidentiary Lens: The “Suggestion Test” as a Rule of 
Evidence, 2006 BYU L. REV. 1517, 1523 (“At the core of the United States patent system is the right to exclude.”); 
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Intellectual Property at the Public Private Divide: The Case of Large-Scale DNA Sequencing, 3 
U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 557, 562 (1996) (“A Kieff & Troy A. Paredes, The Basics Matter: At the Periphery of 
Intellectual Property, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 174, 198 (2004) at 198 (“[P]atents only give a right to exclude. The 
right to use is derived from sources external to IP law.”); Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex 
Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 861 n.96 (1990) (“[A] patent grant is a right to exclude, not an 
affirmative right to practice an invention. ... a subservient patent can prevent a dominant patent holder from 
practicing the particular improved feature claimed in the subservient patent because a patent grant is a right to 
exclude, not an affirmative right to practice an invention”) Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: 
Intellectual Property Law, 1900–2000, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2187, 2222 (2000) ("“necessitated by the existence of blocking 
patents,” because otherwise an overlapping patent would necessarily result in an illegitimate restriction of another 
property owner’s “affirmative right to actually carry into practice a particular invention.”); and John F. Duffy, 
Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 439, 456-7 (2004) (“The formulation of the patent right 
in purely negative terms facilitates the granting of multiple overlapping or ‘blocking’ patents, each with the power 
to exclude the other.”)" Available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1239182 
16 See e.g.: Mark Lemley and Carl Shapiro, Patent holdup and Royalty Stacking, (Tex. L. Rev., Vol 85, 2007). Available 
at https://ssrn.com/abstract=923468 (herein after; Lemley and Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 
(2007)); Chien, Colleen V. and Lemley, Mark A., Patent Holdup, the ITC, and the Public Interest (July 2, 2012). Cornell 
Law Review, 2012; Stanford Public Law Working Paper No. 2022168. Available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2022168; Cotter, Thomas F., Patent Holdup, Patent Remedies, and Antitrust Responses 
(December 10, 2008). Journal of Corporation Law, Vol. 34, No. 1151, 2009; Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper 






legal scholars, with the abuser being described as a "patent trolls".17 From the technology 
manufacturer's prospective, and prior to the definitional changes in intellectual property rights, 
this abusive behaviour could be responded to in one of five ways.  
The first approach is to cease making the integrated technological product. This would be a 
rather extreme response that would likely only be considered if there was such limited potential 
profitability in manufacturing the integrated technological product, that the extra costs of 
responding to excessive demands would negate those profits. Such an action would represent 
an inequitable outcome because it would deprive both the manufacturer and its customers of 
market opportunities. 
The second approach is to cease using of the intellectual property by removing it from the 
integrated technological product and if necessary replacing it with an alternative intellectual 
property. While such a measure would likely be the most appropriate response to excessive 
licensing demands, it may be that the intellectual property is so inherently integrated into the 
technological product that can be neither removed or replaced. This certainly be the case if the 
disputed intellectual property represents a "standard essential property", which is essential to 
the functioning and interoperability of the technological product. 
Assuming manufacturers cannot find a "work around", the third approach would be to simply 
acquiesce to the excessive licensing demands, pay the excessive royalties and continue to 
manufacture in full compliance with the historical interpretation of intellectual property law 
which grants owners with an exclusive right to authorise the use of their intellectual property. If 
this approach is adopted it would by definition mean that some of profits that the manufacturer 
would have otherwise earned, would effectively have been appropriated by the abusive 
intellectual property owner. If the manufacturer did not contribute intellectual property to the 
integrated technological product, it would be their operating profits which were being 
appropriated. If they did contribute intellectual property to the integrated technological 
product, it would effectively be the rewards that they would have otherwise earned on their 
contributions which would be appropriated. While both appropriations would be inequitable, 
the latter is perhaps more egregious as it unjustly provides one intellectual property owner with 
an excessive royalty rate, by denying another intellectual property owner from receiving a 
proper reward for their intellectual property.  
The fourth approach which can be taken by the manufacturer is to attempt to delay the order 
of injunctive relief for as long as possible, by engaging in strategic legal tactics which will prevent 
the case being decided for years. Included in these strategic legal tactics would be actions like 
requesting excessive and intrusive discovery procedures, challenging the validity of the 
intellectual property and denying the infringement of the intellectual property. When it is fairly 
clear that disputed intellectual property is both valid and infringed, such tactics can be defined 
as "legal attrition".18 If and when the courts tolerate this behaviour, not only can the 
manufacturer delay an order for injunctive relief, they may actually force the intellectual 
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18 A more common legal expression for “legal attrition” would be “patent holdout”, however this term does not as 






property owner to abandon their excessive demands because they do not have the financial or 
legal resources to sustain protracted litigation. Although such behaviour would usually be 
condemned as an abuse of the legal process, the courts appear to have justified allowing such 
behaviour because they recognise that providing the quick injunctive relief would result in an 
inequitable outcome. 
The fifth approach that a manufacturer could take, would be to challenge the right of the 
intellectual property owner to injunctive relief in the courts and change the conditions under 
which injunctive relief was provided. In pursuing this effort, it could be expected that they would 
look to intellectual property scholars for arguments which they could use to avoid patent 
holdup. Two of the earliest and most prominent scholars who provided an effective argument 
in opposition to the practice of patent hold up were Mark Lemley and Carl Shapiro. While there 
were many others which also contributed to this opposition, it was the ideas contained in their 
highly cited initial work, which have been adopted as the principle rational for opposing patent 
holdup. Indeed, it was these ideas which formed the foundation for the changes in intellectual 
property law which effectively redefined intellectual property rights.19  
Paradoxically while the success of these last two option have greatly reduced the potential 
of patent owners to engage in patent holdup, it can be argued that these solutions have resulted 
in a situation which is even more unjust than that which resulted from patent holdup. This 
because both solutions have not only prevented intellectual property owners from charging 
royalties in excess of the value that their intellectual property contribution provides to a 
technological product, they have also forced intellectual property owners to accept royalties 
which are significantly below the value of that their intellectual properties contribute to their 
relevant technological products.  
The fourth approach results are a significant undervaluation of intellectual property because 
once the courts allowed multi-nation technology manufacturers to use legal attrition to avoid 
excessive licensing demands, that precedent could be used by those same multi-nationals to 
reduce or even avoid reasonable licensing offers made by other intellectual property owners, 
who had also contributed to the integrated technological product. The effectiveness of this 
approach is based on the same considerations and may be more effective than it was for an 
intellectual property owner which is engaging in patent holdup. For unlike patent trolls who 
anticipate the possibility a lengthy legal battle, most small intellectual property owners, who 
merely want to charge a rate which reflects the value of their intellectual property contributions 
to a technological product, have such limited financial and legal resources that they cannot 
realistically consider engaging in protracted litigation. It should be noted that many of these 
small intellectual property providers can be categorized as “non-practicing entities” in that they 
provide intellectual property to complex technological products, but do not manufacture the 
product themselves. However just because an intellectual property owner doesn’t manufacture 
a technological product does not meant that they are a patent troll. Although many scholarly 
articles fail to differentiate between non-practicing entities and patent trolls,20 non-practicing 
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20 See e.g.: Stefania Fusco, TRIPS Non-Discrimination Principle: Are Alice and Biliski Really the End of NPES? 24 Tex. 
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entities would only be patent trolls if they were attempting to charge users more than the value 
provided by their patent. 
Without sufficient financial and legal resources, the best option for a small intellectual owner 
is to accept whatever the licensing counteroffer made by the multinational manufacturer, 
regardless of how much it undervalues their contribution. To do otherwise would be to take the 
risk of bankrupting their themselves before the litigation is concluded. Further even if they are 
not bankrupted by the litigation expense and they win their case with the relatively limited legal 
resources at their disposal; this may still represent an inequitable outcome. For without the 
royalties that they ought to have received during the litigation period, it is unlikely that they 
would have been able to maintain their inventive efforts, and this would have effectively 
eliminated their long run participation in the industry. That is of course assuming the multi-
national manufacturer is willing to make a counteroffer. If they are not, those under resourced 
intellectual property owners have no options and will simply have to accept that any value their 
intellectual property provides to the integrated technological product will be appropriated by 
multi-national manufacturers and exit the industry. Although legal attrition is less well 
documented, it has garnered more attention lately in articles referring to "patent holdout"21. 
The fifth approach results in a significant undervaluation of intellectual property because the 
ideas promoted by Lemley and Shapiro to prevent patent holdup completely overturned the 
traditional market concept of intellectual property rights. Effectively changed the licensing 
negotiation from ones where the intellectual property owner is considered a monopoly supplier 
of their intellectual properties to an open market, to one where technology companies are 
considered monopoly buyers of intellectual properties and the intellectual property owners are 
the open market suppliers. The difference between these two approaches is that a profit 
maximising monopolist is able to license their intellectual property at a price which reflects the 
value which the buyer places on that property and sets their royalty rates accordingly, whereas 
an open markets supplier of intellectual property is forced to accept whatever rate is set by a 
monopolistic buyer. This difference is significant; and reflects the stated objective of Lemley and 
Shapiro to drive down royalty rates to 20% of the value which an intellectual property provides 
to a technological product.22  
To the extent such a dramatic reversal in the intellectual property rights has been allowed or 
adopted by the courts, indicates just how determined the judiciary has been about avoiding the 
inequitable outcomes of patent holdup. Although it is clear that a solution to the problem patent 
holdup needed to be developed, it would seem to be illogical and entirely inappropriate to 
prevent one inequity by facilitating an even greater inequity. That second inequity representing 
a situation which prevents intellectual property owners from being able to charge royalties 
which are consistent with the value that their properties provide to a technological product and 
instead being forced to accept royalty rates which represent a tiny fraction of their true value. 
This inequity being reinforce by the fact that in no other property market is would it be 
                                                          
21 See for example: Lichtman, Douglas, Patent Holdouts and the Standard-Setting Process (U Chicago Law and 
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considered equitable for the legal system to enforce a practice which requires property owners 
to sell their property for 20% of its true value. 
Given this paradox the question which was researched for this thesis was, can method for 
addresing the issue of patent holdup be found which would prevent patent holdup, while at the 
same time allowing intellectual property owners to charge royalties are equivalent to the value 
that their properties provide to a technological product. As could be expected this research 
initially began with review of alternative solutions which were anticipated in the works of 
existing legal scholarship on intellectual property rights, including the solution proposed by 
Lemley and Shapiro. However, as none of these solutions appeared to provide a practical or 
equitable solution, it was expanded to other fields of law where similar property ownership 
structures could be observed. More specifically this research was focused on finding out how 
property rights were treated when there existed multiple owners of what could be considered 
an inherently integrated single property. This research resulted in a discover of the "correlative 
rights doctrine" which was applied in both Californian groundwater law and U.S. oil and gas law.  
In essence this correlated rights doctrine can be considered the legal embodiment of the 
equitable principle of proportionality, which has been previously advocated from a normative 
prospective by other legal scholars,23 and as mentioned earlier can be defined as follows:  
'When multiple parties have individual property claims on an inherently integrated 
property each is legally entitled to their proportional share of the total value of that 
property and the law should protect that share from being appropriated by others, 
including other owners and users.' 
After researching how this doctrine was applied in those two bodies of law, it was recognised 
that it could be equally applicable in intellectual property law, when multiple intellectual 
property owners contribute their properties to a single integrated technological product. This 
discovery of this doctrine and the recognition that it could achieve the desire equitable result in 
intellectual property law provided a clear objective or problem to be addressed by the thesis. 
That objective was to provide an academically convincing argument for the application of the 
correlated rights doctrine in intellectual property law. 
What makes this thesis different from a normative work is that by identifying an actual 
doctrine which has been used in other bodies of law, the discussion can be moved from one that 
describes what the law ought to be, to one which focuses the potential application of a 
functioning foundational principle. Thus, providing a new legal foundation which is much harder 
to be dismissed, than is the case with respect to a purely normative argument.24  
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3. Anticipated Legal Remedies  
Given the early and widely acknowledge acceptance of the "patent holdup" problem, it is 
entirely understandable the proposed legal remedies to intellectual property problems would 
focus on tactics for preventing patent trolls from coercing users to pay excessive licensing fees. 
Indeed, when the work on this thesis was commenced that was the initial focus of the analysis, 
with an anticipation that if that first problem could be solved, the courts would no longer 
tolerate patent holdout; the scope of which was not fully recognised. For the most part these 
anticipated legal remedies to patent holdup were promoting the following five options: an 
application of the essential facilities doctrine, expanding the concept of patent abuse, 
compulsory patent pooling, and fair reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) enforcement 
and changing the definition of intellectual property rights. An explanation of each of these 
options and the reasons they were not pursued is provide as follows. 
3.1 The Essential Facilities Doctrine 
The basic premise of an essential facility doctrine is that where access to a facility is which is 
needed to compete in market is unreasonably withheld for anticompetitive reasons, the courts 
may oblige the owner of the facility to grant access. The proposition that this might provide legal 
remedy the problem of patent holdup, was suggested and scorned in a variety of legal articles.25 
The primary objection being it represented a direct contradiction to the general principles that 
a firm has no obligation to deal with its competitors and is the very opposite of exclusive 
intellectual property rights which give the IP holders the right to exclude others from making, 
using, offering for sale, or selling their invention without authorization.  
The doctrine itself has its origins in the U.S., in particular in section 2 of the Sherman Act 
which prohibits monopolization or attempts to monopolize. One of the first and likely most well 
know case involving a facility found to be essential was the Supreme Court’s 1912 Terminal 
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Railroad decision.26 In this case a group of railroad companies formed an Association which 
controlled all railway bridges and switching yards into and out of St. Louis. The Terminal Railroad 
Association contract ensured that only those companies belonging to the associations were 
allowed to use the facilities, unless there was a unanimous vote allowing the use of a non-
member. The next closest point to cross the Mississippi River was some 250 miles downstream 
giving the Association a huge economic and business advantage over its competitors. The 
Supreme Court held that the combined ownership of all the facilities violated the Sherman Act 
prohibition on monopolization, however rather than losing the operating efficiencies by 
breaking up the Association, it ordered the Association to provide access to its facilities to non-
members on the same terms as it did to members. 
Another Supreme Court decision associated with the development of the Essential Facilities 
Doctrine is the Associated Press case.27 That case involved a news cooperative whose 
membership included approximately 1,200 daily papers. Members gathered and shared news 
from their staff with the other members providing significant economies of scale in reporting. 
The problem with this arrangement was that Associated Press’s bylaws prohibited members 
from selling news to anyone other than members and gave members the veto on membership 
applications from non-members.28 The Supreme Court found that the Associated Press bylaws 
violated the Sherman Act by restricting membership and withholding use of its copyrighted but 
essential news service, because competitors could not reasonably operate without having 
access to it.  
While both Terminal Railroads and Associated Press involved concerted group activities the 
Otter Tail Power case did not.29 In Otter Tail the defendant was a power generator that also had 
sole control of the electrical grid in its region and was refusing to distribute or wheel electricity 
to a municipality from a third-party power generator. This unilateral action was found by the 
Supreme Court to be in violation of the Sherman Act because it “used its monopoly power in the 
towns in its service area to foreclose competition or gain a competitive advantage, or to destroy 
a competitor all in violation of anti-trust laws”30. To remedy the situation the Court ordered 
Otter Tail to wheel third party power on their grid, however it left the terms of access, to 
regulatory authorities. 
While these and other essential facility based decisions have revolved around the essential 
nature of the facility, it has also been applied to facilities that may not be absolutely essential. 
In Lorain Journal it found that a local newspaper violated the Sherman Act by refusing to accept 
advertising from companies that advertised with the local radio station.31 In Aspen Highlands 
Skiing Corp the Tenth Circuit Court of appeal applied the essential facilities doctrine in to a ski 
resort’s decision to eliminate a competitor from a long standing “multi-area” ski pass.32 The pass 
gave skiers the flexibility to visit, on a discounted pass, any of three resorts owned by the 
defendant as well as the one owed by the competitor. The court described the “multi-area” ski 
pass as an essential facility because without it, its main competitor may be forced out of 
business. The Supreme Court upheld the finding of antitrust liability for refusal to deal but 
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characterised the determination under the more general rules of the Sherman Act and 
emphasising the lack of a commercial justification for not dealing.33  
Subsequent to these cases the Supreme Court had regularly applied the Essential Facility 
Doctrine usually without ever explicitly acknowledging it. In fact, the first time that the term was 
used by the Supreme Court was in 1999 in an AT&T case.34  
While it appeared that the essential facility doctrine was becoming a reliable doctrine, all 
that changed in the Trinko.35 In Trinko, the question was to what extent is an incumbent 
monopolist in the telecommunications market, required to provide access to its networks to a 
new entrant. Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Verizon was supposed to share its 
network with its competitors. It was also obliged to grant competitors access to its operating 
support system which they needed in order to fill their customer orders. In 1999 many 
competitors complained to the FFC and the New York Public Service Commission that Verizon 
were not meeting their obligations under the Act, because many of their orders were not being 
filled. After an investigation Verizon entered into a consent under which it paid substantial fines 
and agreed to fill the orders. After entering into the consent decree, the Law Offices of Curtis V. 
Trinko filed a complaint on behalf of competitor customers claiming that Verizon was only filling 
rival orders after if it had filled those for its own local phone network costumers and this was 
intended to discourage customers from becoming customers of a competitive local exchange 
carrier. The firm sought damages and injunctive relief under section 2 of the Sherman Act, 
suggesting that Verizon was monopolize or attempt to monopolize the local phone network.  
The Supreme Court analysed Trinko under classical anti-trust concepts but ruled somewhat 
differently from previous cases. Referring to Grinnell Corp36 it pointed out that it is settled law 
that this offence requires not only the possession of monopoly power; but a wilful effort to 
maintain that monopoly, as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of 
superior product, business acumen, or historical accident. It then went on to explain that the 
Court did not view the possession of a monopoly created by establishing an infrastructure that 
is uniquely suited to customers as unlawful, but rather an important element of the free market 
system. The ruling went on to discuss the difficulties that arise when firms are compelled to 
provide access to their infrastructure to competitors. First forcing firms to their facilities might 
lessen the incentive to invest in new facilities. Second compelling access requires the courts to 
assume the role of central planner and identify the price and terms of the compelled access. A 
role the Court is not best suited to perform. And third forming a relationship between one or 
two companies could result in horizontal collusion a per se violation of the Sherman Act. Based 
on these criteria the court reaffirmed the general principle that 'the Sherman Act does not 
restrict the long-recognised right of a trader or manufacturer to engaged in an entirely private 
business, freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will 
deal'37. In the view of the Court the key aspect missing from this case was clear anticompetitive 
malice. The undemanding test for determining the lack of malice in the case was the proposition 
that because Verizon’s facility sharing was compulsory it 'shed no light on what motivated its 
refusal to deal-upon whether its regulatory lapses were prompted not by competitive zeal but 
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by anticompetitive malice.'38 This proof of malice requirement significantly increases the burden 
of proof on the plaintive. Whereas previously it was sufficient to show an unjustified anti-
competitive effect, the Trinko ruling now obliges plaintive to prove of actual anti-competitive 
intent. 
With regards to the essential facility doctrine the Court said that although they have never 
recognized the doctrine, they refused to either adopt or repudiate it. Instead the Court stated 
that even if the doctrine were viable it would not apply to the case because access is available 
as a result of regulatory mandated measures and an indispensable part of the doctrine is denial 
of access. Specifically, they suggest that where a state or federal agency has the effective power 
to compel sharing essential facilities, claims should be denied. The rationale behind this view 
appears to be that the courts cannot add any value to a process that is already subject to 
alternative regulation. A rather peculiar view considering that the justice system is specifically 
mandated to act as a check or balance on the legislative and executive offices. 
The effect of Trinko on the essential facility doctrine cannot be denied and are not likely to 
be over turned, as all nine Supreme Court Justices either joined or concurred with the ruling. 
While the ruling did not repudiate the doctrine, it certainly weakened it by increasing the hurdles 
that had to be overcome to successful win a case. Prior to Trinko an essential facility claim had 
to prove: '(1) the control of the essential facility by a monopolist; (2) a competitor’s inability to 
practically or reasonably to duplicate the essential facility (3) the denial of the use of the facility 
to the competitor; and (4) the feasibility of providing the facility to competition.'39 Trinko first of 
all eliminated the possibility of a claim in a regulated industry; where a regulatory authority has 
the power to force involuntary access. Second it puts the burden of proof on the plaintive to 
show that the facility owner intent in taking exclusive actions, where for the sole purpose of 
monopolising or attempting to monopolize. Given that most exclusive actions have both a 
current and long-term benefit to the facility holder this represents a rather difficult, if not 
insurmountable, obstacle to a successful essential facility action in the U.S. courts.  
In Europe the essential facilities doctrine flows from the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) 
development of the general duty to deal. This stands in stark contrast to the American principals 
but has been pursued mainly in order to open up the internal markets of EU members to 
competition from competitors located in other EU members states which was the main rational 
for the establishment of the European Community. 
Like in the U.S.; the first de facto applications of the essential facilities doctrine began with 
cases involving refusal to supply. One of the first and most prominent of these was Commercial 
Solvents.40 Commercial solvents was the dominate supplier of certain chemicals used in the 
production of anti-tuberculosis drugs. It decided to commence manufacturing of the drugs itself 
and subsequently refused to supply a former customer, now a competitor, with the necessary 
chemicals. The competitor was unable to secure the necessary chemical from any other source 
and as such Commercial Solvents was eliminating competition in a downstream market as a 
result of withholding its product from the market. The ECJ found that such behaviour was 
unlawful as it represented an abuse of its dominate position, within the meaning of the Article 
82 of the European Union Treaty.  
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Four year later in United Brands41 the de facto essential facilities doctrine was reiterated in 
another finding of abuse of a dominate position, even though there were alternative suppliers. 
In that case United Brands refused to supply banana ripeners/distributors with bananas, 
because they had begun promoting rival brands. This is important decision because it broadened 
that scope of the de facto essential facilities doctrine from something to prevent 
monopolization, to one which could be used against a general refusal to deal. 
The actual essential facilities doctrine was first enunciated by the Competition Commission 
in B&I Line Plc v Seallink Harbours.42 This case concerned a port, and the business practices used 
by the port manager to restrict competition for the benefit of its own shipping operations from 
the port. In it Sealink had modified the sailing schedule of its own ferry operations to interfere 
with the loading and unloading operation of its competitor B&I Holdings which also ran ferries 
out of the port. In its decision the Commission held that providing access to B&I Holdings on less 
favourable terms to than it did to its own service was in breach of Article 82. It also for the first 
time defined an essential facility as “a facility or infrastructure without access to which 
competitors cannot provide service to their customers”.43 In a similar case the Commission 
imposed interim measures against Sealink forcing it to provide reasonable, non-discriminatory 
access to the port to Sea Containers which wanted to introduce a new ferry service.44 It is worth 
noting that in both cases there was not an absolute refusal of access, but rather unfair access 
conditions which triggered the actions, and that the essential facility argument could be used 
for both existing and new entrants. 
While there are several essential facilities cases45 (refusal to deal) in EU Law which 
demonstrated promise in terms of pursuing a solution to patent holdup using an application of 
the essential facilities doctrine, included in the cases which were reviewed was one case which 
led to the decision to abandon that pursuit. That case was the 2007 decision which upheld a 
competition decision involving the anti-competitive practices by Microsoft. 46 
The competition decision upheld in that case can be represented as an extension of an earlier 
investigations of Microsoft's licensing practices. This earlier investigation, which was done in 
conjunction with the U.S. Anti-trust authorities. It focused on Microsoft's practice of requiring 
computer manufactures to obtain a license for using their operating system on all the computers 
they manufactured, regardless of whether they actually used the system on all the computers 
that the manufactured. The complaint was filed by Novell, who argued that because 
manufactures were being forced to purchase Microsoft licenses for all computers, this unfairly 
restricted the market for their operating system. Before the Commission opened formal 
proceeding, Microsoft provided undertakings to both the US and European competition 
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authorities which was intended to resolve the dispute.47 In that undertaking Microsoft 
committed to; not enter into licence contracts with a duration of more than one year, not 
impose minimum commitments licensees and not to use per processor clauses any longer.48 
Despite this earlier investigation of their licensing practices, three years later Microsoft once 
again came under investigation be the Competition Commission, when Sun Microsystems filed 
a complaint alleging that Microsoft was continuing to abuse of its dominate position by was 
refusing to supply it with interoperability information necessary to make their software 
compatible with Microsoft's operating system. In February of 2000 the Commission launched an 
investigation into this complaint, which was expanded from simply examining the lack of 
interoperability, to also investing the bundling of Windows Media Player with their operating 
system. 49  
Four years later the Commission finally issued its decision.50 In that decision the Commission 
found that Microsoft behaviour represented two separate abuses. The first abuse related to its 
failure to supply its competitors with interoperability information. Finding that 'Microsoft's 
refusal to supply has the consequence of stifling innovation in the impacted market and of 
diminishing consumers choices by locking them into a homogeneous Microsoft solution,'51 and 
therefore violated article 82 of the Treaty.52 The second abuse related to the tying of its media 
player with its operation system. This was considered an abuse as 'tying of WMP allows 
Microsoft to anti-competitively expand its position in adjacent media-related software markets 
and weaken effective competition to the eventual detriment of consumers.'53 Given this abusive 
behaviour the Commission ordered Microsoft of provide the its competitors with the 
interoperability information they need on a timely basis and to provide their operation system 
without the inclusion of the medial player, in addition to imposing a EUR 497.2 million fine. 
Two months after the decision was made Microsoft indicated it intended to comply with the 
decision, stating that it would make available intellectual property licenses to its protocol 
technology on FRAND terms. The next month they appealed the to the EU Court of First instance 
to annul the Decision and to suspend the penalty imposed on them by the Commission. 
Eventually in 2007 Microsoft lost its appeal, the EUR 497 million fine was upheld, as were the 
requirements to provide interoperability information and unbundling of the media player. 54  
It is only after this decision that Microsoft fully complied with the earlier Commission decision 
and the lack of compliance led to an additional EUR 899 million fine by the Commission. 
Although Microsoft appealed against this additional fine, it too was upheld in 2012.  
Although the anti-competitive behaviour of Microsoft was eventually curtailed by these 
proceedings, there were several aspects of this case that led to the decision to abandon pursing 
an application of the essential facilities doctrine to solve the problems of patent holdup and 
patent holdout.  
                                                          
47 Commission Press Release, FOLLOWING AN UNDERTAKING BY MICROSOFTTO CHANGE ITS LICENSING PRACTICES, 
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION SUSPENDS ITS ACTION FOR BREACH OF THE COMPETITIONRULES. (July 16, 1994) 
48 Id. 
49 Comp/C-3/37.792  
50 Commission Decision C (2004) 900 (24.03.2004) 
51 Id. [782] 
52 Id. [784] 
53 Id. [982] 






The first aspect was that the time and effort which was required to use these procedures to 
address the problem. If one just looks at the time it took from when Sun Microsystems filed the 
complaint to when the court up held the decision, it took ten years. If one counts the time from 
the earlier investigation of Microsoft's licensing practices till the final decision, it was almost 
twenty years. Obviously, any solution that requires ten to twenty years to resolve must be 
considered justice severely delayed, if not denied. 
The second was the reliance that the injured party had to put on the competition authorities. 
While the Commission did eventually decide to investigate Sun Microsystems' complaint, it took 
them three years before they announced a decision to do so, which would suggest that they 
could just as easily have decided not to do so.  
The third was the fact that the decision did not compensate Sun Microsystems or Real Player 
for the abusive behaviour that they had endured. The fines being imposed the Commission going 
to the EU.  
The fourth there was the issue of effectiveness of the decision. While Microsoft did 
eventually comply with the decision, that compliance was to a certain extent contrived and did 
not fully comply with the intent of the decision. As part of complying with the order to provide 
interoperability information, Microsoft charged a royalty to the competitors for using their 
intellectual property. Which would be reasonable, except that the competitors complained the 
royalty rates charged were excessive and therefore defeated the purpose.55 In compliance with 
the order to unbundle the media player, Microsoft began selling their operating system without 
their media player, however they continued to sell the same system with the medial player for 
nearly the same price as the standalone operating system. As could be anticipated few 
consumers choose to buy the unbundled operating system.56 This lack of effectiveness led to the 
conclusion that regardless of how dedicated and efficient a government regulatory authority 
was to ensure competitive markets, private entrepreneurs would always seek and often find 
ways around their regulations.  
The fifth was that it was hard to see how the Commission could possibly acquire and provide 
the resources which would be needed resolve thousands of individual intellectual property 
disputes if it could not issue 'per se' regulations and had to look at each case according to the 
"rule of reason".  
Finally, it appeared that the competition authorities had yet resolve how to define 
reasonable royalties or even the right criteria for that definition, which mean they could not 
solve the underlying problem which led to patent holdup and patent holdout.   
As such this case, in conjunction with the American Supreme Court's decidedly unfriendly 
view on the potential application of the essential facilities doctrine, led not only to a search for 
another solution, but a search for another solution outside the confines of competition law.  
3.2 Patent Misuse 
While it could be assumed that the most obvious body of law to search for a solution to 
patent holdup and patent holdout would be patent law, the fact that these problems arose in 
that body of law would appear to indicate that there were no clear answers to problems 
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available in its current configuration and interpretation. That said, the doctrine of patent misuse 
in patent law, certainly could have the potential of resolving the problem of patent holdup, 
assuming the definition of patent abuse can be expanded to include the act of demanding 
excessive licensing royalties by threatening to seek injunctive relief. The possibility has been 
considered in number of articles focused on finding solutions to the patent holdup problem. 57. 
To understand why the definition of patent abuse needed to be expanded to use patent 
misuse as a solution, it needs to be understood that patent misuse is an affirmative defence 
which can be used only as a shield against patent abuse. Which is to suggest that it can only be 
invoked, after a claim of patent abuse has been made. As such if the definition of patent abuse 
does not include the act of demanding excessive royalties based on the threat of seeking 
injunctive relief, it cannot be used. 
The doctrine of patent misuse was established by a series of the US supreme Court cases. 
The first of which was the 1917 case of Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film 
Manufacturing Corp.58 In that case Court was asked to decide whether the patentee could 
include licensing conditions which stated that their projectors only be used with their films. The 
Court determined that these terms were invalid because:  
'a film is obviously not any part of the invention of the patent in suit; because it is 
an attempt, without statutory warrant, to continue the patent monopoly in this 
particular character of film after it has expired, and because to enforce it would be to 
create a monopoly in the manufacture and use of moving picture films, wholly outside 
of the patent in suit and of the patent law as we have interpreted it.'59 
The next case in the series was Carbice Corp. of America v. American Patents Development 
Corp60 In it the Court held that an owner of a patent on refrigerated transportation could not 
use that patent to force licensees to purchase ice from them. In a third case Morton Salt Co. v. 
G.S. Suppiger Co.,61 the owner of a patent for a machine which was used to add salt to cans, was 
held to be abusing their patent by forcing the licensee to purchase salt exclusively from them. 
Taken together these cases established the first rule of patent abuse, for which a defence of 
patent misuse could be utilised. The basic rule being that they could not use their patents force 
the purchase of other products as this would allow them 'to acquire a monopoly not embraced 
in the patent'62  
A similar logic was evident in the second rule of patent abuse, for which a defence of patent 
misuse could be utilised. That rule was established in the 1964 case of Brulotte v. Thys Co.,63 
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where in the patentee was found to be requiring licensing terms which would by contract de 
facto extend the life of his patent protection. In that case the Court stated that while a patent,  
'empowers the owner to exact royalties as high as he can negotiate with the 
leverage of that monopoly. But to use that leverage to project those royalty payments 
beyond the life of the patent is analogous to an effort to enlarge the monopoly of the 
patent by tying the sale or use of the patented article to the purchase or use of 
unpatented ones.'64 
While these two Supreme Court rules focused on patent misuse whenever patentee were 
attempting to broaden the physical or temporal scope of the patent grant, other forms of patent 
abuse which could be defended with a claim of patent misuse, were identified by courts of 
appeal and the competition authorities. These included; tying one patent to another, where the 
tying patent has market power,65 prohibiting a licensee from making a competitive product,66 
and demanding the veto power over subsequent licenses the licensee may want to conclude.67  
This broadening of the use had a parallel in broadening of the definition of the anti-trust 
violations during the same time period. Indeed, it could be argued that; the broadening was a 
direct result of the broadening of antitrust violations, as patent abuse was becoming more and 
more a patent based law for defining anti-competitive behaviour of patent owners. As such it 
was hardly surprisingly that when the anti-trust laws were so successfully eviscerated by Robert 
Bork in the Anti-Trust Paradox68 that it also had an impact on the application of the patent 
misuse doctrine.  
Two years after the publication of The Anti-Trust Paradox in what would appear to a major 
reversal of direction the Supreme court introduced the first major limitation on the application 
of the patent misuse doctrine in Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co.69 To understand the 
case a quick mention must be made of a previous case of Monsanto Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co..70 
In that case Rohm & Haas successfully challenged to validity of Monsanto's patent on a herbicide 
called Propanil by proving that Monsanto had deceived the patent office when applying for the 
patent. This meant the Propanil became an unpatented product which chemical companies 
were free to manufacture and sell without the need of licence, which contributed to a rapid use. 
Somewhat surprisingly in 1974, Rohm & Haas were granted a process patent for the application 
of Propanil. The Abstract of that patent reading as follows: 
'Disclosed is a method for selectively inhibiting growth of undesirable plants in an area 
containing growing undesirable plants in an established crop, which com prises 
applying to said area 3,4~dichloropropionanilide at a rate of application which inhibits 
growth of said undesirable plants and which does not adversely affect the growth of 
said established crop.'71  
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Rohm & Haas exploited this the process patent by manufacturing Propanil and selling it to 
farmers. It did not license the patent to the farmers, but they acquire an implied license to 
practice the process when they bought the Propanil from Rohm & Haas. Rohm & Haas also did 
not license the patent to other manufacturers like Dawson, which had been making and selling 
Propanil to farmers before Rohm & Haas received their process patent. Rohm & Haas sued 
Dawson for contributory infringement and active inducement of infringement, Dawson raised a 
defence of patent misuse, claiming that there had been misuse because Rohm & Haas had "tied" 
the sale of patent rights to the purchase of Propanil. Why Dawson did not pursue their own 
invalidity claim based on previous art regarding the application of Propanil is not known. 
In deciding the case the Supreme Court held that the 'Respondent has not engaged in patent 
misuse, either by its method of selling Propanil or by its refusal to license others to sell that 
commodity.'72 Essentially what this meant was the market for Propanil which was previously 
competitive immediate became a monopoly held by Rohm & Haas. This directly contradiction 
earlier decisions which had held that attempting to monopolize an unpatented market by tying 
it to a patented product was an abuse of patent rights. Not only did this decision stand, it was 
codified by Congress in 1988 when it enacted additional limitation on the use of patent misuse 
in section 271 (d) of the Patent Act, by adding two additional exemptions (4) and (5) such that 
the section read as follows: 
'No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or contributory 
infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse or illegal 
extension of the patent right by reason of his having done one or more of the following: 
(1) derived revenue from acts which if performed by another without his consent 
would constitute contributory infringement of the patent; (2) licensed or authorized 
another to perform acts which if performed without his consent would constitute 
contributory infringement of the patent; (3) sought to enforce his patent rights against 
infringement or contributory infringement; (4) refused to license or use any rights to 
the patent; or (5) conditioned the license of any rights to the patent or the sale of the 
patented product on the acquisition of a license to rights in another patent or purchase 
of a separate product, unless, in view of the circumstances, the patent owner has 
market power in the relevant market for the patent or patented product on which the 
license or sale is conditioned.'73  
Further limitations on the use of patent misuse were to follow. In C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., 
Inc., 74 the appeals court ruled that ' Although the defence of patent misuse evolved to protect 
against ‘wrongful’ use of patents, the catalogue of practices labelled ‘patent misuse’ does not 
include a general notion of ‘wrongful’ use.'75 In Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc76 the US 
Appeals Courts exempted conditional terms imposed during the period of patent protection 
from a claim of patent abuse that relate specifically to the use of the patented product.  
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But perhaps the case which most clearly illustrated the limitation being put on the doctrine 
was the 2010 en banc decision in Princo Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n.77 The case itself was the 
last in a series of three appellate decisions of an initial ITC decision78, the first two being the 
Philips v. ITC,79 and the Princo v. Int'l Trade Comm'n panel decision.80 In the initial ITC case Phillips 
filed suit at the ITC alleging that Princo was infringing their patented laser disc technology and 
was seeking an order preventing them from continuing to import the infringed products. A 
notable difference between this case and other infringement cases were that the allegedly 
infringed patents were part of a patent pool which included patents from Phillips, Sony, Ricoh 
and Taiyo Yuden. While Princo initially was paying royalties to the patent pool, when they ceased 
paying, Phillips brought suit.  
Part of Princo's defence in this action involved an asserting of patent misuse. This misuse was 
based on the notion that because licenses from the patent pool included licenses for all the 
patents in the pool, the pool was effectively tying essential and non-essential licenses together 
and forcing them to buy the bundled package. Specifically, Princo alleged that because Philips 
was not willing to license their patent individually it was abusing its patent rights. In their 
decision the ITC held that Phillip's patents were unenforceable because Phillip's package 
licensing was a per se patent misuse. 
Phillips appealed the ITC decision and in Philips v. ITC the Federal Circuit Court reversed, 
holding that the package license must be analysed under the rule of reason and could not be a 
per se decision. They further found that because the package of licenses did not require the 
licensee to use all the licenses in the package and they were free to use other intellectual 
properties which competed with the properties in the package, it was not an effort to exploit 
market power.81 The abuse of market power being the issue which supposedly provided for a 
patent misuse defence. Of particular note in this decision was the propositions that; 'A package 
license is in effect a promise by the patentee not to sue his customer for infringing any patents 
on whatever technology the customer employs in making commercial use of the licensed 
patent'82 and that the rights the patentee include the right to 'charge whatever maximum 
amount a willing licensee is able to pay to practice the technology in question.'83 On remand 
that ITC reversed its decision on patent misuse.  
It was Princo's appeal of this decision which was considered in the Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade 
Comm’n panel decision. In a unanimous decision the panel rejected Princo's theory of patent 
misuse based on the inclusion of non-essential patents in the licenses package, but in a split 
decision they held that; the lack of an ability to independently license a potentially competitive 
intellectual property which was included in the package, could provide a patent misuse defence. 
Stating that 'It is one thing to offer a pooled license to competing technologies; it is quite another 
to refuse to license the competing technologies on any other basis.'84 
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After this first appeals court’s decision Phillip, Princo and the ITC filed for an enbanc rehearing 
in which the court agreed to rule only on if an alleged agreement between Phillips and Sony to 
suppress the potential competitive intellectual property rose to the level of misuse as portrayed 
in the second part of panel decision. By unanimous decision the full Federal Circuit vacated and 
reversed that part of the panel decision which supported the defence of patent misuse. To do 
so the court narrowly construed the misuse defence, explaining that patent misuse is a 'judge-
made doctrine that is in derogation of statutory patent rights against infringement, and noted 
the court had not applied the doctrine 'expansively.'85 That patent misuse could only be used to 
defend against "patent leverage" whereby the patent owner uses its "patent power" to impose 
conditions on the use of the patent in suit that are 'not within the reach of the monopoly granted 
by the government.'86 As part of this limitation for the court expanded the earlier freedom to 
engage in wrongful conduct by stated that, 'While proof of an antitrust violation shows that the 
patentee has committed wrongful conduct having anticompetitive effects, that does not 
establish misuse of the patent in suit unless the conduct in question restricts the use of that 
patent and does so in one of the specific ways that have been held to be outside the otherwise 
broad scope of the patent grant.'87 This statement effectively separated patent misuse decisions 
from anti-trust decisions. Suggesting that while withholding the patent might be a breach of 
antitrust laws, it was within the reach of the patent monopoly granted by the government.  
While this decision led many scholars to speculate on the death and decline of the patent 
misuse doctrine,88 the reason why this decision resulted in abandoning patent misuse to solve 
the problem of patent holdup were not quite so dramatic. In fact, the reason was a result of two 
specific comments mentioned in the Phillips v. ITC decision. The first being that 'A package 
license is in effect a promise by the patentee not to sue his customer for infringing any patents 
on whatever technology the customer employs in making commercial use of the licensed 
patent'89 and second being that that a patent owner had the right to 'charge whatever maximum 
amount a willing licensee is able to pay to practice the technology in question.'90 
The problem with the first comment as it relates to avoiding patent holdup is that; if the value 
of a patent is provided only by "the promise not to sue" than every patent has the same value, 
and owner of a single patent can assert the same value as the owner of a multitude of patents 
when they are integrated into a common technological product. After all the cost of having an 
injunction order barring a product from the market does not change regardless of how good a 
patent is or whether one or more intellectual properties are infringed. In essence this statement 
represents a "patent troll's charter" as it facilitates rather than limits patent holdup. The second 
statement was equally troublesome as potential licensees are willing to pay holdup prices to 
avoid injunctive relief. 
Obviously to overcome these propositions the doctrine of patent misuse would have to be 
significantly expanded, and the statutory rules would likely have to be rewritten. It was hard to 
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see how that would be possible, particularly considering the entrenched ideological positions 
against antitrust laws which were evident in the ruling. 
3.3 FRAND Enforcement 
The next body of law which was examined was contract law.91 This body was examined 
because of the FRAND licensing commitments to standard setting organizations (SSO's) are 
suggested to establish some form of contract. Assuming that the FRAND commitment establish 
some form of implied agreement,92 the crucial question which must be addressed is what do the 
individual terms; fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory mean. Clearly without a defined 
meaning, which there is not,93 court ordered enforcement of FRAND commitments will provide 
different outcomes, depending on what which definition is used. While this may not be a 
problem if there were only minor differences between the definitions, it becomes a major issue 
if there are huge variation in the definitions used by various jurisdictions or the courts in those 
jurisdictions. As such the possibility of using FRAND enforcement as a solution to patent holdup 
and patent holdout, will depend on the extent of the differences in the definition, the most 
critical definition being the definition of "reasonable". If the range of differences are small it 
could be a feasible solution, if it is large it is not.  
As to the range of differences, clearly there are legal argument which have be used support 
both the lowest and highest possible estimates of what would be reasonable. With respect to 
the lowest possible definition, the argument which would appear to be the most applicable 
would be the one provided by Lemley and Shapiro in their highly cited paper on Patent Holdup 
and Royalty Stacking.94 The higher range argument becoming evident as a consequence of 
adopting the propositions defined in the Phillips v. ITC case. 
Because Lemley and Shapiro's interpretation of the appropriate FRAND royalty rate will be 
thoroughly analysed below, at this point it will suffice to indicate that their analysis defined a 
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benchmark rate for intellectual property which equivalent to 12% to 20% of the value which an 
intellectual property provides to a technological product.95 Given the attention that this paper 
has received it would appear fair to suggest that any number of users would like to see this 20% 
of value contributed by the intellectual property be defined as a reasonable royalty rate. Thus, 
for the purposes of determining whether FRAND enforcement provides a solution this will be 
used as the bottom range of any potential variation in the definition of "reasonable". 
With respect to a definition of the higher end of the reasonable range definition we return 
to the proposition included in Phillip v. ITC. It should be recalled that those propositions were, 
1) a licensing agreement was merely a promise not to sue, and 2) that patent owners had the 
right to charge whatever maximum amount a licensee is able to pay. Using these propositions 
as a criterion to determine a reasonable the calculations would be as follows.  
The value of the patent is not determined by the actual value contributed to the technological 
product by the intellectual property, but rather by the cost which associated with foreclosure 
from the market. For the purposes of this example that cost will be discounted by a factor which 
considers the number of owners which have contributed intellectual property to the 
technological product. The assumption being that if there ten contributors all of which must 
make a promise not to sue, one contributor should reasonably only be allowed to have one tenth 
of that calculated value or ten percent of annual profits of the infringer. 
Attempting to compare this definition of reasonable royalties with those used by Lemley and 
Shapiro requires two additional calculation. First it must be assumed that the annual profits of 
an infringer are not only made up of the value attributed to the intellectual properties used, but 
also by the manufactures normal operating profits including marketing skills. Assuming that half 
of the profits are normal operating profits, this would suggest that this method of calculating 
reasonable royalties would mark up the value provided by the intellectual property by a factor 
of two. A further mark-up would also be required if the owner provided a lower pro-rata share 
of intellectual properties than the other owners. So, for example if the owner's single property 
was only one of one hundred patents used in the technological product and there were ten 
owners who contributed that multiplier would be ten. Taken together these two multipliers 
would indicate that using the Phillip's v. ITC propositions could easily result in a reasonable 
royalty valuation which was twenty times more than the actual value contributed by the 
intellectual property.  
If this mark-up appears high consider that fact that the five patents owned by NTP in the NTP 
v. Research in Motion case represented less than one tenth of one percent of the total patents 
used by Research in Motion to make their Blackberry phones.96 Yet the case resulted in Research 
in Motion having to pay NTP around 85% of their profits, which would be equivalent to about 
1700 times the value which NTP's patents contributed,97 (which is translates into 170,00% of the 
actual value contributed). 
Using these two calculations it would appear that the definition of reasonable royalties is 
anywhere from 12% to 2000% of the actual value contributed by an intellectual property. Given 
this difference it is easy to understand why a solution involving FRAND enforcement was not 
pursued, as the gap between the lowest and highest definition appeared to be unbridgeable. 
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Jumping ahead a little it can be mentioned that the for the purpose applying the correlated 
rights doctrine it is assumed that a "reasonable royalty" directly corresponds to the value that 
the intellectual property contributes to the technological product, with no discounts or mark 
ups. 
3.4 Patent Pools 
The next anticipated solution which was considered was the possibility of using patent pools 
to prevent both patent holdup and patent holdout. Although this solution had been anticipated 
in a number of works98 it was quickly abandoned because of a perception that it would be either 
too utopian or too authoritarian.  
The perception that it would be too utopian was based on the presumption that a voluntary 
patent pool would not be possible, as it would be impossible to get intellectual property owners 
to voluntarily agree on reasonable royalties for each of their intellectual property contributions 
to an integrated technological product. It should be noted that if such a system was possible, 
the problems of patent holdup and patent holdout would not exist, as both owners and users 
would be willing to charge and pay reasonable royalty rates calculated according to a universally 
excepted valuation method.  
The perception that it would be too authoritarian was based on the presumption that the 
only way to structure a patent pool which included all the necessary patents required for an 
integrated technological product, would be if it was a compulsory patent pool. However, a 
compulsory patent pool would by its very nature take away the right of intellectual property 
owners to control their properties and transfer their control to a centralized administrative 
body. Such a draconian measure would also be fraught with other difficulties, the most 
significant of which would be the manner in which that administrative body determines the 
value of the intellectual property rights under their control.  
Obviously if such a valuation would require the unanimous consent of all intellectual property 
owners who belong to the pool, it would be as unworkable as a voluntary pool. Alternatively, if 
patent users controlled the process or were able to veto any valuations it is almost inevitable 
that the administration would have to set royalty rates below the true value to the properties 
to get an agreement. If the pool participants are unable to agree on what constitutes a 
reasonable royalty, would the administrators of the pools simply dictate the terms or would 
there exist some sort of democratic voting mechanism? If it is an administrative decision how 
are the administers selected and what are the limits of their discretion? If there is a voting 
mechanism who gets to vote and what constitutes a majority vote? Can pool participants appeal 
to the courts if they rate consider the rates too high or too low? Will competition authorities in 
all the effected countries accept the decisions of the patent pool, if the courts are excluded?  
While it may be that questions like these can be resolved in a reasonable manner, the fact is 
that without a clear definition or at least some clear criteria for determining reasonable royalties 
the decisions are likely to be too arbitrary to provide a realistic solution.  
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3.5 Dramatically Redefining Intellectual Property Rights 
The final anticipated solution to patent holdup which was rejected, involved proposed 
changes in the application of intellectual property law which dramatically altered the definition 
of intellectual property rights. These efforts were proposed by Lemley and Shapiro in their 2007 
article: 'Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking'99. While there can be no question that the objective 
of this article was to eliminate the inequity of patent holdup, this approach was rejected because 
it was perceived as going far beyond what was needed to achieve that objective. It was perceived 
to go far beyond what was necessary because; not only did it help to eliminate patent holdup, 
it also provided technology equipment manufacturers with a method for justifying royalty 
payments to intellectual property owners which are 20% of the value provided by an intellectual 
property to the technological product. Unlike the appropriation experienced through patent 
holdup; this appropriation of the 80% of the value is not an unintended consequence resulting 
from the abuse of patent laws, but rather intentional appropriation sanctioned by the courts 
which adopt its recommendations. Assuming; that such an appropriation is as inequitable as 
appropriation resulting from patent holdup, clearly the concepts and conclusions of this article 
need to be thoroughly analysed and rebutted. To facilitate this analysis and rebuttal, the first 
part of this subsection will provide a summary of the concepts and conclusions provided by 
Lemley and Shapiro. This will be followed by a second subsection which will challenging both the 
validity of the concepts and the conclusions of the authors.  
3.5.1 Summary of Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking 
Any summary of the article must commence with a description of the five most significant 
assumptions included in in it. These are as follows: 1) infringement of intellectual property are 
primarily the result of accidental infringement, because technological manufacturers are 
typically unaware of the existence of the intellectual property,100 2) only 40% of patents are in 
fact valid,101 3) whenever patent owner charges a higher royalty this will increase manufacturing 
costs thereby reducing demand for the technological product,102 4) royalty stacking leads to 
aggregate royalty rates which would be above those which would be charged by an integrated 
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monopolist,103 and 5) paying the royalty equivalent to the value which a patent provides to a 
technological product will result in decreased margins of technological companies and may drive 
those margins to zero in which case the manufacturer would cease production of  the 
technological product.104  
Taken together what these assumptions provided a narrative in which: infringing technology 
manufactures are accidental victims, in situations where there are too many intellectual 
property owners, all of which are demanding excessive royalties for mostly invalid patents, that 
if paid would result in them exiting the market because their margins would be too low. In 
addition to these assumptions Lemley and Shapiro make two recommendations which enhance 
this narrative which can be described as follows: 1) it was counterproductive to negotiate with 
intellectual property owners before a property is incorporated into a technological product, as 
it would likely result in a royalty rate which is equivalent to the value provided by the intellectual 
property,105 and 2), if intellectual property owners are unwilling to licence their properties at 
royalties which represent a significant discount to the value that they provide to a technological 
product, technology manufacturers should rely on the courts to determine a reasonable royalty 
according to hypothetical negotiations.106 
It is likely that the first of these recommendations was included to mitigate against a 
conclusion that their hypothetical negotiation construct is dependent on an accidental 
infringement and would also be applicable for intentional infringements. Regardless of the 
intent, what is clear is that it is rooted in an overall assumption that intellectual property owners 
do not deserve to be paid a royalty which is equivalent to the value which their properties 
provide to a technological product. An overall assumption which guides the second 
recommendation and provides the methodology and justification for its hypothetical 
negotiation construct proposed by Lemley and Shapiro which is detrimental to the intellectual 
property owners. 
With respect to the actual method for calculating reasonable royalties, while included in the 
article are several economic variables which are suggested should be taken under consideration 
when engaging in hypothetical negotiations, there are only three that form the foundation for 
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how they should be calculated.107 The description of the economic variables which are included 
in this calculation being described in the article as follows: 
"• V: The Value per unit of the patented feature to the downstream firm in 
comparison with the next best alternative technology. For example, if the patented 
feature enhances the value of the product to consumers by $1 over the next best 
alternative, then V = $1. Similarly, if it reduces the cost of manufacturing the good by 
$1, then V = $1.  
• θ: The Strength of the patent, i.e., the probability that litigation will result in a 
finding that the patent is valid and infringed by the downstream firm’s product. 
Critically, we assume there is no way to determine with certainty whether the patent 
is valid and infringed without litigating to judgment. Therefore, it is not possible to take 
into account the value provided by the intellectual property for the downstream firm 
to fully resolve the uncertainty about validity and infringement before making its 
investment decisions. 
• B: The Bargaining skill of the patent holder, as measured by the fraction of the 
combined gains from settling, rather than litigating, that are captured by the patent 
holder. These variable falls between 0 and 1. Equal bargaining skill, B = 0.5, is a 
common assumption."108 
Using these variables, the article then constructs anticipated result of hypothetical 
negotiation which are as follows: 
"we first develop a benchmark level for the royalty rate, i.e., the royalty rate that 
would be reasonable and expected in the ideal patent system without any element of 
holdup. We illustrate our benchmark using a numerical example. Suppose that two 
firms have equal bargaining skill, so they split equally any gains from reaching an 
agreement. This corresponds to a value of B = 0.5. Suppose that a patented feature is 
worth V = $1 per unit to the downstream firm, compared with the best non-infringing 
alternative. If the patent were surely valid, and if holdup were not a factor in the 
negotiations, the two firms would split the gains of $1.00 per unit from using the 
patented technology, which would lead to a royalty rate of $0.50 per unit. More 
generally, the benchmark royalty rate for an ironclad patent is equal to B×V.  
We also consider this the proper benchmark for reasonable royalties, since 
reasonable royalties are meant to reflect the royalty rate that would be negotiated, 
prior to any infringement, if the patent were known to be valid. Because the royalty 
negotiations take place before a final court decision, the benchmark royalty rate must 
be discounted to reflect patent strength. To illustrate, suppose that there is a 40% 
chance that the patent will be found valid and infringed. Absent any holdup, the 
benchmark royalty rate would just be 40% of the value that would apply if the patent 
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were ironclad. In our numerical example above, the benchmark for an ironclad patent 
was $0.50 per unit, so the benchmark for the same patent with strength 40% equals 
$0.20 per unit.15 More generally, the benchmark royalty rate is given by θ × B×V, 
where θ is the patent strength."109 
It is this 20% of the value defined by V which is referred to earlier. What this construct 
suggests is that in the normal negotiations which would be replicated under a hypothetical 
negotiation, an intellectual property owner would agree to license its property to a technological 
manufacturer for 20% of the value that their property provides over the next best alternative. 
Which is to say if the use their property raises the sale value of technological product by $1, they 
should be satisfied with a $.20 royalty rate for that property, with the technology manufacturer 
capturing the additional $ .80 as profits.  
Somewhat surprisingly it is also suggested that this discount could be even greater, 
depending on the profits which the technological manufacture can earn on the next best 
alternative. This because according to the authors, the profit which can be made on the next 
best alternative should be deducted from the value that that intellectual property provides over 
that alternative.110 So using their example if the next best alternative provides the technological 
provider profit of $ .40, then the base value would be $ .60. This; like the earlier value of $ 1, 
would be subject to the same bargaining strengthen and validity discounts, thereby establishing 
a benchmark rate of $ .12. So, what this additional proposition suggests is that in the normal 
negotiations which would be replicated under a hypothetical negotiation, an intellectual 
property owner agree to license its property to a technological manufacturer for 12% of the 
value that their property provides over the next best alternative, and the technology 
manufacturer reaping 88% of that value.  
If the proposition that intellectual property owners only deserve royalties which represent 
12% of the value which their intellectual property provides appears a little extreme, it should be 
noted that this is in fact not far off what intellectual property providers now receive for their 
intellectual property in the field of mobile telecommunications. Recent reports on patent 
royalties as a percentage of mobile phone revenue indicate that the aggregate rate paid by 
mobile phone manufactures is around 3.3% of the price of a mobile phone.111 If that 3.3% were 
divided by 12% it would correspond to an aggregate value contribution from all the intellectual 
property incorporated in a mobile phone of 27.5% of the price of a mobile phone. To the extent 
that mobile phones are a relatively new technological product, and would not exist without 
recently patented intellectual property, it does not appear to be much of a stretch to suggest 
that the intellectual property included in mobile phone provides at least 27.5% of the value of a 
mobile phone. Another way to think about this is pose the question; if there was only one owner 
of all the intellectual properties incorporated in a mobile phone, and no one could manufacturer 
mobile phones without a license from them, what royalty would that owner charge technology 
manufacturers for the use of those intellectual properties? 
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3.5.2 Rebutting Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking 
One common response to Lemley and Shapiro's hypothetical negotiation constructs is a point 
of law which question the use of hypothetical negotiations as an appropriate solution for 
calculating reasonable royalties.112 This response is based upon the fact that there exists no 
statutory definition of reasonable royalties are to be calculated. The term itself is included in the 
U.S. codes as follows: 
'Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the claimant damages 
adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable 
royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer. ... When the damages are 
not found by a jury, the court shall assess them. ... The court may receive expert 
testimony as an aid to the determination of damages or of what royalty would be 
reasonable under the circumstances.'113 
As was pointed out in these responses, historically damages were based upon the actual 
damages, which were associated with either lost profits or lost established royalties.114 Lost 
profits representing the profits that an intellectual property owner would have earned on their 
own technological product "but for" the infringement, and lost established royalties 
representing a royalty payment that the owner can show they would have otherwise been able 
to charge "but for" the infringement.115 To prove lost profits the intellectual property owner 
must prove four facts: a) there was demand for the patented product, b) there was no non-
infringing alternative, c) the owner could have supplied that market demand, d) the profits could 
be reasonably estimated.116 To prove loss of established royalties the owner need shown that 
there existed an active licensing scheme which incorporated a standard rate.117 To the extent 
that both these damage calculations requires such specific facts for proof, they can be 
categorised as specific damages, which clearly indicate the level of compensation which is 
required to cover damages incurred from an unauthorised use. However, the level specificity 
needed to prove such claims meant that it is hard to achieve.118  
It was in an effort provide damages when actual damages were difficult to prove that the 
courts adopted reasonable royalties as a new basis for damages. This method of calculating 
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damages representing general rather than specific damages, which were codified in 1922.119 
Despite this codification the method for calculating reasonable royalties remained rather 
arbitrary until the Georgia Pacific,120 when the district court listed 15 non-exhaustive factors 
which they held were relevant to the calculations. The last of these factors being a consideration 
of the hypothetical negotiations which would have occurred if the infringement were to be 
avoided.121 These factors being reemphasise in the eBay v MercExchange opinion.122 
What legal experts point out in this responses to Lemley and Shapiro is that there are in fact 
thirteen other factors which are listed in the George Pacific decision and to focus solely on 
hypothetical negotiations does not conform with the precedent established in case. The more 
specific criticism points to the fact that it is nearly impossible to construct a hypothetical 
negotiation which would replicate the situation which was in existence before the infringement 
took place. That in order to do so a number of subjective assumptions must be made which 
undermine the reliability of the factor.123 They further point out that the nature and extent of 
these subjective assumptions were clearly recognised by the courts, including by the judge in 
the original case.124 The essence of their response being that the subjectivity of these 
assumptions prevents hypothetical negotiation from providing the legal clarity needed for its 
use as a means of deciding reasonable royalties.125  
While points of law questioning whether or using hypothetical negotiations to determine a 
reasonable royalty rate for an infringement are one way of challenging Lemley and Shapiro's 
construct, given that over the last six years 81% of recent U.S. court cases have determine 
damages according to a hypothetical reasonable royalty rate calculation,126 a more effective way 
is required. 
Assuming that hypothetical negotiations is the way forward, more effective 
counterargument could be provided by challenging the assumptions which are the foundation 
for their hypothetical negotiation and the calculations used to simulate those negotiations. In 
formulating this challenge two aspects need to be considered. First whether their assumptions 
and calculations are consistent with economic theory and second if assumptions and 
calculations are consistent with the foundations of intellectual property law. If their construct 
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can be shown to be incompatible with either of these aspects it should diminish the validity of 
their construct, and if inconsistent with both it should thoroughly invalidate the construct.  
With respect to the assumptions; the first assumption made by Lemley and Shapiro is that 
infringement of intellectual property is primarily the result of accidental infringement, because 
technological manufacturers are typically unaware of the existence of the intellectual property. 
To back up this assumption, Lemley and Shapiro include a discussion of how accidental 
infringement can occur which they describe as follows: 
"Suppose, for now, that the downstream firm is already selling its product when it 
learns of the patent claim. This timing may result because the downstream firm 
designed its product to include a feature for which a patent application was 
subsequently published or a patent was subsequently issued, perhaps after the patent 
holder amended its initial claims to capture the downstream firm’s product, ... 
Alternatively, the downstream firm may simply have been unaware at the time it 
designed its product that the patent now being asserted had been issued, or it may 
have been aware of the patent but had no reason to believe the patent owner would 
argue that the downstream firm’s product infringed it. Further, in some cases, the 
patent holder can engage in strategic delay or concealment, knowing it will be in a 
stronger bargaining position once the downstream firm has already designed its 
product incorporating the patented "127 
While it may be possible that there are instances where the technological manufacturer are 
accidental infringers, common sense and modern patent searches capacities would tend to 
indicate that these would be the exception, rather than the rule. Common sense indicates this 
would be the exception because every technology manufacturer knows that every modern 
technological product incorporates patented innovations. A fact that any technology 
manufacturer could easily verify by using online patent search facilities provided by all patent 
agencies. If that were not enough they could also search legal data bases to find information on 
ongoing litigation between intellectual property owners and other infringers. To pretend that 
the technological product they choose to manufacture is not subject easily verifiable patent 
protection, demonstrates either wilful blindness, or dishonesty. Ironically this practice has been 
condemned by the U.S. Supreme court with respect to induced infringement.128 
Refuting this assumption is important because it is used portrays technological 
manufacturers in a positive light, which will presumably be reflected in the eventual outcomes. 
The effect of this potential bias being demonstrated by statutory language which allow for wilful 
infringement to be more severely punished than unintentional infringements.129 Obviously if this 
assumption is invalidated, it alters the dynamics of the case by portraying the intellectual 
property owners as a victim of wilful infringement by a technological manufacturer; who is 
attempting to avoid paying royalties for the use of a property. 
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The second assumption made in the article is that; only 40% of patents are in fact valid. This 
assumption appears to be entirely valid as has been convincingly demonstrated in Lemley and 
Shapiro's earlier work titled "Probabilistic Patents".130 This despite the fact that the U.S. Supreme 
Court has ruled that a patent grant includes a presumption of validity, which requires a 
heightened standard of proof to invalidate them.131 
The third assumption made is that; whenever patent owner charges a higher royalty this will 
increase manufacturing costs, thereby reducing demand for the technological product. This 
assumption is based upon an economic theory called "Cournot complements", which Lemley 
and Shapiro describe as follows: 'The Cournot-complements effect arises when multiple input 
owners each charge more than marginal cost for their input, thereby raising the price of the 
downstream product and reducing sales of that product.'132 While this represents a valid 
economic theory; it should be noted that the implication that royalties should be based upon 
the marginal cost of inputs is directly contradictory to justification for intellectual property 
protection. For nowhere in any statues covering intellectual property law does is state that 
intellectual property owners are only entitled to cover their marginal cost of production. While 
it absolutely is the case that higher royalties will lead to decreased product sales, this cannot be 
used as a justification for lower royalties without overturning the intent and language of those 
laws. 
The fourth assumption included in the article suggests that; royalty stacking leads to 
aggregate royalty rates which would be above those which would be charged by an integrated 
monopolist. The problem with this assumption is that it conflates patent holdup with royalty 
stacking.133 Clearly it is true that if all intellectual property owners demand royalties which are 
significantly in excess of the value that their property provides to a technological product, this 
will result in a price which exceeds that which would be charged by an integrated monopolist. 
However; if those same owners demand royalties which are equal to the value which their 
properties contribute, that aggregate royalty rate should be equal to the effective royalty rate 
that an integrated monopolist would charge for a technological product. This because as an 
integrated monopolist which does not face any competition, it can use a price maximising 
strategy which captures all to the value provide by its product. An additional problem with this 
assumption is the implication that having multiple patent owners contributing to a technological 
represents an undesirable development in innovation. Nothing could be further from the truth. 
As described in the introduction the fact that multiple parties are contributing to technological 
product significantly enhances the quality, quantity and speed at which new innovations are 
created. 
The fifth assumption included in the article is that paying the royalty equivalent to the value 
which a patent provides to a technological product will result in decreased margins of 
technological manufacturer and may drive those margins to zero in which case the manufacturer 
would cease production of the technological product. What this assumption fails to take into 
consideration is that if higher royalty rates are applied to all the technology manufacturers, all 
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of them could increase their prices in order to maintain their margins, and none would be forced 
exit the market. It should be noted that the prospect of higher prices for the technological 
product were included the previous assumption, which would indicate both that higher prices 
are possible and that there is a clear contradiction between these assumptions. The only manner 
in which this assumption could be considered valid is if it was only some manufacturers had to 
pay higher royalties and others did not. If that were to happen it would obviously put those that 
paid the higher royalties at a competitive disadvantage to those that did not. 
The first recommendation which is included in the article proposes that; it was 
counterproductive to negotiate with intellectual property owners before a property is 
incorporated into a technological product, as it would likely result in a royalty rate which is 
equivalent to the value provided by the intellectual property. Implicit in this recommendation is 
an assumption that there is something inequitable about technology manufacturers paying 
royalties which are equivalent to the value which they provide to t a technological product. And 
further that the court can be relied upon to correct this inequity. This would appear to be a 
relatively one-sided view of equity, as it is unlikely that any intellectual property owner would 
hold this view. It also clearly informs the reader about the intent of the calculation which Lemley 
and Shapiro are advising to be used in the calculations utilised in their hypothetical negotiation 
construct.  
The second recommendation contained in the article suggest that: If intellectual property 
owners are unwilling to licence their properties at royalties which represent a significant 
discount to the value that they provide to a technological product, technological manufacturers 
should rely on the courts to determine a reasonable royalty according to hypothetical 
negotiations. This recommendation is just a reformatted expression of the previous 
recommendation. Like the previous recommendation, inherent in it is the implication that there 
is something inequitable about technology manufacturers paying royalties which are equivalent 
to the value which their properties provide to a technological product. The difference between 
this and the previous recommendation is that it recognises that intellectual property owners 
may not be willing to license their properties at a significant discount to that value. An 
observation which directly contradicts the claims made in their proposed method for calculating 
reasonable royalties.  
Before moving on to the factors which are used by Lemley and Shapiro to construct their 
hypothetical negotiation "benchmark rate", it should be noted that the article implicitly justifies 
the use of these factors by referring to the 'standard economic theory of Nash Bargaining'.134 
Which, according the authors would result in a 'negotiated royalty rate [which] depends upon 
the payoff that each party would obtain if negotiations break down'.135 The problem with this 
justification is that it represents a circular argument. Which is to say that in order for a Nash 
Equilibrium to exist there must be a range of outcome which the litigants could expect to occur 
in the event that negotiation breakdown, and therefore it cannot be used to justify a construct 
which determines that range. More specifically what the Nash Bargaining suggest is that; when 
there is uncertainty about an outcome, the bargaining entities should conclude an agreement 
which takes into account their perception of the relative probability of each potential outcome 
in the range of possible outcomes. If there exists a large range of potential outcomes and each 
                                                          







is equally likely the Nash Equilibrium will generally fall in the middle of that range. To be clear 
this does not mean that the Nash Bargaining is irrelevant to hypothetic negotiation, just that it 
needs to be applied after the range and probabilities of each outcome is as clearly defined as 
possible, and to do so before that range is identified will result in a distortion of its predictive 
powers.136  
To demonstrate how Nash Bargaining results can differ depending on the range and 
probability of outcomes, three scenarios will suffice. In all three scenarios it is assumed the 
intellectual property in dispute is essential to the functioning of a technological product and 
cannot be substituted. In the first scenario the assumption is that the courts still maintain the 
automatic right of property owners to be provided with injunctive relief whenever an 
infringement is found, (the patent holdup scenario). In the second let's assume that the courts 
no longer grant automatic injunctive relief and appear to set reasonable royalty damages on an 
unpredictable basis somewhere between the value provided by the property and 0% of that 
value, (The Lemley Shapiro Scenario). In the third scenario, the courts no longer grant automatic 
injunctive relief, and regularly set the reasonable royalty rate equal to the 90% of the value the 
intellectual property provides which property, (The Correlated Rights Scenario).  
Under the patent holdup scenario there will exist a very high Nash equilibrium. This because 
there is a virtual certainty that injunctive relief will be provided, and the fact that the cost of 
being injuncted from producing the technological product can be thousands of times higher than 
the value provided by an individual patent. It is these virtually certain injunctive costs which 
significantly increased the level and range of outcome expectations, thereby producing a Nash 
Equilibrium which can be exponentially larger than the value which the property provides to a 
technological product. A theoretical prediction which can be easily validated by looking at rates 
negotiated rates prior to the elimination of automatic injunctive relief.137 
Under the Lemley and Shapiro scenario there will exist a significantly lower Nash equilibrium. 
This because the range of anticipated range would be between the value which the property 
provides and 0% of that value with equal probabilities along the entire range. In fact, under this 
scenario the Nash equilibrium would correspond to 50% of the value that the property provides. 
Under the correlated rights scenario, because it would be anticipated that the courts will 
order damages equivalent to 90% of the value which an intellectual property provides to a 
technological product; the range would be represented by the contested estimates of that value, 
with the Nash Equilibrium falling in the middle of that range. 
What these three scenarios clearly demonstrate is that Nash equilibrium is entirely 
dependent upon the doctrine which is followed by the courts and cannot be used as a theoretical 
argument for what those outcomes should be. The essence of this observation being captured 
by the reluctance of the courts to embrace arguments based upon expert testimony as to the 
premature application of a Nash Equilibrium in actual patent disputes. A good summary of those 
cases can be found in the VirnetX, v. Cisco and Apple,138 which provides a list of recent decision 
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where expert witnesses have sought to rely on the Nash Bargaining Solution.139 In the cases 
where such a premature application was rejected, it was done so because the courts questioned 
its connection to the facts of a case. A good articulation of which is provided in decision itself, 
which read as follows:  
'The problem with Weinstein's use of the Nash Bargaining Solution, though 
somewhat different, is related, and just as fatal to the soundness of the testimony. The 
Nash theorem arrives at a result that follows from a certain set of premises. It itself 
asserts nothing about what situations in the real world fit those premises. Anyone 
seeking to invoke the theorem as applicable to a particular situation must establish 
that fit, because the 50/50 profit-split result is proven by the theorem only on those 
premises. Weinstein did not do so. This was an essential failing in invoking the 
Solution.'140 
This decision being cited by other legal scholars who advocate the use of Nash Bargaining in 
intellectual property disputes.141 
Returning to the actual factors used in Lemley and Shapiro's construct, as mentioned above 
there are only three factors which Lemley and Shapiro use to come up with their 20% solution; 
the value the property contributes to the technological product, the bargaining skill of the 
parties, and the probability of invalidity.  
In defining the value provided by the property they suggest that this calculation involves 
assessing the being 'value per unit of the patented feature to the downstream firm in 
comparison with the next best alternative technology.'142 Inherent in this definition appear to 
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be the presumption that a next best alternative is available and that there are no costs 
associated with its use. Obviously if the property in question is essential for the functioning of a 
technological product, and particularly if it is a standard essential property which is required to 
comply with a specific technological standard, there are no substitutes which will be available. 
In such case their definition would need to be shortened to the "value per unit of the patented 
feature to the downstream firm". Equally obviously, if a next best alternative exists but is also a 
protected property, then the value must also take into account the value of that property. So, if 
for example the additional value provided by the property is $1/unit and the next best 
alternative is commonly licensed at the $1/unit than the value of the disputed property must be 
$2/unit.  
Assuming that Lemley and Shapiro’s presumptions are negated by the facts in individual 
cases this factor does not need to be further rebutted, as it simply represents an 
acknowledgement that there exists a value which the intellectual property provides to a 
technological product and that value can be determined. If anything, this factor is 
counterproductive to their construct, as it highlights a potential claim for lost royalties can be 
backed up by a calculation which establishes the level of royalties which an owner would likely 
receive, but for an intentional infringement and reliance on the courts to discount the value 
which a property provides to a technological property. 
The second factor used in their hypothetical negotiations is the anticipated bargaining skills, 
which according to the proposed construct would result in value provided by the intellectual 
property being divided equally between the intellectual property owner and the technology. To 
illustrate this factor Lemley and Shapiro use an example which they describe as follows: 'suppose 
that a buyer values a certain new product at $100, and a seller's marginal cost of producing the 
product is $40. If the buyer has no viable alternative to this product, the buyer's threat point is 
to not buy the product and, and the seller's threat point is to not sell the product. Reaching a 
deal generates gains from trade of $100 - $40 = $60 in comparison with those threat points. 
With equal bargaining skill, these gains would be split equally, leading to a price of $70.'143 What 
is ignored by this illustration are two extremely significant elements. First is the question of 
where or not there are other buyers who are willing to pay the full $100 price. When there are 
other buyers willing to pay the full price, then it does not matter how much bargaining skill the 
buyers have, as the seller will always sell for the highest price. From an intellectual property 
context those other buyers would be other technology manufacturers. It should also be pointed 
out that under intellectual property law there should only be one seller. Second is whether the 
property is essential to the technological product being manufactured. If it is, then the threat 
points of the respective buyer and seller are dramatically altered. When an intellectual property 
is essential the buyer must purchase the property in order to manufacture the technological 
product and will pay any price which still allows them to make a small profit on the technological 
product. To do otherwise would be require them to write off the sunk costs which they have 
invested in their manufacturing operations, which would constitute a significant financial loss. 
It is this dynamic which drives patent holdup. It is only by ignoring these elements that the 
negotiating skill 50/50 split of the value provided by the innovation may be sustained. Which is 
not to suggest that bargaining skill is not a factor, merely that it is a factor which is constrained 
                                                          






by the bargaining strength of the parties as determined by the facts of the case and the strength 
of intellectual property rights.  
It should also be noted that Lemley and Shapiro acknowledged these elements in their article, 
even if they fail to incorporate them into their construct.144 Instead they build on their construct 
by further presuming that there exists an inferior low cost alternative which provides the 
technological manufacturer with a specified profit can be used to reduce their threat points and 
increase the potential discount which should be provided to the technology manufacturer.145 
From a theoretical prospective this additional discount quite simply turns the whole bargaining 
structure of intellectual property on its head. Instead of the intellectual property owner having 
the monopoly and selling to a competitive market, the buyer is presumed to have the monopoly 
and the intellectual property owner part of a competitive market. From a practical prospective 
what it suggests is that a technology manufacturer can remain competitive in the market even 
if it uses outdated technology, a suggestion which highly doubtful. Indeed, such is the 
importance of having the newest and best innovations included in a technological product, this 
factor if anything should enhance the bargaining position of intellectual property owners rather 
than diminishing it.  
The third factor which is used in the article to discount the value which the intellectual 
property provided to the technological product has to do with the strength or validity of the 
patent. Pointing to Shapiro's work on patent validity they argue that because only 40% of all 
patents are found to be valid when challenged; the 50% reduction in value should be discounted 
by a further 60% to reflect the probability that the patent in dispute is invalid. There are two 
elements that are ignored in this discount. The first is that almost every defence of patent 
infringement challenges the validity of the patents in suit, which means that only valid patent 
are considered. To suggest that a valid patent should be discounted by 60% because 60% of 
patent not in suit are invalid, ignores the facts of the case. 
The second element which is ignored has to do with the fact that the few patent disputes are 
only about a single patent, with most being about a portfolio of patents which read on a specific 
technology. While there can be no disputing that significant over declaration does occur, it can 
also not be disputed that the perceived value which is contributed to a technology remains the 
same regardless of how many valid and invalid patent are said to cover the technology. Which 
is to say that consumers value the technological product and its integrated intellectual properties 
according to a subjective judgement which does not involve valid patent counting. For them and 
for the courts the value contributed should be the same, with the value simply being divided 
amongst a smaller number of valid patents. Assuming that a patent owner has the same 
percentage of valid and invalid patents in their portfolio as other intellectual property 
contributors, this should not change their proportional share of that aggregate value. This 
premise is not at all controversial and has incorporated into numerous cases in recent years, 
wherein the courts examined in detail the validity of the patents owned by the plaintiff and 
compare then to the validity all patents which are practiced in a technology.146 In short, this 
patent strength discount should be ignored whenever a patent is found valid. 
Given that the two discount factors suggested by Lemley and Shapiro do not reflect the facts 
in most intellectual property disputes, what's left is a construct which focuses solely on the value 
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provided to a technological product by the intellectual property. This value representing the true 
measure on which reasonable royalties should be determined. Curiously what is missing in 
Lemley and Shapiro's discussion of this factor is the certainty that intellectual property owners 
and technology manufacturers will always disagree on the what will be the value per unit which 
a downstream firm will places on the disputed property. It is this disagreement and the resulting 
range of expectations in terms of what the courts will conclude is that value, which are the most 
suitable components to be used for a Nash Bargaining analysis. The size of the disagreement 
and the range of anticipated value being closely correlated to the range of values which are 
established by the courts in earlier cases which involve the same technological product. In the 
event that the courts establish a consistent value the range will be small, but if court decisions 
vary dramatically it will be large.  
If anything this analysis would suggest that if any point of law needs to be examined it is 
whether intellectual property law provides owners the right to the value which their intellectual 
property provides to a technological product, or unlike other property owners the law should 
prevent them from realising that value.147 The latter being supported by Lemley and Shapiro and 
the former being; required under an application of the correlated rights doctrine, supported by 
the underlying justification for intellectual property law, and other legal scholars who discount 
Lemley and Shapiro's construct.148  
While this proposed solution was rejected because it replaced one injustice with another, it 
does provide two valuable contributions to a more equitable solution. First it suggests that 
intellectual property rights are capable of being redefined in order avoid an inequity. The second 
contribution being that it indicates that it is entirely possible to calculate the value which an 
intellectual property contributes to a technological product.  
3.6 Unanticipated Solution 
Having failed to find an adequate solution in competition law, patent law, or patent pools, 
and the search for an unanticipated solution was initiated. That search involved both a 
comprehensive review of the history of property and property rights149 as well as an examination 
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of specific bodies of law.150 The goal of that that research was to find a solution which could be 
applied without any statutory changes; did not unreasonably infringe on the autonomy of 
intellectual property owners to control their properties, was equitable, efficient, and clear. The 
objective of avoiding solutions which required statutory changes was driven by the expectation 
that such changes would require years of lobbying and it would be virtually impossible to achieve 
a consistent result in every jurisdiction. The objective of maintaining the autonym of intellectual 
property owners, having both principle and practical consideration. The principle perspective 
derived from a belief that property rights should not be unnecessarily interfered with. The 
practical perspective being the lower the level of interference that higher the potential level of 
acceptance. The objective of finding an equitable solution was inherent in the search for a 
solution to the problems of patent holdup and patent holdout, which were defined as problems 
because of their inequitable outcomes. Any solution which did not ensure that intellectual 
property owners were properly rewarded for the value that their property provided; could not 
be considered as a solution. Efficiency was essential in that patent holdout relied on judicial 
inefficiency to achieve their objective. If the solution added yet another component to an 
already complex legal analysis it would increase the possibilities of engaging in "legal attrition". 
The objective of providing clarity resting on the notion that if the solution was easily 
comprehended, it would be more readily excepted. 
When the correlated rights doctrine was found in Californian water law it became clear that 
this represented almost an idea solution, as it met all these criteria. It was equally clear that 
because the doctrine so fundamentally clashed with the historical notion of the exclusivity and 
relative absoluteness of intellectual property rights, there was little chance that this doctrine 
could be migrated into intellectual property law by merely advancing it as an alternative. Which 
is why there are chapters in this thesis not typically associated with a legal thesis including; a 
review of the justifications for intellectual property law, a challenge to the ideological theories 
which form the foundational pillars of the exclusive or absolute rights perceived to exists in 
current intellectual property and a chapter describing a property continuum which 
encompassed a comprehensive history of the evolution of property rights. 
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4. A Review of Intellectual Property Law Justification 
As mentioned in the introduction if the law and its application remain unchanged when the 
subject of the law evolves, it is almost inevitable that a conflict between the intentions of the 
law and outcomes of the law will emerge. In the worst case that conflict will render the laws 
enforcement; unproductive, unreasonable and unjust. As such when a change in the subject of 
the law occurs, like the change from standalone to correlated innovation, those laws need to be 
reviewed in order to determine if they also need to be changed.  
The first consideration of such a review should focus on whether the objective justification is 
still valid and whether the laws protecting intellectual property are still needed. Assuming that 
the objective is still valid, and the laws required, the next consideration is to determine whether 
existing law is still suitable for the achieving the objectives. To put this review in its proper 
context it is desirable to first outline the justifications, and then analyse them with respect to 
the older and newer context of the subject. In the case of intellectual property law, the older 
context represents a situation where standalone innovation was the dominant innovation 
method and the newer context reflects correlated innovation as the dominant innovation 
method.  
4.1 General Justifications for Intellectual Property Rights 
The objective justifications themselves be divided into two different categories: one relying 
on pragmatic justification and the other philosophical justification.151 The pragmatic objective 
representing the physical outcomes that the laws protecting intellectual property are intended 
to promote and the philosophical justifications representing the moral foundations of the laws.  
The pragmatic justifications include both an incentive to invent, and an incentive to disclose. 
The incentive to invent was based on the assumption that if innovators are provided with an 
exclusive right to use their invention for a sufficient time this will provide them with an 
opportunity not only to cover their costs, but also to earn exceptional profits and that the desire 
to earn those exceptional profits act as an incentive to invent. In addition to acting as an 
incentive to invent, this desire to earn exceptional profits would also provide innovators with 
sufficient incentive to disclose their invention, assuming disclosure is a condition of providing 
the protection. To the extent that requirements to disclose provides society with the 
information needed to build on past innovation, this can be viewed as an exchange between 
innovators and that society, in which societies provides innovators with exceptional profits for 
a limited time, in return for information which advances the technological capacity of that 
society.  
This pragmatic justification is evident in all aspects of American intellectual property law, 
which is founded on constitutional article that empowers congress "to promote the progress of 
                                                          
151 For a more detailed discussion of intellectual property justifications see: Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of 







science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right 
to their respective writings and discoveries".152 Further evidence of this justification can be 
found in United State Supreme Court cases which established the legal precedence which follow 
this constitutional amendment.153 In these and the more modern cases the Supreme Court has 
consistently justified their ruling based upon providing authors and inventors with an incentive 
to invent. 
Like so many other property laws, much of the philosophical justification for intellectual 
property law is drawn from a Locke's "theory of property."154 According to Locke when a person 
mixes their labour with property, they create an ownership right in the property. If this 
ownership theory is accepted, then the same must be true when a person uses creative mental 
labour to produce an invention. The underlying objective of this theory is straight forward; work 
deserves to be rewarded. While few would contest the underlying objective of the theory there 
are many who would disagree with the notion that a simple mixing of labour creates ownership 
right. A criticism which was perhaps most clearly summarised by Robert Nozick's in 'Anarchy, 
State and Utopia' when he asked; if he dumped a can of tomato soup in the Pacific Ocean, did 
he acquired ownership of the ocean or merely loses a can of soup.155 The essence of Nozick's 
question having to do with both; the amount of labour which need to be mixed to establish 
ownership, and the ownership potential of the product produced.  
In the same work Nozick addressed intellectual property by observing that because 
innovators; create new properties rather than reducing "common property", there is no harm 
in providing exclusive ownership rights to that property as such rights would not violate Locke's 
proviso that the granting of property rights can only be done on the assumption that "there is 
enough and as good left in common for others."156 Using this analysis he is effectively 
differentiating between appropriation and creation. Property appropriation being defined as the 
taking over control or ownership of an existing property, whereas property creation being 
defined as being as the production of a property which has not previously existed. His view is 
that because intellectual property is not appropriated from anyone, no one is hurt by providing 
exclusive ownership rights to innovators. 
Another philosophical justification for intellectual law flows from the field of sociological 
jurisprudence, in which scholars like Kant and Hegel postulate that private property is crucial to 
the satisfaction of some fundamental human needs which provide a sense of self-worth.157 With 
respect to intellectual property, this theory is based on the notion that because individual 
creations are an expression of the individual who created them, those expressions should be 
protected because it represents a protection of the metaphysical self. The social component of 
this theory contends that this individual protection will create the social and economic 
conditions conducive to creative intellectual activity, which is important to human flourishing.158 
While this metaphysical theory has been primarily used as justification for the copyright 
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protection provided to authors and artists, it has also been used to justify patent protection of 
inventions. 
Although the labour theory and the metaphysical theory provided the initial philosophical 
foundations to justify providing some form of intellectual property law protection, the exclusive 
or absolute form of that protection is likely driven, (either consciously or unconsciously), by 
Blackstonian notions of property rights. This notion is included in his "Commentaries on English 
Law", where Sir William Blackstone famously described property rights as "that sole and 
despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in 
total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe".159 And which endowed every 
Englishman with an 'absolute right, which consists in the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of all 
his acquisitions, without any control or diminution, save only by the laws of the land.'160 At the 
very least this notion is entirely consistent with earlier judicial decisions which contend that 
'because a patent owner could withhold their patented product from market entirely, they could 
also selectively withhold it from people who did not purchase their other products'161 and later 
judicial decisions which content that as a general rule, automatic injunction relief will follow 
findings of validity and infringement.162 
4.2 The Standalone Prospective  
Assessing the validity, necessity and efficacy of legal protection from a standalone 
perspective provides the following conclusions. 
The pragmatic justifications appear completely applicable, as an independent standalone 
inventor would represent an ideal candidate for a rational profit maximizing entity. If it is 
accepted that inventors are interested in profit maximization, then it is reasonably certain that 
the possibility of earning monopoly profits from their invention would provide an incentive to 
invent. Indeed, if the monopoly profits are significantly greater than what they would otherwise 
earn, it will also provide them with an incentive to disclose the workings of their invention. The 
first argument against this pragmatic justification would be that the granting of the monopoly 
with its inherent monopoly profits is redundant; as the profits which can be realised from being 
first to the market, while maintaining the secrecy of the invention provides enough incentive to 
invent. This argument conveniently ignores the fact that not all inventors have the means with 
which to produce and market their inventions. And when they do not have those resources; 
much of the value contributed by their invention would be appropriated by larger entities, which 
not only could dictate contract terms to inventors, but could reverse engineer their invention 
leaving them totally destitute. Another argument against this justification; is that there are 
usually other innovators which are also working on similar inventions, and as such providing a 
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monopoly disenfranchises those others from their profit maximising opportunities. However, 
this argument ignores the possibility that it was the incentive of being granted monopoly profits 
which incentivised those other inventors to do research and development on the same invention 
and without such protection they would simply wait for an invention to become public and then 
copy it. 
Whether there is are valid arguments against the innovation incentive, none of these 
arguments generates a similar redundancy when it comes to the incentive to disclose. For 
commercial sense would dictate and history has shown,163 absent the protection provided under 
intellectual property law, innovators will seek to maintain the monopoly profits by keeping 
secret any aspect of the invention which is possible to keep secret. It is worth noting that; as 
secrets are more easily kept by a single entity than a multiplicity of entities, this proposition may 
be more relevant for standalone inventions than for correlated inventions. Obviously when 
innovations are kept secret this restricts the possibility for other innovators to study earlier 
inventions, which in turn reduces society's ability to innovate which would be to the detriment 
of social productivity. So, whilst on its own; the incentive to invent justification could be 
portrayed as a disguise for an unnecessary protection of privilege, the benefits inherent in the 
disclosure requirements largely offset those concerns by opening up innovation opportunities 
to other innovators. Albeit the ability for others to fully exploit those opportunities are limited 
by the legal protection granted to the invention. 
The Locke's labour justifications appear just, because it appears entirely fair that individuals 
are entitled to a reward for their creative efforts. This justness becomes even more pronounced 
when it is assumed those efforts result in a new product which benefit society and would not 
exist but for those efforts. Like the incentive to innovate, an element of this justness relies on 
the assumption that the invention could only be produced by one specific innovator. Also like 
the incentive to invent a key assumption of this argument is that, but for the creative work of 
inventor the invention would not have existed, which in turn is the key to justification of 
exclusive rights to the invention. The proposition which flows from this assumption is that 
granting exclusive property rights to something which would not have otherwise existed, harms 
no one and in fact benefit consumers because potential monopoly profits provides innovators 
with an incentive to invent. This assumption is particularly relevant because, unlike real 
property, intellectual property can be readily appropriated by others to unjustly reward 
themselves, leaving the original inventor without any rewards for their efforts. This ease of 
appropriation relating to the fact that; sole possession of the knowledge inherent in an 
intellectual property cannot be maintain without extraordinary levels of secrecy. Secrecy which 
unlike the incentive to disclose, would dramatically hinder technological advancement by 
depriving other innovators of the potential of building on earlier innovations.  
As to the metaphysical justification there can be little doubt that the creative efforts used to 
produce a standalone invention represent a source of pride for innovators, and that pride would 
be diminished if innovators received no rewards for their inventions, particularly if the rewards 
were appropriated by others who had no part in their creation. Such an appropriation would not 
merely diminish the value of the innovative efforts by signalling that the innovations were not 
worthy of a reward, it would diminish the self-worth of the innovator by signalling that they 
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were not worthy of the rewards that are inherent in the value of their innovations. The extent 
of this moral degradation can be only truly appreciated when compared to the rewards others 
receive for their labours in other fields. If individuals in every other field are rewarded for their 
productive labours and innovators are not, how could any innovator not feel belittle by that lack 
of respect which the denial of rewards signifies? 
Even the Blackstonian notions of absolute property rights appear just, when it is standalone 
intellectual properties which are being protected. After all, to the extent that societies would 
not have the invention but for the creative efforts of an innovator, what difference does it make 
to society if the innovator uses the exclusive rights granted under the law to withhold the 
invention from the market. Alternatively, what difference does it make to society if an innovator; 
overprice their invention which suppresses demand, or underprice their invention and fail to 
capture the all the potential monopoly profits. In all three cases society is clearly no worse off 
than if the invention was never created and will be better off once the protection periods expires 
and the invention becomes open to free and unrestricted use. Again, this analysis is based on 
the assumption that only a single innovator was capable of creating the invention and no other 
innovators were close to making the same or a similar one. If another independent innovator 
was about to unveil the same invention but was pre-empted by an innovator who chose to 
withhold his invention from the market for twenty years, society is clearly worse off. Society 
would also be worse off if it were the case that that second innovator would have put his 
invention on the market for a fraction of the price of the first. 
4.3 The Correlated Prospective 
Regardless of how reasonable and just these justifications are for standalone properties, the 
evolution from standalone towards inherently integrated inventions obviously requires a 
reassessment of their validity and the impact that these changes have on the achievability of 
their underlying objectives. For the purposes of this reassessment the working assumption will 
be that there exists a technological product, (for example a personal computer or a mobile 
phone) which has been created by integrating the inventions of multiple innovators and which 
is being further developed by integrating additional inventions by multiple innovators both old 
and new.  
Beginning with the incentives to disclose. Clearly the objective of encouraging disclosure is 
as valid, if not more valid, when inherently integrated innovation is the dominate innovation 
process. This validity is derived from the obvious fact that a lack of disclosure would hinder 
efficient integration provided by standardization organizations and impede the development of 
follow on innovations. 
Unlike the incentive to disclose, the incentive to invent is does not have such clear-cut 
validity. If there are multiple innovator working in the same technological field, it is more than 
likely that a number of them are working on similar inventions and this competition between 
innovators may render the incentive to invent redundant. That said it could still be argued that 
if there was no incentive to invent, there would not be multiple innovators competing to create 
innovations in a race to be the first to patent their innovations. At the very least such 
competition would be transformed from a race to be the granted legal protection, into a race to 
be first to the market. While a race to the be first to the market would could provide a similar 






curtailing standardization activities, and practically eliminating the possibility of smaller 
independent innovators being reasonably rewarded for their invention.  
Standardization activities would be curtailed because innovators would be reluctant to 
disclose their innovation to standardization bodies for fear of appropriation. Appropriation 
which would almost certainly happen if they had no legal protection.  
Independent innovators would not be reasonably compensated for their inventions because 
they would be entirely dependent on others to bring their innovation to the market. This 
dependence would make them hostages to the contract terms dictated by others, contract 
terms which would naturally reflect the lack of any obligation to pay for the use of the invention. 
Further even if it is assumed that smaller independent innovators can negotiate reasonable 
terms with a single manufacturer, this would not provide them with protection from having their 
invention appropriated by other manufacturers once that manufacturer introduces it to the 
market. Taken together; the dictated terms and the third-party appropriation, would make it 
practically impossible for any smaller independent innovators to thrive, with most struggling to 
survive. 
If these predictions prove to be true, the net effect of relying on first to market would involve; 
a fragmented technology field, dominated by a few large manufacturers, with the potential 
contributions of independent innovators laying fallow across the technological field. While such 
a scenario would undoubtedly reduce speed of innovation and lessen the functionality of 
technological products; the greatest loss would be the loss of innovative spirit that the collapse 
of independent innovation would entail. It is for these reasons that the validity of the incentive 
to invent remains relatively intact even with an evolution towards inherently correlated 
innovation process. 
It should be noted that even though the incentive to invent remains valid with respect to a 
correlated innovation process, this does not mean that the protections provided by intellectual 
property law always incentivise invention. There are at least three circumstances whereby the 
legal protection provided under intellectual property law can and have been used to discourage 
innovation. The first of these circumstances occurs when innovators use the patent system to 
create a patent fence which prevents other innovators from actively pursuing follow-on 
inventions that they themselves have no interest in actively pursuing.164 The second is when 
patent owners use the threat of injunctive relief to appropriate for themselves rewards in excess 
of the value of their inventive contribution to an inherently integrated technological product.165 
And the third is when manufactures practice legal attrition in order to avoid paying reasonable 
royalties to smaller innovators who cannot afford to sustain lengthy litigation.166 However as 
each of these circumstances clearly represents an action intended to undermine the intent, 
these should not be considered to be disqualifiers of this justification, rather they ought to be 
considered an abuse of law. 
With respect to the labour justification, there would appear to be no reason to presume that 
the labours of multiple innovators working on an integrated technology are less deserving of 
rewards from that labour, than a standalone innovator. The only difference is that the total 
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maximum aggregate value (maximum monopoly profits) of the technology in a product must be 
shared between multiple innovators, rather than reserved for a single innovator. This caveat is 
significant because there is a maximum monopoly profit available from a single technological 
product which remains the same regardless of how many innovators have contributed their 
inventions to that technological product. 
In effect it becomes a zero-sum game whereby rewards received by one innovator 
automatically, reduce the potential aggregate rewards available to other innovators. Under this 
zero-sum game if any innovator(s) receives more than the value of their contribution, they will 
either directly or indirectly be appropriating any excess rewards of other innovators. They will 
be directly appropriating rewards when excessive licensing fees reduce the profit which an 
integrated innovator/manufacturer should have earned on their own contribution. They will be 
indirectly appropriating rewards when their excessive licensing fees are passed on to consumer, 
thereby reducing consumer demand to the detriment of all innovators who have contributed to 
the technology. It should be noted that this maximum aggregate value can rise when additional 
properties are integrated with an existing technological product, as this effectively creates a new 
technological product. However, this new product will also have new maximum monopoly profit 
which will also have to be distributed fairly amongst the various innovators. 
There is one obvious aspect of this labour justification which can be easily overlooked and 
when intentionally overlooked ought to be considered a sophistry. That aspect revolves around 
the notion that there needs to be a correlation between the productivity of the labour and the 
amount of the reward. This correlation is particularly evident in Locke's advocacy of European 
Colonial rights in North America.167 Basically his argument was that merely hunting and 
gathering on the land did not endow ownership rights, rather it was only through working the 
land to increase its productivity that ownership rights could be established. Despite the 
controversial nature of North American land appropriation, the underlying sentiment that 
ownership ought to be correlated to the productivity of the effort is clear. In the case of integrate 
intellectual property this correlation obviously must take into consideration not only; the 
proportion of the total integrated inventions which the innovator's inventions represent, but 
also the importance of those inventions to the product. To do otherwise would undermine this 
justification. 
The same presumption is applicable to the metaphysical justification. Just as there is no 
reason to presume that an innovator will not be proud of their integrated invention, so too, 
there is no reason to presume that their self-worth would not be harmed if another innovator 
appropriated the rewards they ought to have received for their contribution. Indeed, the 
thought that it was an integrated manufacturer which was contributing to the same 
technological product who appropriated their rewards would likely increase the sense of 
injustice; as it would not be innovative efforts in general, but only their innovative efforts which 
were not being properly rewarded. Returning to a patent race metaphor, it would be equivalent 
to a relay team winning a relay race and one or more team members taking two gold medals, 
leaving one or more of their teammates without the metals. Metals which those teammates had 
helped to win, and as such were entitled to receive. As with the metaphor, justice demands that 
each innovator who has contributed to an integrated result is entitled to their fair share of the 
rewards. A fair share of the rewards being defined as; a share of the aggregate available rewards 
                                                          






which is proportionate to their contribution to the total integrated invention. Any more than 
this proportionate share would result a direct or indirect appropriation from other innovators, 
any less is an appropriation of their rewards. Such proportionality signifying a correlated 
relationship between an innovator's inventive contribution and the aggregate inventive 
contributions of all the innovators who have advanced the technological product.  
Whilst a correlated relationship is entirely consistent with both the labour and metaphysical 
justifications, it is obviously incompatible with Blackstonian concepts of absolute property 
rights. Indeed, to whole notion of absolute property rights would appear to be entirely 
contradictory to any and all activity in which multiple participants work together to accomplish 
a desired result. Obviously if every participant in a joint effort were to be granted absolute 
ownership of that total effort this would result in overlapping and conflicting ownership claims. 
However, an almost identical problem arises when individual owners are granted absolute 
property rights over their individual properties in an integrated property. This because if 
absolute rights provide every owner with the right to determine whether, and on what terms 
their contribution can be used, it must also effectively grant every owner with the right to 
determine if, and on what terms the entire integrated property can be used. Indeed, so long as 
their property in inseparable from an integrated property, absolute property rights to individual 
parts, provide every owner with rights which are almost indistinguishable from absolute 
property rights to the total integrated property.  
In economic theory this circumstance is described as a 'Tragedy of the Anti-commons'168. It 
is called a tragedy because the theory suggests that when too many individuals have veto rights 
over the use of a property, it is almost inevitable that the property becomes unused or 
underused. In the field of real property examples of this tragedy are found when property 
owners refuse to allow their property to be used for a large infrastructure projects, or 
alternatively when they demand such excessive prices for their property that it renders the 
project unprofitable. Unsurprisingly this type of behaviour is not protected by most western 
legal systems which have established 'eminent domain' legislation that is used to force 
unreasonable owners to sell their property at reasonable prices, so that the common goods like; 
roads, airports and hospitals, can be built.  
In the field of intellectual property there are two somewhat misleading terms that are used 
to describe the situation. The first of these is "royalty stacking".169 Although it can be considered 
to be a neutral description of the fact that integrated technologies are subject to more royalty 
claims, it can also be interpreted as suggesting that integrated technological products are less 
desirable because there will be multiple patent claims stacked up against and preventing 
companies from bringing products to the market. Whether this negative connotation is 
intended, a negative connotation is certainly the intent of the second term which refers to the 
multiple patent claims inherent in integrated technologies as a "patent thicket." This is an 
abbreviation for the notion that integrated technologies create a 'dense web of overlapping 
intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually 
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commercialize new technology'170. Where terms like this go wrong, and why can be considered 
to be misleading, is that they suggest that it is somehow it is the quantity of the patents and 
patent owners, which is the problem.171  
In real property this would be like implying allowing individual ownership of houses in a town, 
is somehow worse than if all the house were owned by one entity and residents simply rented 
their accommodation from that entity. Ironically this implication would be accurate if every land 
owner had an absolute right to do whatever he wanted with his property. If enough of them 
prevented roads, sewers, water and electrical systems from being built on their property, the 
town would be uninhabitable. Alternatively, if they had an absolute right to build a pig farm on 
their property in the centre of town, this too would make the town undesirable. The reason why 
individual home ownership is possible, is because of obligations and restriction that 
municipalities place on those individual home owners. Although this directly contradicts the 
rhetorical notions about "my home is my castle" there can be no doubt that some obligations 
and restrictions are essential to facilitating an efficiently functioning community. 
What is missing in this terminology related to intellectual property is a recognition that it is 
not the quantity of the patent claims which is the problem, but rather how those claims are 
treated under the law. To illustrate this deficiency, one only need to observe the problems which 
arise when two competitors who both have patents which are essential to a technological 
product are unwilling to work with each other. Under an absolute/exclusive property rights 
system, the product would not be legally made or could be made only by ignoring the legal 
protection provided by those rights.172  
Even when innovators are willing to work together there is high likelihood that at least one 
will use their absolute property rights to demand royalties substantially in excess of the value of 
their invention contribution. They can do this by threatening to take injunctive actions against 
any manufacturers which are unwilling to yield to their excessive demand. While the innovators 
which engage in this type of behaviour were initially referred to as 'patent trolls', more recently 
they have been described in the courts as 'non-practicing entities´. Although the change in 
reference likely has to do with the unacceptability of such a pejorative term as 'troll' in the court 
room proceedings, the former is a much more appropriate description of the behaviour, and the 
latter misleading. The former is more appropriate because like their mythical counterparts, 
patent trolls stand guard over their property and charge excessive rates to anyone who must 
use it. The latter is misleading because it does not matter whether contributing innovator 
manufactures the technological product, what matter is if they charge a reasonable royalty for 
the use of their contributions. Regardless of the name which is applied; the reality is that when 
innovators are granted an absolute property rights this inherently grants them access to 
unrestricted injunctive relief which can be abused to extort excessive royalty payments from 
manufactures. Given that those excessive payments must come either directly or indirectly from 
other innovators, this must be a breach of their own absolute property rights. This inherent 
conflict between the absolute property rights of integrated innovators demonstrates why the 
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Blackstonian notions of absolute property rights is incompatible with an integrated innovation 
process. 
Despite the incompatibility of the Blackstonian concept of absolute property rights with an 
integrated innovation process, the fact that the all the other historic justifications for intellectual 
property remain valid is encouraging. For this means that integrated innovators will almost 
certainly be able to continue to rely on the legal system to protect their inventions from 
appropriation. The only difference is that rights provided under that system will have to consider 









5. Theoretical Illusions and An Alternative Theory 
'If we economists were given less to wishful thinking and more to the observation 
of facts, doubts would immediately arise as to the realistic virtues of a theory that 
would have led us to expect a very different result.'173  
One of the biggest obstacles to finding solutions to the inadequacies of current application 
of intellectual property law is that any proposed solution inevitably runs aground on ideological 
positions and economic theories held by judges which have been used for decades to justify a 
property owner's absolute/exclusive right to property and by extension the absolute right to 
maximise the profit from their property.174 Although significant changes in circumstances should 
nullify or at least alter the beliefs of the judiciary, all too often these changes are either; not 
brought to the attention of the court or are ignored by the court because the, ‘[l]aw is suffused 
with ideology’.175 It is because ideology can play such a central role in determine outcomes, that 
the ideological theories themselves need to be addressed. 
While one of these theories is used to describe the justifications for intellectual property law 
provided in the previous chapter, the other three are economic theories are can be considered 
part of the ideological beliefs which support the application of absolutist intellectual property 
rights. These four theories are; John Locke's "Theory of Property",176 Adam Smith's "Invisible 
Hand",177 Ronald Coase's “Coase Theorem” 178 and Joseph Schumpeter’s “Gale of Creative 
Destruction.”179 Given the reliance of absolutist intellectual property law on these theories it 
would appear that the invalidity of the absolute right interpretations of these theories, must be 
demonstrated before applying correlated intellectual property rights for correlated intellectual 
properties can be considered. This therefore will be the objective of the first part of this chapter 
which titled theoretical illusions. 
Obviously, it would be convenient if there was an established theory which could be used to 
replace the flawed interpretation of the theories listed above, but unfortunately there is not. 
There is however one new theory, also mentioned in the previous chapter, that at least focus 
on issue of multiple owners of correlated properties. That theory which was developed by 
Michael Heller’s is called the “Tragedy of the Anti-Common”.180 This theory cannot be used as a 
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replacement for the theories listed above, because Heller has relied on absolutist theories to 
portray situations where correlated property ownership occurs as a tragedy. However, if one 
strips out the preconceptions about the absoluteness of property rights from Heller's theory, 
and replace that with the concept of correlated property rights, this modified theory creates a 
"Triumph of the Anti-Commons". It is this authors contention that the Triumph of the Anti-
Commons represents perhaps the best response to and replacement of the flawed absolutist 
interpretations. 
Given the originality of the Triumph of the Anti-commons and the relative novelty of the 
Tragedy of the Anti-Commons in legal thinking, there is perhaps a requirement to provide a more 
comprehensive analysis of these theories than would usually be required in a legal thesis. As 
such the second part of this chapter will open with an analysis of the original economic theory 
which predates the Tragedy of the Anti-Commons, called the Tragedy of the Commons,181 and 
its counterpart the Comedy of the Commons182 before moving on to an explanation of the 
"Tragedy of the Anti-Commons" and how that can be modified to generate the "Triumph of the 
Anti-Commons."  
5.1 Theoretical Illusions 
When initiating an analysis of the validity of any theory it is perhaps useful to be view them 
along the continuum that was proposed by John Maynard Keynes in his Thesis on Probability.183 
In that thesis he differentiated between what he called mere belief and rational belief. Mere 
beliefs he defined as those beliefs that are entirely subjective in nature and requires no 
supporting evidence. This definition would suggest that mere belief represent nothing more 
than unjustified speculation based on uniformed opinion. At the other end of his belief 
continuum, Keynes places certain rational belief. As far as Keynes was concerned rational belief 
was an objective concept depending on all available evidence, which was overwhelmingly in its 
favor. Given this definition of certain rational belief, it could be suggested that it represents the 
closest thing to actual truth or knowledge. Obviously, most beliefs fall in the space between 
these two extremes. Usually there is at least some kernel of evidence that supports what would 
otherwise be called a mere belief and some evidence that can be used to dispute what would 
otherwise be called a certain rational belief. The extent of that evidence determines where on 
the belief continuum any particular belief should lie.  
It should be noted that the existence or absence of evidence does not necessarily determine 
if a belief is true or false. It is entirely possible for a mere belief to be true for reasons unrelated 
to the belief. Just as it is entirely possible for a rational belief to be false, if unknown evidence 
were to be subsequently discovered which contradicted the belief. As such while Keynes’s belief 
continuum cannot be called a truth continuum, it can be called a rational thought continuum. 
Keynes expressed this idea as follows: 
“If a man believes something for a reason which is preposterous or for no reason 
at all, and what the man believes turns out to be true for some reason not known to 
him, he cannot be said to believe it rationally, although he believes it and it is in fact 
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true. One the other hand, a man may rationally believe a proposition to be probable, 
when it is in fact false. The distinction between rational belief and mere belief 
therefore is not the same as the distinction between true and false beliefs. The highest 
degree of rational belief is termed certain rational belief, corresponding to knowledge. 
We may be said to know something when we have certain rational belief in it, and vice 
versa.'184 
While there a many economist who would argue with Keynesian economic theories, even his 
most ardent critic ought to be able to support his straightforward idea that rational beliefs need 
to be based on actual evidence and when there exists evidence which contradicts a belief, the 
rational response must be to change that belief in order to conform with the evidence. 
A similar reliance on rational thinking and evidence is expected in every science when 
theories are tested. In science most propositions are called theories because it is seldom possible 
to prove absolutely that they are true in all circumstance. If it can be shown that they are true 
in all circumstances, they are referred to as laws. In economics there are is only really one theory 
which can be considered as representing a law and that is the price theory of supply and 
demand. This theory states that if there is more supply than there is demand, price will go down 
and if there is less supply than there is demand, prices will go up.  
However just because it is difficult to prove a theory, this does not mean that it is difficult to 
invalidate a theory. All that is required to invalidate a theory is to show that there are 
circumstances when the theory is invalid. When this happens it automatically invalidates the 
theory, even if the theory remains true for the original circumstances. When a theory is 
invalidated, it can either be modified to exempt the situation, or its claims can be modified such 
that the invalid claims are eliminated. In either of these instances a different theory is created, 
which also can be tested against evidence to determine if it is valid.  
What should not happen when a theory is invalidated; is to claim that the theory is still valid, 
in its entirety. Obviously when this occurs, it means that the evidence proving the partial 
invalidity of the theory is being ignored, and this cannot be defined as science, merely the illusion 
of science. It is this illusion that is being referred to in the section of this chapter. For to suggest 
that the four theories used to support absolute property rights were entirely invalid could and 
should be construed as sophistry. 
5.1.1 Locke's Theory of Property  
As mentioned in the previous chapter, according to Locke' theory of property when a person 
mixes their labour with property, they create an ownership right in the property.185 The most 
citied passage of this theory is provided in Chapter V of his work which describe outlines his 
theory as follows: 
'Though the earth, and all inferior creatures, be common to all men, yet every man 
has a property in his own person: this nobody has any right to but himself. The labour 
of his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then 
he removes out of the state that nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his 
labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his 
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property. It being by him removed from the common state nature hath placed it in, it 
hath by this labour something annexed to it, that excludes the common right of other 
men: for this labour being the unquestionable property of the labourer, no man but 
he can have a right to what that is once joined to, at least where there is enough, and 
as good, left in common for others.186 
He then immediately provides an example of the practical aspects of this theory in his next 
section: 
'He that is nourished by the acorns he picked up under an oak, or the apples he 
gathered from the trees in the wood, has certainly appropriated them to himself. No 
body can deny but the nourishment is his. I ask then, when did they begin to be his? 
when he digested? or when he eat? or when he boiled? or when he brought them 
home? or when he picked them up? and it is plain, if the first gathering made them not 
his, nothing else could. That labour put a distinction between them and common: that 
added something to them more than nature, the common mother of all, had done; 
and so they became his private right. And will any one say, he had no right to those 
acorns or apples, he thus appropriated, because he had not the consent of all mankind 
to make them his? Was it a robbery thus to assume to himself what belonged to all in 
common? If such a consent as that was necessary, man had starved, notwithstanding 
the plenty God had given him. We see in commons, which remain so by compact, that 
it is the taking any part of what is common, and removing it out of the state nature 
leaves it in, which begins the property; without which the common is of no use. And 
the taking of this or that part, does not depend on the express consent of all the 
commoners. Thus the grass my horse has bit; the turfs my servant has cut; and the ore 
I have digged in any place, where I have a right to them in common with others, 
become my property, without the assignation or consent of any body. The labour that 
was mine, removing them out of that common state they were in, hath fixed my 
property in them.'187 
There can be no question that his assessment that "every man has a property in his own 
person" is correct. There can also be little question that his assessment that " the work of his 
hands, ...  are properly his" is also correct. However, his third pronouncement that "Whatsoever 
... he hath mixed his labour with, ... excludes the common right of other men: for this labour 
being the unquestionable property of the labourer, no man but he can have a right to what that 
is once joined to" can and should be challenged. The primary challenge being that it is based on 
upon on a description of history which has never really existed.  
To the extent that there are actual records available of human activity and social behaviour 
since the dawn of time, what those records reveal is an evolutionary trend in property rights 
which for the most part contradict Locke's description of the state of nature and certainly 
contradict his absurd suggestion that needing "the consent of all mankind to make them his" is 
the only alternative to how property rights are created. Somewhat surprisingly despite the 
obviousness of these flaws, modern libertarian movements throughout the world still rely on 
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this flawed logic to promote absolute property rights. An example of which is can be found on 
the Libertarian web site, libertarianism.org188 which provides the following analysis on their 
pages covering Locke's Theory of Property; 
'The acorns became the private property of the owner when he picked them up, for 
it was in the gathering that labor was first expended. “That labour put a distinction 
between them and common. That added something to them more than Nature, the 
common Mother of all, had done, and so they became his private right.” But this raises 
a crucial question: “Was it a Robbery thus to assume to himself what belonged to all 
in Common?” Locke replied that to require universal consent would lead to universal 
starvation. More is involved here than the practical problem of obtaining the 
permission of every person on earth. Morally speaking, such consent is not required 
because, according to both reason and revelation, humans “have a right to their 
Preservation.” Thus if even the right to eat acorns and other natural goods could not 
be morally justified without first obtaining the consent of every commoner, “Man had 
starved, notwithstanding the Plenty God had given him"'189 
The surprising pervasiveness of this mentality was one of the major reasons why it was 
thought to be necessary to construct the a more realistic analysis of the historical evolution of 
property rights which is included in the chapter fifteen.190 Using that continuum to assess the 
illusions in Locke's Theory provides the following observations.  
During the communal stage of the common phase of property rights, which is the phase 
which supposedly corresponds to the period when Locke's private property rights were 
established, the hunters and gathers of communities shared the resources provided by nature 
with each other in order to survive. For a lone member of the society to suggest to the other 
members of those societies, that they were unwilling to share their "acorns" with the community 
would be unthinkable. Even if such a claim were made, it is likely that it would result in the exile 
of the member which would mean their imminent death, as without community support it is 
highly unlikely they would be able to survive for long.  
During the tribal stage of the common property phase, a member which insisted on their 
private property right to the crops grown in fields they cultivated, but which were established 
through a communal effort, would likely lead to the that same exile. The only difference being 
that exile would be dictated by the tribal rulers rather than the members of the tribe. Even if it 
did not lead to exile such selfishness would lead to member being ostracised. Assuming that 
they were to survive exile or ostracism, it would stroke up such resentment that remaining tribal 
members may choose to simply to bring the resource back into tribal use through force, which 
was the defining component of the next stage.  
During the during the warlord stage of the concentrated property phase, the idea that a lone 
member could claim private property rights to something which a warlord claimed belonged to 
him is at best naive. During this stage the determining factor for claiming ownership was and is 
brute force. Any property which could not be defended was taken and any society which could 
not defend against invading warlords lost their property rights and usually their freedom. 
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The royal property stage of the concentrated property phase was almost identical to the 
warlord property stage except that the military might of the King was augmented by divine 
authority. In this stage, the King's property rights were absolute and unauthorised taking of 
"acorns" from the King's forest could result in severe punishment. It is worth noting that Locke 
wrote his treaties to refute the absolute property right claimed by Kings, but his does not mean 
that the Kings accepted his theory on property. 
During the noble property stage of the concentrated property phase, the King's property 
claims were to a large extent merely replaced by property claims of barons and other high-
ranking officials in the regime. While this dispersed the ownership of property within the royal 
ranks, it still based property rights on might and divine authority, leaving ordinary members of 
society at the mercy of their respective local leaders.  
Even during the aristocratic property stage of the concentrated property phase, property 
rights were still predominantly determined by royal decree and not by the application of private 
property theory advocated by Locke. An excellent example of this would be the salt taxes 
collected under Royal Charter provided to the British East India Company. Whereas under 
Locke's theory of property, when Indians used their own labour to produce salt this should have 
resulted in the salt produced being their property. However, under the Charter such creation of 
private property was prohibited, as salt importation and production were the sole right of the 
British East India Company. A right which was not change until the salt protests by Ghandi in the 
1930's.  
Counter intuitively, although there is little or no historical foundation in Locke's theory, this 
does not mean that his theory is not valid. As noted earlier, Keynes acknowledges just because 
a theory is not supported by evidence this does not mean that the theory cannot be true. Indeed, 
if Locke's theory is viewed more as a new principle for establishing property rights rather than a 
historical description of how they were established, it would be rational to theorize that the 
mixing of labour is an entirely appropriate way of determining property rights. Which bring the 
analysis around to the universal phase of the property continuum.  
To the extent that Locke's principles were applied in the universal property stage, they can 
be considered to be most closely adhered to in the first free market stage of that phase. After 
all it was during this stage that the Americas were developed to a large extent by homesteaders 
and miners who used their labour to create farms, ranches and mines, in what was the closest 
thing to Locke's common property description. While the taking of this land from the natives of 
America certainly breached his principles, there can be no denying that providing private 
property rights to individuals based on their efforts in developing a property, greatly accelerated 
the development of that property. 
It should however also be pointed out that that those property rights did not miraculously 
appear as a result of natural law, but rather were provided as a result of the consent provided 
by the local community. This local consent obviously totally contradicts the notion that the only 
alternative to establishing private property rights through natural law is seeking "consent of all 
mankind to make them his". The opportunity of gain local consent also means that consent could 
be altered, if it turns out that the rights provided are detrimental to the local community. Which 
is preciously what happened in the subsequent stage of on the property continuum.  
At the end of the free market stage the use and abuse of absolute property rights resulted in 
a few industrialists owning vast swaths of industries. Which in Locke's terms meant that there 






the impact of this growing income inequalities, Keynes pointed out, and common-sense dictates, 
that when wealth is too unevenly distributed; 'those that have too much don’t spend enough or 
spend it unwisely, others will have nothing to spend, all of which lead to a drop in aggregate 
demand.'191 This drop in aggregate demand leads to a vicious cycle of decreased sales, which 
leads to layoff which leads to decreased sales, and further layoffs. This observation provides the 
most credible explanation for the global depression that shook the world in the 1930's. That this 
foreseeable outcome was not anticipated by Locke, can be directly attributed to his willingness 
to disregard the sharing of properties which assisted in the survival of early societies, and 
subsequent unwillingness to expand on how property rights should change when there is not 
"enough, and as good, left in common for others." 
As a result of the depression most societies decided they would abandon absolute property 
rights, with some going so far as to issue directives on the use of private property for the 
common good of their communities. This directed property stage was followed by a regulated 
and then a supervised property stage, as the initial regulations imposed were gradually 
decreased. It should be further noted that during these stages some societies experienced the 
strongest economic growth in their history. These stages are important with respect to Locke's 
theory as they provide historical evidence; that even if societies determine that mixing labour 
creates property rights, that does not automatically suggest that those property rights must be 
absolute.  
It is these observations which illustrates the illusion with respect Locke's theory. For by 
analysing history, it is easy to find evidence which contradicts the theory that natural law 
dictates mixing labour with property creates an absolute property right in that property which 
are independent of society and cannot be limited. If anything, history indicates to that early 
societies were reliant on sharing resources which the collective community needed for its 
survival, and that absolute property rights which allow owners to disregard community interests 
were a historic anomaly which was created by the dictatorial brute force of warlords and 
tyrannical kings. It also indicates that after societies granted private property the rights to all 
their members, they eventually limited those rights in order to avoid abuses which were 
detrimental to local community.  
This of course does not mean that the primary principle included in Locke's theory is invalid. 
For even without absolute rights it would appear reasonable to accept the principle that when 
a person mixes their labour with a property this create some form of property right in that 
property, just not always an absolute right, and certainly not an absolute right if others have 
also mixed their labour with property.  
This illusion and its removal clearly have implication for intellectual property. Just as with the 
evolution of any other property rights, the provision of absolute intellectual property rights and 
limitation on those rights are related to the nature of the property which is owned. So, while 
absolute property rights might be completely appropriate for standalone intellectual property, 
an application of the correlated rights doctrine to correlated intellectual property is only made 
possible by removing that illusion.  
                                                          






5.1.2 Adam Smith's "Invisible Hand" 
While the "invisible hand" is usually reference in Smith's Wealth of Nations192 the first time 
Smith used the term was seventeen years earlier in The Theory of Moral Sentiments published 
in 1759.193 In the passage where it is included it is used to describe the behaviour of a rich land 
owner.  
'It is to no purpose, that the proud and unfeeling landlord views his extensive fields, 
and without a thought for the wants of his brethren, in imagination consumes himself 
the whole harvest that grows upon them. The homely and vulgar proverb, that the eye 
is larger than the belly, never was more fully verified than with regard to him. The 
capacity of his stomach bears no proportion to the immensity of his desires. The rest 
he will be obliged to distribute among those, who prepare, in the nicest manner, that 
little which he himself makes use of, among those who fit up the palace in which this 
little is to be consumed, among those who provide and keep in order all the different 
baubles and trinkets which are employed in the economy of greatness; all of whom 
thus derive from his luxury and caprice, that share of the necessaries of life, which they 
would in vain have expected from his humanity or his justice.  
The produce of the soil maintains at all times nearly that number of inhabitants 
which it is capable of maintaining. The rich only select from the heap what is most 
precious and agreeable. They consume little more than the poor, and in spite of their 
natural selfishness and rapacity, though they mean only their own conveniency, 
though the sole end which they propose from the labours of all the thousands whom 
they employ, be the gratification of their own vain and insatiable desires, they divide 
with the poor the produce of all their improvements. 
They are led by an invisible hand to make nearly the same distribution of the 
necessaries of life, which would have been made, had the earth been divided into 
equal portions among all its inhabitants, and thus without intending it, without 
knowing it, advance the interest of the society, and afford means to the multiplication 
of the species. '194 [Italics added] 
One way this passage can be interpreted is to suggest that Smith is simply attempting to 
justify the unequal distribution of wealth prevalent at the time of writing, by invoking something 
in modern terms would be called the "trickledown economics".195 However the overall tone of 
this passage would tend to contradict that interpretation, for in it he is clearly questioning the 
distribution of property. As such the passage can be read; not as an apologist for the wealth, but 
as a lamentation of the fact that the poor were dependent on the " the gratification of [rich land 
owners] own vain and insatiable desires" for their " necessaries of life".  
Seventeen years later, in the year of America's independence, the term appears to take on a 
much more positive connotation in his Wealth of Nations. Given the timing, there is every 
possibility that this more positive connotation was a direct result of a Scotsman reflecting on the 
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potential positive implications of America Revolution and seeking to enlighten the world about 
how a nation could operate outside the control of the landed gentry. 
In his Wealth of Nations Smith essentially argues that the welfare of a nation is best advanced 
by allowing the free market to determine optimal levels of production and consumptions of 
goods. In this work an "invisible hand" is described as a positive force by suggesting; that if 
consumers can freely choose what to buy and producers can freely choose what to sell and how 
to produce it, the market will settle on a product distribution and prices that are beneficial to all 
the individual members of a community, and hence to the community as a whole. This reasoning 
being articulated by Smith in his most famous quote; 
'It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer or the baker, that we 
expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, 
not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own 
necessities but of their advantage'196  
Smith uses the actual term invisible hand in a later quote when he wrote: 
“As every individual, therefore, endeavours as much as he can both to employ his 
capital in the support of domestic industry, and so to direct that industry that its 
produce may be of the greatest value; every individual necessarily labours to render 
the annual revenue of the society as great as he can. He generally, indeed, neither 
intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it. By 
preferring the support of domestic to that of foreign industry, he intends only his own 
security; and by directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the 
greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, 
led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. Nor is it 
always the worse for the society that it was no part of it. By pursuing his own interest 
he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really 
intends to promote it. I have never known much good done by those who affected to 
trade for the public good. It is an affectation, indeed, not very common among 
merchants, and very few words need be employed in dissuading them from it.” [Italic 
Added]197  
According to this theory because the butcher, the brewer and the baker must provide their 
goods and services in a free market, they will have to produce them in an efficient manner and 
sell them at a fair price, otherwise their customers will buy their products from their competitors 
who provide the same products at better prices either because they produce them more 
efficiently and/or price them more competitively. Further because these competitors are 
constantly competing for customers they will continuously seek more efficient means of 
producing their products which will result in better prices for consumers therefore benefiting 
the entire community. Finally, because the most efficient commercial enterprises will have the 
earn the highest returns for their owner’s investors will provide them with necessary financing 
to enable further efficiencies. This dynamic and automatic market adjustment power 
representing the invisible hand of capitalism.  
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The illusion which arises out of this theory and one which to free market supporters 
perpetuate, is the notion that because the invisible hand ensures that markets are competitive, 
there is no need for governments to interfere in the market. Indeed, that government 
involvement will be counterproductive to the interest of society. Examples of this illusion are 
many, but it is worth quoting two implicit and explicit examples of it here: 
'Adam Smith's flash of genius was his recognition that the prices that emerged from 
voluntary transactions between buyers and sellers - for short, in a free market - could 
coordinate the activity of millions of people, each seeking his own interest, in such a 
way as to make everyone better off. It was a startling idea then, and it remains one 
today, that economic order can emerge as the unintended consequence of the actions 
of many people, each seeking his own interest.'198 
'the free market allows more people to satisfy more of their desires, and ultimately 
to enjoy a higher standard of living than any other social system... We need simply to 
remember to let the market process work in its apparent magic and not let the 
government clumsily intervene in it so deeply that it grinds to a halt.'199  
What this illusion ignores is any issues related to the inequality of property ownership which 
Smith initially lamented, and the many incidence of market failure which can occur in imperfect 
markets. It should be noted that what many free market supporters conveniently ignore is 
Smith's own concerns about potential market failures. In particular, they ignore his comments 
on the potential power of market participants to avoid the free market through collusion. 
'People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and 
diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some 
contrivance to raise prices. It is impossible indeed to prevent such meetings, by any 
law which either could be executed, or would be consistent with liberty or justice. But 
though the law cannot hinder people of the same trade from sometimes assembling 
together, it ought to do nothing to facilitate such assemblies; much less to render them 
necessary.'200 
Included in this quote is an expression of the inability of government to prevent market 
collusion and a hint of its tendency to exacerbate it. These sentiments toward government 
regulation were expanded in his specific quotes on regulation which were; 
'The proposal of any new law or regulation of commerce which comes from this 
order, ought always to be listened to with great precaution, and ought never to be 
adopted till after having been long and carefully examined, not only with the most 
scrupulous, but with the most suspicious attention. It comes from an order of men, 
whose interest is never exactly the same with that of the public, who have generally 
an interest to deceive and even to oppress the public, and who accordingly have, upon 
many occasions, both deceived and oppressed it.'201 and 'To give the monopoly of the 
home-market to the produce of domestic industry, in any particular art or 
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manufacture, is in some measure to direct private people in what manner they ought 
to employ their capitals, and must, in almost all cases, be either a useless or a hurtful 
regulation.'202 
That Smith should be predisposed to a negative view government regulation should not be 
surprising; given the blatant biases shown by government meddling during the aristocratic 
property stage and their propensity of grant extremely valuable trade charters to the aristocratic 
class.203 However this does not mean that he thought that governments should not interfere, 
only that any government interference should be closely scrutinised to determine whether it 
was a privilege disguised as something in the common good.  
To be fair to the neo-conservative economist it must be admitted that while some promote 
this illusion others do not. Most notable amongst those that do not was Friedrich Hayek, who is 
considered by many to be the founder of neo-classical economics. In his 1946 books The Road 
to Serfdom.204 Hayek warned about the dangers of big government, but also includes the 
following passages: 
'The successful use of competition as the principle of social organization precludes 
certain types of coercive interference with economic life, but it admits of others which 
sometimes may vary considerably assist its work and even requires certain kinds of 
government action.'205 and 'In no system that could be rationally defended would the 
state just do nothing.'206 
Such an understated comment indicates a clear recognition of the possibility of market 
failure, and the possibility of government involvement in the market to correct those failures. 
In traditional economics a market failure is defined only as 'The failure of an unregulated 
market to achieve an efficient allocation of resources'207 In layman's terms this means that the 
markets product too much of one product and not enough of another. However, added to that 
traditional definition must be any market behaviour which destabilises the market, or is 
detrimental to society as a whole. 
A brief summary of some of the identified causes of market failures are as follows: 
Traditional Market Failures 
 Ill-defined Property Rights: When property rights are not clearly defined it makes it 
very difficult to sell a product in a market as both buyers and sellers are unsure of what 
they are trading. Even when they are traded there is likely to be significant transaction 
costs as buyers and sellers will interpret the property rights in their favor, to reduce or 
increase the price respectively. Outside parties may also interfere in the transaction 
costs by contesting the legitimacy of the entire transition. All of which mean that 
market does not properly form, and the price and quantities traded will be suboptimal.  
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 Monopolies: When a single entity is the sole supplier of a product a competitive 
market does not exist, and price and quantity are determined solely by that 
monopolist. Although monopoly control of a market does not necessarily mean that 
there will be market failure, a market failure is deemed to occur when some potential 
buyers are excluded from the market because the monopoly owner is unwilling to sell 
the product at price reflects the point of allocative efficiency which would be present 
in a competitive market. This does not require the monopolist to sell all its product at 
that price point, as it can use discriminatory pricing to charge a higher price to 
customers which value its products more highly, but it does require the monopolist to 
use that same discriminatory pricing to offer the product at a price, which would be 
equivalent to the price that would be present in a competitive market. If they do not, 
too little of the goods will be produced.208 
 Oligopolies: When there are a limited number of entities offering a product in the 
market, through collusion or indirect price signaling they can maintain the product 
price at a level higher than the price which would be present in a competitive market. 
This is the same form of market failure as occurs with a monopoly in that in that the 
higher prices mean that a lower quantity of goods are provided to the market.209 
 Missing Markets in Public Goods and Services: Pure public goods are products like 
national defense, environmental protection and transportation infrastructure which 
can be simultaneously by many consumers and from which no one can be exclude. The 
inability to exclude consumers leads to something known as the "free rider" effect, 
where by consumers choose to not pay for a product even though they are using it. To 
the extent that such products are essential for the functioning of a market economy, 
governments provide these goods and services using public funding.210 
 Externalities: An externality can be described as a cost of benefit which arises from an 
economic transaction which accrues to a society or members of a society, who are not 
party to economic transaction. The classic example of an externality is the pollution 
which is emitted by a factory producing goods for the market. While all members of a 
society experience the effect of pollution, only the manufacturing entity which sells 
the product and consumers which buy the product are engaged in the market. As such 
the costs to society of the pollution are not incorporated into the price of the 
product.211 
 
Market Destabilization Failures 
 Too Much Income Inequality: An inherent characteristic income inequality is that a 
small percentage of society have more wealth than they can consume, and a large 
percentage of societies do not have enough wealth to buy the products which they 
produce. When this happens, markets can and have collapsed, as they did in the Great 
depression of the 1930's. During that time there was an abundance of goods but too 
many people could simply not afford to buy them, which meant that the factories 
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closed, and workers were laid off further reducing their ability to participate in the 
market.212  
 Too Big to Fail: For markets to operate efficiently, inefficient market supplier must be 
allowed to fail, as this leaves room for efficient market supplier to replace them. 
However, when market supplier become so big that their failure would wreak havoc 
on the entire economy, governments may be forced to step in to save the not the 
inefficient supplier, but the entire economy. This is what happened in the banking crisis 
of 2008. When various financial institutions had engaged in speculative financial 
activities which turned out to be unprofitable, governments were forced to bail out 
their losses with public money in order to avoid a complete financial collapse.213  
 
Detrimental to Society Failures 
 Supply or over supply of De-Merit Goods: De-merit goods are goods which while 
desired by the consumers have been proven to have negative impact on individuals 
and/or societies as a whole. Typical examples of de-merit goods would be things like 
tobacco, alcohol, and narcotics. However, as the 2008 recession reveals they can also 
include financial instruments like sub-prime loans. In the case of sub-prime loans, the 
borrowers were convinced to take loans which had lower initial rates which were 
compensated for by higher later rates. For too many borrowers once the higher rates 
had to be paid, they could no longer afford the payments and as such defaulted on 
their loans causing the banking crisis. Interestingly this particular over borrowing 
failure was anticipated by Adam Smith when he penned Wealth of Nations. 214 
 Under supply of Essential Goods and Service: When a market supplier has monopoly 
or near monopoly control of a market there may be instances where they do supply 
essential goods or services to consumers which they require to survive. In some 
instances, this lack of supply is because the seller sets prices at an unaffordable price, 
in others it may because they are attempting to drive potential competitors out of the 
market. In either case society are worse off when this lack of supply is not corrected. 
 Agency Capture: Agency capture can be defined as market entities having 
disproportionate influence over the government agencies which are supervising their 
market transactions. This disproportionate influence is seldom used to ensure that 
markets are fair, but rather it is used to tilt the markets in their favor, and against the 
interests of society.215 This failure was also anticipated by Adam Smith as described 
above.  
 Improper Definition of Property Rights: When the wrong parties are given property 
rights, and/or they are given too strong or too weak property rights, the markets which 
result can be detrimental to societies as it will appropriate rewards from who are 
disadvantaged by the definition and provide unjust rewards to those that benefit from 
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it. When this happens those who from whom the rewards are appropriated will have 
little incentive to participate in the market and the value which they could have 
contributed to society will be lost. 
Despite that these market failures and others are almost universally accepted by economist 
the illusion that there is no need for governments to interfere in the market persists, as 
demonstrated the following article which was reported in the International Herald Tribune. The 
article involved the Nobel winning economist, Joseph E, Stiglitz responding to a question sent in 
regarding the justifications for government regulations:  
Question: What I find difficult to imagine is why a “superior authority,” such as the 
government or an international organization, would be able to regulate/decide what 
is the best trading strategy for any given country/region/community. Why shouldn’t 
we let the free market forces determine what is the best for the world? What is your 
opinion on the issue on free worldwide market forces vs. regulation?  
Answer: Adam Smith, the father of modern economics, is often cited as arguing for 
the “invisible hand” and free markets: firms... But unlike his followers, Adam Smith was 
aware of some of the limitations of free markets, and research since then has further 
clarified why free markets, by themselves, often do not lead to what is best. ...[T]he 
reason that the invisible hand often seems invisible is that it is often not there. 
Whenever there are “externalities”... markets will not work well. Some of the 
important instances have been long understood—environmental externalities. 
Markets, by themselves, will produce too much pollution. Markets, by themselves, will 
also produce too little basic research... 
But recent research has shown that these externalities are pervasive, whenever 
there is imperfect information or imperfect risk markets—that is always. Government 
plays an important role in banking and securities regulation, and a host of other areas: 
some regulation is required to make markets work. Government is needed, almost all 
would agree, at a minimum to enforce contracts and property rights. 
The real debate today is about finding the right balance between the market and 
government (and the third “sector”—non-governmental non-profit organizations.) 
Both are needed. They can each complement each other. This balance will differ from 
time to time and place to place'216 
This answer representing a layman's summary of a complex analysis that Stiglitz and Bruce 
Greenwald provided in their 1986 paper Externalities in Economies with Imperfect Information 
and Incomplete Markets'217 which describes a 'general framework for analysing externalities in 
economies with incomplete markets and imperfect information.'218  
Another noted authority on law and economics Judge Richard Posner came to a similar 
conclusion after the banking crisis, which he detailed in his book, A Failure of Capitalism.219. 
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What is remarkable about Posner's book is that, unlike Stiglitz who has always recognised the 
limitation of the free market, Posner had been more of the neo-classical school and was 
previously much more sceptical about the need for government interference in the market to 
solve potential market failures.  
It should be noted that while most economist and legal scholars all now agree that 
government involvement in the markets is necessary, and as such regard the proposition that 
there is no need for governments to interfere in the market as an illusion, there still exists major 
differences as to how much and what form that involvement should take. In tradition economics 
the common understanding is that government involvement should primarily take the form of 
regulations, taxation, and provision of public goods,220 with the types and levels of these forms 
of involvement being contested by those that are more or less sympathetic to free market 
ideologies.221  
However, these forms leave out a major policy tool which governments have that could be 
used to avoid market failures, which involves granting or redefining property rights in a way 
which ensure that participants in the market are properly compensated for their property, while 
prohibiting abuses which are derived from the abuse of absolute property rights. The reason 
why this is left out of the debate is rather obvious. In Adam's time, the notion of absolute 
property rights still maintained a pervasive presence as societies were still emerging from a 
concentrated property phase during which absolute property rights were dominant.222 Whereas 
modern economists tend to assume that all properties have or should be regarded as having 
absolute property rights, because they believe is it is the clearest form of property rights and 
thus conforms to their perfect market ideals.  
However, a market does not need absolute property rights to be efficient, only clearly 
defined property rights, and if this is done properly it will avoid many of the market failures 
without requiring extensive regulation. This possibility of clearly and properly define property 
rights as a method of avoiding extensive regulation, conveniently lead to the next set of illusions, 
these illusions being attributed to the Coase theorem. 
5.1.3  The Coase Theorem 
A typical presentation of the Coase theorem Economic textbooks is often represented in 
following manner:  
'The Coase theorem states that if property rights exist and transaction costs are 
low, the individual choice of people in the market lead to the efficient quantity even 
when external costs exist. All the costs and benefits are taken into account by the 
transacting parties. So, it does not matter how property rights are assigned.'223T 
Inherent in this description are two assumptions, two direct arguments and two implied 
arguments. The two assumptions are that property rights exist, and transaction costs are low. 
The two direct arguments are that individual choice will lead to efficient quantities even when 
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external cost exist, and it does not matter how property rights are assigned. The two implied 
arguments are contained in the second direct argument, for if it does not matter how property 
rights are assigned; then the quantum of activities should not change when property rights 
change and given that it does not matter how property rights are assigned it would redundant 
for the government to interfere with the market by changing property rights. 
Similar understanding of what the theorem states can also be found among the works of 
numerous economists and legal scholars, who have described theorem in the following manners:  
'if one assumes rationality, no transaction costs, and no legal impediments to 
bargaining, all misallocations of resources would be fully cured in the market by 
bargains. (Calabresi, 1968, p. 68, emphasis in original) 
in a world of perfect competition, perfect information, and zero transaction costs, the 
allocation of resources in the economy will be efficient and will be unaffected by legal 
rules regarding the initial impact of costs resulting from externalities. (Regan, 1972, p. 
427) 
If transaction costs are zero the structure of the law does not matter because efficiency 
will result in any case (Polinsky, 1974, p. 1665) 
if there were (a) no wealth effects on demand, (b) no transaction costs and (c) rights 
to pollute or control pollution, the allocative solution would be invariant and optimal, 
regardless of the initial assignment of rights. (Frech, 1979, p. 254)  
when parties can bargain together and settle their disagreements by cooperation, 
their behavior will be efficient regardless of the underlying rule of law. (Cooter and 
Ulen, 1988, p. 105)224  
Surprisingly much of what is included in these definitions are illusions added on to Coase's 
original work and refuted by Coase in that work.225 Given this general level of misinterpretation 
of his original work, it is clearly necessary to first summarize this work before, examining the 
illusions. 
Coase's Problem of Social Cost is divided into nine chapters, with the first chapter describing 
the issues he will be addressing. In this chapter Coase explains that he will be addressing the 
issue of 'action of business firms which have harmful effects on others' and contesting the 
common economic conclusions that the most appropriate methods to deal with externalities like 
pollution is to; make the factory liable for damages, tax the factory or make the factory move.226  
The second chapter expands the definition of the problem from a one-dimensional issue to a 
two-dimensional issue. The first dimension being the harm created by A, and the second 
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dimension being the harm to A if it was not allowed to engage in the harmful activity. In this 
chapter he suggests that the real "problem is to avoid the more serious harm."227  
In the third chapter Coase examines a pricing system which would result from holding A liable 
for the damages inflicted on B in the course of his business. The example he uses is that of a 
rancher and a farmer where the rancher’s cattle wander on to the farmer's field and destroy his 
crops. In this example it is assumed that there is a higher level of damage created with each 
additional cow which is added the rancher’s herd. The conclusion of this chapter is that the 
rancher will expand his operations until such a point as the marginal damages caused by the 
expansion exceed the marginal profits gained from it, so if adding one more cow, causes more 
damages than the profit which can be made from that cow, that rancher will not add that extra 
cow. In an extreme example this may mean that the farmer will abandon farming if adding an 
extra cow is more profitable than farming would be, as the rancher would simply pay the farmer 
an amount equivalent to his potential farming profits to cease farming. Using this analysis Coase 
points out that market efficiency is maximised using this process because productivity of the 
farm land is put to its most efficient use and neither the rancher or the farmer is prevented from 
engaging in an activity that would have a higher marginal value than their counterpart. This is 
referred to as his efficiency hypothesis. One notable aspect of this analysis is the assumptions of 
prefect markets with low transaction cost, is an assumption that Coase readily accepts is 
unrealistic.228  
In chapter four, Coase turns the analysis provide in chapter three around by assuming that A 
has no liabilities, and that the only way for B to avoid this harm is by paying A not to engage in 
the harmful activity. Under this analysis he argues that the farmer would be willing to pay the 
rancher to limit the size of his herd, an amount equivalent to the marginal profit that he makes 
from adding an extra cow so long as the damages which he can avoid are greater than that 
payment. The conclusion Coase draws from this chapter is that "the ultimate result (which 
maximizes the value of production) is independent of the legal position if the pricing system is 
assumed to work without costs."229 
In chapter five Coase moves from the theoretical to real world analysis by examining a series 
of four cases involving external harm. In these cases, all the plaintiffs were seeking injunctive 
actions which would eliminate the external harm. In the first case an injunction was granted but 
in the following three injunctive relief was not provided, although in one of those cases the 
plaintiff was encouraged to seek damages. The primary point that Coase argues through 
presenting these cases is that it does not matter who is liable, as a property function pricing 
system would allow the litigant who was unsuccessful to purchase the right to harm or the right 
not to be harmed from the successful litigant.  
'But it has to be remembered that the immediate question faced by the courts is 
not what shall be done by whom but who has the legal right to do what. It is always 
possible to modify by transaction on the market the initial legal delimitation of rights. 
And, of course, if such market transactions are costless, such rearrangement of rights 
will always take place if it would lead to an increase in the value of production.'230 
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In chapter six Coase abandons the notion of zero of low-cost transactions to see what the 
effect of removing this assumption would have on his argument. His initial conclusion is that: 
'Once the cost of carrying out market transactions are taken into account it is clear 
that such rearrangements of rights will only be undertaken when the increase in the 
value of production consequent upon the rearrangement is greater than the cost 
which are involved in bringing it about. ...  In these conditions the initial delimitation 
of legal rights does have an effect on the efficiency with which the economy 
operates'231  
Contrary to the modern interpretation of his theorem, it is also in this chapter that Coase 
argues in favour of government regulations. 
'In the standard case of a smoke nuisance, which may affect a vast number of 
people engaged in a wide variety of activities, the administrative costs might well be 
so high as to make any attempt to deal with the problem within the confines of a single 
firm impossible. An alternative solution is direct Government regulation. Instead of 
instituting a legal system of rights which can be modified by transactions on the 
market, the government may impose regulations which state what people must or 
must not do and which have to be obeyed. Thus, the government (by statute or 
perhaps more likely through an administrative agency) may, to deal with the problem 
of smoke nuisance, decree that certain methods of production should or should not 
be used (e.g. that smoke preventing devices should be installed or that coal or oil 
should not be burned) or may confine certain types of business to certain districts 
(zoning regulations).232  
Although he subsequently provides the following caveat: 
'It is my belief that economists, and policy-makers generally, have tended to over-
estimate the advantages which come from governmental regulation. But this belief, 
even if justified, does not do more than suggest that government regulation should be 
curtailed.'233 
Chapter seven can be viewed as Coase's attempt to convince judges to use economic theory 
to decide the initial delimitation of legal rights. The first point he makes in this chapter is that: 
'if market transactions were costless, all that matters (questions of equity apart) is 
that the rights of the various parties should be well-defined and the results of legal 
actions easy to forecast. But as we have seen, the situation is quite different when 
market transactions are so costly as to make it difficult to change the arrangement of 
rights established by the law.'234  
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This point is crucial because in it, he is suggesting that "equity" should determine the initial 
delimitation of rights, advocating for clearly defined rights to enhance market efficiency and 
suggesting that transaction cost will make it difficult to rearrange an initial rights delimitation.  
He then goes on to suggest that the courts are aware of the economic consequences inherent 
in their rights delimitation and for the most part adhere to the notion that only unreasonable 
externalities should evoke a change in rights.  
'The doctrine that the harmful effect must be substantial before the court will act 
is, no doubt, in part a reflection of the fact that there will almost always be some gain 
to offset the harm. And in the reports of individual cases, it is clear that the judges 
have had in mind what would be lost as well as what would be gained in deciding 
whether to grant an injunction or award damages.235  
In concluding this chapter, he summarizes his advice, which in many ways represents a 
summary of the entire paper: 
'The problem which we face in dealing with actions which have harmful effects is 
not simply one of restraining those responsible for them. What has to be decided is 
whether the gain from preventing the harm is greater than the loss which would be 
suffered elsewhere as a result of stopping the action which produces the harm. In a 
world in which there are costs of rearranging the rights established by the legal system, 
the courts, in cases relating to nuisance, are, in effect, making a decision on the 
economic problem and determining how resources are to be employed. It was argued 
that the courts are conscious of this and that they often make, although not always in 
a very explicit fashion, a comparison between what would be gained and what lost by 
preventing actions which have harmful effects. But the delimitation of rights is also the 
result of statutory enactments. Here we also find evidence of an appreciation of the 
reciprocal nature of the problem. While statutory enactments add to the list of 
nuisances, action is also taken to legalize what would otherwise be nuisances under 
the common law. The kind of situation which economists are prone to consider as 
requiring corrective Government action is, in fact, often the result of Government 
action. Such action is not necessarily unwise. But there is a real danger that extensive 
Government intervention in the economic system may lead to the protection of those 
responsible for harmful effects being carried too far.'236 
A layman's summary of this summary would be that; because external harm can sometimes 
be less harmful to the economic efficiency than preventing that harm, such harm should be 
allowed when transaction costs are high. That government interference by either the 
delimitation of rights or enacting regulations to prevent such harms may be wise, but it can go 
too far. 
The eighth chapter effectively examines the historical economic recommendations for the 
treatment of externalities, by analysing Pigou's Economics of Welfare.237 In this chapter he 
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demonstrates several contradictions in Pigou's description of the divergence between private 
and social products which make Pigou's treatment of the problem is "extremely elusive".238  
In his ninth chapter of Coase criticise the Pigovian notion that externalities are best remedied 
by either making entities liable for the harm that they create or taxing the external harm, as 
neither may result in optimal efficiencies.239  
The final chapter Coase first admits that the 'problems of welfare economics must ultimately 
dissolve into a study of ethics and morals' and repudiating the notion that a "laissez affair" state 
is the solution. 
'Actually very little analysis is required to show that an ideal world is better than a 
state of laissez faire, unless the definitions of a state of laissez faire and an ideal world 
happen to be the same. But the whole discussion is largely irrelevant for questions of 
economic policy since whatever we may have in mind as our ideal world, it is clear that 
we have not yet discovered how to get to it from where we are. A better approach 
would seem to be to start our analysis with a situation approximating that which 
actually exists, to examine the effects of a proposed policy change and to attempt to 
decide whether the new situation would be, in total, better or worse than the original 
one. In this way, conclusions for policy would have some relevance to the actual 
situation.'240  
His ultimate conclusion being that: 
'in choosing between social arrangements within the context of which individual 
decisions are made, we have to bear in mind that a change in the existing system which 
will lead to an improvement in some decisions may well lead to a worsening of others. 
Furthermore, we have to take into account the costs involved in operating the various 
social arrangements (whether it be the working of a market or of a government 
department), as well as the costs involved in moving to a new system. In devising and 
choosing between social arrangements we should have regard for the total effect.'241 
Given this description of Coase's paper it would appear that a definition of the Coase theorem 
could really be something like:  
The Coase theorem states that rights should be equitable but not absolute as they 
should allow for reasonable externalities. When these rights are clearly defined, and 
transaction cost are low, individual choices will allow for a reorganization of these 
rights to maximise efficiency while maintaining equity. Only when transaction costs 
are high, should the government regulate externalities and it should seldom tax 
externalities as this is never efficient. 
While such a definition would clearly allow for an examination of the illusions inherent in the 
definitions provided above, it only makes sense to address the potential illusions in Coase's 
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original work at the same time as addressing the definitional illusions, as these potential illusions 
evolved into those definitional illusions. 
The first potential illusions can be found in chapter two; where there appears to be a 
suggestion of moral ambivalence between the parties, a suggestion that all harms can and 
should be quantified only according to economic efficiency, and a suggestion that most 
externalities are unavoidable. This moral ambivalence is evident in the proposal that the harm 
cause by preventing harm is somehow comparable to the harm itself and may even create a 
greater harm. The suggestion that harms could and should be quantified using only economic 
factors obviously reinforces the moral ambivalence. And the proposition that externalities are 
unavoidable is inherent, indicates a lack of analysis of the possibility that the harm could be 
otherwise avoided.  
These possible illusions naturally feed into the direct argument/illusion that that it does not 
matter how rights are assigned and the indirect argument/illusion that government interference 
with property rights is pointless. Clearly if there is no moral difference between harm, there is 
no need for a legal system whose primary purpose is determine who is the guilty party in a 
dispute. Nor is there any point in attempting to change the status quo with respect to a 
delimitation of rights. While illusion may represent an amoral prefect market economic, it is 
clearly not an illusion which Coase accepts, as on several occasions he implies that equity should 
be the deciding factor in delimiting rights. Coase's references to equity indicating that he has a 
clear understanding of the very severe consequences in the real world of an inequitable 
distribution of rights, some of which will be described below. 
The fourth major potential illusion can be found in the third chapter. This potential illusion 
revolves around the assumptions made with respect to pricing of damages. The assumption used 
is one which assumes that negotiated or ordered damages will be equivalent to the actual 
damages suffered. This may or may not be the case outside the perfect market constructed in 
the example. An illusion which Coase alludes to as follows:  
'What payments would in fact be made would depend on the shrewdness of the 
framer and the cattle raiser as bargainers.'242 
The illusion is possible because Coarse does not elaborate on the potential impact of a 
disconnect between negotiated and actual damages. Using Coase's example; if the farmer can 
negotiate more damages than they suffer, the size of the rancher's herd will be smaller than 
would be efficient. This possibility being all too likely if the farm is considered as a unique factor 
of production rather than a competitive commodity. Unique factors of production are not sold 
at the lowest price point of an alternative use, but at the price point that reflects the additional 
value their use will provide to an economic activity. In Coase's example this would be the profit 
that the rancher can earn from each cow in his herd and not the damage that they inflict. 
Alternatively, if the rancher is able to negotiate damages that are lower than the actual damages 
his herd will be larger efficiency would dictate. In either case it indicates that Coase's primary 
argument; that a pricing system will ensure an optimal allocation of resources is put in jeopardy 
outside a perfect market. That said; what Coase is arguing in this chapter would appear to be 
entirely reasonable. Just as a single rational economic actor who owns both properties would 
seek to maximise the aggregate value of both properties, it makes sense that two rational 
                                                          






economic actors would seek to maximise the value of their respective properties through 
negotiation. 
A fifth potential illusion in Coase's original work is the notion that there will be no change in 
the use of resources when liability rules are changed. This illusion in included in chapter four 
where Coase explains how an elimination of the liability rules will result in the same productive 
outcomes, albeit with the relative share of the aggregate profits from that outcome being 
redistributed. This is a potential illusion because it may be that there exists more than one 
combination of resource allocations which result in an optimal production output. In such a case 
the party which gets to decide the level of harm or the level of harm avoided will obviously 
choose the resource allocation combination that provides them with the greatest profit. Moving 
from a prefect market, there is also the question of the correct knowledge of the value of 
abandoned output. 
A sixth potential illusion in Coase's work can be found in his criticism of excessive government 
action which can be found throughout the work. What is ignored in the definitional illusions is 
that although Coase criticises excessive government intervention, at no time does he advocate 
no governmental intervention. Indeed, it appears to be quite conveniently forgotten that in 
chapter seven, where he most critical of government regulations and the imposition of taxes on 
externalities, he admits that when transaction cost are high government regulations may be 
necessary to achieve optimal levels of production. 
It should be noted that all six of these potential illusions are at least briefly considered by 
Medema and Zerbe, in the article on The Coase Theorem included in the Encyclopaedia of Law 
and Economics,243 even though their treatment of them is not entirely the same as provided 
here. While part of that difference can be ascribed to the fact they distil the essence of the 
theorem down to an "efficiency hypothesis"244 and an "invariable hypnotises"245, given their 
authority on the subject a more thorough examination of these differences appears appropriate.  
With the first illusion about the moral ambivalence between the initial allocation of rights, 
they state that 'The Theorem is a positive statement with no normative implications; it is an "is" 
statement, not an "ought" statement.'246 While this statement is possible if one ignores Coase's 
comments on equity and concentrates solely on the efficiency and invariance hypotheses, what 
is curious is that they do actually make a moral argument, before focusing on an amoral 
argument with respect to the initial allocation of rights.  
The moral argument that they make is that because loses are felt more acutely than gains, 
'(due to income, substitution effects and loss aversion)' rights ought to be left where they lie.247 
This analysis is quite fascinating because it totally ignores one of the fundamental assumptions 
of economics, which is the marginal utility theory. This theory states that economic actors tend 
to value products less as they acquire more of them. So, while the first product they acquire has 
the highest utility value, the last one they acquire has the lowest. Using this utility theory would 
obviously totally change the dynamics of loss and gain comparison made by Medema and Zerbe, 
in circumstances where the loser had a lot of rights and the winner had none.  
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Moving on from their moral argument they then take a rather amoral economic position by 
citing Posner's statement that '[s]ince transactions are never costless in the real world, efficiency 
is promoted by assigning the legal right to the party who would buy it'248 .Although this 
statement can be considered an amoral economic assessment it has huge moral implication, for 
what it implies is that rights should belong to whoever can afford to pay the most. Such a moral 
implication is of course directly contradictory to their statement about the lack of normative 
implications in the theorem, and again ignores much of Coase's original work.  
As to the fourth illusion regarding the assumptions made with respect to pricing of damages, 
Medema and Zerbe merely assume it away, suggesting that under a Quasi-Competitive 
Framework, there is 'no strategic behaviour'.249 However, if this assumption is deemed 
necessary there must have been a recognition that "strategic behaviour" could have an impact.  
The fifth illusion on the potential for variance depending on how rights are assigned is 
recognised in their analysis of the evidence supporting the invariance hypothesis. In this analysis 
they bring up an empirical study done by Kenneth Vogel which examined actual changes in 
Californian Animal Trespass laws.250 What that study revealed was that when ranchers became 
liable for the damage done by their cattle, farm production increased, and the herds were 
moved to up into the foothills.251 An outcome which clearly contradicted the invariance 
hypothesis. Surprising Medema and Zerbe rather than accepting that there was a possibility of 
the theorem being at least partly illusionary, instead focused on an unconvincing explanation of 
why the outcome was irrelevant. 
As to the final illusion which denies the potential of a positive impact resulting from 
governmental involvement, Medema and Zerbe agree with Coase: 
'Three prescriptions for legal-economic policy are said to flow from the Coase 
Theorem.  
1. Rights-cum-market solutions are said to be preferable to Pigouvian remedies for 
the resolution of externality problems.  
2. Property and contract are efficient; any interference with the outcomes so 
generated will make matters worse rather than better. It is this implication that 
makes the Coase Theorem, in the minds of some, ‘the cornerstone of a laissez-faire 
legal and economic policy regarding contract and property law’ (Hoffman and Spitzer, 
1986, p. 151).  
3. When transaction costs are positive, rights should be assigned to those who would 
possess them in the end-state if transaction costs were zero, as seen in the 
prescriptions of wealth maximization, or ‘mimic the market’.  
But the Coase Theorem says none of these things.'252 
Having identified the major illusions associated with the Coase theorem it appears 
appropriate examine those illusions outside the perfect markets to ascertain their actual impacts 
on real world situation and particular on intellectual property. 
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The central challenge to the moral ambivalence is derived from the fact that property rights 
can be abused, and the market will not correct that abuse. Abuse in this situation being defined 
as the use of property rights in a way that intentionally causes harm for others in society. This 
harm can be either direct or indirect and will often far out weight any gain that the property 
owner gains from perpetrating it.  
Probably the most infamous example of how property rights can be abused to indirectly harm 
others in a society must be the Irish Potato Famine of 1740-41. In the superficial version of the 
story of this famine; it is explained that there was a potato plight which destroyed the potato 
crop and is was assumed that the destruction of the potato crops caused the deaths to nearly 
one million Irish and forced another million Irish emigrating in order to survive. However, this is 
only half the story. What this version of that story does not provide is an explanation of why; 
when the same plight destroyed potato crops across the rest of Europe, the rest of Europe did 
not experience a mass famine. For this it is necessary it examine the privileged property rights 
which were in place in Ireland at the time of the famine. 
What must be remembered in that during the famine 80% of the cultivated land in Ireland 
was owned by absentee landlords, and those absentee landowners expected a certain level of 
annual revenues from their property and they cared little how that revenue was achieved. For 
the most part they managed their properties by hiring farm managers, which would hire farm 
labourers, who would be given permission to maintain small cottage and garden allotments on 
the land in return for their labour. These allotments were so small the only crop which could 
sustain their families were potatoes, which when the blight came meant they had nothing else 
to eat. This fully conforms to Coase’s theorem, as those absentee landlords had a clear and 
absolute right to their property and the crops produced on their property, and this right was not 
in any way constrained by a duty to protect the farm labourers who work their land to produce 
those crops. It was a manifestation of those rights, which allowed the absentee landowners to 
turn their backs on the plight of the farm workers when the potato plight struck. 
Whereas in the rest of Europe when the potato plight stuck, the land owners recognised their 
duties to come to the aid of their farm workers, in Ireland this did not happen. To be clear in 
Ireland there was more than enough food produced to feed the population during the plight, the 
problem was that the vast majority of those crops were not shared with the farm labourers who 
cultivated them. Instead they were shipped to foreign market at the behest of absentee 
landlords. That the farm labours starved after the potato crops on their tiny allotments failed, 
was of no consideration. Whether the absentee aristocracy were acting within their allocated 
property rights or that the agricultural efficiency was sustained can be debated. What cannot be 
debated is that it was morally repulsive to starve one million Irish, because the absentee 
landlords insisted on maintaining their incomes from their properties at the same level that they 
were prior to the blight. The fact that the illusion attached to the Coase theorem promotes and 
encourages such a reprehensible state of affairs; is an indictment their immorality.  
Further, the indifference toward the allocation of liabilities, and an unwillingness to condemn 
the intentional perpetration of direct harm is perhaps even more immoral indictment of this 
illusion. The mere idea that it does not matter who cause the damages; is both offensive and 
absurd. It is offensive because it basically bifurcates society into two separate classes of citizens, 
providing a property-owning class the freedom to harm all others with impunity. This makes a 
mockery of the notion of equality which societies continually struggles to achieve. It is absurd in 






To emphasis the absurdity of this argument, just imagine how ridicules it would be for an 
economist to argue that; because damages were the same regardless of who commits a crime, 
it did not matter whether the criminal or the victim was held accountable.253  
Disregarding the moral imperative such an argument, there is also the question of the effects 
that a lack of accountability will have on the likelihood of an action occurring. To the extent that 
potential criminal and civil liabilities act as a deterrent to the potential perpetrators, being 
released from those liability will obvious eliminate that deterrence. In most cases this lack of 
deterrence will logically result in an increase in the level of the activity. This is true whether the 
act is a criminal offense or strictly a liability issue. Just as with indemnifying perpetrators of a 
criminal act will lead to more criminal acts, neglecting to hold a factory responsibility for the 
damages caused by its pollution, will cause more pollution. That this increase in harm should not 
matter, must challenge the morality of this illusion. 
Astonishingly, these moral arguments appear to beyond the wit of economists that support 
the illusion. In classrooms across the world neo-classical supporters portray their illusions as the 
ideal summation of the idea of omnipotent market capacity based on an unrestrained pursuit of 
profit maximization. For them the proposition that economic efficiency will be served regardless 
of how right are distributed, means the distribution of rights is irrelevant. Who is injured, how 
they are injured, and why they are injured means nothing; so long as economic efficiency is 
achieved. This notion is so amoral, that it is immoral. For if it is truly just economic efficiency that 
is to be considered and workers being just another are means of production, then human and 
workers’ rights are meaningless. 
In the field of intellectual property this theorem and its resulting myth of market 
omnipotence takes the form of calls for the government to simply impose and protect strong 
intellectual property rights as a means of ensuring that the market operates efficiently. However, 
the same moral argument can be used for this proposition. If the illusions attached to the Coase 
theorem are to be believed, it does not matter if strong intellectual property rights prevent 
lifesaving medications from being provide in an affordable way to potentially millions of dying 
patients. All that matter is if the properly rights and profits of the pharmaceutical companies are 
protected, regardless of the indirect harm it creates.  
The same lack of morality can be seen with the wiliness to overlook the direct harm 
perpetrated by intellectual property right owners of correlated intellectual properties. To the 
extent that the theorem suggest owners can use their intellectual property to intentionally inflict 
harm on others, without suffering any consequences, is not only unjust but it is bound to 
encourage others to do the same. Such is the case with the rise of the so called “patent trolls”. 
After the first troll was not condemned for extorting excessive royalties for the use of their 
intellectual property, many more adopted the same practice.  
Of course, some may try to rationalize the morality of such behaviour by pointing out that 
the excessive royalties charged by trolls, are offset by lower royalties from those that do not take 
full advantage of their property rights. Or alternatively that such behaviour is a small price to 
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pay for the overall benefits from intellectual property regime. These rationalizations are 
equivalent to suggesting that the pollution created by Stigler’s factories can be ignored because 
other factories do not pollute, and the overall benefits of the factory outweigh the damage 
caused by pollution.  
The first of these arguments is morally invalid because it is like saying that a restaurant owner 
it should not complain about extortionate pricing in the supply of alcohol supplied by the mafia 
if it is able to find a cheap source of fresh produce. The second argument is not a moral argument 
but a straw argument. It is creating a false choice between strong intellectual property rights 
and no intellectual property rights. Just as eliminating the factories is not an appropriate solution 
to pollution, eliminating intellectual property rights is not an appropriate solution to intellectual 
property abuse. All that a moral imperative would require is that factory be held accountable for 
the harm that they do by polluting, and intellectual property owners be held accountable 
abusing their intellectual property rights. Failing to do so is what creates and encourages the 
morally objectionable behaviour.  
As far as the second illusion is concerned it is an undeniable that there are real world 
examples of how optimal outcomes are frustrated by "strategic behaviour" in an otherwise 
operational pricing system. No better example can be provided than by so called "patent trolls" 
active in intellectual property. What can happen in this situation is that intellectual property 
rights allow patent trolls to extort disproportionally high licensing fees for their contribution of 
the correlated intellectual, thereby reducing the integrated producers profit margin and 
reducing the funds it has available to invest in research and development.  
The most illustrative examples of this type of behaviour altering effect must be the 2003 case 
of NTP v Research in Motion.254 In the case Research in Motion (RIM) was found to have infringed 
five of NTP’s patents. To remedy this infringement, the jury awarded NTP damages in the 
amount of $53,704,322.69 for past infringements and the court entered a permanent injunction 
against RIM, enjoining it from further manufacture, use, importation, and/or sale of all accused 
BlackBerry systems, software, and handhelds. An injunction that was stayed pending final 
appeal, which was denied. 255 As some of these patents were considered to be essential to the 
production of RIM’s Blackberry phone, RIM was forced to reach a settlement with NTP or close 
its doors. This settlement involved a $612.5 million payment to NTP which was described as a 
“full and final settlement of all claims against RIM, as well as for a perpetual, fully-paid up license 
going forward.”256 To put this $615.5 million in context, RIM’s 2005 adjusted net income, before 
the litigation expenses was $414.5 million, and it had to provide for $352.6 million of legal 
expense because of this settlement. 257 This meant that fully 85% of RIM’s 2005 profits went to 
NTP, which may have been entirely appropriate if NTP’s patents represented 85% of the patents 
used by RIM, but they did not. In fact, NTP’s five patents did not cover even one tenth of one 
percent of the intellectual property used in the Blackberry. For not only were there RIM’s own 
proprietary intellectual properties used in the Blackberry, it also incorporated the seven 
thousand or so intellectual properties required to meet the 3G standard.258 As such what can be 
argued is that in this instance the court forced the indirect appropriation of 84% of RIM’s profits. 
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There can be no denying that this appropriation meant RIM had less funds to invest in research 
and development, and as such the high protection altered its behaviour. What is also beyond 
doubt is that NTP did not use the money, appropriated from RIM, to finance further research 
and development.259 What this example clearly demonstrates is that property rights and in 
particular relatively absolute property rights do have significant effects on industrial efficiency, 
contrary to the illusions attached to the efficiency hypothesis. 
Contrary to invariance hypothesis illusion, those same property rights can also have an 
impact on the use of resources. This illusion can be easily demonstrated by posing and 
addressing two questions. The first question revolves around the whether intellectual property 
rights are necessary and the second what level of protection those rights should provide if they 
are deemed necessary? 
With respect to the first question, if it is true economic efficiencies and individual economic 
activity are not altered by the initial allocation of rights, why do societies bother to create and 
enforce intellectual property rights? After all, if the fees and expenses paid to negotiate licenses 
and prosecute cases are not necessary, doesn’t it make sense to eliminate those artificial legal 
rights and save the transaction costs? The only response that illusion advocates can provide to 
this question is that the economic benefits of providing the right, must exceed the additional 
transaction cost that it entails. That without intellectual property rights protection, there would 
be significantly less innovation, and that would be more harmful to society than the increase in 
transaction costs. But this argument directly contradicts the theory. Either economic efficiencies 
and economic activities don’t change as the theory suggests, or the theory does not work for 
intellectual property. 
Of course, the difficulty with testing this question is that there does not exist a developed 
society where intellectual property rights do not exist, so it would be sheer speculation to 
suggest that such a society would be more economically efficient. That said the very fact that all 
developed societies have adopted intellectual property laws, would tend to suggest that they 
have determined that there is a benefit to society to providing such protection. While this 
observation does not represent a testable theory it at the very least provides a strong indication 
that intellectual property rights in fact matter, and the illusion that they do not, is invalid. 
Given the evidence that the protection of property rights under enacted intellectual property 
laws provide an overall benefit to society, the question that remains is how does the level of 
protection provided under those laws alter the overall economic efficiency of society or the 
economic activities of those engaged in the intellectual property dependant industries? 
According to the theory it should make no difference whatsoever as long as those rights are 
clearly defined and enforced. It is this assumption that leads to the proposition that all the 
societies need to do; is to provide strong and clear protections to intellectual property for the 
market to find the most economically efficient level of production. A level that will result in the 
same level of individual activities regardless of what level of protection is provided, the only 
difference being the distribution of the rewards between the intellectual property providers and 
the intellectual property practitioners.  
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This proposition appears absurd even on the surface. There is no way in which the level of 
protection provided will have no effect on the individual activities of intellectual property 
providers and it is just as unlikely that it would no effect on overall economic activity. 
As far as the individual economic activity is concerned, the theory is particularly untrue for 
independent intellectual property providers, like university technical programs and other purely 
technology organizations that provide technology to external technology practitioners. In many 
cases decreased protection for these organizations, would mean lower licensing revenues, 
which would mean a decrease in spending on research and development. But higher protection 
can also have the same effect. Take for example the pharmaceutical industry where higher 
protection can be used to prevent independent labs from researching fields where existing 
intellectual property is protected. Exclusion from these fields mean that only existing intellectual 
property owners can do the research, which proves higher protection also alters individual 
economic activity.  
This alteration of individual economic activity is also evident in integrated intellectual 
property providers who; both develop new innovations and provide products to the market. For 
these entities decreased intellectual property protection will mean that they are not able to 
profit as much from the sale of products that they provide, so this will almost inevitably result 
in decreased research and development expenditure. Nowhere is this more evident than in the 
previously mentioned pharmaceutical field where costly medical trials represent a huge financial 
commitment that would have to be delayed or could not be made if intellectual property 
protections levels were significantly lowered.  
Higher protection can also alter economic activities of standalone intellectual property 
providers. One obvious alteration would be when entities delay; either the development or roll 
out of advances on their technology. They could do this if higher protections allow them to 
exclude others from participating in their relevant fields, which would mean that they do not 
face the threat of their competition coming to market with an advance on their technology 
before they do. They would do this if they believe that they can make more money by: milking 
the existing technology and extending their protection period; than they could to by pursuing 
and introducing advance as quickly as possible.  
The final illusion which denies the potential of a positive impact resulting from governmental 
involvement is also clearly invalid. To the extent that intellectual property rights are a product 
of government involvement, it should go without saying that government involvement is 
necessary. The only question therefore should be can government limitations of existing 
intellectual property rights provide a benefit to operational efficiency. To answer this question 
in a positive manner would require showing that such limitations would reduce transaction cost 
which in the real world would mean a reduction in litigation costs. Whether this occurs will be 
dependent on the nature of that limitations. If governments choose to reapply something like 
the nine no-noes in intellectual property law it will not,260 however if they merely recognise the 
correlated rights of intellectual property owners, it could reduce transaction cost by more clearly 
defining the limits of intellectual property rights. 
Of course, one excuse for why the illusions attached to Course theorem can be so easily 
invalidated is that it was developed at a time that economics was primarily focused on static 
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industries operating in a relatively stable economic structure. That it was never intended to be 
applied to dynamic competition, where intellectual property plays a more significant role in 
rapidly changing industries. However even if the theorem was updated to include dynamic 
competition, it is unlike that the conclusions invaliding the illusions would be nullified. This 
statement can be made with some certainly because illusions attached to neo-classical theories 
that focus on market dynamics can be just as easily rebutted. 
5.1.4 Schumpeter's Creative Destruction  
The main focus of Schumpeter’s 1942 work titled; “Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy” 
was to refute Karl Marx’s assertions that capitalism would eventually destroy itself.261 In this 
work Schumpeter argued that although progress in industry and commerce contained 
destructive forces which destroyed old industries, this destructive process was not a sign of the 
ultimate demise of capitalism, but rather a sign of its rebirth. 
'The opening up of new markets, foreign or domestic, and the organizational 
development from the craft shop to such concerns as U.S. Steel illustrate the same 
process of industrial mutation—if I may use that biological term—that incessantly 
revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, 
incessantly creating a new one. This process of Creative Destruction is the essential 
fact about capitalism. It is what capitalism consist in and what every capitalist concern 
has got to live in. '262 
In addition to providing a compelling argument against Marxist theories, Schumpeter also 
greatly advanced the understanding of the economics. His analysis suggested that classic 
economic was too focused on static markets where the products did not change, and competitor 
competed almost exclusively on price. His insight was that; far from being static most markets 
were highly dynamic, and competition often took the form of new way of manufacturing 
products, new markets and even new products. It was these constant changes in methods, 
markets and products that he was attempting to describe with his famous quote referring to 
“perennial gale of creative destruction”.263 A quote which Schumpeter intended as shorthand 
for the free market’s painful way of delivering progress. 
It was his belief society could not reap the rewards of capitalism without accepting the 
destruction of older industries, even though this destruction would inevitably harm some 
individuals. Indeed, he went even further by suggesting that attempts to soften the harsher 
aspects of creative destruction were futile and counterproductive because while they might 
provide some short-term benefits, it would ultimately lead to stagnation and decline. A decline 
imposed on the society by other societies which did not adopt these measures and would 
therefore be able the surpass the protected society in both industrial advances and increased 
economic productivity. Under this argument, progress did not only create winners and loser, it 
appeared to require losers as a sign of progress. Indeed, Schumpeter’s himself, in his description 
of stages of industrial development, took pains to point out how inefficient systems and workers 
had to be sacrificed in order to further progress.  
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This attitude was also present in his defence of the monopolistic business practices engaged 
in by the industrialist at the turn of the last century. This defence basically involved suggesting 
that because these monopolies were ultimately more efficient than the prior industrial 
structures; this must be better for society. While the argument about the economic efficiency 
of monopolies is still actively debated, there is one aspect of this argument that Schumpeter did 
not address and that his supporters seem happy to ignore. That aspect has to do with the 
method in which these monopolies are created.  
Whereas it is presumed that these monopolies evolved as a result of superior competitive 
models; there is ample evidence to suggest that many of the monopolies he referred to were 
created more as a result of unscrupulous business practices, than they were as a result of the 
competitive advantage provided by an original business idea.264 Which means that the 
destruction which Schumpeter so enthusiastically endorsed was more of a malicious self-serving 
nature, than a gale of creative destruction. This is not to say that these monopolies were not 
founded on an original business idea which could provide a competitive advantage; but rather 
that existence of the original idea was often used as a screen, to obscure the use of business 
practices that had nothing to do with the competitive advantage. These unscrupulous business 
practices involving many of the activities subsequently deemed illegal under competition law, 
but also activities like union-busting, and consumer fraud. That these practices occurred is 
undeniable. What is also undeniable is that Schumpeter not only ignored them but did so in a 
wilful manner. This wilful ignorance being evident in Schumpeter’s dismissive attitude to these 
practices and the theorists that studied them.  
'we are set to wondering what world these theorists live in, unless, as stated above, 
fringe-end cases are all they had in mind.' 265  
Ironically this is preciously the same perchance for wishful thinking that Schumpeter 
condemned in others.266 However it is hardly surprising that his theory which focuses on the end 
result, would ignore the means by which that result is achieved, particularly if those means do 
not conform to ideological agenda which was being promoted. For Schumpeter the objective 
was to discredit communism, and any substantive criticism of capitalism would be 
counterproductive to that goal.  
However, this question of the means is important because it could be that the structure of 
an industry may not have occurred without the unscrupulous behaviour. And even if economic 
efficiency did dictate the structure, it is almost certain that the absence of abusive behaviour, 
the distribution of rewards would have been dramatically altered. A primary manner in which 
this alternative distribution could have occurred would have involved industrialists buying out 
competitors, rather than driving them out of business through anticompetitive business 
practices. These buyouts would have provided those competitors with the resources needed to 
start new businesses and allowing them to continue to play an important role in the economic 
development of society. Of course, it could be argued that the funds saved by the industrialist, 
were more effectively invested than they would have been by the competitor that they drove 
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out of business. However, that argument rest on the assumption that only these industrialists 
were capable of making the best investments, and as such society was better off with an elite 
few making the economic decision for the entire society. An argument that would appear to run 
counter to the criticism made by free market proponents of socialism systems, wherein they 
reject the notion that an elite few can make the best economic decisions for the entire society.267  
Applying Schumpeter’s creative destruction premise to intellectual property seems relatively 
straight forward. The “gale” could obviously be represented by a new innovation, which in one 
way or another renders older innovations obsolete. The “creative destruction” representing the 
replacement of old business based on obsolete innovations, by new business based on the new 
innovation. This simplistic argument representing a foundational belief of those that advocate 
for strong intellectual property rights. For clearly; if it is a just a matter of new and better 
innovation replacing and old obsolete innovation, strong intellectual property rights should 
enable a quick transition which would minimise the transition cost and maximise the economic 
benefit to society. The problem with this argument is that it is based on an illusion about the 
innovation process and ignores the same issues that Schumpeter does in his industrialist 
analysis. 
The illusion although seldom explicitly stated, is inherently implicit in the notion of creative 
destruction. That illusion being that each innovation in and of itself represents some sort of 
revolutionary advance that is capable of destroying all previous innovations in its field of 
invention. The evidence of the existence of this implicit illusion can be found in the examples 
that Schumpeter uses to describe the innovation process. These include description of how 
railways replaced the mail coach and rayon replaced silk.268 While there can be little doubt that 
these sorts of revolutionary events do happen, and when they do happen they precipitate a 
creative destruction process, the problem is that revolutionary innovations are extremely rare, 
and revolutionary inventions only resent only a tiny fraction of the total inventions. 
For proof of the rarity of revolutionary innovations all that is required is a quick examination 
of any modern technological field. For example; in 1939 Konrad Zus built the first fully 
functioning electro-mechanical computer, which represented a revolutionary change in the way 
that information was stored and managed.269 This initial innovation was however only the 
beginning. Subsequently there were literally millions of additional incremental innovations, by 
a vast multitude of inventors, which formed the basis for modern computing technology. The 
continuous innovation process in the computing industry demonstrating how the innovation 
process, far from being a onetime revolutionary event, is much more of a long-term evolutionary 
process. Which is why in the field of innovation, it would be more appropriate to describe 
advances as a “wind of creative evolution” rather than a “gale of creative destruction”. Ironically 
“evolution” is a term that was not only used by Schumpeter, but one that he felt was essential 
to understanding of his thesis.  
'The essential point to grasp is that in dealing with capitalism we are dealing with 
an evolutionary process.'270 
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The problem appears to be that there is a lack of understanding of what an evolutionary 
process involves. Evolution does not suggest that one day there were apes and the following day 
there were humans. Rather it says that evolution is a process of minor changes in an existing 
species, which can result in the creation of a higher species or an entirely new species. 
Regardless of whether these changes represent the main evolutionary path to a higher species, 
or branches off to create an entirely new species, both the higher species and new species would 
not exist without the building blocks provided by the earlier lower species. This same 
evolutionary process happens in innovation. While changes to a technology can create higher 
technologies or branch off to create entirely new technologies; both the higher technologies 
and the new technologies are almost invariably dependent on building blocks provided by older 
technologies.  
For example, in the field of computer technology every modern computer whether; tablet, 
portable or desktop, incorporates substantial quantities of technology created for and 
incorporated in earlier computers. Which is to say that; even though this process of “creative 
evolution” frequently alters, supplements or replaces parts of this earlier technology, it never 
totally abandons the entire technology. This does not mean that the winds of creative evolution 
won’t result in older computers becoming obsolescent, as the gale of creative destruction 
assumes. Rather that; even when obsolesce happens the clear majority of the intellectual 
properties that is incorporated in the older computers retain their relevance, because they are 
incorporated into the new computer with which some additional more modern technical 
features. The only obsolete intellectual property being the tiny fraction of intellectual property 
which is not altered, but actually abandoned in the transition process.  
While creative evolution can be observed in all technological fields, it is particularly evident 
in technological fields where there are interoperability requirements. In these fields, 
interoperability is facilitated when multiple technology producers adopt and utilize common 
intellectual property. The use of common intellectual property being “essential” to 
interoperability not only across devices at any given time, but also in successive technologic 
advances over a longer span of time. So readily acknowledged is the essential nature of these 
common intellectual property that they are referred to as “Standard Essential Properties” by the 
standardisation bodies which are established to facilitate interoperability.271 Obviously the 
notion that these standard essential patents are “destroyed” by every advance in technology is 
absurd, for even in instances when there is a significant technological advance, there is almost 
always an effort to maintain backwards compatibility through producing dual mode products 
and infrastructure. 
Regardless of the real rational, when the notion of creative destruction is replaced by creative 
evolution, it makes underlying conclusion of worthlessness untenable. For under creative 
evolution there is a recognition that older intellectual property represents a building block for 
the new advances and as such remains a vital and valuable part of the technological field. This 
does not mean that the value of that intellectual property is not altered. Simple math can be 
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used to show that when new intellectual property is added to a technological field, the 
proportional contribution of the older intellectual property decreases. If for example one piece 
of intellectual property is added to one hundred existing pieces, and assuming that the 
aggregate contribution is stable, the proportional value that those older properties is reduced 
by 1%.272 This reduction in value is of course is significantly less than 100% assumed under 
creative destruction. At this point it is worth repeating that all beliefs without supporting 
evidence are nothing more than mere beliefs, and if there is sufficient evidence to indicate that 
they are in fact false they should be defined as an illusion. 
The importance of this value discrepancy is so fundamental to the legal treatment, or rather 
mistreatment, of intellectual property that it needs to be considered from the prospective of its 
impact on the judicial process. If it is assumed judges believes in creative destruction, by 
definition they will view litigation of legacy intellectual property as an attempt to create excess 
value out of an intellectual property that has little or no real value. This perception almost 
certainly would create a positive bias towards the infringers, as this behaviour would likely be 
considered to be a justifiable response to an effort to unjustly enrich the property owner at the 
infringers expense.  
While the protection provided under intellectual property law, will generally not allow the 
bias to be manifest in an outright dismissal of the case, it could to be manifest in other ways. 
The most notable of way would be to permit the infringer to use wilful ignorance273 as a defence 
or to allow them to engage in legal attrition. In both cases this effectively represent a situation 
where it is accepted that one unscrupulous behaviour is being allowed to be counteract another 
unscrupulous behaviour. Regardless of whether this decision is conscious or subconscious, it still 
amounts to creating an untenable circumstance for judges, wherein they are forced to 
circumvent the law in order to avoid what they perceive as an injustice.  
This is not the way the courts are supposed to function. If it were true that a certain 
intellectual property is destroyed when new intellectual property is developed, then the 
intellectual property laws ought to be changed to reflect that truth. Such a change would provide 
the judges with the authority they need to dismiss any perceived frivolous and unjust cases and 
unburden them from of attempting to find alternative methods of balancing out an unjust law. 
The fact that this change in the law has not happened, would tend to indicate that there is no or 
little evidence to support a belief in creative destruction of all legacy intellectual property.  
Alternatively, if it is assumed that judges believe in creative evolution it would appear more 
likely that the legacy property owner would receive a fairer trial. This because the judge’s 
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awareness of the continuing value would negate any preconceived notions of an infringement 
actions as some sort of attempt at unjust enrichment. This elimination of potential bias could 
not only manifest itself in less a less tolerant attitude towards ligation abuses like wilful 
ignorance and legal attrition but would also allow the judge to take a more balance view on the 
true value of the infringed property. A value which would put the infringed intellectual property 
in proportional context with other properties inherent in the technology. 
As mentioned earlier in addition to the illusion related to “creative destruction”, there is also 
the issue of how such notions can be used to hide or justify unscrupulous business practices. In 
the field of intellectual property rights those unscrupulous practices can be broken down into 
three separate forms of behaviour. The first and most serious is the theft of intellectual property 
by unlicensed and unauthorized use. The second and third are the practices of 
disproportionately undervaluing and overvaluing of intellectual property by potential licensees 
and licensors respectfully. In all three of these cases the notion of “creative destruction” can be 
used as a justification, for these behaviours. Behaviours which would become much more 
noticeable and therefore less feasible if the notion of “creative destruction” was replaced by 
“creative evolution”.  
With respect to theft of intellectual property by unlicensed use, clearly if old intellectual 
properties are considered to be destroyed by new intellectual property it is not that 
unreasonable to believe that the old property had little or no value. This misconception would 
imply that there is little or no need to bother with a license. Even when the owner of the old 
intellectual property takes an authorised user to court creative destruction may create a 
conscious or subconscious bias, which the judge can use to justify declaring an old intellectual 
property is either invalid or un-infringed, when this is not the case.  
While this argument is never articulated in quite such a brutal a fashion in the courts, there 
is every likelihood that it is an underlying attitude for an incontestable infringement. An 
incontestable infringement representing a case where there is unequivocal evidence of the 
infringement of a clearly valid intellectual property. The most obvious examples of an 
incontestable infringement being cases where the infringement involves standard essential 
intellectual properties which are indisputably part of an existing standard. That the actual 
infringement may be based on the strategic decision to either; engage in wilful ignorance, or to 
practice legal attrition, does not eliminate the underlying notion inherent in creative 
destruction. Rather these decisions are simply practical manifestations of the notion. The first 
indicating the perceived worthlessness of the intellectual property and the second indicating the 
perceived economic insignificance of the intellectual property, relative the cost of pursuing an 
infringement action. In such cases when the judge declares invalidity or non-infringed they are 
using a belief in creative destruction to justify theft.  
The same logic would be behind a decision which, while not invaliding the validity or 
infringement of an intellectual property, disproportionally under values it. If new intellectual 
property is believed to “destroy” existing intellectual property, then it would appear obvious 
that the value existing intellectual property must be minimal. While this may appear to be only 
slightly different from a situation where an infringer seeks to avoid taking a license, it is not. The 
significant of this difference is in that fact that the infringer is actually recognising the validity of 
the intellectual property and their infringement of it. This makes them a willing licensee who is 
disputing the value of the license and asking the court to arbitrate that value. In the example 






infringer is willing to pay, and the value demanded by the property owner. The value being 
demanded by the property owner being the other potentially unscrupulous behaviour justified 
by the creative destruction myth. 
Like disproportional undervaluation, creative destruction also promotes disproportional 
overvaluations of new intellectual property by both a direct and indirect effects. The obvious 
direct effect is that if new intellectual property destroys existing property, then that new 
property must be responsible for all the intellectual property value generated in the field. While 
this is clearly an absurd rationalization it is none the less evident in the behaviour of new 
entrance to certain technological fields, which seek to avoid paying royalties to older 
contributors because they claim that their innovations have revolutionized the product. 
The indirect overvaluation occurs when owners of older properties observe newer 
contributors making enormous profits from small contributions and presume that they too 
deserve similar rewards for their own small contributions. A behaviour that would tend to 
indicate that they view their intellectual property as valuable as the newer contributions even 
though theoretically it should have been destroyed according to the creative destruction theory. 
This indirect overvaluation being supported by another legal proposition which suggests that an 
intellectual property licences do not represent license to use the underlying intellectual 
property, but rather a commitment not to sue for the use of that property.274 Under this 
proposition the quantum and therefore inherent value of the intellectual property is irrelevant, 
the more important factor being the ability to avoid injunctive relief. To the extent that this 
proposition relies on strong property laws for its existence, it is itself a product which is indirectly 
related to creative destruction.  
Fortunately, when the creative destruction is replaced by creative evolution this negates the 
direct arguments underlying theft, disproportional undervaluation and overvaluation. For not 
only does it allow judges to recognise the retained value of older intellectual property, it also 
allows the more accurately estimate of that value by placing it in context with the other 
intellectual properties which are integral to the technology.  
With respect to disproportionate overvaluation, if it is accepted that most technological 
products rely on an ever-increasing number of aggregated intellectual properties and that 
individual properties within that aggregate only contribute a small part of the innovation, this 
should constrain the severity of the remedies when infringement is found. Specifically, it should 
limit automatic injunctive relief to cases where the infringer is unwilling to enter into good faith 
negotiations and limit damages to the best estimate of value provided, rather than being based 
on the potential damage that could be inflicted through injunctive remedies. Practically this 
would restrict the grant of injunction relief when it is apparent that the infringement is the result 
of a practitioner standing firm against excessive licensing demands on an essential intellectual 
property.  
This would mean an adopting a new bifurcated concept of wilful infringement, which could 
be categorised as; offensive wilful infringement, and defensive wilful infringement. Offensive 
wilful infringement would be where the infringer knows that they are infringing on the 
intellectual property owned by others, and have shown no desire to seek a license, or have not 
negotiated in good faith with the owner. Defensive wilful infringement would be where the 
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infringer knows they are infringing on an essential intellectual property, have negotiated in good 
faith to licence the property, but have not been able to agree terms with the owner. Obviously 
if the “patent trolls” are simply taking advantage of a legal system which facilitates extortion, 
removing the excessive rewards which can be received from that extortion, should 
fundamentally change their calculations and help to eradicate the behaviour.  
An additional benefit of bifurcation of wilful infringement would be that it would; not just 
eliminate the necessitate of wilful ignorance but incentivise intellectual property users to 
actively search for property that they use and enter into negotiations with owners of those 
properties. This transition from wilful ignorance to incentivised awareness, would not only be 
good for all intellectual property owners, it would also be good for users. This because in doing 
their searches, the engineers that work in intellectual property users will become more aware 
of the latest technological advances and therefore be better prepared to advance the 
technology themselves. This raised consciousness reflecting precisely the distribution of 
knowledge justification used for intellectual property. 
The argument that licensing agreements are just agreements not to sue, is also negated with 
a shift to creative evolution. This because if it is excepted that existing intellectual property 
retains some proportional part of its value until it is no longer used, that idea of proportionality 
in and of itself negates the idea that one property can have the same value as ten thousand. 
Negating this concept would benefit users, who could argue that proportionality needs to be a 
major factor in infringement remedies, but it would also benefit intellectual property owners 
and society as a whole. It would benefit intellectual property owners because in order to 
maintain their proportionate share of the industries intellectual property revenues, they would 
be forced to create new intellectual property, thereby ensuring that their long-term 
competitiveness and viability. This increased effort to create new properties would naturally be 
beneficial to society, as it would mean more advances. 
5.2 An Alternative Theory 
Whilst demonstrated the invalidity of the illusions attached to foundational theories used to 
support the strong intellectual property rights should be enough to facilitate an openness to 
changing the interpretation of intellectual property law, in order to do so a new foundation likely 
needs to be provided. This is because without providing appropriate foundations, intellectual 
property law would become a muddle of contradictory and incoherent decisions that reflect the 
different opinions of different courts on how best to modernise the law.  
This raises the question of how and where to find an economic theory to support a new legal 
method of treating the new property structure. The newness of the property structure being 
embodied in the fragmented ownership of integrated intellectual property which pervades the 
high technology industries. Ideally such a theory would not only accurately describe the new 
structure but also incorporate predictive capabilities that would regularly and accurately reflect 
real world experiences. These predictive capabilities not only showing what happens when 
absolute property rights are applied, but also what happens when proportional property rights 
or correlated property rights are adopted. 
Given the pervasive efforts over the last forty years to promote the neoclassical economics 
ideas of wealth-enhancing value of free markets based on absolute property rights, it is 






the new foundational theory tempering intellectual property rights. That theory being Michael 
Heller’s theory describing the “Tragedy of the Anti-Common”,275 which Heller developed as an 
extension to Harden’s “Tragedy of the Commons”.276 Not only does this new theory accurately 
describes the fragmented structure of intellectual property ownership inherent in most high 
technology industries, also provides a good prognosis of what happens when those fragmented 
ownership structures are granted absolute property rights. The main problem with using this 
theory as a foundation for modern intellectual property, is that Heller appears to blame the 
tragedy primarily on a fragmented property structure, with no responsibility being placed on an 
application of absolute property rights. This attitude being overtly stated in the subtitle of his 
book which expanded on his initial theory “How Too Much Ownership Wrecks Markets, Stops 
Innovation and Cost Lives.”277 italics added. 
This makes no sense. As described earlier, the fragmented structure of intellectual property 
ownership is a direct result of the multiple and diverse nature of skill which has been used to 
create most modern innovations. As such to the extent that Heller condemns a fragmented 
ownership structure, he is condemning this multiple and diverse source of innovation. A 
condemnation that directly contradicts the realities of the modern innovation process, as there 
can be little question that a large and diverse innovation system, will generate more and better 
innovative ideas, than a smaller centrally controlled system. Fortunately, Heller’s prescription 
doesn’t detract from the validity of the fragmented ownership issues identified in his theory, 
and all that is required to make his theory a foundation for modern intellectual property law, is 
to find and justify an alternate solution which celebrates, rather than condemns, the fragmented 
property structure he identified. 
While such a solution cannot be found in the neoclassical ideology, it becomes surprisingly 
obvious if the search is opened up to include the rival ordo-liberal ideology. The difference being 
that unlike neo-classicalism, ordo-liberalism recognises that unfettered capitalism can often 
lead to market failures which generate unjust and inefficient results. Which means that ordo-
liberalism is much more open to the idea of enacting regulations or changing property rights in 
order to maximise economic justice and efficiency. Whilst replacing ideologies may appear like 
a dramatic step, it isn’t actually that much of a change. The truth is that; the even though the 
neo-conservative ideology may be averse to regulations and redefining property rights, there 
are few neoclassical advocates who totally reject the idea that these can enhance efficiency. 
Which implies that even neo-conservatives are in reality; closet ordo-liberals. This closet support 
is important because it means that rather than attempting to get neo-classical supporters to 
switch ideologies, all that is really required to get them to expand the range of regulations and 
property rights definitions that they are willing to admit provide economic benefits. 
That a solution can be found in the ordo-liberal ideology should not come as a surprise to 
parties familiar with the “Tragedy of the Commons”, who will know one solution to that tragedy 
was also found using ordo-liberal principles. In particular Hardin himself proposed a solution 
using “mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon”.278 A proposition that while elegantly phrased 
does nothing more than suggest that regulations should be adopted which avoid the tragedy. 
The imposition of these regulations in the Tragedy of the Commons has been referred to as 
                                                          
275 Heller, Tragedy of the Anticommons, (1998) 
276 Garrett Hardin, "The Tragedy of the Commons". Science 162 (3859): 1243–1248. [1968] see below 
277 Heller, The Gridlock Economy (2008)  






generating the “Comedy of the Commons”279. It is called a comedy because of the positive 
outcome that it achieves, whilst still maintaining the common property structure. In a similar 
way it is argued here that regulations can be used as a solution to the Tragedy of the Anti-
common, in a way which both produces a positive outcome and maintains the fragmented 
ownership structure. However, because this positive outcome is better than any outcome that 
can be achieved by concentrated central ownership, it deserves a title that is more than a mere 
antonym of a tragedy. The title should also encapsulate the notion that it is the most just and 
efficient way of dealing with fragmented intellectual property, which is why the name “Triumph 
of the Anti-commons” has been coined and will be used by this author. Provided below is a 
description and critic of each of these theories, which hopefully will provide a clear 
understanding of why the Triumph of the Anti-Commons represents the most appropriate 
economic foundation for the laws which deal with correlated intellectual properties.  
5.2.1 The Tragedy of the Commons 
The tragedy of the commons was a social theory280 that became an economic theory focused 
on the problems which occur when resources are commonly shared. While it does not 
specifically relate to the issues of fragmented intellectual property rights, it is included because 
it provides both the structural and ideological basis for Heller’s anti-common tragedy.  
According to economic theory a commons tragedy will typically occurs whenever there is a 
finite common resource and individuals are able to independently decide how much of that 
finite common resource they will take for their own use. When this happens, self-interest will 
provide individuals with an incentive to use more of the resource than they should if they 
cooperated. However, this increase usage harms other individuals by either; restricting their use 
or by making the usage unsustainable. Unsustainable usage occurs if the increase usage exceeds 
the natural limit and will eventually result in the complete destruction of the common resource. 
Individuals pursue this unsustainable usage because they do not consider the total social cost of 
their decision. Extinction of species due to over-fishing, over-hunting, deforestation, and climate 
change represent real world examples of this process.  
Over fishing is the most regularly used example of a commons tragedy because it is 
something most people have heard of and it easily lends itself to both hypothetical and practical 
analysis. A typical hypothetical example of this analysis would have a fish stock that harvested 
by fisherman and replenished on an annual basis as old fish spawn new fish. To replicate nature, 
it is generally assumed that there is direct correlation between the existing stock of fish and the 
number of new fish that are born. Obviously, any harvesting of the fish that exceeds the natural 
limits of reproduction, not only reduces the overall fish stock but also limits the ability of future 
reproduction.  
Figure 1 represents a situation where one party is fishing at an unsustainable level and two 
others are fishing at sustainable level. In the first few years there does not appear to be a 
problem as everyone is still able to continue fishing at their chosen level even though the fish 
stock is being depleted. It is only after several periods that the true magnitude of the tragedy 
unfolds. At that time stocks are so depleted that a virtual ban on fishing would need to be 
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imposed if the stock is to be saved. All this because one party made an uncooperative decision, 
that they thought would optimise their personal benefits, which instead turned into a tragedy 
for both the individual and society. 
 
 
Figure 1  
The neoclassical solution to this tragedy is for the property to be taken from common use, 
and put into private ownership, which in this example would mean assigning all fishing rights to 
one party. The idea being that once this privatisation occurs, the owner would ensure that the 
resources are managed in a way which is both sustainable and maximizes economic efficiency, 
because it is now in their self-interest to do so. In the example provided this would mean that a 
single fisherman would be allocated the fishing rights and because he/she is a profit maximizer, 
they would only catch an amount equal to the annual reproductive rate of the fish stock, as this 
will maximise the long-term profit from the resource. 
This proposed solution is clearly compatible with the Coase theorem, which argues that 
economic efficiency will occur when ever clear property rights are implemented, regardless of 
how they are allocated. Unsurprisingly it suffers from the same moral flaw as the Coase theorem. 
That moral flaw being that this solution does nothing to ensure that those who lose access to 
the common, are not left to starve in the same way the Irish tenant farmers were. In addition to 
the exclusion issues, there is also the moral question about how the right is allocated. Assuming 
it is a government agency which decides who get the right, how is that decision going to be 
made? From a strictly profit maximization prospective it should go to the most efficient user, 
but is profit maximization the right criteria? Maybe the right criteria be the user that agrees to 
pay the highest royalty for the right or the user that agrees to invest the most into the local 
economy? In the worst case maybe, the decision is made as a result of “agency capture”. Capture 
being a process whereby government agencies become subservient to the those that they are 
supposed have authority over. This is usually done through buying either directly or indirectly 
the votes of the decision makers. Direct buying occurs when decision makers get some form of 
bribe or kickback from winning bidders, indirect buying occurs when biased decision makers are 
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appointed by officials that have received some form of campaign contributions.281 Regardless of 
how the decision is made there will always be a moral argument suggesting that the wrong 
criteria was used and which resulted in the wrong user being selected.  
Aside from the moral issues there are the theoretical and practical questions as to the 
external effects of privatizing and monopolizing an industry. These questions are particularly 
relevant for both the suppliers and customers of an industry. Obviously if all but one participant 
is excluded from the industry, that one participant will have monopolistic buying power with 
respect to suppliers, and monopolistic selling power with respect to customers. In cases where 
monopolistic buying power exists it can be expected that the suppliers will have to forfeit some 
of their profits to the buyer and this will usually lead to a reduction in the number of suppliers. 
From a customer’s prospective the monopolization of an industry will generally result in 
monopolistic prices, which will mean higher costs for consumers. Using the fishing example, the 
enhanced buyer power would enable the sole remaining fisherman to extract larger discounts 
from suppliers on everything from fishing tackle to fishing boats. At the same time that sole 
fisherman may also be able to charge higher prices to consumers or the canning factories which 
rely on local fish to operate. The double benefit of reduced costs and higher prices providing the 
sole fisherman with a higher profit than the aggregate available to all the fisherman that were 
operating under the common structure. All of which are routine outcomes according to 
monopoly theory and begs the question; why is a monopoly more efficient than a competitive 
market?  
There is one further issue which can occur when an industry is privatized in a monopolistic 
manner, which is all too often ignored. That issue is what happens if the sole user decides that 
it is better to maximise the short-term personal profits, than long term industry profits. This 
could happen for several reasons. Not the least of which is that sometimes the short-term profits 
are sufficient to allow the party to retire in luxury.282 Even if the user does not want to retire, 
imagine what happens if they believe that investments in other industries can provide better 
returns or a better lifestyle. What is to prevent the fisherman from catching all the fish in a single 
season and then exiting the industry to go into wine production? If such an action would net the 
fisherman ten years’ worth of profits and those profits could be invested at a rate of return 
higher than the average yearly fishing profit, the fisherman would be maximising profits even 
though the resource would be destroyed. Of course, such action could be prohibited by the user 
licenses, but if restrictions on a single user licence are acceptable, why would it be any less 
acceptable to impose similar restrictions on a multiple of commons users and thereby avoid the 
approbation and monopolisation issues. Adopting restriction on multiple users representing an 
ordo-liberal solution to the Tradedy of the Commons which was recommended by Hardin. 
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5.2.2 The Comedy of the Commons 
As the name implies “the comedy of the commons” is meant to denote the circumstances 
where positive outcomes arise even when the property is part of a common.283 The happy 
outcome being facilitated by what Hardin referred to as a solution which involves; “Mutual 
coercion, mutually agreed upon”.284 While this sounds complicated it means nothing more than 
having the users to agree to a binding solution to the potential tragedy. Not only is this solution 
not complicated, it is also not new. For centuries if not millennium societies have treated some 
property as commons, granting open access, but limiting use. Such was the case in many 15th 
century villages in Europe where common land had 'restrictions of planting crops and raising 
animals to prevent over use.'285 
Using the fishing example this would take the form of all fishermen agreeing to limit their 
catch to sustainable levels. If the aggregate catch of all fisherman is limited to the replenishment 
rate of the resource the fish stocks are maintained at a constant level and the long-term viability 
of industry is ensured. Figure 2 provides one possible solution to the problem. In this solution, 
basically society has coerced the fisherman who was taking more than his propionate share of 
the fish to reduce his catch to the same levels as the other fishermen. Of course, the same long-
term viability could occur if all fishermen reduced their catch by the percentage needed to 
achieve sustainability or if the smaller fisherman were the only ones who reduced their catch, 
but the proportional rule appears to be the most just. This solution can be facilitated either 
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If it is done on a voluntary basis it would likely be done through a trade association 
agreement, under which all the users of the common have gotten together and agreed on a 
formula for sharing the resource. There are at least two benefits to a voluntary agreement. The 
first benefit is that the users often have the best information about the resource and as such are 
in the best position to understand the threat to the resource. Assuming this is true, this would 
mean that they are also in the best position to decide what is needed to protect the resource. 
The second major benefit is that theoretically all users have “bought in” to the voluntary 
agreement, which means that they are all presumably committed to abide by it. 
There are however several problems with the voluntary solution. The first of which is that 
voluntary agreements negotiations may collapse because the users simply cannot agree on 
aggregate or individual usage limits. The second problem is that even all the participants in an 
industry do get together to restrict output, there is always the question of whether they are 
doing so to protect the resource or solely to raise prices. The latter being a direct violation of 
basic competition laws. The third problem is that the agreed upon terms may not be 
enforceable. This is particularly true if there is no formal contract that is binding on all the users 
and it is just common understanding. However, it may also occur if the terms of the contract are 
so vague they can be interpreted in several different manners or if there are no clear or agreed 
consequences for the breaching the terms of the contract.  
This third problem is likely the most underappreciated, although it may be the most 
dangerous. It is the most dangerous because if the agreement does not provide clear terms and 
unequivocal consequences for breaching those term, the same users that were abusing the 
common before the agreement may just pretend to abide by the agreement while continuing to 
abuse the common. If this happens the agreement would be providing nothing more than a false 
sense of security which would lead other users to mistakenly believe that a resource is protected 
when it is not. Such a false sense of security in turn may lead those same users to ignore the 
early signs of resource collapse and until it is too late. 
It should be noted that even if the voluntary agreement has the required specificity, and 
unambiguous consequences, any breach of contract will almost never be enforced through a 
vigilante process. Rather they will most likely be enforced through an arbitration process or 
through the courts. This means that the mutual coercion referred to Hardin almost always 
involves the use of state police powers. As such, the only difference between a voluntary 
agreement and a regulated solution is the source of “mutually agreed upon” part of his solution.  
Under government regulation this source of mutually agreement comes from the state 
agencies, which are supposed to represent the will of the people. Ideally the agency will allow 
for sufficient consultation with the commons users to determine the magnitude of the problem 
and the validity of their proposed solutions. In the event that the users do not understand the 
problem or are unable to provide viable solutions the agency should engage experts to study 
the problem and recommend solutions. The most important benefit of a regulated solution is 
that the solution is not subject to the unanimity constraints and can be imposed on users that 
would not voluntarily participate in any usage restrictions. Inherent in the imposition of the 






the expectation that the experts engaged by the agency may be more knowledgeable than the 
users and therefore a better solution developed.286   
The two biggest problem with the regulatory solution is that the agency may be incompetent 
and or it might be captured. An incompetent agency would be one which either does not 
understand the problem or does not issue the most effective and efficient solutions. A captured 
agency will be one which is biased towards will one or more of the users and produces 
regulations that unjustly discriminates between the users. Of course, there is nothing to suggest 
that an agency could not be both incompetent and captured. Lesser problems include the 
likelihood that users will be more prone to cheat because the agency is imposing the limitation 
which they may not agree with. Regardless of the benefits and problems, maintaining multiparty 
access to the common clearly avoids the moral issues revolving around exclusion and initial 
allocation. Further if it is appropriately regulated it will likely result in a more efficient outcome 
than would be provided by a creating a monopoly through privatization.  
The only theoretical negative aspect of such an arrangement is that it appears to contradict 
the neoclassical preconception about the wealth enhancing value of property rights based on 
absolutism. However just because a solution contradicts a neoclassical perception does not 
mean that it is solution is as fault, it may mean that the neoclassical idea that is at fault. It should 
be recalled that this is an idea which has remained relatively unchanged for centuries regardless 
of the change in ownership structures during the same period. While neoclassical proponents 
appear to believe that the passage of time has enhanced the credibility of absolutism,287 it is 
more likely that passage of time combined with changing circumstances have rendered the 
absolutist idea obsolete. The fact is that since the idea was first introduced in the 18th century; 
societies have moved down the property continuum288 and the legal concept of property rights 
has evolved far beyond that which provides owners with absolute rights to deal with their 
property in a despotic manner.289  
This mismatch between legal and economic theory would tend suggest that the ideological 
preconception may have run aground on the practicalities of the ever-increasing 
interrelationship between properties, property owners and society at large. Which is to say that; 
societies have evolved from a time when there were few property owners and their properties 
were so separated from each other, that owners could treat their property as an individual 
fiefdom. In the modern world where property ownership has become almost universal, and 
properties so intertwined, it is almost impossible use property in a way that does not have 
external effects on neighbouring properties. It is these external effects which have forced that 
legal jurisprudence and regulations to evolve away from the notions of splendid isolation and 
despotic control. Ironically it appears that the neoclassical proponents, who have been so 
instrumental promoting property ownership, reject the consequences inherent in the expansion 
of the number of property owners. This irony being vividly illustrated in the proposed 
neoclassical solution to the tragedy of the anti-common. 
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5.2.3 The Tragedy of the Anti-Commons 
The concept of a property structure that would eventually be defined as an “anti-commons” 
was presented by Michelman in 1982, who described it as fined it as “a type of property in which 
everyone always has rights respecting the objects in the regime, and no one, consequently, is 
ever privileged to use any of them except as particularly authorized by others”.290 In 1998 
Michael Heller expanded the concept of “anti-commons” by developing a theory which he called 
“the tragedy of the anti-commons”.291 Under this theory Heller postulated that the anti-common 
property will lead to a tragic underuse of the property existence, which is the very opposite of 
the overuse experienced under the “tragedy of the commons”. While there have been several 
additional works which have expanded upon this theory,292 Heller maintained his authoritative 
role on the topic with the publication of his 2008 book titled Gridlock Economy. 293 
Heller found his inspiration for the theory about the tragedy of the anti-commons in post-
communist Moscow. While working with the World Bank his team were asked by local 
authorities to find out why there were such high vacancy rates in shopping centres space vacated 
by the Soviet era businesses which went bust. These vacancies puzzled the authorities because 
there had been a dramatic growth in the number of road side kiosks on streets adjacent the 
vacant malls, which appeared to indicate that there was abundant demand. Heller first 
established that the vacancies had nothing to do with demand, as several kiosk operators 
indicated that they would be interested in moving into the vacated space. He then explained 
how the vacancies were a result of as fragmented property rights which resulted in an anti-
commons tragedy.  
These so-called fragmented property rights were created as part of the transition to market-
based economy, in which former communist bureaucratic roles were entrenched by granting 
them formal bureaucratic property rights. As counter intuitive as it sounds, the entrenchment 
of these bureaucratic roles was recommended as part of a neo-classical solution intended to aid 
the transition away from communism. This recommendation being founded on the Coase’s 
neoclassical theory which maintained that all that was required for capitalism to flourish, were 
“clear property rights”. The primary thought being that; once “clear property rights” were 
established, the market would miraculously overcome any obstacles to future development, by 
allowing rights holders to trade their rights in the most profit maximising manner. The secondary 
thought being that; by providing these rights to the bureaucracy it would secure their support 
for the transition. Unfortunately for the neo-classical supporters this theory proved to be an 
illusion, as the fragmented property rights proved to be even more inefficient than the 
discredited communist system it replaced. Somewhat predictably it turns out that granting 
numerous independent parties with absolute property rights over the same property decreases 
rather than increases, the liquidity of that property in the market. In the case of the Moscow 
shopping malls, Heller’s team identified eighteen different authorities that had been granted 
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some sort of right to decide on new leases.294 In the worst-case scenario this meant that a new 
lease had to be approved by eighteen separate bodies, and which conversely meant that a new 
lease could be vetoed by any one of the eighteen bodies. Heller’s team ascertained that these 
veto rights were severely overvalued by many of the various authorities. What happened was 
that instead of basing their approval fees on the proportional value it had for a potential tenant, 
they were basing it on the total value of the lease. That these excessive fees were often closely 
correlated to the amounts needed to fund the authority was probably not a coincidence, 
however the most crucial factor was that the individual authorities were not required to take 
into consideration the cost of getting similar authorization from other authorities. This meant 
that when all the various authorization fees were added up they substantially exceeded any 
profit that could be realised from the lease. This was at least the official story. What is more 
likely was the that the individuals in the authorities were demanding too much in the way of 
bribes to authorize the tenancy than the tenancies were worth.295 Whether the aggregate costs 
were official fees or unofficial bribes does not matter, what matters was that they were in 
aggregate simply too high to be economical. This then was the foundation of Heller’s theory that 
too many owners create economic gridlock which results in the tragedy of resource underuse. 
Whilst Heller’s developed his theory about a “tragedy of the anti-commons” relatively 
recently, this does not mean that these types of tragedies are uncommon or a new 
phenomenon. In fact, as Heller and others began to search for more examples of anti-commons 
tragedies, they were probably surprised to find that they could be found in almost every facet 
of economic activity. A list of some of the examples provided in Heller’s book are as follows:  
 Middle age Rhine River Traffic. -In the middle ages a common way to raise taxes 
was to charge tolls for travelling on rivers. To enforce these tolls the fortresses were 
built along the river banks complete with chains and canons which would be used to 
sink any barge that tried to avoid paying the toll. On the river Rhine these tolls were 
collected by local Barons, with the central authority embodied in the Holy Roman 
Emperor deciding which Barons could collect the tolls and how much they could 
collect. When in the thirteenth century there was a dispute over the throne, this 
central authority was absent and the freedom from central control allowed the local 
Barons could charge as much as they wanted in transit fee. The tragedy occurred when 
too many Barons began to charge too much, and this eliminated the economic viability 
of transporting goods on the Rhine.296  
 Irish Potato Famine-Heller claims that the Irish potato famine represented a 
tragedy of the commons because when farms were subdivided between male heirs 
and this resulted in farms becoming so small that the only crop which would sustain a 
family was potatoes. This argument goes on to suggest that when the blight wiped out 
the potato crops in the 1840’s this reliance on one crop proved fatal and therefore the 
famine represented a tragedy of the anti-commons. This analysis is however 
somewhat questionable. First, the anti-commons tragedy is supposed to result in 
under use and there is no evidence of under use in this case. Second, while it is true 
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that if the smallness of the farms meant that the only crops which could sustain the 
families were potatoes, it is false to suggest that the smallness was due to misguided 
subdivision. The fact is that the vast majority of those that suffered and died during 
the famine, were allocated their small plots in exchange for their labours on absentee 
landlord farms. This practice of providing farmers with a place to grow crops in return 
for their labour representing a common form of sharecropping in Europe at the time. 
The critical issue was that while this form of payment may have provided a subsistence 
living in the ordinary years, it could not do so during the blight. It should be noted that 
Irish farms continued to produce an abundance of non-potato crops during the plight, 
most of which was exported in order to maintain the pre-plight incomes of their 
absentee landlords. If these landlords had chosen to share some of those crops with 
their workers, the famine could have been avoided. This is what happened in the rest 
of Europe where there was no famine despite the potato blight spreading across the 
entire continent. These facts would tend to suggest that the Irish Famine was not so 
much a tragedy of the anti-commons but a tragedy of unbridled greed. 297 
 Urban Development-In most metropolitan cities much of the real estate is divided 
has been divided into small property holding. For large urban projects to be possible, 
these smaller holdings must be brought together to form a large property holding. The 
tragedy occurs when owners are; either unwilling to sell their smaller holdings or they 
demand too much for their properties. When this happens, the large development 
become impossible to build or become economically infeasible. This lack of 
development is considered to be a tragedy because it represents a loss of economic 
activity in the municipality.298 
 Public Infrastructure Development-Whether airports, highways, or hospitals, the 
construction of public infrastructure almost always requires the accumulation of 
significant amounts of privately-owned property in order to completed. When private 
owners refuse to sell or ask too much for their property this will prevent the 
infrastructure from being built which would be a clear example of a tragedy of the anti-
commons.299 Indeed it is not hard to imagine that the owner of the last piece of land 
located in the middle of a proposed superhighway would demand an excessive price 
simply based on his ability to hold up the project. This holdup action representing the 
very essence of neoclassical profit maximising behaviour. While paying holdup prices 
to one seller is possible, clearly if too many individuals are able to make unreasonable 
demands, (or alternatively refuse to sell their land), many roads, railway tracks, dams, 
hospitals and other essential infrastructure projects would never have been built. They 
would not have been built because the government would have been unable gather 
the necessary land to build the projects or the price being demanded by the land 
owners would have been so high as to make the projects unfeasible. 
 U.S. Airplane Manufacturing-In the early days of aviation there were not that many 
parties which held patent relevant for the construction of airplanes. The most 
significant of which were the Wright Brothers, who famously were the first to achieve 
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controlled flight of an aircraft at Kitty Hawk, and the Curtiss Company, the nation’s 
leading integrated aircraft manufacturer. Heller repeats the accusation that because 
these manufacturers could not agree on licensing terms, aircraft manufacturing was 
becoming gridlocked and this gridlock represented a tragedy not only for the two 
companies but for the American aviation industry as whole which was being surpassed 
by the European aviation industry.300 
 Drug Development Tools- In the 1980’s the U.S. government allowed the patenting 
of medical research tools. While this allowance encouraged the development of a 
range of new research tools, the licensing fees charged for using those tools increased 
the cost of doing research. The tragedy arises when the increased cost of licensing fees 
outweighs the potential profit from doing the research. This happens when too many 
owners charge too much for their licenses. 301 
 Oil Drilling Prohibitions. -In America, land ownership often includes the subsurface 
mineral rights including oil and gas rights. However, these subsurface rights can be 
separate, or separated, from the surface rights. When this happens the surface owner 
may not want to allow the extraction of the subsurface minerals, because it will 
damage or degrade their surface property. If surface owners can prevent the 
extraction this would represent tragedy of anti-common for the mineral extraction 
operations. According to Heller a tragedy of this nature occurred in 2004 when Alaska 
enacted legislation that required extensive administrative reviews if land owners 
objected to oil and gas drilling activities. 302 Presumably there would be not be an anti-
commons tragedy if oil and gas companies could drill where ever and when every they 
liked. Such a proposition being strikingly similar to the argument that it does not 
matter who has the right to pollute a stream. 
Looking through these examples it’s clear that Heller considers an anti-common tragedy as 
any situations in which a fragmented ownership structure leads to property underuse. On this 
point there can be little disagreement as this would appear to be the definition of an anti-
common tragedy. Where there is room for disagreement is in Heller’s assessment of the cause 
of tragedy and his proposed solution. For while it initially appeared that Heller was going to 
adopt a pragmatic approach to in these matters, he instead appears to adopt a more ideological 
approach. 
The indications of a pragmatic approach can be found in the early pages of his book where 
he comments on the changes in the law which were enacted during the commencement of the 
commercial aviation industry to avoid aviation airspace gridlock. The change in the law involved 
reducing airspace ownership rights of surface property owners; to one thousand feet above their 
property, from the previously held notion of unlimited rights. The previously held notion 
reflecting the ancient maxim “Whoever owns the soil also owns the sky and the depths”.  This 
change was necessary, as without it, airlines would have had to negotiate transit rights with 
every property owner that they flew over, something which was simply not feasible. In 
commenting on this change in the law Heller declares; 
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'The courts and legislators got this one right. By legal fiat, we eliminated, adjusted—
some sticks in the bundle of rights we call “private property” to accommodate a 
potentially valuable new technology. No compensation was due from the government 
or from fledgling commercial air carriers because nothing was “taken” from private 
landownership. Such property rights adjustments should not shock you. Form a 
historical point of view, it is wrong to see private ownership as fixed and unchanging. 
Even the staunchest private-property system are always adapting rights to manage 
new resources.'303 
In declaring his support for this change in the law, Heller is articulating a rejection of 
ideological dogma in favour of pragmatic analysis. This pragmatic analysis reflecting the principle 
that property laws need to evolve in order to reflect changing circumstances. Which makes it 
even more surprising that a similar pragmatism does not appear to be apparent in either his 
analysis of the problem or his proposed solution. As to his analysis of the problem Heller 
concludes as follows;  
'Gridlock is a human creation that does not follow from any immutable laws of 
nature. It is not intrinsic to an economy or culture. Instead, underuse results from 
mistakes and gaps in economic, legal and social organization. It is an artefact of 
ownership gone awry.'304 
This analysis begs the questions; what are the "immutable laws of nature", and which of 
those laws is it that “gridlock” does not follow. What it would appear to be suggested is that 
under natural law no resources are wasted because ownership is disputed. However, it can’t be 
the case because nature is full of waste. What is more likely is that Heller is asserting that the 
neo-classical ideal of absolute sovereignty over property is an immutable law of nature, and 
fragmented ownership conflicts with that ideal. If this is the case; it is a bold assertion, for it 
elevates disputed ideological assumptions to the level of indisputable universal law, not to 
mention that fact that it tends to rewrite six million years of human history in which property 
resources were shared.305 Given the issues with this first assertion, it is perhaps best to ignore it 
and move on the next assertion. This assertion suggests that gridlock over property disputes are 
“not intrinsic to an economy or culture”. Where this assertion comes from is unknown, but it is 
clearly mistaken. Literally since the dawn of mankind, humans have been fighting over disputed 
economic, cultural, or ownership issues. If his assertion were true, most of those conflicts would 
not have happened.  
What’s left are Heller’s last two assertions which appear to suggest that it is “mistakes and 
gaps in economic, legal, or social organizations”, which have resulted in “ownership gone awry”. 
Assuming the “ownership gone awry” refers to the fragmented ownership these assertions 
suggest that Heller believes any economic, legal or social policy which results in fragmented 
ownership is a mistake, or conversely that sound legal and social policies tend to promote and 
maintain unitary ownership.  
The problem with this assessment is that again it ignores the march of human history towards 
truly universal property rights, which guarantees everyone’s right to own property. Further it 
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does nothing to address the legal issues inherent in inherently integrated properties, most 
notability correlated intellectual properties. For example, how does legal system grant sole 
ownership rights to integrated intellectual property which has been created by thousands of 
independent inventors and innovators? Should all but one of those inventors and innovators be 
stripped of their creations in order to facilitate the unified property ownership ideal? Wouldn’t 
such an action be a direct contradiction of; not only the universal property rights but the 
neoclassical notions of absolute property rights? 
Logical dictates that the way in which a problem is define will be reflected in the proposed 
solution.306 After defining the cause of the tragedy as “mistakes and gaps in economic, legal or 
social organization”, which lead to a fragmented ownership structure, the most logical solution 
must involve in some way change economic, legal and social policy to avoid fragmented property 
ownership. Unsurprisingly, this is preciously the primary solution that Heller most advocates to 
solve a tragedy of the anti-commons. This solution being propose in both an ex ante and ex post 
form.  
Under its ex ante form Heller primary solution requires a constant vigilance to identify and 
avoid situations where “people own small chunks of things that can be best used in larger 
bundles”307 This vigilance to be particularly acute when property rights are first being assigned 
in newly emerging markets because; 
'The greatest risk of gridlock arises when governments define property rights for 
the first time. ... Regulators don’t have a strong passion to get rights right. They want 
to please competing constituencies-everyone should get something-ant they fail to 
realize that privatization can go too far.'308 
The core idea being that if potential gridlock situations are identified early, the law can be 
“tweaked” before the rights become entrenched. Presumably this would involve restricting the 
minimum ownership size, as opposed to the restricting who can own the property, but no details 
are provided as to what form this “tweaking” should take.309 
The ex post form of Heller’s solution applies to situations where overly fragmented 
ownership structures have already created gridlock. In this situation Heller’s makes two 
recommendations, one voluntary and the other mandatory. The voluntary solution involves the 
creation of “assemble tools” which “make it easier to put rights together”310. As examples of this 
solution Heller points to oil-field unitization and condominium agreements.311 The assumption 
being that these assemble tools will allow for the voluntary assembly of the fragmented 
ownership structure by the owners. The mandatory solution recommended by Heller involves 
“wiping out existing rights and starting over”.312 The implication of this recommendation is that 
he believes that the government should be able to confiscate and reassign title to property, in 
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order to eliminate a tragedy of the anti-commons. A proposal which he more specifically 
articulates in the following statement; 
'Faced with intractable gridlock, we should be able to condemn rights, pay just 
compensation, assemble the resource, and move it to the higher value use.'313  
Heller identifies two examples of laws which represent this confiscation solution, “eminent 
domain” and “march-in rights”. Eminent domain describing a process whereby the government 
forces the sale a property because its development is essential to the advancement of some 
public good. March on rights being a specific legal remedy included in the Bayh–Dole Act314 
which allows the Government to breach the exclusivity of government institutional licensing 
agreements if the licensee is in breach of one of four criteria.315 
In addition to these two-principle recommendation Heller does include alternative and non-
traditional solutions. The first of these involves shaming the misbehaving party into a more 
reasonable behaviour.316 The next involves entering into voluntary arrangements like patent 
pool.317 Lastly Heller suggests that philanthropy can be used as a solution.318   
It should be noted that each of these proposed solutions in some way or another is designed 
to reduce the fragmented nature of the ownership structure. This is hardly surprising given 
Heller’s definition of the problem as resulting from excessive fragmentation. However, it is 
rather disappointing, because it indicates that Heller does not appreciate the evolutionary 
nature of property ownership from a private privilege to a universal right. Further he appears to 
be reluctant to break away from the neo-classical ideology which insists on Blackstone’s 
definition of property as “that sole and despotic dominion ...over the external things in the 
world, in total exclusion of the rights of any other individual in the universe”. To better 
understand the full extent of this misconception only requires that those same ideas be 
observed using a broader prospective. 
Taking the broadest possible prospective a “tragedy of the anti-commons” represents little 
more than an economic description of an unresolved property dispute which prevents the 
property from being fully used. So, although the focus of the anti-commons tragedy is on smaller 
highly fragmented properties, it could just as easily be applied to much larger properties. For 
example; most of the wars fought for European domination could be considered tragedies of 
the anti-common, as they involved intractable property disputes which resulted in the 
destruction or underuse of property. If these wars were considered tragedies of the anti-
common, then theoretically Heller’s solution would be to unify to property under a single owner. 
While it is undoubtedly true that if one Monarch had uncontested ownership of all of Europe, 
much of the property destruction would have been avoided, it is highly unlikely that any modern 
economist would recommend such a solution. There are at least two reasons why such a solution 
would not be recommended. First it would violate the social and economic ideal of universal 
property rights, which are the fundamental to western democracy and the capitalist market. 
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Second it could never result in optimal economic efficiency as it would put the decision-making 
power on how to use the property into too few hands.319 The point of this extrapolation is that 
although unification of a property may eliminate gridlock, it does not necessarily mean that it is 
the solution which should be adopted, and it should not be adopted if it both violates the ideal 
of universal property rights and results in suboptimal level of efficiency.  
With respect to the evolution of property rights. The vast majority of societies quite some 
time ago adopted universal property rights, a policy which provides everyone with the right to 
own property. If governments put in place policies which limit the minimum size of properties, 
this will have the de facto effect of increasing property prices and thereby of reducing the ability 
of less affluent members to buy property. At the very least they could not afford to buy the 
larger unified properties on their own. So, while such a policy may solve the tragedy of anti-
commons, it would increase the social divide and make a mockery of the ideal of universal 
property rights. A case of the cure being worse than the disease. 
This can be more fully appreciated by considering the implications that a unified property 
policy would have in the field of intellectual property. This disastrous effect would occur because 
it would disenfranchise and otherwise eliminate the incentive to innovate for vast majority of 
innovators. As mentioned earlier, it must be recognised that most modern technology is not the 
sole creation of a single entity but rather an aggregation of the best innovations crated by a 
multitude of entities. As such if there was a policy that limited the intellectual property 
ownership in a given technology to one entity, this would require the disenfranchise of all other 
innovators working in the technological field. While some of those disenfranchised innovators 
may find work in the entity which has been granted the sole ownership, many will not and their 
creative contribution to the field will be lost. Furthermore, even those who were fortunate 
enough to find work, may not find it as rewarding as working independently and so be less 
creative. All in all, this loss of creative will almost certainly overwhelm the gains that will be 
made by avoiding the gridlock. Not to mention the fact that such a policy would also dramatically 
increase the cost of owning intellectual property, which would reduce the ability of less affluent 
members of society to own the property. A more tangible method of conceptualising the 
magnitude of this potential disaster would be to imagine what the internet would look like today 
if IBM had been granted sole ownership of computing technology. 
Given the significance of universal property rights in these matters, a clear definition appears 
appropriate. In this thesis universal property rights will be defined as meaning;  
'those rights which guarantee everyone has an equal right to own property and that 
similar properties will be provide with the same rights.'320 
This is quite a different from neoclassical version of property rights which supposedly grants 
owners with; “sole and despotic dominion ...in total exclusion of the rights of any other 
individual in the universe”. In fact, these differences are so great it renders these two versions 
of property rights rather incompatible. An incompatibility which is easily illustrated with a single 
case. In 1916 The Court of Appeals of Kentucky up held the following ordinance; 
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“An ordinance to prevent conflict and ill-feeling between the white and colored 
races in the city of Louisville, and to preserve the public peace and promote the general 
welfare, by making reasonable provisions requiring, as far as practicable, the use of 
separate blocks, for residences, places of abode, and places of assembly by white and 
colored people respectively.'321 
By the first section of the ordinance it is made unlawful for any colored person to 
move into and occupy as a residence, place of abode, or to establish and maintain as 
a place of public assembly any house upon any block upon which a greater number of 
houses are occupied as residences, places of abode, or places of public assembly by 
white people than are occupied as residences, places of abode, or places of public 
assembly by colored people.'322 
The ordinance can be viewed as evidence that "white" property owners believed their 
property rights were so absolute, that they can use those rights to protect their property from 
damage that would be brought as a result of “colored” people being allowed to move into their 
neighbourhoods. That the ordinance also prohibited “white” people from moving into “colored” 
neighbourhoods does not make this ordinance compatible with universal property rights, 
because it only treats people equally by depriving both “colored” and “whites” of their universal 
rights. Ironically this ordinance was struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court not because it 
prevented “colored” people from buying property, but because it violated a “white” owners 
constitutional right to dispose of his property to a “colored” buyer.323 Despite the origins of the 
Court’s decision to hear the case, the decision itself was a clear declaration that the property 
rights provided for under the United States Constitution were universal and must be applied 
equally to all people; 
'The Fourteenth Amendment made all persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, citizens of the United States and of the states in which they reside, and provided 
that no state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States, and that no state shall deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person the 
equal protection of the laws' 324 and  'We think this attempt to prevent the alienation 
of the property in question to a person of color was not a legitimate exercise of the 
police power of the state, and is in direct violation of the fundamental law enacted in 
the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution preventing state interference with 
property rights except by due process of law. That being the case, the ordinance 
cannot stand.” 325 
Conveniently in this case the Court also mentioned another inconsistency between neo-
classical and universal property rights when it refers to the ability of police powers to limit 
absolute rights.  
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“True it is that dominion over property springing from ownership is not absolute 
and unqualified. The disposition and use of property may be controlled in the exercise 
of the police power in the interest of the public health, convenience, or welfare. 
Harmful occupations may be controlled and regulated. Legitimate business may also 
be regulated in the interest of the public. Certain uses of property may be confined to 
portions of the municipality other than the resident district, such as livery stables, 
brickyards and the like, because of the impairment of the health and comfort of the 
occupants of neighbouring property. Many illustrations might be given from the 
decisions of this court, and other courts, of this principle”326 
This is a clear statement from the Supreme Court’s which has determined that property 
rights, while universal, are not absolute and the that government can restrict those rights if it is 
in the public interest. This case illustrates why Heller recommendation is so surprising. By 
recommending using the state police power to unify fragmented property, he is effectively 
supporting the notion that the ownership of potentially anti-common property; be terminated 
for small property owners and transferred to those that can afford the unified property. This 
elimination of small property owners not only would be a direct breach of universal property 
rights it also ignores the potential to limit property rights for the public good.  
A related aspect of the tragedy of the anti-commons which also appears to have been 
overlooked, is the possibility that a fragmented property structure might provide the most 
efficient outcome. Just as a single Monarch owning all the land in Europe is less efficient than a 
Europe owned by a fragmented multitude of diverse land owners, a single company owning all 
the intellectual property technology related to modern industry would almost certainly be less 
efficient than a multitude of innovators providing and owning the technology. Certainly, from 
an origination prospective it is hard to imagine that one entity would have the same creativity 
as hundreds, if not thousands, of independent inventors. 
Ironically the criticism of centralized ownership can is drawn directly from the neo-classical 
economic theory which was used to condemn communism. According to economists like 
Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman; communism was always going to be less efficient than 
capitalism, because capitalism allowed for multitude of independent decision makers to develop 
goods for the market.327 This criticism however apparently disappears when it is a single 
capitalist rather than a single communist that is making the decisions. 
While the incoherence of this logic is apparent, its origins are less obvious. Indications are 
that it most likely results; not from a faith in capitalism, but rather from a contempt for 
government. A contempt so great that it prevents neo-classical proponents from taking a 
position that would recommend government regulations.328 This ideological belief being driven 
by the undeniable fact that unrestrained government regulations can become so oppressive, 
they strangle economic activities that they are intended to promote. The fatal flaw of neo-
classical supporters is they have become so preoccupied by detrimental government 
regulations, that they have become loath to acknowledge, let alone endorse a regulation which 
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might be beneficial. A position which is undermined by everyday evidence that some regulatory 
limitations are both necessary and beneficial.329  
In Heller’s case that flaw is evident; not just because he does not recommend government 
involvement to limit property rights, nor because he recommends the defragmentation of 
properties, but because he recommends confiscating property to create a monopoly rather than 
allowing the government to limit property rights. By making this recommendation he is 
effectively acknowledging that he considers that the known market failures of a monopoly, to 
be preferable to the supposedly dire consequence which would follow if a government limited 
property rights. Ignoring the irony of having the government interfere by confiscation property, 
the assumption that a monopoly is better than promoting property ownership; would appear to 
be a tragedy in and of itself. 
Of course, it may be that Heller only intentioned that limits on minimum property size be 
imposed in case where gridlock has become intractable or is expected to become intractable. 
Although this would certainly limit the damage of such a policy, it raises more questions than it 
solves. For example, what is the criteria that defines intractable gridlock or likely intractable 
gridlock? Is it only when there is evidence of a total collapse or an impending total collapse or is 
it enough that there is evidence of under use? If underuse is the criteria what level of underuse 
would be the threshold? Who decides when circumstances meet that criteria? Even if an 
intractable gridlock is undeniably, how does one identify which of the fragmented owners will 
be granted sole ownership of the property and who will be disenfranchised? Who will decide 
who gets ownership and who is disenfranchised? Will the disenfranchised owners receive 
compensation for their property? If so how much and again who gets to decide? The list of 
potential questions goes on and in reality, there is no way to answer these questions in a manner 
that would satisfy all owners.  
Fortuitously it turns out that economists do not have to spent must time debating the right 
answer to these difficult questions as there exists a tried and tested alternative solution to the 
tragedy of the anti-commons which does not involve confiscating property and giving it to a 
monopolist. 
This solution involves redefining the problem from one focusing on the fragmented nature 
of the property, to the one focusing on addressing the antiquated, economic, legal, and social 
policies of absolute property rights. If this were to happen there is every expectation that the 
“tragedy of the anti-commons" would be replaced by a “triumph of the anti-common”. 
5.2.4 The Triumph of the Anti-Commons 
As discussed in the criticism of Heller's solution to the anti-commons tragedy, it appears both 
ironic and illogical to suggest that it would be reasonable for governments to use their police 
powers to confiscate property from small properties owners in order to create a monopoly of 
larger owners, while at the same time being unwilling to allow them to use those same powers 
to merely limit the ownership rights of inherently integrated property owners. This irony 
becomes even more pronounced when it is evident that some of the historical examples 
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provided by Heller were in fact solved by pursuing limitations in property rights, and not by 
creating a monopoly ownership situation. This irony is further compounded by the fact that such 
limitations were facilitated through the simple application of an existing legal doctrine, rather 
than a regulatory change which would be difficult to achieve. That doctrine is called the 
correlative rights doctrine, which was defined in the introduction as follows; 
'When multiple parties have individual property claims on an inherently integrated 
property each is legally entitled to their proportional share of the value of that property 
and the law should protect that share from being appropriated by others, including other 
owners.'330 
The proposition that a limiting ownership rights by apply the correlated doctrine is better 
than a solution than a monopoly rests on three premises.   
 Firstly; because achieving a monopoly is usually going to involve conflicts which will result 
in the destruction of property. 
 Secondly; because destruction can be avoided through the implementation of appropriate 
regulations; which is to say that the conflicting interest of the fragmented owners can be 
resolved by limiting property rights.  
 Third; because there are inherent benefits to having fragmented property ownership which 
are lost under a unified property regime. The primary benefit which can be expected to 
accrue from a fragmented property structure is an increase in innovations which is derived 
from an increase in the diversity of decision making and the therefore the creation of a 
more vibrant industry.331   
All of these premises certainly apply to the European wars mentioned earlier. The 
destructiveness of the wars is obvious. The peace treaties that prevented the wars would seem 
like agreements which limited property rights and notion that expanding the ranks of property 
ownership generates economic benefits would appear to be historically self-evident. A good 
example of this would be the resolution of Hundred Years war between England and France. 
Under the Treaty of Picquigny332 the two Monarchs agreed to a seven-year truce, a mutual 
defence pack and free-trade between the two countries. In addition to these and certain other 
financial terms they also organised a committee which would meet annually to resolve future 
disputes through binding arbitrations. While the terms to the treaty favoured England, it clearly 
ensconced into the field of international relations, the concept of correlative rights. This concept 
basically required that the both English and French Monarchy avoid engaging in actions which 
were harmful to the other or to their dominion. Whilst this treaty was still far from ideal, (mainly 
because it perpetuated the quasi exclusive rule of the monarchy), it does provide a very salient 
lesson as to the explanation of the differences between absolute and correlative rights. Under 
absolute rights peace and prosperity is only achieved if the one side is able to conquer and 
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eliminate the rights of the others. Whereas with correlative rights peace and prosperity can be 
achieved by the simple act of respecting the rights of others. 
This lesson is as valid today as it was 600 years ago. The big difference is that because of the 
evolution towards universal property rights, which mean there are now millions of property 
owners, it is no longer possible to protect correlated rights through bilateral or even multilateral 
agreements. What is required is an application of the correlated rights doctrine which codifies 
those rights in a way that can be relied upon by all property owners. In its simplest form the 
doctrine provides property owners with a proportionate share of the rewards from an inherently 
integrated property and ensure that no property owner uses his property to harm the property 
of others.  
For examples of how a correlated rights doctrine would resolve disputes it seems logical to 
return to the tragedies of the anti-commons identified by Heller; 
 Middle Age Rhine River Traffic- Applying the correlative rights doctrine in this 
situation would involve first determining what aggregate rate which would provide the 
greatest return from river tolls and then dividing that rate by some measure of total 
boat distance travelled thereby deriving a metric of what a reasonable rate would be 
for boat activity on a Barron’s particular section of the river. If any Barron charged 
more than that rate they would be breaching their correlative rights doctrine as they 
would be taking more than their fair share of the aggregate revenue. Curiously 
something like this was done to solve this Middle Age gridlock. History shows that that 
once the central authority was restored, unauthorized tolls were eliminated, and 
authorized tolls were limited. These centrally imposed controls can be considered to 
represent a profit maximising solution that provided enough revenue to maintain the 
fidelity of the most important Barons, while at the same time being low enough be to 
allow for the resumption of profitable river traffic. Further given that the river boat 
captains would undoubtedly complaint about of any excessive tolls payments it is likely 
that the authorized tolls were all be kept at about the same level. If they were not, this 
would have offended the Barons who received lower tolls and thus created undue 
resentment towards the monarchy. To the extent these similar sized tolls represented 
a proportional share in the profit maximising revenue they can be considers a 
correlated solution. 
 The Irish Potato Famine- Although the Irish potato famine shouldn’t really be 
considered a tragedy of the anti-common, applying the correlative rights doctrine to 
this unbridled greed tragedy would mean that the rights of the landowner to the crops 
should be correlated with the rights of the tenant farmers to a fair return on their 
labour. Any just assessment of this correlation would surely require that the landlord 
share enough of the crops with the tenant farmers to keep them from starving. An 
assessment that the rest of the European landlords accepted, but the Irish absentee 
landlords rejected.   
 Urban Development- In urban development cases the dispute is usually portrayed 
as a dispute over two mutually exclusive uses of a property. While the correlative rights 
doctrine is not designed arbitrate between two mutually exclusive uses, it can provide 
an indication of the highest proportional return to the property owners from those 






sharing of rewards is what is really driving the dispute. This would likely be the case in 
situations where a new use is being proposed, which has a much higher value and the 
owners are being offered a value based on the old use. If the owners are offered their 
proportionate share of the value of the new use the dispute may not even arise. Simple 
appropriating the property from the owners at the old use value and giving it to a new 
owner at that value would appear to be an unjust redistribution of property. Only if 
the offer to owners is at the higher new use value and they still do not want to sell, 
should an eminent domain be considered.333  
 Public Infrastructure Development- Public infrastructure developments are 
different from private urban development as rather than transferring the property to 
another private, owner the property is being procured for public use. The value of that 
public use is however very hard to determine, which is why most public eminent 
domain purchases are done at the current use valuation. The correlative property 
rights doctrine can add little to this process as it can’t compare the value generated 
between the two uses.  
 U.S Airplane Manufacturing-The correlative rights doctrine would solve this 
problem by determining what would be the profit maximising aggregated rate which 
could be charged for the aviation intellectual property and then provide some 
guidance as to the proportionate share that should be allocated to each patent. Patent 
owners which wanted to charge more than the proportionate share would have to 
justify the excess in by indicating why their intellectual property was more valuable 
than the intellectual property of others. The case referred to by Heller is complicate by 
the fact the aircraft were needed to fight in the First World War. Because airplanes 
were so essential to the war effort, this dramatically increased their value and would 
have facilitated significant war profiteering on the part of the patent owners. If war 
profiteering was not the objective of Wright-Martin when they sent out letters 
informing airplane manufacturing companies that they would be seeking 5% royalties 
for the use of their one patent, it would have certainly been the result. It should be 
noted that if the same rate were to be applied to the other 60 aviation patents that 
were outstanding at the time, this would have aggregated into a rate equal to 300% of 
the value of an airplane. This dispute therefore had more to do with patent hold-up 
than gridlock.  
That said according to Heller this gridlock was solved by through the creation of 
government mandated compulsory patent pool, which was to be owned and 
controlled by the newly created Manufacturers Aircraft Association (MAA). For him it 
was the unification of all the relevant intellectual properties under one body which 
could license all the relevant intellectual property to aircraft manufactures that 
unlocked the gridlock and enable the U.S. manufacturers to take their rightful place at 
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the forefront of the aviation industry. This description has been disputed in a paper 
which argues that there was no gridlock and that the only issue at dispute was the level 
of royalties the Government was going to have to pay on airplanes which were need 
for the impending war.334 While this new paper provides a compelling argument as to 
the lack of a gridlock, it does not provide as compelling an argument on the lack of a 
hold-up.  
Regardless of whether it was gridlock or a holdup the correlative rights doctrine could 
have solved either by mandating that aircraft patent holders not charge more for the 
use of their intellectual property than the correlated value they provide to an airplane. 
Such a rule may have avoided the transfer of patents to the MAA, but it would have 
ensured that later follow on patent would also be proportionately rewarded.335  
 Drug Development Tools- Just as with any other intellectual property dispute the 
correlative right doctrine can solve the gridlock by first determining the aggregated 
profit maximising value of the combined testing tools and providing an indication of 
how that aggregates should be proportionality distributed. If tool owners wanted to 
charge a higher licensing fee they would have to justify it by showing their particular 
property added more value than the others. 
 Oil Drilling Prohibitions-Whilst oil drilling prohibitions would appear to represent 
a dispute between two mutually exclusive use, something which the correlative rights 
doctrine is not designed to solve, the fact is that the doctrine has been used to solve 
oil drilling disputes for more than a century. Its use is possible because oil reservoirs 
are usually large enough to facilitate extraction access over are large area. As such 
drilling can sometimes be accommodated in less intrusive locations, far away from 
areas where they conflict with the other uses. When this is possible the correlative 
rights doctrine provides that the property owner who was prevented from drilling into 
the reservoir, still receives a proportional share of the oil revenues from oil that was 
extracted from the reservoir in other locations.336  
As can be seen from these examples the correlative rights doctrine can solve almost every 
perceived tragedy of the anti-commons. However, solving a tragedy is not what changes a 
tragedy into a triumph. Correlative rights change a tragedy into a triumph because it ensures 
maximum value through encouraging higher ownership rates, while at the same time providing 
a fair share of that value to all property owners.  
Higher ownership participation rates are beneficial from both an abstract and practical 
prospective. From an abstract prospective the mere fact that more people are able to own 
property is in and of itself a benefit, as this increases their sense of self-worth.337 A concept 
which is clearly conveyed in the moral right justification for copyright law. This justification 
focuses on the personal and reputational elements of the work, rather than merely its monetary 
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value. From a practical prospective the most obvious benefit is that when more people have 
ownership interest in a property there will be more brain power focused on how best to use and 
develop the property. These increased ownership levels will also obviously increase the level of 
competition between the property owners. The most tangible effect of this increase competition 
can be found in the field of intellectual property where the creative race to develop new 
intellectual properties clearly benefits from an increase in the number of participants engaged 
in that race. 
The proportional rewards requirements also have both abstract and practical benefits. From 
an abstract prospective, the proportional distribution of rewards certainly conforms the 
fundamental ideas of fairness and lends credibility to the presumption that legal system ought 
to be just. It also aids in the development of self-worth, in that it avoids the demeaning prospect 
of owning property where the rewards are appropriated by another.  
From a practical prospective the first benefit of proportionality is that encourages 
cooperation between property owners because they do not have to fear that their contributions 
will be appropriated by those that they are cooperating with. The second advantage of 
proportionality is that it encourages innovative competition particularly in the field of 
intellectual property because new innovations will also receive their proportionate reward.338 
Finally proportionality requirements will almost inevitably reduce litigation levels. The first way 
that it will reduce litigation is that it will force both owners and implementers to adopt more 
reasonable expectation as to intellectual property values which will make voluntarily negotiated 
agreements more likely. The second way it reduces litigation is that it could allow the courts to 
punish parties that come to court with totally disproportional expectation. Such punishment 
sending a message to potential litigants that unreasonable licensing demands which either 
excessively overvalue or undervalue the intellectual property are counterproductive. 
All of which makes it a far better solution than confiscating property and providing that 
property to a monopolist. Given these potential benefits it could justifiably be asserted that not 
only does applying the correlative rights doctrine solve the tragedy of the anti-commons, it 
changes it into a “Triumph of the Anti-Commons.” 
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6. A History of the Correlated Rights Doctrine 
'common law by its own principles adapts itself to varying conditions, and modifies its 
own rules so as to serve the ends of justice under the different circumstances, a principle 
adopted into our code by section 3510 of the Civil Code: "When the reason of a rule 
ceases, so should the rule itself.” This is well stated in Morgan v. King, 30 Barb. 16:  “We 
are not bound to follow the letter of the common law, forgetful of its spirit; its rule instead 
of its principle.'339 
This quote is provided at the beginning of this chapter for two reasons. The first reason is 
because it provides a succinct explanation of how and why common law should evolve when 
faced with changes which occur in a society. The second, because it is drawn from what was the 
first case to articulated and defined the correlated rights doctrine in any body of law. While the 
two bodies of law discussed below may not be the first to use the practice of providing owners 
of integrated properties with a proportionate share of the rewards from that property, they 
were the first to adopt a formal doctrine which require that the courts to recognise and formalise 
that practice. 
Although it may have been sufficient to simply identify how the correlative rights is used in 
both water law and oil and gas law, this chapter also provides information on the evolution of 
those respective laws. This enhanced analysis is provided to highlight the similarities between 
the way that those bodies of laws changed their understanding of their underlying subject and 
how intellectual property law is changing in the same manner. Another reason for providing the 
details behind the evolution of these laws is because it provides an illustration of how current 
problems in intellectual property are not that much different from those which were 
experienced in other industries, thereby providing a tangible example of how the correlative 
rights doctrine can be used to better resolve intellectual property disputes. Finally, these 
histories are provided simply because it may encourage material comparison not include in this 
discussion by others. 
6.1 The Evolution of Correlated Water Rights 
In many ways water law followed the same evolutionary path that can be observed with all 
property rights. Beginning with a common ownership phase, followed by a concentrated 
ownership phase, finally moving to a universal ownership phase. Significantly each of these 
phases is distinguishable by the application of different legal doctrines, which reflected the 
rights provided under each phase. First there was the riparian doctrine which viewed water as a 
common resource and required that land owners avoid using the water which passed through 
their property in a way which would harm downstream land owners. Then there were the 
absolute and prior appropriation doctrines which established a landowner’s absolute right to 
water, which later evolved into an absolute right for those who first used the water. Under both 
                                                          






these later doctrines owners were effectively able to disregard any effect that their use may 
have had on others who also wanted to use the water. Finally, there was the correlative rights 
doctrine which established a joint right to water based upon proportional land ownership. This 
final doctrine was meant to ensure that no owner appropriated more than their fair share of the 
water resource form other land owners.  
While a comprehensive description of the evolution of water law would necessitate 
describing the development under Roman law and the changes which occurred in the United 
Kingdom,340 this section will omit that long-term evolution and instead focus on the much 
quicker evolution of water law in the State of California.341 This can be done because although 
Californian water law evolved somewhat differently and in a more compressed timeframe, its 
evolution included the application of all the doctrines included in the long-term evolution. It will 
be done because the more modern Californian case law provides a clearer and more direct 
comparison with the evolution of modern intellectual property law. A comparison will reveal 
remarkable parallels between the two bodies of law, which can be directly attributed the similar 
nature of the underlying properties and corresponding searches for equitable and efficient 
solutions. 
To begin this analysis, it should be noted that American water law evolved from an initial 
application of either riparian and prior appropriation doctrines. Whereas in the Eastern States 
they tended to favour riparian rights, in the Western States they tended to rely on prior 
appropriation as the guiding principles for developing water law. In eight states; Idaho, 
Montana, Wyoming, Nevada, Utah, Colorado, Arizona and New Mexico, they had only 
appropriative rights whereas the nine other western states, Washington, Oregon, California, 
North Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Texas and Oklahoma have had a “mixed” system of riparian 
rights and appropriative rights. These doctrinal differences can be attributed to the differences 
in water use in the various States. Whereas in the riparian States water was initially used mainly 
for agricultural purposes, in appropriative States water was initially used primarily used for 
mining purposes and in the mixed States the water use was initially divided. California’s statutes 
as mixed state and its subsequent development and application of the correlated rights doctrine 
can be easily understood when put in the context of its historical development and reviewing 
the case law associated with that development.  
6.1.1 Prior Appropriation Rights 
California was ceded to the United States by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo which ended 
the war between the two countries in 1848. Apart from some private land rights granted by the 
former Spanish and Mexican Governments the entire area became public property of United 
States. This happened at the same time that word began to spread about the discovery of gold 
in Sierra Nevada, which precipitated one of the biggest gold rushes in history. During the influx 
of gold miners, the inhabitants adopted a Constitution in preparation for their admission in to 
the Union which took place in 1850. Among the first acts of the legislature was the declaration 
that the common law of England would be applied by the court if it was in harmony with the 
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federal constitution and laws and constitution of the state. This meant that there would be three 
doctrines applied to water rights: pueblo, riparian and prior appropriation.342  
While the English common law focused on riparian rights, it initially had little application in 
the state, as most of the early water use was for mining purposes. Specifically, the miner used 
the water to wash the gold out of the gravel in slosh boxes. When the mines were not located 
on a river they would build trenches and aqueducts to take it to their mining sites. Not only were 
these uses not a customary use for riparian rights; because the miners were trespassers on 
public property and not property owners, they could have no riparian rights. Absent riparian 
rights, and indeed any legal structure for the use of water, the miners adopted their own 
customs for regulating water use. This custom allowed miners to continue to use any water that 
they needed and could acquire, so long as they continued their mining activities. As this custom 
was equivalent to the prior appropriation doctrine in England, the state Legislature in 1851, 
decreed that the "customs, usage, or regulations" established by the miners could be used to 
govern disputes between them, thus officially accepting the appropriation principle.343 This was 
followed by the Mining Act of 1866 whereby the Californian Congress recognized the miners' 
appropriative rights acquired under local custom by virtue of their diversion and use of water, 
rights which were which was codified in 1872 when provisions were added to the Civil Code 
creating a statutory procedure for securing appropriative water rights.344 A classic example of 
prior appropriation in US water law would be the 1855 case of Irwin v. Phillips.345. 
According to the facts of that case, Phillips owned a canal that took water to his mining site 
which was some distance from stream. Sometime later Irwin sought to set up a mining operation 
which was hindered due to a lack of water, as it was downstream from where Phillips sourced 
his water. Irwin appealed to the California Supreme Court to enforce riparian water rights as his 
claim was beside the stream and he felt that riparian rights ought to protect the natural flow of 
water. Although the court decided that riparian rights could not exist because Irwin did not own 
the land on which he was mining, they also recognised the importance of the mining industry, 
and the need to protect the investments that the industry had made in essential water 
infrastructure:  
'a system has been permitted to grow up by the voluntary action and assent of the 
population, whose free and unrestrained occupation of the mineral region has been 
tacitly assented to by the one government, and heartily encouraged by the expressed 
legislative policy of the other. ... Among these the most important are the rights of 
miners to be protected in the possession of their selected localities, and the rights of 
those who, by prior appropriation, have taken the waters from their natural beds, and 
by costly artificial works have conducted them for miles over mountains and ravines, 
to supply the necessities of gold diggers, and without which the most important 
interests of the mineral region would remain without development.346 
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Using this justification, the final ruling stated that:  
'The miner, who selects a piece of ground to work, must take it as he finds it, subject 
to prior rights, which have an equal equity, on account of an equal recognition from 
the sovereign power. If it is upon a stream the waters of which have not been taken 
from their bed, they cannot be taken to his prejudice; but if they have been already 
diverted, and for as high, and legitimate a purpose as the one he seeks to accomplish, 
he has no right to complain, no right to interfere with the prior occupation of his 
neighbor, and must abide the disadvantages of his own selection.'347  
6.1.2 Riparian Rights 
While Irwin v. Phillips rejected the riparian rights of the plaintiff it clearly foretold the 
potential for conflict between appropriative and riparian rights. This potential for conflict 
became much more likely three years later with the passage of the Homestead Act of 1862, 
which opened up public land to private ownership. Under Common law private ownership would 
endow those private land owners with riparian rights. To alleviate the potential for conflict, in 
1870 a supplementary act was passed which provided that all Homesteads, as well as all patents 
granted for public land, would be subject to the appropriative rights included in the Mining Act 
of 1866. This provided the early appropriators of water with vested water rights which were 
senior to all riparian rights, including the state's own riparian water rights. 
This however did not end the conflicts; as water appropriation which occurred prior to a 
transfer to private ownership were clearly granted a superior right, appropriations after such 
transfers did not. Which is to say that any homestead could claim that their riparian rights 
provided them with protection against any appropriation which occurred after ownership of the 
property was transferred to them. This protection being recognised in the 1886 Supreme Court 
decision of Lux v. Haggin. 348  
In that case Lux (the plaintiff) was seeking an injunction which would prohibit Haggin (the 
defendant), from taking upstream of water from the Kern river for irrigation that they needed 
for their downstream cattle business. The plaintiffs invoked the doctrine of riparian rights in 
support of their request for this injunction. In a lower court it was ruled that neither of them 
were riparian owners as the plaintiff's property bordered a slough which did not have a defined 
course of water and the defendant was using water on property which was not adjacent to the 
river. Given lack of riparian rights, the lower court denied the injunction based on the 
defendant’s appropriation rights. The plaintiffs appealed to the Californian Supreme Court, 
which was accepted as they felt that there were facts to be determined by a new trial. The most 
significant fact being a recognition that the water on the plaintiff's property flowed through it, 
and thus had to be considered a waterway; which meant the plaintiff did have riparian rights. 
The question then became whose rights should have priority, the plaintiff's riparian rights or the 
defendant’s appropriative rights.  
In an opinion occupying nearly two hundred pages the court held that the doctrine of riparian 
rights had been adopted in 1850 with the common law and still prevailed. It further decided that 
riparian rights which attached to riparian land, was superior to the rights of all other 
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appropriators, except those who had made an appropriation prior to it becoming private 
property. Justice Sharpstein explaining this decision by juxtaposed the doctrines of riparian 
rights and appropriation rights as follows:  
'Both, the State and the United States governments have granted to private persons 
and corporations large tracts of land which have remained unoccupied and in their 
virgin state for many years afterwards. It probably never occurred to any one that the 
owners, by neglecting to appropriate the grasses and trees naturally growing on such 
lands to some useful purpose, left them open and subject to a rightful appropriation 
by someone else. And yet we have the same authority for holding that a simple grant 
of land conveys a right to have the water flowing over it continue so to flow, as we 
have for holding that it conveys a right to the trees and grasses growing on it, or to the 
sun itself. The principle that he who first appropriates property to a useful purpose is 
best entitled to it, applies only to cases in which none of the parties has a grant, actual 
or presumptive.'349  
In the same decision the court explain why appropriation was valid for some parts of the 
state and not for others: 
'In Hill vs. Smith (27 Cal., 476), it is explicitly denied that the rules of the common 
law touching water rights have been materially modified in this State, although in that 
case it is said that these rules do not apply to sections of the State in which water is 
exclusively used for mining purposes. But this was said in a case in which neither of the 
parties owned any land over which a natural stream of water flowed. The respective 
rights of prior and subsequent appropriators were alone involved. It is claimed that the 
same reason exists for not applying the common law doctrine of riparian rights to the 
agricultural, as is given for not applying to the mining regions of the State because 
water is as essential to the prosecution of the one industry as of the other in this State.  
But in Hill vs. Smith, the Court says: "When the law declares that a riparian 
proprietor is entitled to have the water of a stream flow in its natural channel -ubi 
currere solebat- without diminution or alteration, it does so because its flow imparts 
fertility to his land, and because water in its pure state is indispensable for domestic 
uses. But this rule is not applicable to miners and ditch owners, simply because the 
conditions upon which it is founded do not exist in their case." The conditions upon 
which it is said the rule is founded, do exist in agricultural districts. And it is the rule 
applicable to those districts which concerns us in this case. And after carefully 
examining all the cases bearing on this question, we are unable to find one in which it 
is held or even suggested that outside of the mining districts the common law doctrine 
of riparian rights does not apply with the same force and effect in this State as 
elsewhere.'350 
California therefore had adopted a dual system of water rights. One which attached riparian 
rights to land as soon as it became private property and provided appropriation rights to when 
                                                          







water was appropriate for other uses. The superiority of these rights being determined by the 
date that they were acquired. While this would appear to put these rights on equal footing, 
there was one major difference which gave riparian rights owners an advantage over 
appropriation rights owners. That advantage had to do with the limitation on the quantity and 
use of water. Whereas appropriated water was subject to strict controls on volume and defined 
uses, riparian land owners had no such restriction. The only restrictions which they faced were 
the requirement to use the water on their property, and to ensure that other downstream 
riparian owners were not harmed by that use. These riparian rights not only included current 
use, they could also include the right to future use. What this meant was the after riparian rights 
were granted, it was extremely difficult to get subsequent appropriations, as one or many 
riparian owners would oppose such appropriation because it might harm their future uses. Not 
even when the proposed future use might be unreasonable, and the proposed appropriation 
useful to the common good, could the use detract from this riparian right. This made California's 
new riparian owners as powerful as an owner would have been under the absolute water 
doctrine. A case which demonstrated this renewed absolutist doctrine was the 1926 case of 
Herminghaus v. Southern California Edison.351  
In that case Southern California Edison Company (the defendant) owned land upstream of 
Herminghuas (the plaintiff) on the San Joaquin river, where it was planning to build a power 
plant. The relevant local and national authorities had granted permission for the plant, as it 
would generate much needed electricity for California's growing population. These plans were 
opposed by the plaintiff, who brought action to obtain an injunction against its construction, on 
the basis that the proposed diversion of the waters required to fill the dam and the loss of annual 
flood waters, would injure his riparian rights. Apparently, it was only during the annual flood 
that the river rose up to a high enough for water to flow in canals at the higher elevations of the 
defendant's property and a loss of this annual watering would be detrimental to the productivity 
of that part of his property. The actual amount of water available for use on his property water 
was never at issue, as the dam would be filled during the spring runoff periods and the power 
generation activities did not actually take any water out of the river. To the extent that the 
plaintiff was seeking not damages, but an injunction against the construction of the power plant, 
it appears reasonable to suppose that he was less concerned with watering his land than he was 
about being able to extort a much larger amount of money from the defendant in return for 
having the injunction lifted.  
The practical decision the court had to make was should it allow the defendant to build the 
dam and provide much needed power to the State, or should it order an injunction which would 
allow the plaintiff to wet a small part of his land on an annual and temporary basis. Of course, 
they could have also decided that these choices were not the only options. For example, they 
could have denied the injunction, but ordered the defendant to pay the cost of installing 
irrigating equipment, which could be used to water the higher land throughout the year making 
it even more productive than it was with the annual flooding. Such a decision would be totally 
in keeping with the Supreme Courts authority and resolve the matter in a reasonable and 
equitable manner. The plaintiff would be better off, and the defendant could build, and the 
people of the State would receive an additional supply of much needed electricity.  
                                                          






Surprisingly in a four to three split decision the court granted the injunction, the majority 
justifying this decision based on what can only be described as an absolute riparian right. 
'In the presence of the foregoing consistent rulings of this court and of the federal 
court having reference to the precise or similar conditions relative to the annual, usual, 
ordinary, and regularly recurring outflow of the San Joaquin River during the varying 
seasons of each and every year we are constrained to hold that in so far as the lands 
of said plaintiffs shall be found to be riparian to said river they are entitled to the 
exercise and enjoyment of whatever riparian rights they shall be determined to be 
invested with, in the entire flow of the waters of said river considering the same with 
its seasonal accretions as the usual and ordinary flow of said stream during each and 
every year.'352 
And further stating that:  
'The doctrine that a riparian owner is limited to a reasonable use of the water 
applies only as between different riparian proprietors. As against an appropriator who 
seeks to divert water to nonriparian lands, the riparian owner is entitled to restrain 
any diversion which will deprive him of the customary flow of water which is or may 
be beneficial to his land. He is not limited by any measure of reasonableness.'353 
The dissenting opinion pointed out that:  
'In section 11 of that act [The Water Commission Act of 1913] the legislature has 
provided that all waters flowing in any river, except in so far as the same are or may 
be reasonably needed for useful and beneficial purposes upon lands riparian thereto 
or otherwise appropriated, are declared to be public waters of the state and subject 
to appropriation in accordance with the provisions of the act.'354 
Arguing that: 
'In order to have the beneficial use of less than one per cent of the maximum flow 
of the San Joaquin River on their riparian lands the plaintiffs are contending for the 
right to use the balance in such a way that, so far as they are concerned, over ninety-
nine per cent of that flow is wasted. This is a highly unreasonable use or method of the 
use of water.'355 
6.1.3 Reasonable or Beneficial Use Rights 
Unsurprisingly two years later in 1928 the California Legislature passed a Constitutional 
amendment which significantly enhanced the State Water Resources Control Board authority to 
limit unexercised riparian rights. The amendment states in part:  
                                                          
352 Id. p 91 
353 Id. p100-101 
354 Id. p124 






'It is hereby declared that because of the conditions prevailing in this state the 
general welfare requires that the water resources of the state be put to beneficial use 
to the fullest extent of which they are capable, and that the waste or unreasonable 
use or unreasonable method of use of water be prevented, and that the conservation 
of such waters is to be exercised with a view to the reasonable and beneficial use 
thereof in the interest of the people and for the public welfare. The right to water or 
to the use or flow of water in or from any natural stream or water course in this state 
is and shall be limited to such water as shall be reasonably required for the beneficial 
use to be served, and such right does not and shall not extend to the waste or 
unreasonable use or unreasonable method of use or unreasonable method of 
diversion of water. Riparian rights in a stream or water course attach to, but to no 
more than as much of the flow thereof as may be required or used consistently with 
this section, for the purposes for which such lands are, or may be made adaptable, in 
view of such reasonable and beneficial uses; provided, however, that nothing herein 
contained shall be construed as depriving any riparian owner of the reasonable use of 
water of the stream to which his land is riparian under reasonable methods of 
diversion and use, or of depriving any appropriator of water to which he is lawfully 
entitled. This section shall be self-executing, and the legislature may also enact laws in 
the furtherance of the policy in this section contained.'356  
From a practical prospective this amendment abolished a riparian owners' right to use the 
natural flow of the water for unreasonable or wasteful purposes, while preserving their right to 
the that same flow for beneficial and useful purposes, and rights of appropriative owners to 
their specified uses. Whereas this requirement for beneficial use did not replace, but rather only 
limited the rights of riparian water users, it does not necessarily represent a new doctrine. 
Indeed, under an application of the riparian doctrine in English courts this sort of legislative 
measure was not needed as they took a much less absolutist approach to applying the doctrine.  
Regardless of whether "beneficial use" was a new doctrine or not, it did change the rights of 
water users, and as such was inevitably going to be challenged by water users which wanted to 
maintain their absolutist rights, and this is precisely what happened a few years later in the case 
of GIN S. CHOW v. CITY OF SANTA BARBARA.357 
This case was similar to Herminghaus v. Southern California Edison in that the Gin S. Chow 
(the plaintiff) was seeking an injunction under his riparian rights to prevent the City of Santa 
Barbra (the defendant) from appropriating flood water upstream of the Santa Ynez River which 
ran by his property. It was different because this appropriation, involved constructing a dam, 
and series of canals and tunnels to divert the water from the river to Santa Barbra, where it 
would be used for domestic consumption. Unlike Herminghaus v. Southern California Edison, 
this would permanently reduce the flow of the river by the amount diverted. In order to avoid 
injury to the riparian right holders down the river it was stipulated that any diversion to fill the 
dam could only be done in the rainy season when the river was flooding, and those flood waters 
would otherwise flow past the riparian owners and be lost to the sea.  
When the lower court ruled on the case denying the injunction they also stipulated that:  
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'In order to safeguard at all events the usual, ordinary and customary flow of the 
stream to which the plaintiffs are found to be entitled, the court directed that the 
defendant city shall, during the summer and fall months in each year, and until the 
ensuing rainy season, release and discharge from the Gibraltar dam, into the stream 
channel of the river below said dam and reservoir, waters in excess of the waters 
flowing into said reservoir during said period, to the extent of 616 acre-feet; and that 
the defendants shall make and maintain such adequate and efficient provision, in 
connection with their dams and reservoirs, as will permit the usual, ordinary and 
customary flow of the river to be discharged into the stream bed of the river below the 
Gibraltar dam.'358 
This stipulation meant that the plaintiff would have a steadier flow of water throughout the 
year, which provided a potential to increase the productivity of his property. The plaintiff was 
however not satisfied with this ruling and made an appeal which was being heard in the Supreme 
Court. The plaintiff contention with respect to this appeal was that; although he was not capable 
of capturing the flood water, when it flooded it increased the saturation of the ground under his 
land and that the loss of this saturation was a breach of his riparian rights. The weakness of this 
argument lends itself to the notion that this case, like Herminghaus v. Southern California Edison, 
was more about attempting to extort excessive rewards through injunctive actions, than it was 
about protecting riparian rights. 
Obviously in the intervening period between the two cases the Legislature had amended the 
constitution, as described earlier. It was because of this amendment that the appeal failed. The 
court referring to the constitution in its ruling as follows:  
'The purpose of the amendment was stated to be "to prevent the waste of waters 
of the state resulting from an interpretation of our law which permits them to flow 
unused, unrestrained and undiminished to the sea", and is an effort "on the part of the 
state, in the interest of the people of the state, to conserve our waters" without 
interference with the beneficial uses to which such waters may be put  by the owners 
of water rights, including riparian owners. That such purpose is reflected in the 
language of the amendment is beyond question. Its language is plain and 
unambiguous. In the main it is an endeavor on the part of the people of the state, 
through its fundamental law, to conserve a great natural resource, and thereby render 
available for beneficial use that portion of the waters of our rivers and streams which, 
under the old riparian doctrine, was of no substantial benefit to the riparian owner 
and the conservation of which will result in no material injury to his riparian right, and 
without which conservation such waters would be wasted and forever lost. It was 
because this court felt impelled to adhere to the long-established rule of Lux v. Haggin, 
supra, that a constitutional amendment was made necessary. Upon the adoption of 
the amendment, it superseded all state laws inconsistent therewith.'359 
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To justify using the amendment in its ruling and to quell the notion that rules limiting riparian 
rights constituted a taking of property without compensation, which is prohibited by the 
American constitution, the court stated that: 
'There is a well recognized and established distinction between a "taking" or 
"damaging" for public use and the regulation of the use and enjoyment of a property 
right for the public benefit. The former falls within the realm of eminent domain, and 
the latter within the sphere of the police power. That the constitutional amendment 
now under consideration is a legitimate exercise of the police power of the state 
cannot be questioned. It is the highest and most solemn expression of the people of 
the state in behalf of the general welfare. The present and future well-being and 
prosperity of the state depend upon the conservation of its life-giving waters.'360 
Further stating that:  
'It has been long established that all property is held subject to the reasonable 
exercise of the police power and that constitutional provisions declaring that property 
shall not be taken without due process of law have no application in such cases. ... The 
constitutional amendment of 1928 is an exercise of that power. This is especially true 
as applied to the facts of the present case, which is a controversy between the public, 
represented by the municipality and the water district, on the one hand, and the 
property owners asserting a vested interest as against the exercise of the power on 
behalf of the public, on the other hand.'361 
Curiously while this California Supreme Court felt that they could only limit riparian rights as 
the result of a constitutional amendment, an earlier California Supreme Court did not feel as 
constrained when the extraction and use of ground water was at issue. In that earlier case the 
Supreme Court simply rejected both the riparian doctrine and appropriation doctrine and 
replaced them with a newly created correlated rights doctrine. 
6.1.4 Correlated Rights 
The practical implication of the correlated rights doctrine was that it allocated ground water 
rights not to the seniority of use, but rather according to a proportional share of the land which 
was owned above the reservoir. So, if a land owner owned 10% of the land above a reservoir 
than they were entitled to 10% of the natural replenishment rate of that reservoir. While this 
doctrine was first developed and applied in the 1902 case of Katz v. Walkinshaw,,362 it has since 
been adopted by a number of States throughout America. The reason why this doctrine is 
evolved in the United States and has not been evident in the other nations is related to the 
nature of property rights in America. Unlike most other nations where underground water 
resources are considered to be the property of the state, in America they are owned by the 
surface property owner. This situation being a direct result of the American revolution which 
reject the British monarchy and the notion of monarchical ownership of property which 
persisted prior to the revolution. Ironically in this respect American law follows the common law 
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Latin maxim of “Cuius est solum, eius est usque ad coelum et ad inferos”, more so that British 
law. The net result however is that; while in the rest of the world the state usually owns 
underground water and as such does not need a doctrine to control that use, in America this 
doctrine is essential. 
In the initial case of Katz v. Walkinshaw, the Supreme Court of Californian were asked to rule 
on the following facts; 
“The action was brought to enjoin defendant from drawing off and diverting water 
from an artesian belt which is in part on or under the premises of plaintiffs, and to the 
water of which they have sunk wells, thereby causing the water to rise and flow upon 
the premises of plaintiffs, and which they ever had constantly so flowed, for 20 years 
before the wrong complained of was committed by defendant. The water is necessary 
for domestic purposes, and for irrigating the lands of plaintiffs, upon which there are 
growing trees, vines, shrubbery, and other plants, which are of great value to plaintiffs. 
All of said plants will perish, and plaintiffs will be greatly and irreparably injured, if the 
defendant is allowed to divert the water ... further that defendant is diverting the 
water for sale, to be used on lands of others distant from the saturated belt from which 
the artesian water is derived”363 
It was the plaintiff’s contention that the artesian belt constituted an underground stream, 
which made them a riparian property owner, and this provided an unalienable right with respect 
to the water in that stream.  
As discussed above, the fundamental right provided by the riparian water doctrine is the right 
of all property holders to a natural flow of water on to their property. By implication this right 
requires that any flow of water which naturally enters a property, be allowed to flow unhindered 
through the property, so that the natural flow can be provided to downstream property owners. 
Whilst the doctrine allowed for reasonable uses such as; water for households, drinking water 
for livestock, and irrigation for plants, riparian owners were not allowed the transfer and use of 
water beyond the bounds of the watershed area, as this would result in the absolute loss of 
water to downstream riparian rights holders. 
Reading through the case, it is clear that the main reason why the plaintiff sought to invoke 
their riparian rights was because the defendant was not using the water that they extracted 
from their property, on their property. Rather they were selling and shipping the water to other 
landowners which did not have property overlaying the artesian belt, in direct contradiction of 
the principle restriction of the riparian water doctrine. The difficulty with this contention was 
that the defendant was not drawing the water from an open source, but was drawing the water 
from an underground source or more particularly drawing water from an underground source 
that percolating to the surface on their property. 
This distinction is important; because while drawing water from an open source would 
potentially open the defendant up to riparian rights claims, drawing form an underground 
source could allow the defendants to claim that riparian rights did not apply. Indeed, in this case 
not only did the defendant claim that the riparian doctrine did not apply, they also claimed that 
the proper doctrine to apply to the artesian stream or any underground water was an absolutist 
                                                          






doctrine which gave property owners the rights to any objects below or above the land that they 
owned. 
As mentioned earlier this absolutist doctrine is another very old doctrine which can be traced 
back to the 13th  century maxim; “Cuius est solum, eius est usque ad coelum et ad inferos”, Latin 
for “ whoever owns [the] soil, [it] is theirs all the way [up] to Heaven and [down] to Hell”.364 
While it can be traced back to the thirteenth century, it really came into prominence in the 17th 
century after the publication of William Blackstone’s, influential legal writings “Commentaries 
on the Laws of England” in 1766. In these writings Blackstone described the ownership rights of 
land as follows; 
'Land hath also, in its legal signification, an indefinite extent, upwards as well as 
downwards. Cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum, is the maxim of the law, 
upwards; therefore no man may erect any building, or the like, to overhang another's 
land: and, downwards, whatever is in a direct line between the surface of any land, 
and the center of the earth, belongs to the owner of the surface; as is every day's 
experience in the mining countries. So that the word "land" includes not only the face 
of the earth, but every thing under it, or over it. And therefore if a man grants all his 
lands, he grants thereby all his mines of metal and other fossils, his woods, his waters, 
and his houses, as well as his fields and meadows.”365  
According to this specific passage, ownership of all water on a property appears to rest with 
to the owner of the property, however in a previous passage Blackstone appears to accept at 
least a partial deference the concept of riparian rights when related to open water. For in this 
previous passage Blackstone refers to the difficult of owning water because of its transitory 
nature.366  
The rational for this absolutist doctrine can be derived in the earlier works of John Locke who 
provided a natural law reasoning for property ownership.367 As mentioned earlier under Locke’s 
version of natural law, private ownership was justified because property in private ownership 
tended to be more productive than property the was held in public ownership.368 It does not 
take a huge leap of logic to conclude that if private ownership creates greater productivity, than 
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absolute private ownership must provide the most productive result. This of course was the 
reasoning that prevailed in William Blackstone’s commentaries. As this doctrine followed the 
riparian doctrine it can be considered an attempt to create a universal acceptable way of 
allocating resource use, whether in the land, or the resources under the land. To the extent that 
this absolute private ownership allowed property owners to grow crops and mine minerals on 
property that was previously fallow or unproductive, this justification appeared reasonable. The 
major flaw with it is that this doctrine is fails to recognise that unrestricted actions of one 
property owner, can have severely detrimental effects on other property owners. This flaw 
which was to become known as external effects have be debated by economists and litigated in 
the courts ever since.  
In this case it is clear that this was the rational and the logic that the defendants were 
following, because the cases listed by the defendants in support of their claim of absolute 
property rights were cases involving the mining rights of property owners.369  
This short summary describes this was the case that the court was to adjudicate. Two parties 
both claiming rights to water that was under their respective properties. One using the ancient 
doctrine of riparian water rights and the other using a later doctrine of absolute property rights. 
As a side note it is interesting that the defendant did not claim their water rights under the more 
modern doctrine of prior appropriation. Like the absolute property right doctrine, this doctrine 
was supported by John Locke’s natural law which claims to grant property rights to the first 
person that blended this work with a property.370 In this case as the defendant has been using 
the underground water for 20 years, they would clearly have some sort of prior appropriation 
claim on the water. However, it is perhaps fortunate that this claim was not made, for it may 
has prevented the court from deciding the case in the way that it did. That is by rejecting the 
claims of both the plaintiff and defendant and establishing a new correlated rights doctrine.  
With respect to the riparian rights the court rejected the plaintiffs claim on both technical 
and practical grounds. The technical grounds were associated with underground nature of the 
water. This rejection as enunciated by Judge Temple in his opinion, as follows; 
'It is quite manifest that this body (if it can be so styled) of percolating water cannot 
be called an underground water course to which riparian rights can attach...The 
plaintiffs, therefore, cannot establish their claim upon a theory of an underground 
water course to which they are riparian'371   
From a practical prospective the court took issue with the inevitable consequence of applying 
a strict interpretation of riparian rights as provide by this observation; 
'It is even said that the opposite doctrine (applying to such water the rule as to 
riparian rights) would amount to total abrogation of the rights of property. It is said 
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one could not clear or cultivate his land or build a house without interfering with 
percolating water, and, even if rights were admitted to exist, the difficulty of enforcing 
them would be insurmountable.'372 
This rejection of the riparian doctrine was matched by an equally unequivocal rejection of a 
technical and practical grounds of the defendant’s claims under the absolutist doctrine. With 
respect to the technical grounds the court rejected the notion that water was the same as any 
other mineral or resource located under a property. This rejection being based on the transitory 
nature of water. In this point Judge Temple wrote the following; 
'It is obvious at once that the analogy between the right to remove sand and gravel 
from the land for sale, and to remove and sell percolating water, is not perfect. If we 
suppose a saturated plain, one may remove and sell the sand and gravel from his land 
without affecting or diminishing the sand and gravel on the lands of his neighbors. If 
the water on his lands is his property, then the water in the soil of his neighbors is their 
property. But when he drains out and sells the water on his land, he draws to his land 
and also sells water which is the property of his neighbor. Mid the effect is similar in 
other respects. By pumping out the water from his lands, he can, perhaps, deprive his 
neighbors of water for domestic uses, and in fact render their land valueless.' 
From a practical prospective Judge Temple took issue with the very negative consequences 
that applying a strict interpretation of this absolutist doctrine would have on the property 
concerned. This was noted by referring to the argument made by the counsel for the plaintiff’s 
when Judge Temple states:  
'The learned counsel for the appellants state in their belief that water at San 
Bernardino is worth $1,000 per inch of flow. Percolating water or water held in the 
earth is the main source of supply for domestic uses and for irrigation, without which 
most lands are unproductive. It is also stated that speculators are seeking to 
appropriate the percolating water by getting title to some part of a watershed or slope, 
and by running canals and tunnels, and by sinking to obtain water for sale. It is asserted 
that the lands naturally made moist by percolating water are very productive, and 
were first settled upon, and have been most highly improved; and he asks whether 
these lands are to be converted into deserts because speculators may pump and carry 
away to some distant locality the subsurface waters which rendered the land fertile. 
Certainly, no such case as this has come before a court or could well exist in England 
or in the Eastern states.'373  
The last sentence of this paragraph though rather inconspicuous, was perhaps the most 
important. For it is with this idea, that the judge sought to justify the rejection of the absolutist 
doctrine. The essence of this sentence was that; while the absolutist doctrine was applied in 
England or the Eastern States where there is an abundance of water, the arid nature of the 
Southern Californian creates circumstances which render the English and Eastern States 
precedents inappropriate.  








The rejection of the claims of both plaintiff and the defendant, meant that the court would 
have to find an alternative way of deciding the case. As part of this process Judge Temple 
recognised that there was a change in underlying circumstances which he describes as follows;  
'We have derived our law, in respect to subterranean waters, as in other respects, 
mostly from England, but in regard to this matter the first cases are quite modern. 
Even yet the text-books on water rights have but little to say upon the subject of 
percolating water. Such law as has been made upon the subject comes from countries 
and climates where water is abundant, and its conservation and economical use of 
little consequence, as compared with a climate like southern California.” and “in 
England and in our Eastern states a more thorough and minute consideration of the 
equities of parties may not often be required. The ease is very different, however, in 
an arid country like southern California, where the relative importance of percolating 
water and water flowing in definite water courses is greatly changed.'374  
Given these changes the underlying circumstances, Judge Temple details his search for a 
more appropriate doctrine. This search lead him to analyse the doctrine of reasonable use. In 
cases cited by him, property owners used were allowed to use water both open and percolating 
for the betterment of their property.  
'The doctrine of reasonable use has been recognized In many cases In the United 
States, impliedly in most, as I have stated, but expressly in some. 
Wheatley v. Baugh, 25 Pa. 528, 64 Am. Dec. 721, 4 Pitts. Leg. J. 452, is one of these, 
and is remarkable in that the court states as strongly as possible, and with approbation, 
the cujus est solum doctrine.... And yet, notwithstanding this insistence upon the rule 
which apparently ignores all equities of others than the owner of the soil in which the 
water is found, the court felt obliged to, and did, in unequivocal words, declare that 
the use of it must be reasonable. The proprietor may make a reasonable, use of his 
own land, although in so doing he obstructs or changes the percolation of water to or 
from his neighbor's land. 
 Pixley v. Clark, 35 N.Y. 520. 35 N.Y. 520, 91 Am. Dec. 72: "An owner of the soil may 
divert percolating water, consume, or cut it off with impunity. It is the same as land, 
and cant not be distinguished in law from land." He says this proposition must be 
admitted, but nevertheless a case cannot be found in this country "where the right has 
been upheld in the owner of land to destroy a stream, a spring, or a well upon his 
neighbor's land, by cutting off the source of its supply, except it was done in the 
exercise of a legal right to improve the land, or make some use of it in connection with 
the enjoyment of the land itself." I have italicized the last clause, as it contains the 
qualification found in the civil law, upon which the English rule is professedly based, 
and expresses the principle for which I contend.... The court recognized the right of 
the landowner to percolating water, but says the right must be exercised with 
reference to the equal right of others in their land, lie says one may as well claim the 
right to tunnel into his neighbor's land and take out valuable minerals, as to drain from 
it water which is also parcel of it, for sale. The peculiar nature of the property which 







enables one to take it by drainage does not justify the taking, save in the usual and 
reasonable use of his own land, - in other words, for the proper use and betterment of 
his own property 
Forbell v. City, of New York, 164 N. Y. 522, 58 N. E. 644, 51 L. R. A. 695, 79 Am. St. 
Rep. 666. It was a suit by another plaintiff, restrain the same operations considered in 
Smith v. City of Brooklyn. Here there was no visible stream or pond on plaintiff's land. 
His injury was merely that the level of the water held in the soil was lowered, to his 
injury. In stating the case the court said: "The city makes merchandise of the large 
quantities of water which it draws from the wells that it has sunk on its two acres of 
land. The plaintiff does not complain that any surface stream or pond or body of water 
upon his land is thereby affected, but does complain, and the courts below have found, 
that the defendant exhausts his land of its accustomed and natura supply of 
underground or subsurface water, and thus prevents him from growing upon it the 
crops to which the land was and is peculiarly adapted, or destroys such crops after they 
are grown or partly grown." This statement shows a striking similarity of the issues 
made in that case to those involved here. The court proceeds to state the usual 
doctrine in regard to percolating water and approves the doctrine for the cases in 
which it is properly applicable. No doubt, the land proprietor owns the water which is 
parcel of his land, and may use it as he pleases, regard being had to the rights of others. 
It is not unreasonable that he should dig wells in order to have the fullest enjoyment 
and usefulness of his estate, or for pleasure, trade, or whatever else the land as land 
may serve. "But to fit it up with wells and pumps of such persuasive and potential reach 
that from their base the defendant can tap the water stored in the plaintiff's land, and 
in all the region thereabout, and lead it to his own land, and, by merchandising it, 
prevent its return, is, however reasonable it may appear to the defendant and its 
customers, unreasonable as to the plaintiff and others, whose lands are thus 
clandestinely sapped and their value impaired. Counsel for the plaintiff in that case 
contended that, since plaintiff owned the percolating water in his own soil, the 
unlawful draining of it away by the defendant was a trespass committed on his land. 
This contention was sustained both in the supreme court and in the court of 
appeals."375 
As convinced as Judge Temple was of the appropriateness of the reasonable doctrine in this 
case, he did not limit this ruling to just applying this doctrine. For in attempting to limit the 
impact of the reasonable use doctrine he also created a new one, the doctrine of correlated 
property rights. The doctrine itself was developed in three separate stages, in different parts of 
the opinion. In the first stage Temple discusses the idea that members of the community have a 
common interest in the water; 
'In short, the members of the community, in the case supposed, have a common 
interest in the water. It is necessary for all, and it is an anomaly in the law if one person 







can for his individual profit destroy the community, and render the neighborhood 
uninhabitable.”376 
In the second stage he discusses how riparian water rights are limited by correlative rights of 
other riparian owners; 
'A riparian owner may not divert the water, because he would thereby injure his 
neighbors who have equal rights in the stream. Still he may take a reasonable amount 
from the stream for domestic purposes, and that may equal the entire flow, although 
he thereby injures his neighbors. It is a question of reasonable use, and that applies 
both to the land of the person disturbing the percolation and to adjoining land. He may 
cultivate his land, and for that purpose ordinarily may drain it, and plow it or clear it 
from forests, although all these operations may affect the flow of water to the lower 
proprietor, both in the water course and by percolation. He was allowed to become 
the owner for those purposes, and with the understanding that all other proprietors 
have the same right to use their land. The maxim, "Sic utere," etc., plainly applies as 
between such proprietors, very much as it does between different riparian proprietors 
upon the same stream. The title to all land is held subject to this maxim. Such 
ownership is "but an aggregation of qualified principles, the limits of which are 
prescribed by the equality of rights, and the correlation of rights and obligations 
necessary for the highest use of land by the entire community of proprietors." 
Thompson v. Improvement Co., 54 N. H. 545.'377 
This introduction of the maxim “Sic utere” in conjunction with notions of equality and 
correlation clearly indicates a definition of property rights that cannot be viewed in isolation, 
but must also concerned with the property rights of other property owners.378 Further just as 
this inclusion nullifies the qualifying statement that a riparian owner may “take a reasonable 
amount which may equal the entire flow of the stream”, it also nullifies a reasonable use 
doctrine that would allow one owner the take all the water, injuring the other property owners.  
In the final stage he indicated that the same correlative rights that limit riparian rights ought 
to limit reasonable use rights. This stage was presented in the final part of the opinion which 
although a little confusing, were as follows; 
'Whatever the English rule may be, the American cases either recognize the 
application of the rule of "Sic utere tuo" to the subject, or they are cases in which it 
was wholly unnecessary to consider that subject. ... Still this court was not called upon 
to, and did not consider any such question. I think it clear that the American cases do 
not require us to hold that the maxim, "Sic utere tuo," does not limit the right of the 
landowner to the use of subsurface water, but, on the contrary, all the cases in which 
the question has been discussed held or admit that such maxim should limit such right 
where justice requires it. Such, I think, is the proper rule.' 
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Whatever the intentions of Judge Temple, the implications of this ruling were so great, that 
a host of water companies jointed together to petition for an appeal of the case.379 The 
Californian Supreme Court granted a rehearing of the case;  
'for the purpose of considering more fully, and by the aid of such additional 
arguments as might be presented by persons not parties to the action, but vitally 
interested in the principle involved, a question that is novel and of the utmost 
importance to the application to useful purposes of the waters which may be found in 
the soil.'380 
In this petition the respondents and their amicus supporters contended; 1) that under 
common law the plaintiff can only recover from an action based on a subterranean stream, 2) 
that a plaintiff cannot recover from a different cause of action from that alleged, and 3) that the 
absolute right to percolating water was settled law. In support of their petition they cited dozens 
of cases from both California and other states all of which they contended upheld the absolute 
doctrine in percolation water.381  
What is clear from this petition was that there were a number of large, more powerful parties 
who were determined to eliminate correlative property rights in water, before it had a chance 
to be established as a reliable legal doctrine. However, these parties were in for a huge surprise; 
as the Supreme Court of California in this rehearing, not only endorsed correlative property 
rights, they also rejected the notion that the absolute property right doctrine was settled law. 
Further unlike the earlier ruling, there was nothing confusing about this ruling. In all aspects 
including; its confirmation of the flexibility of common law, its rejection of that absolute 
doctrine, and its endorsement of correlative property right were clear and unequivocal.  
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The confirmation of the flexibility of common law was so poignant and relevant it not only 
was quoted at the commencement of this chapter but deserves to be cited in full here; 
'The true doctrine is, that the common law by its own principles adapts itself to 
varying conditions, and modifies its own rules so as to serve the ends of justice under 
the different circumstances, a principle adopted into our code by section 3510 of the 
Civil Code: "When the reason of a rule ceases, so should the rule itself.” This is well 
stated in Morgan v. King, 30 Barb. 16: “We are not bound to follow the letter of the 
common law, forgetful of its spirit; its rule instead of its principle. ... . If so, the common 
law modifies its rules upon its own principles, and conforms them to the wants of the 
community, the nature, character, and capacity of the subject to which they are to be 
applied." In Beardsley v. Hartford, 50 Conn. 542, 4 the court says: "It is a well-settled 
rule that the law varies with the varying reasons on which it is founded. This is 
expressed by the maxim: 'Cessante ratione, cessat ipsa lex.' This means that no law can 
survive the reasons on which it is founded. It needs no statute to change it; it abrogates 
itself. If the reasons on which a law rests are overborne by opposing reasons, which, 
in the progress of society, gain controlling force, the old law, though still good as an 
abstract principle, and good in its application to some circumstances, must cease to 
apply or to be a controlling principle to the new circumstances." Accordingly, in many 
instances in this country, in states where the common law is held to be in force, some 
of its rules are held to be not applicable to the conditions different from the place of 
its origin.'382 
While the petitioners were assuming that the common law relating to water was to be 
regarded as a static law, unchanging regardless of circumstances, the court took the opposite 
view. It decided that; if applying old law to new circumstances resulted in an inefficient and 
unjust outcome, it was the law itself that must change. It should be noted, that court did not 
take this decision to alter the law lightly. As was clearly stated in the following quote from the 
opinion written by Judge Shaw; 
'An ordinary difference in the conditions would scarcely justify the refusal to adopt 
a rule of the common law, or one which has been so generally supposed to exist; but 
where the differences are so radical as in this case, and would tend to cause so great 
a subversion of justice, a different rule is imperative.'383 
With respect to the specific rejection of the absolute property right doctrine in water, Judge 
Shaw attempted to highlight the potential injustice and inefficiency of adhering to this doctrine. 
He did this as follows: 
'It is apparent that the parties who have asked for a reconsideration of this case, 
and other persons of the same class, if the rule [absolutist doctrine] for which they 
contend is the law, or no law, of the land, will be constantly threatened with danger of 
utter destruction of the valuable enterprises and systems of water-works which they 
control, and that all new enterprises of the same sort will be subject to the same peril. 








They will have absolutely no protection in law against others having stronger pumps, 
deeper wells, or a more favorable situation, who can thereby take from them unlimited 
quantities of the water, reaching to the entire supply, and without regard to the place  
of use. We cannot perceive how a doctrine offering so little protection to the 
investments in and product of such enterprises, and offering so much temptation to 
others to capture the water on which they depend, can tend to promote developments 
in the future or preserve those already made, and, therefore, we do not believe that 
public policy or a regard for the general welfare demands the doctrine. '384 
As can be gleaned from this part of the opinion, the court clearly had little more than 
contempt for the absolute property right doctrine in water and provide a much clearer and more 
aggressive rejection of it than had been provided in the previous case. That the petition should 
have resulted in such scathing reproach was far from certain and once again demonstrates the 
clear and unequivocal ruling of the court.  
Following this rejection of absolute rights, the court then proceeded to provide an 
explanation of what correlative property rights were, and why justice demanded that it be 
applied regardless of the judicial challenges inherent in their application. Their description of 
correlative property rights being so clear and concise it could be enunciated in a single sentence; 
'Disputes between overlying landowners, concerning water for use on the land, to 
which they have an equal right, in cases where the supply is insufficient for all, are to 
be settled by giving to each a fair and just proportion.'385 
The beauty of this statement is that requires little analysis or interpretation. It is a simple 
straight forward endorsement of proportionality as the guiding principle of a just system of 
justice. As to the application of the doctrine the court took note of the petitioner’s concerns and 
responded as follows in the final paragraphs of the opinion;   
'The objection that this rule of correlative rights will throw upon the court a duty 
impossible of performance, that of apportioning an insufficient supply of water among 
a large number of users, is largely conjectural. No doubt cases can be imagined where 
the task would be extremely difficult, but if the rule is the only just one, as we think 
has been shown, the difficulty in its application in extreme cases is not a sufficient 
reason for rejecting it and leaving property without any protection from the law.'386  
The inclusion of this statement in the final paragraphs of the opinion are the best evidence 
of the strong support that the court had for correlative property right. For not only did it state 
that the court thought it that the doctrine was the “only just one”, it also stated that it its support 
was not constrained by potential difficulties in its application. When all was said and done; 
although the petitioners had intended to eliminate the correlative rights doctrine, what they 
succeeded in doing was to facilitate a much more solid legal foundation by allowing the court to 
rewrite and strengthen the original ruling. All of which has allowed the doctrine to remain valid 
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for over one hundred years as can be seen in a the more recent case of Niles Sand Co and Gravel 
v Alameda County Water District.387  
As the names suggest Nile Sand and Gravel the plaintiff) was a commercial sand and gravel 
operation and Alameda County Water District (the defendant) was a government entity charged 
with managing the water supply in a district that included San Francisco. As part of its water 
management operations the defendant ran a ground water replenishment program that 
involved pumping water sourced from outside the district into the Niles water basin of the 
district. This replenishment program had two objectives. First, it was a water storage operation 
that would create a large enough reserve of water during the spring to supply the district during 
the dry summer months. The other objective was to prevent salt water intrusion into the basin, 
which was possible because to the immediate proximity of the basin to San Francisco Bay, and 
which would occur if the water basin dropped below sea level.   
The conflict arose because this same replenishment program resulted in fresh water flooding 
the quarries operated by plaintiff which were below sea level. To access these quarries the 
company installed pumps and which they use to drain the quarries, with the waste water being 
pumped into San Francisco Bay. This of course defeated both objective of the replenishment 
program and resulted in the absurd situation where one party was pumping water into the basin 
and another pumping it out.  
The plaintiff sued the defendant asking for damages on the basis that the flooding of their 
quarries constituted a “taking” or “damage” to their property by a governmental organization 
for public use, which ought to be compensated by way of inverse condemnation under the 
Californian constitution.388 The defendant sued to enjoin the plaintiff from discharging and 
wasting its water and to recover damages from them for the loss of water previously wasted.389 
The plaintiff claims rested upon the argument that they had the “absolute right” to use their 
land to an unlimited depth below the surface, because the Civil code which vested them with: 
“the right to the surface and to everything permanently situated beneath it”.390 As such that the 
flooding of the quarries that resulted from the replenishment program had interfered with their 
subterranean rights to their land, thereby “taking” or “damaging” their property. They further 
argued that the defendant's claim that their land was subject to a “public servitude for water 
and conservation purposes” was just a contrived way of creating a new property interest for the 
benefit of a public agency, which could allow the district to escape liability to the landowners 
for damages. 
Neither the earlier trial court nor the Supreme Court agreed with their “absolute right” 
argument and instead invoked the “correlative rights doctrine”. The Supreme court confirming 
application of the correlative rights doctrine and acknowledging the trial courts proper use of it, 
before restating its original use in Katz v. Walkinshaw: 
“The correlative rights doctrine was first pronounced in a landmark case (Katz v. 
Walkinshaw (1903) 141 (1903) 141 Cal. 116 [74 P. 766]) in which the Supreme Court, 
in a decision upon rehearing (see id. at p. 120), developed and reiterated the doctrine 
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as adopted in its original decision. (Id. at pp. 137-138 et seq.) Under the facts presented 
in Katz, the court was called upon to balance the effect of the common law maxim 
"Cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad inferos," as to waters percolating below ground, 
against the realities of the underground water situation in California. (Id. at pp. 120-
121, 125-128, 139.) Rejecting the maxim under compulsion of the realities (see id. at 
p. 143; see also Krieger & Banks, Ground Water Basin Management (1962) 50 
Cal.L.Rev. 56, 72-73) the court held that, as between the owners of land overlying 
strata of percolating waters, the rights of each to the water are limited, in correlation 
with those of others, to his "reasonable use" thereof when the water is insufficient to 
meet the needs of all.”391 
The court then went on to state that; 
“The trial court was also correct in using the word "servitude" to connote the 
obligation imposed by the doctrine upon appellants, as landowners in the basin, to 
refrain from discharging more than their reasonable share of the underground water 
therein; the term ("servitude") is commonly used with reference to such obligations 
when imposed by law, and limiting the use of lands lying in a particular geographical 
area, where an overriding public interest requires it.” 
While this case confirms the validity of the correlated rights doctrine some seventy years 
after it was introduced, it is also notable for three additional reason. First it demonstrates that 
the doctrine can be applied in cases which involve government agencies and not just applicable 
in disputes between private land owners. Secondly it indicates that the doctrine is able to 
withstand a challenge which accused it of being in breach of the California constitution, which 
like the US Constitution prohibits the government from the taking of property without 
compensation. Thirdly it indicates that it can be used against mining interests that harm the 
water supply, not just disproportionate water used. The first makes sense because injuring an 
entire community is worse than merely injuring a neighbour. The second makes sense because 
if it is accepted that water below the surface belongs to the surface owner, then all that the 
correlative rights doctrine does is prevent the appropriation of those rights by neighbouring land 
owners, as opposed to the appropriation doctrine which facilitated taking of inherently 
integrated groundwater which belonged to their neighbours. The third makes sense because 
prioritising mining, over water operations would defeat the purpose of the doctrine.  
But it was not only the courts which have supported correlated rights for the last one 
hundred years. The legislature as provided similar support as evidenced by the administrative 
law which now regulates the use of water in California. The most recent enunciation of this 
doctrine being included in the 2011 publication of booklet describing the Water Rights Law 
which was produced by California State Water Resources Control Board and in which it states:  
'California law also recognizes and protects rights to extract and use waters 
percolating beneath the surface of the land. Again, while the Water Code implies the 
existence of these groundwater rights, their doctrinal bases and characteristics are 
essentially the product of the decisions of our courts. (See Katz v. Walkinshaw (1902) 
                                                          






141 Cal. 138, 70 Pac. 663; additional opinion on rehearing (1903): 141 Cal. 116, 74 Pac. 
766.)'392 
6.1.5 Water Law Lessons for Intellectual Property Law 
While Katz v. Walkinshaw was clearly focused on water rights, it is within the bounds of a 
more general analysis to observe that the ability of common law to recognize and adapt to an 
alternative set of underlying circumstances, is the reason why it has been able to retain its 
relevance. For if common law was to maintain a rigid adherence to precedent, it would be as 
outdate as the medieval feudal system that it originated in. A medieval system which incidentally 
was also the formation period for the notion of absolute property rights. 
Which is not to suggest that an absolutist/exclusive doctrine is incompatible, with intellectual 
property law. If anything, this the analysis of Californian water law indicates that it is perfectly 
reasonable to apply multiple doctrines in the same body of law depending on the individual 
circumstance of the underlying dispute. As described in this analysis the appropriation doctrine 
was applied to water on public owned lands, the riparian doctrine to surface water on private 
land, and the correlative rights doctrine for ground water on private land. This ability to apply 
multiple doctrines is clearly not limited to water law and could just as easily be recognised in 
intellectual property law; with an absolutist doctrine continuing to be applied to standalone 
intellectual properties and the correlated rights doctrine being applied to inherently integrated 
intellectual properties. 
While the primary reason why Californian water law featured so prominently in this analysis 
is because it the source of the correlated rights doctrine, it is worth noting that the doctrine 
would not have been created if there was an abundant supply of water in the state. This scarcity 
meant that a new and more equitable means of dividing up the groundwater needed to be 
devised, as the use of historical doctrines which were applied in locations where there was not 
"enough, and as good, left in common for others". The same can be said with intellectual 
property: Just as in the arid regions of California where there is not an unlimited supply of 
groundwater which can be extracted, so too intellectual properties there is not an unlimited 
quantity of technological value which can be extracted from an integrated technological 
product. Clearly when integrated intellectual property owners take more than their proportional 
share, they injure other intellectual property owners in the same way that land owners who take 
more than their proportional share of groundwater injures other land owners.  
With respect to ownership structures, it is interesting to note that both water rights and 
intellectual property rights appear to be on the same evolutionary path, with intellectual 
property rights lagging far behind water rights. For example, in the early civilisations, both water 
and innovation could be considered to be free of ownership. Rivers did not belong to anyone 
and neither did ideas, they were just there available for the use of anyone and everyone. Moving 
into the medieval civilizations both went to the other extreme coming under sole ownership of 
the royal persons provided through patronage to their most important or most loyal supporters. 
It was during this transition that the notion of absolute ownership of those rights was adopted. 
This royal grant being transformed into an absolute ownership right, when those supporters 
began to recognise the value of their contributions to the realm. It was likely in the mercantile 
period that these two evolutionary paths diverged. For while the dramatic increases in the ranks 
                                                          






of land owners, required that water rights become responsive to the injuries which could be 
caused by absolutist rights, the same growth in the ranks of intellectual property owners left 
unchanged the absolutist rights provided to them. This lack of progress in the development of 
intellectual property rights for the most part being attributable to the standalone nature of 
intellectual property which was prevalent at the time. Moving to the modern time, this 
divergence became even greater as water rights became subject to reasonable use limitations 
and proportional sharing. Restriction which are still to be fully imposed on intellectual property 
rights, despite the fact that modern intellectual properties is no longer dominated by standalone 
intellectual properties and it can be shown that utilizing an absolutist doctrine for correlated 
intellectual properties results in inequitable outcomes. 
This continuity and divergence can also be observed in the consequences which emerge from 
the stagnated evolution of intellectual property. If it is excepted that early the riparian stages' 
lack of private water rights was comparable to a time when there were no intellectual property 
rights, history shows that that most improvement in the waterways and innovation had to come 
from the state. Obviously if the state was highly committed to the development of either 
waterways or innovation this could spur growth. However, when the state's commitment is 
weak, there is no private development which can replace it. This because without a method of 
recovering their costs private parties would not have the where with all to develop waterway or 
inventions. So, although the early riparian doctrine and lack of intellectual property rights 
undoubtedly sustained a certain degree of access, most uses would have been of a rather 
conventional nature, and development rather slow. 
With respect to the absolutist water law, this is somewhat of an anomaly because it is difficult 
to find a historical situation when one entity declared absolute ownership of all innovations. 
However, a comparison can be made in individual industries when patent owners try to establish 
a monopoly in an industry, to the exclusion of others which also have intellectual property used 
in the industry.393 When this happens not only is property effectively appropriated from previous 
owners and accumulated by those monopolistic property holder, but it also may slow 
development as potential users are excluded from participating.  
The appropriation doctrine would appear to be consistent with the absolutist doctrine in 
intellectual property when standalone properties are involved. In both cases the first use in 
water and first to file in intellectual property; grants the owner with an exclusive monopoly. The 
main differences between the two is prior appropriation usually places limits on the quantity of 
water which can be used and protects that use for an indefinite period, whereas absolutist 
intellectual property rights have no limits and protected for a defined period. Both monopolies 
being justified as an incentive to further the development of the society through the expansion 
of industry, which is undeniably true at least in the short run. 
The absolutist riparian doctrine would also appear to consistent with an absolutist 
intellectual property rights doctrine when correlated intellectual properties are involved. While 
those rights can and do stimulate development, which is good for societies, in both cases they 
can also be abused to extort excessive returns from other integrated users. As has been 
mentioned this abuse almost always involves threatening or pursuing injunctive actions when 
injury can easily be repaired by damages.  
                                                          






Limiting riparian water rights by the reasonable use doctrine would obviously have the same 
effect as limiting absolutist intellectual property rights by the same doctrine. Given this doctrine 
has primarily been used to prevent abuse of riparian owners right, which has facilitated a better 
and more efficient use of water resources, there is no reason why it could not have the same 
effect on intellectual property. Particularly when correlated intellectual properties are involved. 
Indeed, this appears to be the path which intellectual property law is advancing down under 
recent court decisions, which have limited owner’s absolute intellectual property rights when 
the disputes involve correlated properties.  
The correlated doctrine in water, which requires that water resources are granted in 
proportion to surface land ownership, is not just comparable with correlated intellectual 
property rights but a legal inspiration for those rights. And just as the correlated rights doctrine 
has ensured that all owners of correlated groundwater can use their proportional share of that 
ground water, correlated intellectual property rights should ensure that every intellectual 
property owner who contributes their innovations to an integrated technological product is able 
to receive their proportional share of the value those aggregated and integrated properties 
contribute to that product. This doctrine going beyond the reasonable use doctrine because it 
is capable of a degree of quantification which cannot be reached through abstract and 
conflicting notions of what is reasonable. 
6.2 The Evolution of Correlated Oil and Gas Rights  
While the correlative rights doctrine was initially applied in water law it did not take long for 
it to be recognised that it clearly had implication for other industries, most notability the oil and 
gas industry. In fact, the potential for its application in the oil and gas industry was so obvious, 
that it was even mentioned in the decision of Katz v. Walkinshaw.  
'It does not necessarily follow that a rule for the government of rights in percolating 
water must also be followed as to underground seepages of percolations of mineral 
oil. Oil is not extracted for use in agriculture, or upon the land from which is taken, but 
solely for the sale as an article of merchandise, and for use in commerce and 
manufactures. The conditions under which oil is found and taken from the earth in this 
state are in no important particulars different from those present in other countries 
where it is produced. Whether, in a contest between oil producers concerning the 
drawing out by one of the oil under the land of another, we should follow the rule 
adopted by the courts of other oil producing states, or apply a rule better calculated 
to protect oil not actually developed, is a question not before us, and which need not 
be considered.' 394 
It should be acknowledged that despite this attempt to limit the doctrine to groundwater 
there was no way that such an important and economically relevant doctrine would be ignored 
by the oil and gas industry. Particularly given the nature of the underlying resource and its 
ownership structure were virtually identical. Which is to say that in both cases the underlying 
property was an inherently integrated resource, with multiple owners claiming individual 
                                                          






property rights to it. The only real difference was that one underground resource was water, 
while the other was oil and gas. 
Like the chapter examining the common law case for correlative water rights, this chapter 
will commence with a description of the evolution of oil and gas law. This evolution will track 
not only the administrative rules which created the law, but also the court cases which provided 
the legal support for those rules. The jurisdictions which will be the focus of this analysis will be 
the administrative and judicial bodies representing the various states in the United States of 
America. There are two reasons why the oil and gas in America will be the focus. The first of 
these is that it was in America where the oil and gas industry was initially and most actively 
developed, which meant that it was the first country which had to established administrative 
rules and laws covering the oil and gas industry. Rules and laws that had to evolve as the 
scientific knowledge and understanding of origin and physical properties of those oil and gas 
reservoirs grew. The second reason and more practical reason is that in America, real property 
owners have both surface and subsurface rights with respect to their property. A situation which 
has resulted in an abundance of conflicting individual subsurface ownership claims on 
interrogated oil and gas reservoirs, as these frequently extended beyond any private and public 
property ownership boundaries.395 After the evolution has been explained there will be a closer 
examination of the current state of the law and with a few cases to illustrate its effect and 
effectiveness. The final part of this chapter will be a discussion of the potential lessons which 
this body of law provides with respect to creating the doctrine of correlative intellectual 
property rights.  
For anyone not directly involved with oil and gas law, it would be easy to assume that this 
supposed bastion of free enterprise, would follow legal doctrines which would epitomise the 
free markets principles in a winner take all competitive battle. However, this is not the case. Far 
from adopting unrestricted free market legal principles, oil and gas law is marked by an 
extraordinary amount of governmental interference. Interference that is justified based on 
protecting the public interest, by avoiding waste and destruction of oil and gas reservoirs, 
protecting the environment and finally ensuring that all property owners receive their fair share 
of the value ascribed to their ownership claims. However, it was not always this way. In the 
beginning it was an unrestricted free market industry, where little consideration was given to 
anything other than getting rich quickly by producing the most oil possible in the shortest period 
of time. Given the dramatic difference between the initial state of the industry and its current 
state it is not surprising that the evolution of the legal practices in the industry involved several 
steps, each defining new legal rules which would be incorporated in oil and gas law. Of these 
steps there were five that are readily identifiable. 
The first identifiable step can be described as the ownership in place rule. This step assumed 
that oil and gas were like any other natural resource that could be acquired through surface 
mining and belonged to the property owner where the oil and gas either; percolated to the 
surface or was accessed by digging shallow pits. Next came the capture rule, which occurred 
after there was a recognition that oil and gas reservoirs were much larger than initially 
understood and extended beyond property lines. In this step the law treated oil and gas in a 
similar manner to the way in which it treated wild animals that moved from one property to 
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another. This legal treatment essentially considered the oil and gas in the ground to be free of 
ownership, until it was brought to the surface and captured by an oil producer. While this step 
unleashed free market forces that dramatically increased the production of oil and gas, they also 
resulted in significant waste of resources and severely damage to the oil and gas reservoirs. It 
was because of this waste and damage that successive limitations on free market activities were 
enacted. The first of these limitations created the third identifiable rule which involved 
restrictions on the wasting of resources, in particular a prohibition on burning off the less 
valuable natural gas, in order to secure more valuable oil production. The fourth identifiable 
step was the establishment of regulations designed to prevent overproduction that was 
damaging the long-term production potential of oil and gas reservoirs. This rule involved limiting 
production activities in approaches that allowed for a more sustainable development of the oil 
and gas reservoirs. The final identifiable step involved the imposition of regulations which were 
focused on ensuring that all property owners received a fair share of the value of the resources 
whenever they had some sort of ownership rights. This rule was adopted as a consequence of 
the fourth step which restricted the ability of certain owners to capture any oil and gas from a 
reservoir, despite having valid claims which would otherwise allow them to do so. While these 
final regulations were imposed to correct the unjust effects, which resulted from the protective 
regulations, it ultimately evolved into a fully-fledged correlative rights protection mechanism. A 
mechanism that dramatically changed the nature of the oil and gas industry by moving it from a 
win and lose battle between property owners, to a much more equitable form of competition 
where the property rights of all parties which had legal claim on the reservoirs were protected. 
That this correlative rights doctrine has been enacted and supported in fourth-nine of the 
fifty American States, not only provides evidence of its judicial acceptance, but also provides 
testament to the general support it receives from participants engaged in the oil and gas 
industry. A more detailed analysis of these various steps, including the regulation and case law 
which created them, is as follows. 
6.2.1 Ownership in Place Rule. 
Although there were several locations in the world where crude oil percolated to the surface, 
it was in a remote corner of the State of Pennsylvania where the first significant 
commercialization of this resource took place in 1854. At that time the substance that 
percolated from the ground was known as “rock oil” in an attempt to differentiate it from 
vegetable oils and animal fats.396 This differentiation was necessary because before that time 
the primary use of the substance was medicinal.397 The primitive methods used to gather this 
rock oil usually involved property owners skimming the substance off a creek and steams or 
wringing it out of rags or blankets which had been placed in those same creeks and streams. In 
short this was not a highly industrialised process and bore no resemblance to anything that could 
be called a modern industry, especially at a time when modern mechanical manufacturing was 
beginning to dominate most industries.  
This lack of industrialization ended after an entrepreneur named George Brissell, hired a Yale 
Professor named Silliman, to investigate and report on the illumination potential of rock oil. 
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What Silliman discovered in 1855 was that with the use of a distillation process, crude petroleum 
could be broken down into a several fractions of carbon and hydrogen, one of which provided a 
very high-quality illumination oil. Armed with this report Brissell was able to secure investors 
and set up the Pennsylvania Rock Oil Company, the world’s first commercial oil drilling and 
production company. After two years of disputes and indecision, the company eventually hired 
“Colonel” Edwin Drake as their general agent or project manager.398 In the fall of 1857, Drake 
was dispatched to Titusville, Pennsylvania, to secure oil rights from local farmers and returned 
the following year to commence operation.399 The extraction method used in this initial 
operation were adapted from an ancient Chinese process of salt boring. Although it was called 
drilling, this technique was more mining that it was drilling. The technique involved lifting and 
dropping a large, heavy rod to break up the ground, which was then removed by manual labour. 
Over time, as the workers removed the broken rock, this would create a mine shaft. The 
objective being to dig a shaft which was deep enough, to create a well where the crude 
petroleum could accumulate. A well not that dissimilar to a conventional water well although 
certainly deeper. Once built, the liquid oil would be taken to the surface using buckets or basic 
hand pumps.  
Drake set up operations around two miles downstream from Titusville, on a farm that 
contained an oil spring which was producing about three gallons a day naturally. However, when 
they got to a depth of 16 feet the sides of the shaft started to collapse. To overcome this 
obstacle, Blake came up with the ingenious idea of using a cast iron pipe as a housing to protect 
the side of the shaft from collapse. The drilling tools being lowered down inside the pipe to 
continue the rock crushing operations, with the pipe being driven down to greater depths to 
keep the sides of the shaft from collapsing. Using this new method Drake was able to dig down 
to a depth of 32 feet, where they finally hit bedrock. Bedrock that turned out to be capstone for 
an underground oil reservoir. After pounding through an additional 35 feet of bedrock, they 
finally broke through a crevice in the stone which allowed the crude oil in the reservoir to seep 
into the well. For all intense and purposes this was the first time that anyone ever “struck oil”. 
Whilst the drilling operations developed by Drake was rather innovative, the law that 
pertained to the early oil and gas industry was not. In fact, it was drawn straight from old 
common law principles related to hard mineral mining. That law being best described by the 
Latin maxim, “Cuius est solum eius est usque ad coelum” which is intended to convey the 
message that a property owner owns not only the surface of the land, but everything above or 
below it. The principle was established in common law by Edward Coke in Bury v. Pope (1587), 
when he enunciated the principle as follows; 
'And lastly, the earth hath in law a great extent upwards, not only of water as hath 
been said, but of aire, and all other things even up to heaven, for cujus est solum ejus est 
usque ad coelum, as it is holden.' 400 
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This common law tradition being strengthened in America by adoption of the Blackstone 
Commentaries on English Common law, as part of the foundations for American common law. 
In those commentaries, Blackstone describes property rights as follows;  
'Land hath also, in its legal signification, an indefinite extent, upwards as well as 
downwards. Cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum, is the maxim of the law, upwards; 
therefore no man may erect any building, or the like, to overhang another's land: and, 
downwards, whatever is in a direct line between the surface of any land, and the center 
of the earth, belongs to the owner of the surface; as is every day's experience in the 
mining countries. So that the word "land" includes not only the face of the earth, but 
everything under it, or over it. And therefore if a man grants all his lands, he grants 
thereby all his mines of metal and other fossils, his woods, his waters, and his houses, as 
well as his fields and meadows.'401 
With respect to petroleum resources one of the first cases to enunciate this principle was the 
1862 case of Keir v. Peterson.402 In that case Peterson leased land to Kier for the purpose of 
manufacturing salt. After commencing operations Kier discovered that there were certain 
quantities oil mixed in with salt water brine that he was using. He separated this oil out and 
commenced selling it as an unexpected product of the salt extraction process. Peterson filed 
suit, claiming that the oil Kier recovered was his property. Whilst the court ruled in favour of 
Kier, it did so only because it felt that Peterson had severed his ownership of the oil rights when 
he agreed to the salt lease. 403 However as far as the petroleum rights of surface owner were 
concerned the court was unequivocal in its the opinion, stated by Justice Woodward as follows; 
'Petroleum ... is included in the very comprehensive idea which the law attaches to 
the word land. It is part of the land. It is land. As such it belonged to Peterson, in the place 
where the present dispute arose. He held it by the same title by which he held the 
surface, or the salt which underlay the surface.'404   
Given this general principle it can be said that under common law ownership of the surface 
provided the best Prima Facia title to the ownership of the minerals below. Although this 
ownership could and was limited by legislation. The earliest example of limitations by legislation 
would be the original State Charters which reserved for the Crown an interest in all gold and 
silver mines established in the colonies, the so called “royal mine”. Later examples of this 
reservation being found in the various settlement acts granting farming rights to frontier 
settlers.405 Failing such reservations common law would automatically ascribe mineral 
ownership to the surface owner, which is exactly what the situation was in Pennsylvania in 1855. 
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The absence of a legislative reservation in favour of the state meant that; the subsoil oil and gas 
reservoirs were considered to be the property of the surface owner. 
It was as a result of this ownership structure that most of the local farmers who owned 
property near Drake’s first well had ownership in place rights to oil that was located under their 
property and it was these rights that they immediately leased out to oil companies to secure oil 
royalties for themselves. For the oil industry, it was like a gold rush. Within fifteen months of the 
discovery, hundreds of wells were drilled in the Oil Creek valley, and over seventy-five of them 
were producing oil. The fever pitch at which this oil boom progressed was also seen in 
neighbouring towns.  
In 1864, at a place called Pithole Creek, a location just fifteen miles away from Titusville, a 
“wildcat”406 oil company named The United States Petroleum Company bought an oil lease on 
part of the Holmden farm. After drilling for a year, they finally struck oil in January of 1865. By 
June they had four well producing two thousand barrels a day. This unprecedented rate of 
production generated so much excitement that other wildcat oil companies were willing to pay 
unheard of prices to secure drilling right, with the rest of the Holmden farm being leased for $2 
million dollars.407 By August the combined production of the Pit Creek wells was in excess of six 
thousand barrels per day. As a result of this production boom the backwoods farm had turned 
into a bustling city of 60,000 people.408 As far as this city and the surrounding community were 
concerned, the oil industry appeared to be working miracles. 
While Pithole story provides an excellent example of how the oil industry expanded under a 
legal structure based on established mining law, it also provides a cautionary tale about what 
can happens when oil resources are not protected from free market excesses and as a result are 
exploited too rapidly. Within two years after the first well was sunk, and after some 4 million 
barrels of oil extracted, the oil abruptly stopped flowing. While it was not known at the time, 
there were likely two major reason why the oil stopped flowing. First: too many wells had been 
drilled on the site and as a result the internal oil field pressure of the reservoir was lost. Second: 
on the 2nd of August 1866, one US Petroleum’s main wells caught fire and that fire consumed a 
further 27 wells and rigs, all of which resulted in an untold burn of oil and gas as well as a massive 
depletion of oil field pressure from the underground reservoir.  
Regardless of the scientific explanation, as far as the oil men in Pithole were concerned the 
conclusions were as obvious as they were simple; the oil had run out and it was time to move 
on. This was calamity for the city and the thousands of people who had built businesses or 
migrated there in search of work. By 1868 almost everyone left, the city was all but abandoned 
and property values plummeted. While it is undeniable that fortunes were made in Pithole, 409 
for most of the population it was a financial disaster. Not only were there too many wells, most 
of which never provided any return to their investors, there was also the excessive investment 
made in the city, which went to waste when the city was abandoned. 410  In addition to financial 
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losses there were also the question of the lost oil which could have been captured, if the internal 
oil pressure had not been wasted. Not to mention the pollution from the operations that 
destroyed the area’s farming potential.411 All of which should have generated at least a modicum 
of cautious consideration by the parties involved in the industry. However, this was not the case, 
for regardless of the perils that this first oil boom and bust exposed, any lessons on how to avoid 
those perils were ignored for decades by the oil men, politicians and the judiciary. 
While the lessons on the perils were ignored, this does not mean that that lessons were not 
learned. The lesson that the oil men learned was that whenever an oil reservoir was found the 
best strategy was to immediately drill as many wells as possible and extract as much oil as 
possible, before the oil runs out. This was of course a totally understandable profit maximising 
policy to adopt when there was little scientific knowledge about the makeup of the underground 
oil and gas formations. The rationale of this strategy being derived from the assumption, that 
wherever one source of oil is found, there may be many other sources of oil that can be found. 
Much like the idea that wherever one wild animal is found others might be found. The animal 
analogy reflecting the reality of the exploitation of the wild bison found on the great plains. For 
just as the first hunters on the plains had to maximise their hunting rewards before the stock of 
bison were wiped out, those that got to oil area first had to find and exploit all the pools of oil 
in a neighbourhood before their competitors found and exploited them.  
 
6.2.2 The First to Capture Rule 
Once it became common knowledge that wells located in close proximity to each other were 
producing oil from the same integrated oil and gas reservoir, it was only logical that the 
competition for the oil would become a zero-sum game focused on who could recover the 
highest percentage of oil contained in the reservoir for themselves. The problem was that this 
form of competition did not fit easily with the “ownership in place” laws that initially governed 
the oil and gas industry. Under those laws the surface owners had ownership of all the minerals 
that were located under their land, which meant that any oil and gas under a surface owners 
land must belong to the surface owner. While this form of law may have been effective for hard 
minerals which remained in a stationary place until they were mined, it was impractical for fluid 
resource like oil and gas that could move from one location to another within the larger 
reservoir. Movement that would be induced by the extraction of oil in any part of the reservoir, 
which would create a low-pressure area into which oil and gas located in surrounding high-
pressure area would automatically flow or seep.  
After it was recognised that that oil and gas could move, it was soon accepted that the 
“ownership in place” law were an obsolete and unworkable way of determining ownership. 
Obsolete because it is a legal doctrine designed for stationary resources. Unworkable because it 
created irreconcilable separate ownership claims between neighbouring surface owners. The 
rights of an initial surface owners being directly in conflict with the rights of other surface owners 
after the oil and gas had moved. Indeed, it was just this sort of dispute that forced the courts to 
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abandon “ownership in place” and adopt a new doctrine which is referred to as the “Pure 
Capture Rule”. 
An irony associated with the movement of oil and gas, is that it only occurs when there is an 
outside disturbance and it stay in one place for hundreds of thousands, if not millions of years, 
when undisturbed. As such it can be stated that it is the active disturbance of the reservoir by 
human forces that created the movement. Putting this movement into context with the hard 
rock mining laws, such disturbances would be the equivalent of one property owner digging a 
pit on his property which is so close the border with his neighbour’s property, that the minerals 
on the neighbour’s property fall into his pit. Under most hard rock mining law this type of action 
at the very least be considered a tort, as it caused damage to the neighbour’s property,412 and 
may have even be considered a criminal act of theft because of the intentional appropriation of 
the neighbours’ property through active and deliberate human agency. The philosophy of these 
actions reflecting the notion that such a wrongdoer would not be permitted to make a profit 
from his own wrong. However, under the new “pure capture rule” not only would such 
appropriations be legalized, they were actively encouraged. Whether the courts really 
understood that they were encouraging this unjust appropriation is unclear. Regardless of 
whether this was the intent, it certainly was the result. 
The seminal case that established the “Pure Capture Rule” was the 1889 Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania decision in Westmoreland &Cambria Natural Gas Co. V. De Witt.413  
This case involved a surface landowner named John Brown who executed an oil and gas lease 
for approximately 140 acres of his land. Included in the lease was a clause that prohibited the 
lessee from drilling within 300 yards of buildings on the farm. This lease was eventually assigned 
to Westmoreland Natural Gas Company, which drilled a well into the gas-bearing strata. 
However rather than extracting gas from the well, Westmoreland shut the well in by closing the 
valves at the surface. The purported rational behind this action was to hold the well in reserve 
in the event one of the company’s other wells experienced failure or low production. Because 
the well was shut in Brown received no royalties, a situation which Brown was not willing to 
accept. To remedy this situation Brown ordered Westmoreland off his land and claimed a 
forfeiture of the lease due to Westmoreland’s failure to make certain payments. He also 
provided a new lease with DeWitt to drill on the same property. These allegations were disputed 
by Brown who claimed that the new lease was not for the same property as it provided a licence 
for drilling within 300 yards of his farm buildings, an area excluded by the earlier lease. 
Westmoreland filed suit to prevent the second company from drilling a well. 
In its decision the court decided that Brown had leased all his oil and gas rights to 
Westmoreland and therefore could not lease them to Dewitt. 414 This lease dispute resolution 
was however dramatically overshadowed by the courts pronouncement of a new legal doctrine 
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which was to be applied to oil and gas industry, the “rule of capture”. The reasons for elucidating 
this rule in a case that was primarily about a leasing agreement are unclear. But it was likely 
because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court knew it would have to address the ever-growing 
number ownership disputes which were occurring in the rapidly developing oil and gas industry 
and this was the first case that allowed them to do so. As such in its decision it included the 
following declarations on oil and gas ownership;  
'The learned master says gas is a mineral, and while in situ is part of the land, and 
therefore possession of the land is possession of the gas. But this deduction must be made 
with some qualifications. Gas, it is true, is a mineral; but it is a mineral with peculiar 
attributes, which require the application of precedents arising out of ordinary mineral 
rights, with much more careful consideration of the principles involved than of the mere 
decisions…. Water and oil, and still more strongly gas, may be classed by themselves, if 
the analogy be not too fanciful, as minerals feroe naturoe. In common with animals, and 
unlike other minerals, they have the power and the tendency to escape without the 
volition of the owner. …. They belong to the owner of the land, and are part of it, so long 
as they are on or in it, and are subject to his control; but when they escape, and go into 
other land, or come under another's control, the title of the former owner is gone. 
Possession of the land, therefore, is not necessarily possession of the gas.'415 
As can be appreciated from reading this ruling, the court was clearly and dramatically 
changing the common law treatment of oil and gas rights. Under this ruling any claim the surface 
owner had to oil and gas under their land was lost the moment that that it left his property. The 
implication of this were that surface owners would have no legal recourse when oil and gas were 
siphoned out from underneath their property by their neighbours. This principle was endorsed 
by the U.S. Supreme Court in Brown v. Spilman,416 wherein the Court stated; 
'Petroleum gas and oil are substances of a peculiar character, and decisions in ordinary 
cases of mining, for coal and other minerals which have a fixed situs, cannot be applied to 
contracts concerning them without some qualifications. They belong to the owner of the 
land, and are part of it, so long as they are on it or in it or subject to his control; but when 
they escape and go into other land, or come under another's control, the title of the 
former owner is gone. If an adjoining owner drills his own land, and taps a deposit of oil 
or gas, extending under his neighbor's field, so that it comes into his well, it becomes his 
property.'417. 
As far as the oil and gas industry was concerned, this ruling legalised the aggressive behaviour 
that they had already adopted. By making the ownership of oil and gas resources contingent on 
the capture of those resources, it encouraged an even more feverish pursuit of the finite 
resources in any given oil and gas reservoir. 
As far as surface owners were concerned, this decision put them at the mercy of the oil 
companies. For when oil was found in their neighbourhood they would have to immediately 
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license out drilling rights to their property or risk having the oil and gas siphoned away by oil 
companies operating on their neighbour’s property. Unsurprisingly the oil companies used the 
treat of this potential loss as a tool to minimise the amount of the royalties they were willing to 
pay for the leases. A threat that could be easily visualised by drilling wells near the border of the 
threatened landowner. It was by using this threat that many oil companies were able to acquire 
oil and gas licenses for a fraction of their true value.418 In the most abusive cases, once an oil and 
gas company got a license from all the surrounding farms, they would only drill and produce 
from the property from which they could pay the lowest royalties. An action that bears a striking 
similarity to the action that Westmoreland chose to take when they shut in the wells on Browns 
farm and which was retroactively sanctioned Pennsylvania Supreme Court. 
It should be noted that providing the oil companies with the tools to inequitably enrich 
themselves was not the objective, but rather an unintended consequence for the early cases.419 
For those early courts the primary objective of the capture rule was to provide a new practical 
method of deciding ownership of this mysterious and mobile resource. It should be remembered 
that adoption of this rule took place years before there existed any reliable way of determining 
how much oil was under individual piece of property. So even if the court wanted to maintain 
the previous rule of ownership on place this was not possible, as there was no way of knowing 
how much oil and gas was in any given place. It was because of this lack of knowledge that the 
court had to develop a new method, and what better method for determining ownership could 
be found than absolute possession.  
Although the consequence of the capture rule may have been unintended, this does not 
mean that they were not litigated. After the adoption of the capture rule there would have been 
many instances where disputes arose which as a result of oil and gas being siphoned across 
borders. During the first decade the court's response to these disputes was to uphold the 
capture rule and recommended that the injured parties engage in defensive drilling which soon 
became known as the offset drilling rule. The case usually credited with advocating this rule is 
the1897 Ohio Supreme Court case of Kelley v. Ohio Oil Co.420 In that case the plaintiff was a 
lessee who sought to enjoin the defendant from drilling twenty-five feet from a property line 
separating the two. Plaintiff asserted that this particular oil bearing sand would allow for the 
movement of oil for a distance of at least 200-250 feet any well should be at least the same 
distance from the border.421 The plaintiff further asserted that defendant placed its well with 
the malicious intent to injure by draining oil from underneath the plaintiffs land.422 The court 
ruled that the action of the defendant was not one of malicious intent but one which one which 
adhered to the capture rule. In its ruling it stated; 
'Petroleum oil is a mineral, and while in the earth it is part of the realty, and should 
it move from place to place by percolation or otherwise, it forms part of that tract of 
land in which it tarries for the time being, and if it moves to the next adjoining tract, it 
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becomes part and parcel of that tract; and it forms part of some tract, until it reaches a 
well and is raised to the surface, and then for the first time it becomes the subject of 
distinct ownership separate from the realty, and becomes personal property.'423 
It further stated that:  
'The right to acquire, enjoy and own property carries with it the right to use it as the 
owner pleases, so long as such use does not interfere with the legal rights of others'424, 
while at the same time explaining that the owners legal rights as 'the right to drill and 
produce oil on one's own land is absolute, and cannot be supervised or controlled by a 
court or an adjoining landowner,'425  
In terms of addressing the actual dispute the court stated that and that the sole remedy 
afforded to neighbours which own property over a common supply was; 'drilling wells on both 
sides of such a line,'426 and that this provides an 'ample and sufficient remedy' which precludes 
the need for injunctive relief.427 Of course, this remedy did nothing to lessen the dependency of 
the surface owners on the oil companies. By advancing the offset drilling rule, the court was 
saying to surface owners; that if they want to receive any rewards for the oil and gas that may 
be under their property, their only option was to reach an agreement with an oil company to 
drill and produce as quickly as possible. All of which dramatically strengthened the bargaining 
position of oil industry relative to the property owners.  
While the adoption of a capture rule may have harmed the bargaining position of surface 
property owners, it did provide an ideal legal structure for overall advancement of the oil and 
gas industry. Unconstrained by ownership disputes, the full force of unrestricted capitalism 
would produce one of the most remarkable expansion of an industry the world had ever seen. 
Across the nation and throughout the world the search for oil and gas became a rush. A rush 
that was bigger and would produce more wealth than any gold rush ever did. However, there 
was a negative side to that rush. In the haste to find and produce oil, waste became rampant. 
The major sources of this waste can be divided into three categories. First there was the outright 
destruction of resources, which usually involved the burning of the less valuable gas resources 
in an effort to capture more valuable oil resources. The second was the of waste resulted from 
over investment in redundant infrastructure which greatly increased the total cost of bringing 
the resources to the surface. And the third involved the damage that was done to the reservoirs 
when excessive drilling caused the premature loss of internal pressure making it more difficult 
to bring the oil and gas to the surface. Although early courts did not know about the third form 
of waste, they were clearly aware of and usually indifferent to the first two. The offside drilling 
rule being evidence of their lack of concern for over investment. 
As far as the first source of waste is concerned the courts acceptance of this was 
demonstrated in the 1893 Pennsylvanian appeal court ruling in Hague v Wheeler.428 In that case 
there were three parties which had legal access to the same oil and gas reservoir. All three had 
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drilled wells and started production, however only two of them had a market for the gas that 
was being produced from the wells. The third party who did not have a buyer for gas simply let 
the gas escape into the air or burned it off in a process called flaring, in order to maintain its oil 
production. It was also alleged that the defendant simply abandoned wells that stopped 
producing oil, rather than capping them which would help to preserve the internal pressure of 
the reservoir. The plaintiff contended that because of the defendant’s action the common 
reservoir was being wasted and so sought an injunction that would prohibit the defendant from 
continuing these wasteful practices. In making its decision the appeal court first ruled that the 
third producer was not flaring the gas out of malicious intent429 and that as the rule of capture 
provided the defendant with absolute ownership of any gas that it brought to the surface, they 
could do whatever it wanted to do with their property, including destroying it through flaring.430   
While this case is considered the pinnacle of an absolutist interpretation of the capture 
rule,431 it did not start or end that way, and there is every reason to interpret in a quite different 
manner. For not only did this case first raise the possibility of correlative rights in oil and gas, it 
also represents a clearly identifiable plea by the court; for legislators to make new laws that 
would limit the destructive effects of the rule of capture. The possibility of correlative rights 
being introduced in the lower trial court and the pleas for new laws being made by the appeal 
Court. 
As to the introduction of the concept of correlative property rights; this took place in at the 
lower trial court which granted the injunction the plaintiffs were requesting. An important 
aspect of the ruling was that it adapted water law to make new oil and gas law, thus representing 
an understanding that doctrines in one body of law can be transferred into another body of law; 
when relevant. These correlative principles being drawn from an article written by Judge Cooley 
in the Southern Law review the described water law as follows; 
'These waters belong to no one until they are collected and they may be 
appropriated by the one who collects and puts them to use. But though neither 
proprietor has such right in or control over the water as will enable him to complain of 
his neighbor's appropriation, does not each owe to the other certain duties of good 
neighborhood, among which is the duty to abstain from purposely withdrawing the 
water that may be useful to both, when a use of it is not intended?'432 
The trial court then proceeded to establish the thesis that the rights of adjoining owners of 
oil and gas were not absolute and independent but qualified and correlative. 
'These valuable products are obtainable only in connection with the ownership of 
land and for many purposes are to be regarded as minerals, and as constituting an 
integral portion of the land itself. ... But they are not, like coal and iron ore, fixed in 
their place in the rocks, so that the owner may know his own, protract his lines 
downwards to mark his boundaries, and take them when he pleases. As water 
percolates by untraceable rills through the gravel, so these 'minerals ferae naturae,' as 
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they have been aptly called in a recent case, permeate the porous rocks deep in the 
bowels of the earth, and rush to the surface through any opening made through the 
impervious cap by which the basin which contains them is sealed. No landowner gets 
through his wells oil or gas exclusively from his own land; that which saturates his rocks 
may be lawfully taken by his neighbour through wells on his land, tapping the common 
reservoir. From the very nature of the case the right of each owner is qualified. It is 
common to all whose land overlies the basin, and each must of necessity exercise his 
right with some regard to the rights of the others. [Italics added] ... The same 
considerations of natural justice which place limits on the use of waters to their 
usufruct, must of necessity impose qualifications upon the enjoyment of all right of 
property, which, from the nature of the things possessed, many must enjoy together 
'433 
While this opinion was overturned, the intelligence and foresight demonstrated it indicates 
just how close Pennsylvania came to adopting a more progressive line of reasoning in the early 
development of oil and gas law. A line of which would be almost universally adopted by all 
jurisdictions some sixty years later.434  
While the appellant court could have adopted the trial courts verdict, it instead chose to 
reiterate the “capture rule” while simultaneously and ironically attempting to reinforce that 
rule’s validity by claiming it was based on the absolutist “Cujus est solum rule,” it had replaced. 
Although the court acknowledged that “oil and gas are unlike solid minerals, since they may 
move through the interstitial spaces or crevices in the sand rocks," it held that "the owner of the 
surface is an owner downward to the centre. ... His dominion is, upon general principles, as 
absolute over the fluid as the solid minerals"435 While the verdict obviously ignored the fact that 
it was the intentional disturbance of the surface owner that caused the movement, the complete 
ruling did not. To this point the court added a statement to the ruling which can only be regarded 
as a plea for the Pennsylvania legislature to amend its oil and gas law to prevent the needless 
waste of gas resources that this case embodied. That statement, which the offer a glimmer of 
hope for those that were concerned about the waste in the industry was as follows;  
'In the disposition he [the third producer] may make of it [gas] he is subject to two 
limitations: he must not disregard his obligations to the public, he must not disregard 
his neighbour's rights. If he uses his product in such a manner as to violate any rule of 
public policy or any positive provision of the written law, he brings himself within the 
reach of the courts. If the use he makes of his own, or its waste, is injurious to the 
property or the health of others, such use or waste may be restrained, or damages 
recovered therefore; but, subject to these limitations, his power as an owner is 
absolute, until the legislature shall, in the interest of the public as consumers, restrict 
and regulate it by statute.'[italics added] 436 
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In doing so the court was basically providing an open invitation for the Pennsylvania 
Legislature to formulate new laws to protect against the waste and abuse engendered by the 
“pure capture rule”. An invitation that reflected judicial support for legislation that was enacted 
in the State of Indiana shortly thereafter.  
6.2.3 Waste Limitation Rules 
The first legislations regulating the oil and gas industry mainly dealt with safety issues which 
were fairly uniformly upheld against due process challenges.437 Given the successful defence of 
these regulations, it is hardly surprising that concerned legislatures would attempt to expand 
these regulations to restrict the waste of resources that was inflicting the industry. A waste of 
resources that the both public, and judiciary were asking the legislatures to address. The first 
State to do this was the State of Indiana, when in 1893 it enacted the Indiana Code § 46-306. 
The title, preamble, and first and fourth section of a law enacted in 1893 by the state of Indiana 
were as follows: 
'An Act Concerning the Sinking, Safety, Maintenance, Use, and Operation of Natural 
Gas and Oil Wells, Prescribing Penalties and Declaring an Emergency. 
Whereas, great danger to life and injury to persons and property is liable to result 
from the improper, unsafe, and negligent sinking, maintenance, use, and operation of 
natural gas and oil wells; therefore, 
Sec. 1. Be it enacted by the general assembly of the state of Indiana, That it shall be 
unlawful for any person, firm, or corporation having possession or control of any 
natural gas or oil well, whether as a contractor, owner, lessee, agent, or manager, to 
allow or permit the flow of gas or oil from any such well to escape into the open air 
without being confined within such well or proper pipes or other safe receptacle, for a 
longer period than two (2) days next after gas or oil shall have been struck in such well. 
And thereafter all such gas or oil shall be safely and securely confined in such well, 
pipes, or other safe and proper receptacles... 
Sec. 4. Whenever any person or corporation in possession or control of any well 
in which natural gas or oil has been found shall fail to comply with the provisions of 
this act, any person or corporation lawfully in possession of lands situate adjacent to 
or in the vicinity or neighborhood of such well may enter upon the lands upon which 
such well is situate, and take possession of such well from which gas or oil is allowed 
to escape in violation of the provisions of § 1 of this act, and pack and tube such well, 
and shut in and secure the flow of gas or oil, and maintain a civil action in any court 
of competent jurisdiction in this state against the owner, lessee, agent, or manager 
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of said well, and each of them jointly and severally, to recover the cost and expense 
of such tubing and packing, together with attorneys' fees and costs of suit.”438 
Although the preamble attempts to present this regulation as a safety provision its lack of 
reference to other safety matters would appear to indicate that safety was in essence a 
technicality which could be used to justify enacting waste prevention measure for the oil and 
gas industry. As could be expected, and like previous safety regulations, these were quickly to 
be challenged by the oil and gas companies which believed that the “pure capture rule” provided 
them with an absolute right to do whatever they pleased with the oil and gas that they brought 
to the surface. While there was an earlier case,439 the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Ohio Oil 
Co V. Indiana (1897)440 was really the case that established a new precedent in support of such 
regulatory restrictions. 
The facts in the case of Ohio Oil Co. were relatively straightforward. Ohio Oil Company was a 
corporation organized under the Ohio State laws which was authorized to carry out business in 
the State of Indiana. The corporation had an oil lease on land above and part of; 
'a large subterranean deposit of natural gas, occupying a reservoir of large extent, 
with well-defined boundaries, and utilized for fuel and light by the people of those 
counties and many other counties and cities of Indiana, including Indianapolis, Fort 
Wayne, Richmond, Logansport, Anderson, Muncie, Marion, Kokomo, and others of the 
most populous cities of said state, to which cities said gas is conducted, after being 
brought to the surface of the earth, through pipes and conduits, by means of which 
many hundreds of thousands of the people of the state of Indiana are now, and have 
been for more than ten years last past, continuously supplied with gas for light and 
fuel; that said natural gas underlying the counties aforesaid and other portions of the 
state is contained in and percolates freely through a stratum of rock known as Trenton 
rock, comprising a vast reservoir in which the gas is confined under great pressure, and 
from which it escapes, when it is permitted to do so, with great force.'441 
In May of 1897 Ohio Oil Co. drilled a number of wells on its lease which produced a 
combination of oil and gas in large quantities. However; instead of containing the gas as required 
by section 1 of the regulations, they allowed the gas to flow into the open air. They did this 
because while they could sell the oil, they had no market for the gas and the cost of capturing it 
would greatly reduce the profits that they made from the oil. After a period of nine months in 
which the defendant vented an unknown but significant quantity of gas, the States Attorney 
General applied for, and was granted in the lower courts an injunction which forced the 
defendant to comply with the regulation. While the company admitted that they were not in 
compliance, they challenged the lower court ruling by challenging the validity of the regulation. 
Claiming it constituted an unlawful taking of private property, which was prohibited under the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.442 It was this alleged breach of the 14th Amendment 
                                                          
438 Ind. Code Ann § 406-306 (1894), p 300 
439 Townsend v. State, 147 Ind. 624, 37 L.R.A. 294, 49 N.E. 14 
440 Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana - 177 U.S. 190 (1900)  
441 Id. p 201 
442 U.S. Constitution, 14th Amendment, Section 1. “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject 
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall 






which became the primary focus of the court, which stated that the issue at question was as 
follows; 
'Did the enforcement of the first section of the statute produce as to the persons 
whose obedience to its commands were coerced by injunction, a taking of private 
property without adequate compensation; that is, did the execution of the statute 
amount to a denial of due process of law contrary to the provisions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States?'443 
An extremely revealing aspect of the State’s complaint against the defendant is that there is 
no mention of safety issues, even though the regulation was issued under the pretext of 
protecting public safety. Instead the compliant focuses on providing a description of how much 
money and resources the communities and the State had invested in the infrastructure necessary 
to utilize the gas reservoirs for lighting and fuel purposes, how important the gas was to the 
overall welfare of the state and request to prohibit the defendant’s wasteful behaviour as it was 
threatening the common source of gas.444 All of which makes this complaint more of a plea for 
fairness or equity, rather than a question about the validity of a safety regulation. 
From the defendant’s side, they argued that because they were venting the gas in area which 
was removed from populated areas there was no safety threat. They further asserted that 
because the “capture rule” provided them with absolute ownership of the gas after they brought 
it to the surface, they were free to dispose of it in any manner they choose, including letting it 
escape into the air. The essence of their defence being therefore a request for the strict 
application of existing common law regardless of the fairness or equity of the outcome.  
In framing the dispute as a constitutional issue, the court was in effect using the constitution 
to decide between two contradictory, legal contentions. The constitution itself being sufficiently 
vague as to allow for a decision in support of either of the contentions, the underlying judicial 
decision for the court came down to this;  
Should precedent prevail when it results in an un-equitable and inefficient outcome, or 
should equity and efficiency force the evolution of the law to meet the demands of a 
changing circumstances? 
The reason why this case is considered to be so important in the development of oil and gas 
law is not only that it sought to address this contradiction, but because of the comprehensive 
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manner in which it addressed it. For rather than simply blindly adopting one contention over the 
other, in its ruling the court made a conscious effort to examine the very essence of property 
rights which had been and which they felt ought to be attached to oil and gas ownership. They 
opened this examination by admitting that there existed confusion and misconceptions as to the 
nature of the rights of surface owners to oil and gas and the scope of the legislative authority to 
regulate the industry. Further; that these misconceptions were as a result of the fallacy that 
considered the rights of an owner to use certain means to acquire the resources, to be identical 
to the rights of ownership once acquired. 
In attempting to eliminate this confusion, the court first stated that there was no doubt that 
under common law rules; 
'the ownership in fee of that of the earth carries with it the right to the minerals 
beneath, and the consequent privilege to mining to extract them” and that there was 
also no doubt that governments had “the legislative authority to regulate the exercise 
of mining rights and to direct the methods of their enjoyment so as to prevent the 
infringement by one miner of the rights of others.'445  
That said they went on to identify a practical issue that they felt needed to be addressed in 
order to resolve this dispute, which was; 
'Does the peculiar character of the substances, oil and gas, which are here involved, 
the manner in which they are held in their natural reservoirs, the method by which and 
the time when they may be reduced to actual possession or become the property of a 
particular person, cause them to be exceptions to the general principles applicable to 
other mineral deposits, and hence subject them to different rules?'446 
In order to answer this question, they first acknowledged the oil and gas were different from 
hard mineral because of its fluidity.447 A fluidity, which generated external consequences that 
the court described as follows; 
'No one owner of the surface of the earth, within the area beneath which the gas 
and oil move, can exercise his right to extract from the common reservoir in which the 
supply is held without, to an extent, diminishing the source of supply as to which all 
other owners of the surface must exercise their rights. The waste by one owner, caused 
by a reckless enjoyment of his right of striking the reservoir at once therefore operates 
upon the other surface owners.'448 
This answer was an indisputable annunciation of a simple premise, which was that when oil 
and gas reservoirs are under land of (and therefore common to) several surface owners, the 
actions of each and every surface owner must as a direct result of that commonality, have an 
effect of the property interests of all other surface land owners. The significance of this 
acknowledgement of commonality, was that it represented the first step on the evolutionary 
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path towards the more contentious idea that common ownership of an assets resulted in 
correlative ownership rights. The reference to the “reckless enjoyment” of rights simply being an 
indication of the sentiment of the court towards the prevention of waste, which was the central 
issue at question in this case. A sentiment which the court sought support for by referring to 
Hague v. Wheeler and drawing from that case the following quote; 
'Now it is doubtless true that the public has a sufficient interest in the preservation 
of oil and gas from waste to justify legislation upon this subject. Something has been 
done in this direction already by the acts regulating the plugging of abandoned wells. 
... In the disposition he may make of it [private property], he is subject to two 
limitations. He must not disregard his obligations ligations to the public. He must not 
disregard his neighbor's rights. If he uses his product in such a manner as to violate any 
rule of public policy or any positive provision of the written law, he brings himself 
within the reach of the courts. If the use he makes of his own, or its waste, is injurious 
to the property or the health of others, such use or waste may be restrained, or 
damages recovered therefore, but, subject to these limitations, his power as an owner 
is absolute until the legislature shall, in the interest of the public, as consumers, restrict 
and regulate it by statute.'449 
While this recognition of a communal effects and interest, clearly represented a start down 
the evolutionary path towards correlative property rights, there was an additional proposition in 
the ruling which made that path more likely. That proposition had to do with the way that the 
court changed the conceptualization of the nature of property rights attached to oil and gas 
reserves. It should be recalled that the “capture rule” was a concept that migrated from the 
property rights related to “feroe nature” or wild animals. Because of this migration it was not 
unreasonable to assume that oil and gas property rights would be equivalent to wild animal 
property rights. However, the court in took issue with that assumption. In their ruling they stated 
that;  
'If the analogy between animals ferae naturae and mineral deposits of oil and gas, 
stated by the Pennsylvania court and adopted by the Indiana court, instead of simply 
establishing a similarity of relation, proved the identity of the two things, there would 
be an end of the case. This follows because things which are ferae naturae belong to 
the negative community; in other words, are public things subject to the absolute 
control of the state, which, although it allows them to be reduced to possession, may 
at its will not only regulate, but wholly forbid, their future taking... But whilst there is 
an analogy between animals ferae naturae and the moving deposits of oil and natural 
gas, there is not identity between them. Thus, the owner of land has the exclusive 
right on his property to reduce the game there found to possession, just as the owner 
of the soil has the exclusive right to reduce to possession the deposits of natural gas 
and oil found beneath the surface of his land. The owner of the soil cannot follow 
game when it passes from his property; so, also, the owner may not follow the natural 
gas when it shifts from beneath his own to the property of someone else within the 
gas field. It being true as to both animals ferae naturae and gas and oil, therefore, 
                                                          






that whilst the right to appropriate and become the owner exists, proprietorship does 
not take being until the particular subjects of the right become property by being 
reduced to actual possession. The identity, however, is for many reasons wanting. In 
things ferae naturae, all are endowed with the power of seeking to reduce a portion 
of the public property to the domain of private ownership by reducing them to 
possession. In the case of natural gas and oil, no such right exists in the public. It is 
vested only in the owners in fee of the surface of the earth within the area of the gas 
field. This difference points at once to the distinction between the power which the 
lawmaker may exercise as to the two. In the one, as the public are the owners, 
everyone may be absolutely prevented from seeking to reduce to possession. No 
divesting of private property under such a condition can be conceived, because the 
public are the owners, and the enacting by the state of a law as to the public 
ownership is but the discharge of the governmental trust resting in the state as to 
property of that character. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U. S. 519, 161 U. S. 525. On the 
other hand, as to gas and oil the surface proprietors within the gas field all have the 
right to reduce to possession the gas and oil beneath. They could not be absolutely 
deprived of this right which belongs to them without a taking of private property.' 450 
The distinction that the court was making in this passage can be summarised into two 
sentences. First, because no one has any ownership interest in wild animals before they are 
captured, they belong to public property which the government can regulate it in any way it sees 
fit, including prohibiting their capture. Second, because surface land owners have some form of 
pre-capture rights to the oil and gas reservoirs under their property, the government does not 
have absolute authority in terms of regulations and specifically cannot absolutely prohibit their 
capture. While this may have appeared to support the absolutist doctrine being espoused by the 
defendant, it had quite the opposite effect. For by proscribing the imposition of regulations that 
would prohibit capture of oil and gas by surface owners, the court was effectively saying that it 
was legal to regulate capture, so long as those regulation did not absolutely prohibit capture. All 
of which meant that because the regulation at issue did not prohibit the capture by surface 
owners, the court was unlikely to overturn it. Which indeed was ultimately the case with the 
court referring to the defendant’s assertions as follows: 
'They really go, not to the power to make the regulations, but to their wisdom. But 
with the lawful discretion of the legislature or the state we may not interfere.'451 
The reason this particular proposition was so vital to the eventual adoption of correlated 
property rights in oil and gas was the it provided legislatures with an extremely wide purview in 
terms of its legitimate regulatory authority. A regulatory authority that in this instance prevented 
the court from interfering with regulation that were intended to prevent the waste of gas 
resources, but in later instances would require that all surface owners respect the correlative 
property rights of all other surface owners. That is not to say that this case did not have certain 
correlative property rights references in the ruling. Immediately after identifying the limits of 
regulation, the ruling went on to discuss the rights of individual and all surface owners as follows; 
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'But there is a coequal right in them all to take from a common source of supply the 
two substances which in the nature of things are united, though separate. It follows 
from the essence of their right and from the situation of the things as to which it can 
be exerted that the use by one of his power to seek to convert a part of the common 
fund to actual possession may result in an undue proportion's being attributed to one 
of the possessors of the right to the detriment of the others, [Italics added] or by waste 
by one or more to the annihilation of the rights of the remainder. Hence it is that the 
legislative power, from the peculiar nature of the right and the objects upon which it 
is to be exerted, can be manifested for the purpose of protecting all the collective 
owners by securing a just distribution, [Italics added] to arise from the enjoyment by 
them of their privilege to reduce to possession, and to reach the like end by preventing 
waste. ... Viewed, then, as a statute to protect or to prevent the waste of the common 
property of the surface owners,[Italics added] the law of the State of Indiana which is 
here attacked because it is asserted that it divested private property without due 
compensation, in substance, is a statute protecting private property and preventing it 
from being taken by one of the common owners without regard to the enjoyment of 
the others. [Italic added]'452 
Of interest in this part of the ruling is that the court did not limit itself to a discussion on the 
validity of anti-waste legislation that was being challenged. Instead it chose to expand the ruling 
to encompass the possibility of future legislation which was designed protect all surface owners 
from the unjust appropriation of a single land owner. The result of this analysis was that the 
court took issue with the defendant’s argument that the constitution protected its individual 
property right as this would imply; 
'that one common owner may divest all the others of their rights without 
wrongdoing, but the lawmaking power cannot protect all the owners in their 
enjoyment without violating the Constitution of the United States.'453 
The significance of this question cannot be overestimated. For it represents a very 
fundamental and extremely appropriate question, which was; When there are several separate 
owners of an integrated property, does the Constitution protect the property rights of a single 
individual owners’ rights to the detriment of all other property owners, or does it protect the 
rights of all property owners equally? While the court did not answer this specific question, the 
answer can be inferred from the decision that it made in this case, which was; 
'In view of the fact that regulations of natural deposits of oil and gas and the right 
of the owner to take them as an incident of title in fee to the surface of the earth, as 
said by the supreme court of Indiana, is ultimately but a regulation of real property, 
and they must hence be treated as relating to the preservation and protection of rights 
of an essentially local character. Considering this fact and the peculiar situation of the 
substances, as well as the character of the rights of the surface owners, we cannot say 
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that the statute amounts to a taking of private property, when it is but a regulation by 
the state of Indiana of a subject which especially comes within its lawful authority.'454 
In providing this affirmation the court not only was ruling on the legitimacy of the regulation 
but was clearly acting like a court of equity. For rather than being restricted to maintaining a 
precedent that would result in an inefficient outcome, it sought to provide State governments 
with the flexibility to not only avoid inefficient outcomes, but to do so in a way that would allow 
a more equitable resolution of future ownership disputes. Although it would take some time 
before the full impact of this ruling would be felt, there can be no doubt that it was critical ruling 
that fundamentally changed the direction of the law and put it firmly on the path towards 
establishing correlative property rights in oil and gas.  
6.2.4 Well Spacing Rules 
While the State v. Ohio Oil Co. case involved the enforcement of State regulations which 
prohibited the waste of valuable gas resources prohibiting the venting gas into the air, this 
regulation was not to be the last regulation designed to protect against the destruction of oil and 
gas resources. In the first instance these regulations evolved as a result of practical 
considerations which were supported by a better scientific understanding of oil and gas 
resources. The practical considerations had to do with the regrettably short well life that was 
being experienced in the industry. In many, if not the majority of cases, high producing wells 
would either greatly reduce or stop production within one or two years of oil being discovered. 
Perhaps the most dramatic examples of this involved one of the most important oil and gas find 
in the history of the United States.  
On January 10th, 1901 Captain Anthony F. Lucas and his drilling team struck oil in the 
Spindletop salt dome near Beaumont, Texas. This well was one of the most spectacular gushers 
since the foundation of the oil and gas industry, with production estimated at over 75,000 barrels 
per day. This record production level resulted in a rush of speculators who in the first year sunk 
440 wells and by the third year had sunk over 1,000 wells. Unfortunately, because so many wells 
had been drilled so close together and so quickly; only 100 of them produced oil at a rate of more 
than 10,000 barrels a day. After the rush Lucas explained his understanding of the need for 
appropriate production methods and conservation, lamenting that Spindletop’s rapid decline 
came from being “punched too full of holes.” He added:  
'The cow was milked too hard, and, moreover, she was not milked intelligently.'455 
It was as a result of sentiments like Captain Lucus’s, that answers were sought to determine 
how to better prolong the life of the oil wells being drilled. The answer turned out to be as simple 
as it was obvious. Too many wells, in too close a proximity were rapidly depleting the internal 
pressure of the reservoirs. The problem with this rapid depletion was that because oil did not 
move to the well head as fast as gas, the mixture of oil and gas that came to the surface often 
contained a lower concentration of oil than would have otherwise been possible if a slower 
depletion rate was utilised. All of which meant that huge quantities of oil were being left trapped 
in the ground after the internal pressure had been exhausted. Compounding this waste was the 
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practical considerations of redundant capital expenditure on oil drilling equipment. Obviously if 
one well could produce more oil than two wells the cost of the additional well was wasted. The 
simple solution to these problems was to restrict the number of wells which would be allowed 
to be drilled in a reservoir. This is precisely what the new oil and gas conservation regulations set 
out to accomplish under what came to be called "well spacing rules". 
Staying with Texas these oil and gas conservation rules were eventually delegated to Texas 
Railway Commission, which was to become the central administrative agency provided with the 
executive, legislative and judicial power to regulate the oil and gas industry in Texas.456 In fulfilling 
its conservation duties the Railway Commission established what became known as “Rule 37”, 
which was the first well spacing rule to be adopted in the United States.457 This rule provided 
that; 
'No well for oil or gas shall hereafter be drilled nearer than three hundred (300) feet 
to any other completed or drilling well on the same or adjoining tract or farm, and no 
well shall be drilled nearer than one hundred fifty (150) feet to any property line; 
provided that the commission, in order to prevent waste or to protect vested rights, 
will grant exceptions permitting drilling within shorter distances than as above 
prescribed, upon application filed fully stating the facts, notice thereof having first 
been given to all adjacent lessees affected thereby. Rule 37 shall not for the present 
be enforced within the proven fields of the Gulf Coast.'458  
While there were the possibilities of being granted an exception under rule 37, it was 
inevitable that there would be those that would challenge the rule in the same way that the 
previous waste rules were challenged. These challenges were particularly likely as this rule clearly 
overturned a Supreme Court of Texas ruling made one year earlier in the 1916 case of Texas 
Company v. Daugherty459 where it was held that: 
'For the purpose of making the exploration and producing all the oil, gas, and other 
minerals that might be within the ground, and the erection of all structures necessary 
thereto, as well as their storing and transportation, the possession of the land itself is 
likewise granted, with no limitation upon the number of wells or shafts that the grantee 
might sink, or the extent of its operations in that connection, and consequently no 
                                                          
456 The Railroad Commission of Texas, “Chronological Listing of Key Events in the History of the Railroad Commission 
of Texas (1866-1939)”, (1999), “February 20, 1917 “Legislature declares pipelines to be common carriers, and gives 
Railroad Commission jurisdiction over same. This is the first act to designate the Railroad Commission as the agency 
to administer the conservation laws relating to oil and gas”. Tex. Nat. Res. Code Ann. '111.013 (Vernon 1978) 
[original version at 1917 Tex. Gen. Laws, Ch. 30, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 6019 (Vernon 1962)]” ... ” December 21, 
1917"...The preservation and conservation of all natural resources of the State are each and all hereby declared 
public rights and duties, and the Legislature shall pass all such laws as may be appropriate thereto. “Adopted at 
August 21, 1917 election, Proclamation of December 21, 1917” ...” March 31, 1919 Legislature enacts a statute 
requiring the conservation of oil and gas, forbidding waste, and giving the Railroad Commission jurisdiction. Tex. 
Nat. Res. Code Ann. '81.051 (Vernon 1978) [original version at 1919 Tex. Gen. Laws, Ch. 155, Tex. Gen. Civ. Stat. art. 
6023 (Vernon 1962]. 
457 Id. “November 26, 1919 Railroad Commission adopts first Statewide Rule regulating the oil and gas industry. 
Texas is the first state to adopt a well spacing rule: Rule 37, which has a conservation basis, was promulgated 
primarily to reduce fire hazards, and to minimize the danger of water percolation into oil stratum from wells drilled 
in too great a number or in too close of a proximity. Railroad Commission v. Bass, l0 S.W.2d 586 (Tex. Civ App.- 
Austin 1928} writ dism'd, 51 S.W.2d 1113 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1932}  
458 Texas Administrative Code, Title 16, Part 1 Chapter 3, Rule §3.37 






qualification of its right of possession of all such parts of the surface, [Italics added] 
except that no well should be drilled nearer than 200 feet from the house or barn on 
the premises without the consent of both parties, as might be necessary to its full use 
by the grantee for the purposes named.'[Italics Added]460 
While these challenges to the well spacing rules were virtually inevitable, the precedent set 
by U.S. Supreme Court in Ohio Oil v Indiana, also meant that the ruling in support of the rules 
were practically inevitable. This because; if it was legally acceptable to regulate against the 
wasteful process of flaring gas, it ought to be legally acceptable the regulate against the wasteful 
practice of over drilling. The only difference between that former being, it was more obviousness 
than the later. As such, once science could confirm the waste involved in over drilling, it became 
a relatively straight forward decision for the courts. This indeed was exactly what happened. 
Two of years after enacting the well spacing rules, the Supreme Court of Texas was presented 
with the case of Oxford Oil Co. v. Atlantic Oil Co.461. While this case involved a dispute between 
two oil companies, the real issue in the case was the well spacing rules imposed by the Texas 
Railroad Commission. In this case the plaintiff complained the because of well spacing rules they 
were not allowed to drill sufficient wells on their property which resulted in the defendant being 
able to drain oil from under that which the plaintiff felt ought to belong to them. The actual 
claims made by the plaintiffs were that; 
'the vesting of the authority in the commission by the Legislature to supervise the 
drilling of oil wells in Texas is and was illegal; that such illegal acts and regulations was 
a violation of two of the provisions of the national Constitution, namely, section 10 of 
article 1, and the Fourteenth.'462 
In rendering its decision, the Court ruled that the Texas Legislature had the ability to delegate 
and had properly delegated it authority to the Railway Commission. As to the constitutionality 
of “Rule 14” Judge Atwell after citing Ohio Oil v. Illinois declared that; 
'In considering this demurrer, I am convinced that the plaintiffs' rights have not 
been violated, and, that the drillings allowed by the commission were consistent with 
the plaintiffs' ownership, rights of development, and enjoyment, and preservative of 
the property rights of neighboring and contiguous owners.'463 
Shortly after this decision almost every oil producing State in the Union adopted similar well 
spacing rules to protect their own oil and gas resources from the waste inherent in over drilling. 
Because this was done using administrative agencies and administrative regulation, the 
landmark cases and precedents in this field relate to confirming the legality of those agencies 
and their regulations. An early and notable precedent relating to well spacing being provided in 
the 1929, case of Marrs v. City of Oxford. 464 While that case involved an appeal of municipal 
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regulations prohibiting drilling oil well within the city limits the court expanded its ruling by 
referring to correlative rights as follows; 
“But looking to the substance of things, as equity does, what are the rights of 
plaintiffs that will be encroached upon or denied to them by the enforcement of this 
ordinance? It is not the mere right to drill a well on one or two lots at great cost and 
stop with that, or to take the proportionate part of the oil and gas in the pool that 
might be said to lie under or be fairly attributed to those lots. The obvious purpose 
was to reach the pool as quickly as possible and take all of the oil and gas obtainable 
before others could get it, thus seriously encroaching upon and probably destroying 
the same rights of adjoining lot owners. If one or more lot owners have given a lease 
for which no permit is obtainable their lessee may join a lessee who has a permit in 
the same block on terms that are fair to both lessor and lessee. If a lot owner has not 
given a lease he is protected by the asking in a fair proportion of the mineral produced 
by a permittee. The regulations make every effort to protect, rather than to destroy 
rights. They extend equal opportunity to all who have an interest and eliminate the 
race between those having equal rights in a common source of wealth, so that some 
may not take all and leave others with nothing...The basis of a statute, suggested in 
the Indiana case, is the governmental power to equally protect each surface owner in 
his right to a common fund. Complaint is made that the city was not vested with that 
power. Let it be conceded; still it does not follow that a court of equity will lend its aid 
to one in his effort to take all of a fund in which there is a community interest. The bill 
seems to us to be wholly without merit and the judgments of dismissal are 
Affirmed.”465 
Again, it should be noted that the discussion of correlative rights clearly represents a 
dramatic change from the early oil and gas precedents which provided every surface owner with 
the absolute right to extract as much oil and gas water as they desired regardless of consequence 
for the reservoir and their neighbours. A precedent that was discarded in an effort protect the 
reservoir and avoid inequitable outcomes. As effective as well spacing rules were in reducing 
the rapid depletion of internal pressure in reservoirs, it turned out that they were not capable 
of restricting oil production to a level that ensured maximum oil recovery. As such they were 
soon augmented by proration rules, that limited the amount of oil that could be taken from any 
given well during a specific period.  
6.2.5 Proration Rules 
Whilst well spacing rules were clearly intended to prevent the waste associated with internal 
pressure depletion, this was not the sole motivation for the production restrictions imposed on 
well owners under proration rules. The additional motivation for prorationing rules focused not 
on the physical waste of the natural resources, but rather a concern about the perceived 
economic waste which occurred when there was more oil being produced than the market could 
absorb. To put this concern into context, it should be remembered that the demand for oil and 
gas was initially based on illumination market. Although this market was large, it was not nearly 
                                                          






large enough to absorb all the oil and gas that was coming to the market as a result of prospecting 
operations. Indeed, it was not until there was a dramatic expansion in petrol engines and gas 
power plants that there was sufficient demand required to absorb the increase in supply that 
was reaching the markets during the early decades of the 20th century. This imbalance between 
supply and demand being exacerbated by the that huge oil and gas finds that took place in Texas 
and Oklahoma in the first two decades of the new century. All of which meant that the price of 
oil and gas dropped dramatically after the end of World War I. A price drop that was causing 
significant financial distress to everyone involved with the oil and gas industry, but most 
significantly to smaller independent operators.  
It should also be recalled that during this same period there was the beginnings of a dramatic 
shift in the attitudes towards the excesses of free markets operations and absolute property 
rights. Even before the turn of the century the scepticism of totally unregulated free markets had 
resulted in the adoption of the Sherman Act which was designed to prohibit anti-competitive 
behaviour amongst the powerful trading companies, most notable Standard Oil. These 
restrictions being further enhanced by the adoption of the Clayton Act in 1915 which attempted 
to clarify the prohibition embodied in the Sherman Act.466  
Put in the context of the financial distress of the oil and gas industry and a growing scepticism 
of unregulated markets and the resulting the expansion of government regulations, it is hardly 
surprising that the oil and gas regulators felt that they not only ought to, but also had the 
authority to do something to reduce this perceived economic waste. This feeling being consistent 
with the precedence that had been established by the courts when upholding prior waste 
prohibiting regulations. Not the least of which being the well spacing rules, which although 
reducing actual physical waste of oil and gas reservoirs also served to reduce the economic waste 
involved with redundant drilling operations. For these regulators the solution appeared simple. 
If too much oil and gas was being produced, they should impose regulations that restricted 
production, by prorationing or limiting the production allowances of individual oil wells on a 
State-wide basis. 
One of the first States to adopt proration regulations was the State of Oklahoma. These 
restrictions were adopted in 1921, by the Oklahoma Corporate Commission, which was 
authorized to create a department with authority over oil and gas production in the State of 
Oklahoma under a 1917 statute for the purpose of regulating the conservation of oil and gas.467 
The relevant sections of regulations which were imposed by the Commission reading as follows; 
'Section 7954: Waste prohibited. That the production of crude oil or petroleum in 
the state of Oklahoma, in such manner and under such conditions as to constitute 
waste, is hereby prohibited. 
Section 7955: Production and Sale Regulated. That the taking of crude oil or 
petroleum from any oil-bearing sand or sands in the State of Oklahoma at a time when 
there is not a market demand therefore at the well at a price equivalent to the actual 
value of such crude oil or petroleum is hereby prohibited, and the actual value of such 
crude oil or petroleum at any time shall be the average value as near as may be 
ascertained in the United States at retail of the by products of such crude oil or 
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petroleum when refined less the cost and a reasonable profit in the business of 
transporting, refining and marketing the same, and the Corporation Commission of this 
State is hereby invested (sic) with the authority and power to investigate and determine 
from time to time the actual value of such crude oil or petroleum by the standard herein 
provided, and when so determined said Commission shall promulgate its findings by its 
orders duly made and recorded, and publish the same in some newspaper of general 
circulation in the State.'468 
While these regulations were adopted in 1921, the first major application of proration orders 
did not occur until 1930. In that year the Commission issued orders which dramatically restricted 
the production of crude petroleum in Oklahoma and which had the result of limiting production 
in major field called the Oklahoma City field to 8 1/3 per cent of the potential production.469 
Needless to say this extremely restrictive level of production was quickly challenged in the courts 
and was the subject of the case of C. C. Julian Oil & Royalties Co. V. Capshaw.470 In this case C. C. 
Julian Oil & Royalties Co. (the petitioner), an oil company operating in the Oklahoma City field, 
was seeking a writ of prohibition from  the Supreme Court prohibiting Capshaw (the Corporate 
Commission), from enforcing its proration orders. 
Although the petition also challenged the authority of the Commission, as well as the due 
process involved in the preparation and implementation of the proration orders, the substantive 
part of the allegations in the petition concerned the validity of the orders. The first validity 
challenge revolved around the fact that the petitioner was an integrated petroleum company 
which had facilities to process and sell all the oil extracted from its wells. As such, it argued that 
because it was not wasting oil, the waste provisions of the regulation should not apply to it and 
that the restriction on its crude production amounted to a breach of the 14th Amendment. The 
second validity challenge revolved around the fact that proration orders did not treat all fields in 
the same manner, and it was argued that as the orders allowed wells in other fields to produce 
at higher levels, and this constituted a breach of doctrine of equal protection under the law. The 
final allegation was that as the proration orders restricted the supply of crude, this would 
necessary raise the price of crude and could be construed as price fixing, which was a breach of 
completion laws. The nature and consequences of each of these challenges is so relevant to the 
evolution of this law that each deserves to be clearly asked and answered in a more detailed 
manner.  
With respect the application of the specific proration order made on the petitioner, it is easy 
to comprehend why they argued these regulations should not be enforced against them. After 
all they were producing oil from their own wells, transporting it in their own pipeline, and refining 
it in their own refinery. This integration operation allowed them not only to minimise waste, but 
to utilize the full production capacity of their wells, to maximise their profits. By classical 
economic standards they were pursuing preciously the sort of competitive activities that free 
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market advocates applauded. It was not their fault that the other producers in the Oklahoma 
field did not have their own pipelines and refining facilitates. They were not responsible for the 
waste which the other producers were creating by producing oil that they could neither sell or 
store properly. To add insult to injury if the proration order was held up it would force them to 
buy crude oil for their refining operation from their wasteful competitors, rather that supply it 
for free from their own non-wasteful production operation.  
The implication of this argument was that the commission should only act against those non-
integrated producers who were the ones generating the waste, rather than enacting proration 
orders against all producers. There was however one obvious flaw in their argument, which was 
that it could nullify or at least disproportionately harm the property rights of the smaller non-
integrated oil producers. The manners in which this could happen are as follows. In the worst 
case if the integrated wells can produce all the crude oil needed for their refineries, this would 
result in the non-integrated wells being total shut down. Over the long term these circumstances 
this would allow the integrated oil companies to eventually capture all of the oil and gas from 
the reservoir, entirely eliminating the oil and gas property rights of the non-integrated 
producers. In a less extreme case, where the integrated oil companies could not produce 
sufficient crude from their own well, but there is still too much capacity, this would result in the 
non-integrated wells production being restricted. These restrictions would reduce the value the 
non-integrated wells, allowing the integrated oil companies to purchase them at a discount. 
Once the wells changed ownership, the integrated oil companies could increase production until 
all of their supply needs were met, returning the situation to the earlier worst case scenario. 
Even if the wells were not to change hands, and the integrated producer simply purchased 
addition supply needs from the restricted non-integrated wells, this would still mean that the 
integrated oil companies which were operating their wells at full capacity while the non-
integrated competitors were producing at less than full capacity. This disproportionate capture 
of oil by the integrated oil companies, representing an appropriation of oil that would otherwise 
have been captured by the non-integrated producers.  
While the petitioner may have been unconcerned about the disproportionate effect that their 
first challenge would have on non-integrated producers, that did not prevent them from raising 
this in their second challenge. Their contention being that because other fields were allowed to 
produce at higher levels than the Oklahoma City field, this constituted a breach of the doctrine 
of equal protection under the law. Whilst there can be no doubt that imposing different 
production restrictions in different fields represented a different regulatory treatment, the real 
question was if this treatment represented unequal protection of the property rights of the oil 
producers? With respect to the actual property rights of the petitioner it is clear that allowing 
higher production levels in other fields would not impact either total amount of oil in the 
Oklahoma City field nor the petitioner’s ability to capture its proportional share of that reservoir. 
The real consequence of the variable proration orders was that operators in other fields could 
capture and exhaust the oil and gas in their common reservoirs more quickly than the petitioner. 
The financial consequence of this delay being that a longer production period would mean higher 
production costs.  
However, it must be acknowledged that variations in proration orders were based on a 
scientific assessment of production potential of the individual fields involved and not some 
random or malevolent decision-making process. As such it can be assumed that there were 






reasons for these higher production levels would be because of decreased production capacities 
of the other field. Decreased production capacities could mean that if they were subject to the 
same restrictive levels as the highly productive Oklahoma City field, their output would be so low 
that they could no longer be economically viable. Given the costs of shutting in a well, and the 
potential harm that can be done to reservoir from such a closure, the least wasteful option for 
the commission would be to allow production at a level the was viable even though it might be 
higher than those imposed on other fields.  
If it is accepted that the variable level of the proration orders were designed to minimize 
aggregate waste, the substantive issue was; did the lower proration rate imposed on the 
Oklahoma field rates imposed a disproportionate cost on the petitioner. To calculate this cost 
requires comparing costs of the imposed rate, against the cost of what the average rate would 
have been. Given the aggregate proration orders reduced state wide production to less than 25% 
of total capacity, the difference between this rate and the proration rate imposed on the 
Oklahoma City field of 8.33% meant that the production period would be about three time as 
long as if the average rate would have been applied. This delay in production therefore would 
imply marginal production cost of three time what it would have been in the average rate had 
been used. Although this multiple appears quite high, it should be noted that the marginal costs 
were almost negligible. In terms of overall production cost, the highest costs of production were 
the actual drilling of the well and connecting the well to a pipeline transport network. After these 
activities were completed there were no real marginal costs other than the maintenance of the 
transport system and the cost of turning valves connected to the well to the pipeline on and off. 
Given this low level of marginal costs it would appear that the actual additional cost to the 
petitioner with respect to crude oil production would be so low as to be immaterial.  
While the marginal cost of crude production may have been immaterial, the third challenge 
to the proration orders demonstrated that the petitioner was concerned about an anticipated 
increase costs of acquiring crude to supply their refining operations. According to this challenge 
they were concerned that the price of crude might increase as a result of the production 
restrictions. This they argued that it would be equivalent setting up a price fixing cartel which 
was prohibited under existing competition law.471 Whilst the merits of this challenge can be 
debated there were several factors which tended to undermine this challenge, at that time. The 
first of which was that the restriction imposed by the commission did not have a material effect 
on supply or price of crude oil, as other States did not impose similar restriction. Second because 
of the economic downturn which had just started, there was a significant contraction in demand 
for the refined products, which led to corresponding decrease in demand for crude oil. Indeed, 
the contraction in demand was one of the main reasons why the Commission felt that proration 
orders were necessary. Third, the initial reaction to the onset of the Great Depression involved 
a dramatic increase in the scepticism towards free markets, and an equally dramatic increase in 
the perceived need for governmental management of the market through regulation. Given this 
context it really did not matter if the restrictive production limits may have amounted to a failed 
attempt at governmental price fixing, there was little sympathy in the public arena or the courts 
for such a charge.  
Although these challenges were framed as separate issues there was also an overall implied 
challenge that was not articulated, which was that the government had no right to interfere with 
                                                          






the internal operations of an integrated corporate entity. This challenge revolved around the 
idea that there was a sanctity of internal business operations that was guaranteed under free 
market property principles. By issuing the proration orders the government was forcing the 
petitioner to buy its crude from external suppliers, when it could more easily and at less cost 
supply its needs from internally owned wells. The shortcoming of this proposition was that while 
the petitioner’s business was involved internally integrated operations they were operation 
which represented several different business activities, on several different markets. Their first 
activity was a crude oil exploration and development business, their second activity was an oil 
and gas transport business, and their final activity was a refining business. Each of these business 
activities clearly being capable of being operated and regulated on a separate basis. Which is 
preciously why the regulators were focussed on their specific area of authority, rather than 
overall integrated operations. For the commission it did not matter whether the subjects of the 
proration orders were integrated or not. They had the authority and were acting on concerns 
regarding the overproduction in Oklahoma oil fields, which they believed was causing 
unnecessary waste to a valuable state resource. The sanctity of internal operations were of less 
concern, than finding and equitable solution which both eliminated the waste and provided the 
fairest result for all crude oil producers. 
While the court supported the commission by declining the writ of prohibition, its decision 
represented both an extension and expansion of earlier precedent. It can be regarded as an 
extension, because as with previous decisions it found that the commission was authorised to 
prevent physical waste in the industry. It can be regarded as an expansion, because it supported 
the imposition of indirect methods of preventing physical waste that had previously not been 
litigated.  
The clearest explanation of the commissions right to regulate against physical waste can be 
found in the Judge Hunt’s special concurring opinion, which read as follows:  
'The word "waste" means to destroy wantonly, to diminish, to squander, to impair. 
Ordinarily, the term, when used in connection with the waste of crude oil, means to 
permit oil to be discharged or to flow out on the ground or be washed away and put 
to no useful purpose. Practically all surface losses of oil comes from the lack of proper 
storage and pipe line facilities and the inability of producers to control the flow of wells 
when they are first brought in under heavy pressures. It is a matter of common 
knowledge that serious surface wastage of oil results from putting it in earthen 
storage. These and other kinds of surface or ordinary waste are intended to be 
prevented by the act herein under consideration. "Underground waste" takes place 
whenever oil in the reservoir where it is discovered is left in the ground when it could, 
by proper operating methods, have been recovered. ... Surface waste or underground 
waste, or both, may occur as an incident to the production of crude oil in excess of 
transportation or marketing facilities or reasonable market demand. It is readily 
apparent that if the production exceeds the market demand or transportation 
facilities, then the oil must be placed in storage, and if one producer produces in excess 
of such demand, then another must do likewise to prevent his oil from being drained, 
and so on with all the producers in the field, with the result that much oil would have 
to be placed in earthen storage and considerable oil would almost certainly be allowed 






These several definitions of waste, all of which are prohibited by the act, are, in our 
judgment, definite and certain, and we so hold.'472 
It should be noted that although the proration orders were driven by a practical need to 
address the glut of crude oil on the markets, this explanation of waste does not focus on the 
economic waste that would result from a price reduction, but rather the actual physical waste 
that results from the inability to properly store excess production. By defining the waste as 
physical waste, the court was able to invoke the precedent established in Ohio Oil v. Indiana. 
However, as Ohio Oil involved direct waste by the plaintiff the court would need to expand on 
that precedent to address the indirect waste described above. To do this the court drew upon 
addition case law, as well as Oklahoma Constitutional law. 
The additional case law which was instrumental in expanding the Ohio Oil precedent was 
Pawshuska Oil & Gas v. City of Pawshuska.473 This case which involved the regulation of gas prices 
was cited not for its details, but because of the sentiments towards the correlated rights 
expressed in the opinion. The specific sentiments quoted by Judge Hunt were contained in a 
single sentence which was;  
'The right of the owner of property to do with it as he pleases is subject to the 
limitation that he must have due regard to the rights of others.'474  
The court interpreted this sentence as an invocation of the maxim, “Sic utere tuo, ut alienum 
non laedas” which the court translated as “Everyone must so use his own property as not to 
injure the rights of others”. This interpretation being supported by the court’s citation of to 
Oklahoma Constitutional law where it was stated that; 
'The police power to a large extent rests on the maxim 'Sic utere tuo ut alienum 
non laedas,' and it is the function of the government by which this maxim is enforced. 
One of the objects of government is to impose that degree of restraint on individual 
action which is required for the reasonable enjoyment of all in their respective rights. 
It has been said that nearly every problem involved in the police power finds its 
solution in the application of the principle embodied in this maxim, that everyone must 
so use his own property as not to injure the rights of others, and that this principle 
should be observed in the exercise of the police power.'475 
The significance of this court invocating this maxim should not be underestimated. At the very 
least it challenged the capture doctrine, which contained no obligations to protect the property 
rights of other owners. Moreover, and more significantly by invoking this maxim, the court was 
signalling that it would be following the correlative rights doctrine on the oil and gas industry, as 
the concept of “not using your property to hurt others” represents the cornerstone, if not the 
quintessential foundation of correlative property rights. Of course, indicating that a doctrine is 
going to be followed does not mean that doctrine will be applied. To see whether the doctrine 
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was applied requires examining the decision of the court and the supplemental opinions. The 
decision of the court in this case concluded with the sentence; 
'we do hold that the act as a whole provides a valid method of preventing waste of 
the oil of this state; that the same is a proper exercise of the police power of the state; 
and that plaintiff has not been deprived of any of its constitutional rights....The writ is 
therefore denied'476 
While this rather innocuous sentence does not refer to correlative rights, the fact that it is 
upholding the regulations which imposes the same restrictions that would be imposed under the 
correlative rights doctrine, means that the court is de-facto imposing the correlative rights 
doctrine. This de-facto imposition of the correlative rights doctrine being much more clearly 
conveyed in the Special Concurring Opinion provided by Judge Hunt. His most notable comments 
on de-facto correlative property rights reading as follows;  
'As has been shown, the state may, in order to prevent waste, limit the production 
of oil from any well. This is true whether the owner of such well has his own market 
outlet or not; and, as has already been shown, the state has the power to protect all 
the collective owners in a common pool against the disproportionate taking by any one 
or more of said owners. [Italics added] Since, unquestionably, the power of the state 
extends to requiring proportionality of taking by all the owners in any pool where the 
production from the pool cannot be obtained without waste, it extends also to limiting 
the taking of only their proportionate parts of the common fund by those producers 
who possess their own pipe lines or refineries or other means of disposing of the full 
amount of the potential production of their wells. Certainly not all the owners in the 
Oklahoma City pool have outlets for their full potential production, else there would 
be a market outlet for the full production of the field, and no need for any curtailment. 
A limited few, one or more large producers, and one or more small producers, may 
have such outlet, but if they be allowed to produce without limit, then the oil of the 
remainder will be drained and appropriated by these fortunate ones, or such 
remaining well owners will have to produce and store, many of them in earthen tanks, 
their oil, and thus great waste will result. A law which prohibits these things is valid. It 
does not unconstitutionally interfere with the rights of one in the situation of petitioner. 
He may not indirectly cause waste to occur nor may he deprive others of their fair share 
of the oil in the common pool.”[Italics Added]477 
In these comments Judge Hunt comes as close a Judge can to invoking the correlative rights 
doctrine without articulating the words. Included in this quote are not only the concepts to 
common pool which entails common ownership, but also the need to facilitate proportional 
production and to prevent disproportionate taking. The last sentence concluding that the 
petitioner “may not deprive others of their fair share of the oil in a common pool” being perhaps 
the simplest rule which would result from imposing the correlative rights doctrine in oil and gas 
industry. A rule which had been applied in previous water cases and would become more and 
more relevant to other oil and gas cases as this field of law evolved.  
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To the extent that the decision of the court and Judge Hunt’s special concurring opinion 
represent a de-facto imposition of correlative property rights, the only step required for the 
formal adoption of correlative property rights doctrine in the field of oil and gas law, was the 
actual annunciation of the doctrine and its adoption in subsequent cases. This is preciously what 
occurred when the courts began to hear cases which related to yet another regulatory measure 
intended to create a more equitable and efficient outcome by combining the ownership interests 
of all owners in the oil fields. Those regulation creating what is now referred to as pooling and 
unitization rules.  
6.2.6 Pooling and Unitization Rules 
Before going into the details of pooling and unitization it is perhaps useful to recap, how this 
next stage in the regulatory process evolved. As discussed above, the capture doctrine relied on 
a race to capture as much oil as possible, in a total disregard for both production efficiencies and 
conservation. It was to address the conservation and efficiency problems that various regulation, 
including oil well spacing and proration, were developed. However, there were several problems 
that these regulations created, the most obvious of which were that they tended to discriminate 
against the smaller property owners which either; did not own land large enough to qualify for a 
well, (under the well spacing rules), or who’s wells were such marginal producers that any 
production restriction would make them uneconomical. The only way to overcome this problem 
was to provide the small property owners with exemptions. The two most obvious problem with 
the exemptions were that they both defeated the purpose of the regulations and discriminated 
against those that were not provided with exemptions. In addition to the self-defeating and 
discrimination nature of the exemption, there were two other issues which created an incentive 
to develop new form of regulations. The first there was the potential for corruption and the 
second the free rider issues.  
As to corruption. By definition all exceptions are deviations from a regulation which require 
some degree of subjective decision making, and whenever subjective decision is required there 
is always a greater opportunity for corruption. In the field of oil and gas these subjective decisions 
primarily involved acquiring drilling rights and avoiding production constraints. Clearly as these 
decisions could have profound financial implication for not only the property owners that were 
seeking the exemptions, but also for all other property owners that would be affected by either 
an increase in the number of wells or a change in the production allowances granted to their 
competitors. It was because of the financial effects of these decisions that oil companies sought 
to influence the regulators through various corrupt methods.478  
As to the free rider issue, this arose because of the advances in petroleum technology, 
specifically the technological developments related to re-pressurising underground oil 
reservoirs. The basic idea behind this technology was that by pumping or injecting various 
solution down into a reservoir the internal pressure could be increased allowing for greater 
recovery from the reservoir. The free rider issue arose because of the integrated nature of the 
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reservoir. Obviously if when one party injects fluids into a reservoir it re-pressurises the whole 
reservoir and as such it also is a free benefit to other owners. 
It was this free rider issue which initially severely limited the use of injection technology even 
though it could substantially increase the recovery process. Given the reliance of all property 
owners on a single integrated resource, it could be expected that these regulations would focus 
on integrating the ownership interest of previously separate property owners into a single 
common ownership interest. This integration being facilitated through two different process 
called pooling and unitization. Notwithstanding the fact that they are closely related, pooling and 
unitization have their own special meaning. Pooling usually means a voluntary, although it can 
also be a compulsory, combination of tracts which were instituted in order to comply with 
spacing and or proration regulations. These pooling combinations generally represent only part 
of a reservoir but in certain instances can cover the entire reservoir. Unitization on the other 
hand almost always means a compulsory combination of all tracts in an entire reservoir, which 
elimination of internal property boundaries within the unit area. The objective of a unitization 
being to extract underlying oil and gas reserves in the most the most efficient and cost-effective 
means.479 
The first of these regulations to be adopted were those that covered pooling. This was 
because in the first instance pooling regulations did not require a change in the law, but rather 
a recognition and acceptance of a process that property owners were pursuing in the private 
sphere. This process generally involved smaller property owners, combining their separately 
owned properties together, to form a property which was large enough to qualify for a well under 
the applicable well spacing rules. While these combinations resulted in a smaller number of well 
authorization than may have occurred under an exemption program, it did result in more wells 
than would have been authorized without an exemption program.  
While this initial acceptance of pooling would appear to be rather straight forward, that does 
not mean that there were no controversial aspects which arose as a result of its adoption. The 
most controversial aspect of its adoption was that it often resulted in a restriction of the supply 
of exemptions. This restriction in the supply of exemptions had at least two negative 
consequences for small property owners. First, it meant that if single property owners did not 
want to cooperate with their neighbours they would be deprived of an opportunity to access the 
oil and gas under their property. As can be expected, this raised the same taking issues that arose 
when the well spacing rules were first adopted. Second, even if they were willing to cooperate 
with their neighbours, it put them in a much weaker bargaining position if their neighbours which 
had properties large enough to meet the well spacing requirements. The second of these was 
even more contentious problem if the neighbouring property owner was a large oil company, as 
it could involve competition law considerations. Although both issues had been previously 
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resolved by exemptions allowances, those allowances were now being withdrawn or at least 
restricted in an effort to promote pooling. 
Additional controversies with respect to the pooling acceptance revolved around the 
perception that it did nothing to resolve the distress caused by proration production limitations. 
It was as result of these concerns that the pooling regulations were expanded from rules that 
recognised and authorised pooling, to ones that actively encouraged pooling. This 
encouragement usually involved various incentive schemes, the most important of which was 
allowing production allocations to be transferred from multiple wells to a single well. Under this 
scheme production from marginal or uneconomical wells could be transferred to a single well 
which could be operated at higher capacity, eliminating the production costs at the wells that 
were shut in. Because these potential reductions in costs would improve the profitability of the 
combined operations, whilst at the same time maintaining the primary conservation and 
economic objectives of proration, they were relatively popular with both producers and 
regulators. The problem with this scheme was that it did little to address the free rider issue that 
arose when oil reservoirs needed to be pressurised. To address this issue regulators had to 
expand regulations from encouraging voluntary pooling of parts of a reservoir to mandating the 
compulsory unitization of the entire reservoir. 
Because by definition unitization involves compulsory orders it is often assumed that it is a 
highly regulated process, that is outside the control of the property owners. However, this is not 
the case. In fact, unitization was and is primarily initiated and decided by property owners 
themselves. When property owners with a working interest in the reservoir want to pursue the 
unitization of their reservoir they first submit an application to prompt a unitization vote.  
Assuming sufficient property owners support the application, the regulatory authorities will 
organise a vote. To win the unitization vote typically requires a super majority of between 66% 
to 75% of all property ownership rights holders to support it. It is only after this democratic 
process has been completed, and a super majority of property owners have given active support 
to unitization, that the relevant authorities can commence issuing compulsory unitization orders.  
However regardless of the democratic nature of the unitization process there can be no 
denying the fact that when unitization occurs it subordinates the will of the individual property 
owner to the will of the majority of property owners. As such from the prospective of a non-
consenting property owner, this was viewed as an unacceptable and unconstitutional taking of 
property rights. However, because previous litigation against other regulation designed to 
protect oil and gas reserves had already been cleared of allegations with respect to taking, and 
these regulations were simply an extension of those regulations, no challenge has been 
successful. Which is why pooling, statutory pooling and unitization regulations are still applied in 
most oil producing states. A good example of which can be found in the Mineral and Mining part 
of the Utah Code:  
'It is declared to be in the public interest to foster, encourage, and promote the 
development, production, and utilization of natural resources of oil and gas in the state 
of Utah in such a manner as will prevent waste; to authorize and to provide for the 
operation and development of oil and gas properties in such a manner that a greater 
ultimate recovery of oil and gas may be obtained and that the correlative rights of all 
owners may be fully protected; to provide exclusive state authority over oil and gas 






encourage, authorize, and provide for voluntary agreements for cycling, recycling, 
pressure maintenance, and secondary recovery operations in order that the greatest 
possible economic recovery of oil and gas may be obtained within the state to the end 
that the land owners, the royalty owners, the producers, and the general public may 
realize and enjoy the greatest possible good from these vital natural resources.'[Italics 
Added]480 
6.2.7 Oil and Gas Law Lessons for Intellectual Property Law 
Just like water law, oil and gas law demonstrated an ability of common law to recognize and 
adapt to alternative sets of underlying circumstances, which is the reason why it has been able 
to retain its relevance. Also like water law, this evolution in doctrines was the result of searching 
for an equitable manner of sharing what is a finite amount of resources between multiple 
owners each of which had an independent claim on the integrated resource. The net result of 
this evolution has been that the oil and gas resources have been much more efficiently used, 
with the rewards from it being shared in a much more equitable fashion than what they were 
during the early stages of development.  
Given the similarities between water law and oil and gas law it is hardly surprising that they 
provide similar lessons for intellectual property law. In fact, the lessons are so similar that it 
would be redundant to repeat them here. That said there are at least four lessons which can be 
drawn from oil and gas law which either were not evident in water law or were not articulated 
at length when the implications of water law were provided.  
The first and perhaps most significant is that the evolution of oil and gas law demonstrates 
that it is perfectly acceptable and practically justifiable to used doctrines established in one body 
of law, when attempting to find equitable solutions to similar problems in another. That good 
doctrines can and do migrate between bodies of law, that there is nothing that limits the use of 
the correlated rights doctrine to merely dealing with water disputes. More specifically; if it is 
perfectly acceptable for the correlated rights doctrine to be applied in oil and gas law, than it 
must also be perfectly acceptable to apply it in intellectual property law. The only question being 
if applying the correlated rights doctrine will result in more equitable outcomes than applying 
other doctrines. 
The second additional implication that comes out of oil and gas law is that regulating an 
industry is not the same as taking property. A reality which had to be litigated almost every time 
that oil and gas doctrines changed. That governments have the power to regulate properties for 
the common good of property owners and society was challenged so frequently; indicates just 
how ingrained the absolutist doctrine was in the attitudes of the oil and gas industry. It goes 
without saying that the similar attitudes undoubtedly prevail in the intellectual property 
industry, which is why it is so fortunate that applying the correlated rights doctrine does not 
appear to require the same sort of legislative changes which were needed in the oil and gas 
industry. But even if there were needed, it is comforting to know that the applying the correlated 
right doctrine in the oil and gas law did not constitute taking as defined under the State and US 
constitutions. 
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The third implication is that applying the correlated rights doctrine is less intrusive than other 
regulations which were utilised and held to be in keeping with constitutional property 
protection. Most notably the proration rules which were allowed government agencies to 
dictate production levels in the oil fields based on economic policies. This would be the 
intellectual property equivalent of compulsory licensing for economic reasons, which is far 
beyond what the correlative rights doctrine would require of intellectual property owners.  
The final additional implication is that unlike water, oil and gas is perceived to be a highly 
competitive industry. And as an application of the correlated rights doctrine was eventually 
accepted in that industry, it is entirely possible for it to be accepted in the equally competitive 
industries which are based on intellectual properties. 
With respect to comparisons between the oil and gas stages and intellectual property stage 
it is obvious that an application of an absolutist doctrine in intellectual property is most closely 
comparable to the first to capture doctrine in which dominated the early development of the oil 
and gas industry. In both cases the owners could behave in total disregard to how their 
behaviour impacted other owners of what was essentially an integrated resource. Including but 
not limited to appropriating the properties which effectively belonged to those other owners. 
While such behaviour undoubtedly assisted in the development of both fields, it also created 
substantial inequity and inefficiencies.  
As with the water law, the application of the correlated rights doctrine in oil and gas law, 
would naturally correspond to the same application in intellectual property law. And just as its 
application improved both efficiencies and equity in oil and gas law, it could also do the same 








7. An Example of Intellectual Property Issues and Solutions 
Before addressing the specifics of the correlated rights doctrine and how it could be applied 
to intellectual property, it is worthwhile to provide a historical example of how patent holdup 
and patent holdout arise whenever strong or absolutist property rights are enforced on 
technologies which incorporate inherently integrated intellectual properties. Although much as 
been made of these problems in recent year under the title of "patent wars", neither represent 
a new phenomenon. Indeed, for as long as intellectual property rights have existed, some 
owners have invariably sought to abuse those rights and others have sought to counter that 
abuse through abuses of the judicial system. An excellent example of this was the patent 
disputes which arose as a result of one of the most famous innovations and involved two of 
America's most famous inventors Wilber and Orville Wright. A discussion of that dispute and the 
evolution of licensing in the aviation industry is provided to prove; the historical existence of the 
problems, the challenges of cross licensing agreements and how arrangements, very similar to 
what would be put in place under the correlated rights doctrine, eventually were put in place to 
solve them.  
7.1 The Wright Patent War 
In the early years of aviation history from 1910 to 1917 the Wright Brothers Company (Wright 
Co.) initiated a number of patent infringement actions which are often referred to as the Wright 
patent war.481 The first legal case in this war took place in 1910 when the Wright Co. brought an 
action against Herring-Curtiss Co and Glen H. Curtiss, seeking a preliminary injunction preventing 
Glen Curtiss from manufacturing, selling or demonstrating a Curtiss aircraft which allegedly 
infringed the Wright Bros’ 1906 patent covering the control systems on a powered aircraft.482 
Others would soon followed,483 the combination of which indicates that Wright Co. was 
attempting to secure a monopoly in the industry for themselves.484 Depending on whose 
prospective is taken; this desire for a monopoly was either a valid effort by the Wright Co. to 
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injunction relief, “It further appears that the defendants now threaten to continue such use for gain and profit, and 
to engage in the manufacture and sale of such infringing machine, thereby becoming an active rival of complainant 
in the business of constructing flying-machines embodying the claims in suit, but such use of the infringing machine 






protect their intellectual property or an anti-competitive attempt at monopolisation. Before 
addressing this issue, it is necessary to provide some context about the period and the events 
that both proceeded and followed the Wright brothers' 1904 patent application, and 
subsequent enforcement actions. 
First with respect to the actual innovation produced by the Wrights brothers. What cannot 
be ignored is that while the Wright brothers' contribution to aviation innovation was truly 
exceptional, there was a long history of aviation advances which proceeded their work and there 
were numerous parties working on the problem at the same time as the Wrights. This is 
significant because it quashes the notion of the Wrights as the sole inventors in the aviation 





In fact, it turns out that there were many parts incorporated into the Wright’s Flyer which 
were developed by other parties. These parts included the horizontal and vertical rudders, and 
the warped wings; all of which were critical to the Wrights Flyer. The vertical rudder is the 
vertical surface at the back of the aircraft that controls the left and right direction of the 
machine. The horizontal rudder is the horizontal surface of the aircraft which controls the up 
and down movement of the aircraft. Initially this was positioned at the front of the aircraft but 
within a few short years was moved to the back of the aircraft and it is now called the elevator.  
The unique thing that the Wright brothers did was to better calibrate these parts and 
combine their controls in a way that allowed the equilibrium of the aircraft to be established. In 
particular they built a cable system that tied the movement of the warped wing to the rudder, 
which meant that controlling the aircraft in a turn became much easier. The practical effect 
these modifications was that it enabled them to achieve the first fully controlled powered flight 
at Kitty Hawk, while their competitors were still crashing shortly after take-off. Indeed, it was 
this coordinated control which formed the core of the claims under the Wright patent which 
was described as; 
'invented certain new and useful improvements in flying machine, of which the 
objects of our invention are to provide means for maintaining or restoring the 
equilibrium or lateral balance of the apparatus, to provide means for guiding the 
machine both vertically and horizontally, and to provide a structure combining 
Figure 4 Orville Wright flying over Fort 
Myer 1908. 
Figure 3 Chanute's hang glider of 1896 clearly 






lightness, strength, convenience of construction, and certain other advantages.'485 
[italics added] 
With the key claim being the one in which the function of the warped wings and the rudder 
are combined. 
'In a flying-machine, the combination, with an aeroplane, and means for 
simultaneously moving the lateral portions thereof into different angular relations to 
the normal plane of the body of the aeroplane and to each other, so as to present to 
the atmosphere different angles of incidence, of a vertical rudder, and means whereby 
said rudder is caused to present to the wind that side thereof nearest the side of the 
aeroplane having the smaller angle of incidence and offering the least resistance to the 
atmosphere, substantially as described.'486 
The expectation of being granted a monopoly undoubtedly were derived from the adulation 
they received because for their successful fights. Although it is somewhat of an 
oversimplification, it is clear that those first amazing flights led to the presumption that the 
Wright patent must also include truly amazing innovations. A presumption that the Wrights 
actively promoted, as shown in the introduction of their complaint against Paulhan487; 
'When hope of human flight ... had practically died out, and when men were 
ridiculed and reviled and laughed at for further attempting it and proposing it, Wilbur 
and Orville Wright, ... astonished and electrified the waiting world by actually, really 
and successfully rising from the ground with a heavier-than-air machine ridden by 
either of them in person, flying through the air, going whither they would, to the. right 
or to the left, upward or downward and landing, as do the birds, softly and 
successfully.'488  
And then for good measure added a lengthy description of the awards which they had 
received to prove that their efforts were truly spectacular. 
“But first a word as to what happened throughout the world in recognition of this 
long-waited-for achievement. The press of the country heralded it from ocean to 
ocean. and from the lakes to the gulf; the foreign press acclaimed it everywhere, the 
American people, through their Congress then assembled, sent this greeting to these 
modest inventor: ''For their success in navigating the air;" the French Academy of Sport 
this recognition: “To the Conqueror of the Air, M.M. Wilbur and Orville Wright. the 
first to fly with an apparatus heavier-than-air driven by a motor;"... In addition, this 
achievement won for Wright Bros. Metal of Congress of the United States, ... the 
Legion of Honor of the French Republic, gold medal of the aeronautical societies of 
America. Great Britain, France, etc. and honorary membership in numerous societies, 
with honorary degrees from institutions of learning, both in America and Europe. Then 
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followed commercial recognition by the purchase by the United States of one of their 
flying machines, with the right to use it for National purpose, while abroad similar 
recognition has taken place, both official and private or commercial. ... Thus the 
pioneership of Wright Bros. has been recognized”489 
The problem with such statements were that they were attempting to conflate two separate 
achievements. While there can be no doubt that their flights were singular triumphant 
achievements which crossed the elusive technological threshold to controlled flying, their 
patented invention represented only a few new steps on an innovation path that had both 
predecessors and successors. As mentioned included in the Wright Flyer were many of the parts 
developed by earlier inventors, many of which were subsequently improved upon by other 
innovators in the seven years before the patent wars were commenced.  
Although this self-promotion clearly impressed the judiciary,490 it did not have the desired 
effect on their competitors. As far as their competitors were concerned; the Wrights' 
achievements were not a signal to abandon the aviation industry to the Wrights; but rather a 
rather an incentive to advance their own efforts for fear of being left behind by the Wrights. A 
reaction which is preciously what the patent system is designed to produce. To the extent that 
those competitors incorporated Wright innovations into their aeroplanes they would certainly 
be infringing on Wright patents, but as the Wrights were incorporation the innovations of others 
in their aeroplane, the Wrights were also infringing on the patents of others. This could have 
been easily resolved by all parties recognising the inherently integrated nature of their 
innovations and seeking to put in place a cross licensing agreements which reflected the 
contribution of each party.  
However, the Wrights appeared to have other ideas. Rather than seeking a reasonable 
royalty for the use of their patent and paying a reasonable royalty for their use of patents owned 
by others, they sought exclude everyone else from the industry with a single patent. A patent 
which in no way represented the totality of the innovations used before and after the first 
powered fight. The most unjust aspect of this behaviour is that if successful, it would have 
effectively appropriated the innovations of all other innovators to the Wright brothers. 
Given that the Wright brothers were innovators themselves, this attempted appropriation 
would appear to run counter to the principles of cooperation and innovative recognition which 
existed at the time. There is however a very practical explanation for why the Wright brothers 
would engage in this kind of anti-competitive behaviour, and it relates to the involvement of 
external financers. What should be remembered is that before 1909 the Wright brothers were 
just Orville and Wilber Wright and their flying machines. The quintessential example of 
innovators, as envisioned in popular culture. That changed in 1909 when they sold their patent 
rights to the newly established Wright Bros. Company.491 The other investors in this closed 
                                                          
489 Id. 9 
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company were rich financiers, who invested $1 million in what they were hoping would be the 
sole manufacturer of aircraft in the United States.492 The fact that these financiers were referred 
to as Robber Barons provides a clear indication of how they conducted business.493 Another 
indications of how they intended to conduct business can be found in the press fillings covering 
the formation of the company. In these filings where there are ample indications that the new 
company would be actively engaged in litigation; 
'The new company was incorporated yesterday in Albany, and its purposes, in 
addition to the commercial manufacturing of aeroplanes, is to protect all the Wright 
patents in the United States and Canada from possible infringement. The new formed 
company will have many legal fights on its hands in the effort to prevent infringements 
on Wright patents. ...Clinton R. Peterkin, one of the company Vice Presidents said that 
it is the purpose of the Wrights and the Board of Directors to maintain and defend the 
Wright patents against all comers. He said that the patents control the principles under 
which aerial flight is now accomplished and that one of the main purposes in forming 
the corporation with such a strong Board of Directors was to assist the Wrights in every 
way to maintain their patent rights. ...During the investigation of the Wright patents 
the capitalist became convinced that the Wrights had a valid claim to patent rights of 
aeroplanes, monoplanes, and biplanes.' [Italics added]494  
It does not take much insight into the world of finance to recognise that these financiers 
would have encouraged the Wrights to pursue infringement actions as a pre-condition to their 
investment. Which would explain why the Wright brothers initiated an injunctive action against 
Curtiss just one month before the investment was finalized.  
With respect to the justification of these infringement actions, the following observations 
can be made. If the goal of these action was to extract a reasonably royalty from the users of 
the Wright patents, they could have been considered a valid effort by the Wright Bros. to protect 
and profit from their intellectual property. However, as the objective was to prevent everyone, 
especially other aviation innovators from “manufacturing, selling or exhibiting” an “aeroplane, 
monoplane, and biplane”, it appears obvious that this was an anti-competitive effort designed 
to eliminate all competitor from the aviation field.495 Further as the Wrights were abusing the 
courts to achieve this purpose, it would appear only fair to define the Wright Bros. Company as 
a “Patent Ogre”.496 
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However, the investigation of the Wright brother cases would not be complete with just a 
definition of the initial behaviour. Of equal, if not greater importance is the consequence of that 
behaviour, to see if it has any relevance to modern jurisprudence. These consequences are part 
of and arise out of the various reactions and subsequent counter-reactions of the parties 
involved. The first of these consequences relates to the reaction of competitors and the courts. 
As mentioned above, the first action against Curtiss took place one month before the formation 
of the company. There was however another event that occurred just prior to that action which 
also may have contributed to its timing. That event was the flight of the June Bug.  
In June of 1908 the Wright’s turned down an offer to win the Scientific American Cup by 
making the first “public flight” of their aircraft over a distance of one kilometre.497 This provided 
Glenn Curtiss with the opportunity of using the June Bug, an aircraft he had designed and built 
in conjunction with the Aerial Experiment Association (AEA) to win the completion. Curtiss took 
to the air on July 4th and, flew 1.6 km in 1 minute and 40 seconds. This victory must have come 
as a shock to the Wrights, who had effectively monopolised the America’s aviation imagination 
up to that date. It is difficult to predict what bothered the Wrights more; the media attention 
Curtiss got from the first public fight, Curtiss winning the Cup, or Curtiss winning the $25,000 
prize that came with the Cup. Regardless of the motivation, shortly thereafter the Wright’s sent 
another letter to Curtiss warning that he did not have permission to the use of their aircraft 
control system for either exposition or commercial purposes. This letter was early evidence that 
they were attempting to establish exclusive control of the aircraft industry in America, although 
it did suggest that they might be willing to license Curtiss for exhibition purposes. Curtiss replied 
that he was not intending to enter the exhibition business, and that the matter of patents has 
been referred to the AEA. The AEA ignored this notice because the June Bug was using an aileron 
system and not the warped wing system,498 as well as having an independent control system 
rather than the coordinated control system patented by the Wrights. These differences did not 
matter to the Wrights who in their 1910 action insisted that the Curtis improvements were 
covered by a broad interpretation of their patent claims.  
It was the Wright’s interpretation which was to prevail in the first case.499 Judge Hazel 
declaring in January of 1910 that; 
'On the papers presented I incline to the view...that the claims of the patent should 
be broadly construed; and when given such construction the elements of the Wright 
machine are found in defendants’ machine performing the same functional result. 
There are dissimilarities in defendants’ structure—changes of form and strengthening 
of parts—which may be improvements, but such dissimilarities seem to me to have no 
bearing on the means to adopted to preserve equilibrium, which means are equivalent 
of the claims in suit and attain an identical result'500 
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The irony of this decision is that if the same standard was used for the Wright's 
improvements, those also could have been deemed to have provided an equivalent means, 
however they were not invalidated because they resulted in a successful flight: 
'True, some of the elements of the claims were old and are shown in prior gliding 
machines, but such machines without the combination which included a method of 
maintaining equilibrium or lateral balance were utter failures. Hence the prior patents 
and publications apparently do not anticipate the Wright, patent, and the claims are 
entitled to a broad and liberal construction.'501 
To sum up this decision: because the Wrights made the first successful flight this apparently 
secured for them special treatment. This special treatment was not lost on Curtiss who in June 
appealed the case by arguing that; 1) The Wrights patent was not entitled to a broad 
construction; 2) if it was broadly constructed it was invalid in view of prior art, 3) if properly 
constructed their machine did not infringe; 4) their mode of flying was different than the 
Wright’s.  
The Court of Appeals having heard conflicting evidence on these matters reversed Judge 
Hazel’s injunction and returned the case for further proceedings and evidence.502 During the 
rehearing Judge Hazel continues his preferential treatment of the Wright’s by dismissing the 
invalidity defence; on the basis that prior earlier patent and prior art did not represent a 
complete combination that the Wright’s had conceived,503 and then finding infringement even 
though Curtiss construction was different from the Wright construction and did not operate on 
the Wright principles.504 This amounted to a narrow interpretation of prior patents and art, 
followed by a broad interpretation of the Wright patent, which caught the Curtiss aircraft in 
narrow breach. Specifically, he found that because the Curtiss aircraft sometime used the rudder 
and the ailerons “at the same time” to maintain flight equilibrium, and this was equivalent to 
the Wright’s method of maintaining flight equilibrium. This infringement was found even though 
the Curtiss controls separated the combined controls which were supposedly what made the 
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502 Wright Company v. Herring Curtiss 180 F. 110 (C.C.A. 2d 1910) “This is an appeal from an order granting 
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Wright patent different from all previous patent and the fact that the Wright aircraft did not 
have ailerons.505  
When Curtiss appealed this decision, the Appeals Court upheld the injunction decision stating 
that; 
'As we are in full accord with the reasoning by which he [Judge Hazel] (and Judge 
Hand) reached the conclusion that the patent in suit is a valid one, that the patentees 
may fairly be considered pioneers in the practical art of flying with heavier-than air 
machines, and that the claims should have a liberal interpretation,'506  
With hindsight this conclusion certainly appears prejudice as it provided the Wrights with 
liberal patent protections, whilst withholding that same liberal protection from prior patents. 
That is not to say that the courts should have found the Wright patents invalid, rather that they 
should have invalidated the claims which were proceeded by prior patents and art; and then 
narrowly interpreted those that remained. This would have left the Wrights with a smaller, but 
stronger set of patent claims. The smaller size of the claims would hopefully have restrained 
their impractical ambitions of attempting to reserve the entire American aviation industry for 
themselves. The stronger nature would have aided their enforcement efforts, not only because 
the courts proceedings would be less ambiguous but because their competitors would not have 
been so contemptuous (more respectful) of their property. Taken together this would have 
provided the Wrights with excellent licensing opportunities, from which they could have funded 
further advances in the aviation industry. 
As it was, because the courts did not restrain the patent claims; this likely gave the Wrights 
a false sense of security, which led them and their financial backers to believe that they should 
be the sole producer of aircraft in America. It was this belief that drove them into expending an 
exorbitant amount of time, money in a doomed effort of creating a court mandated aviation 
monopoly. Time, money and energy which might have been better spent advancing the 
technology and which could have provided them with technological domination. 
Naturally this decision also had a negative impact on their competitors and potential 
competitors. By interpreting the Wright claims so liberally the court was effectively providing 
the Wright Bros. Co. with a court mandated monopoly, and it was also assisting the Wright Bros 
Co. in their appropriation of third-party innovations. This left their competitors with a difficult 
choice; they could either abided by the decision which would mean that there would be no 
competitors and their innovations would have become the Wright Bros. Co innovations, or they 
could try and circumvent the decision in order to remain in the industry. Whether it was the 
unjust nature of the decision or that the potential rewards were simply too high to be 
abandoned, they decided to circumvent the decision.  
Curtiss himself took a rather straight foreword approach to circumventing the decision. After 
the final rejection of his appeal in 1914, he put the defendant company, Herring-Curtiss, into 
bankruptcy and founded another aeroplane manufacturing company named the “Curtiss 
Aeroplane and Motor Company” which manufactured aeroplanes which were slightly different 
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that the Herring and Curtiss models.507 Not coincidentally this strategy of slightly modifying the 
aircraft was recommended his lawyer George Sheldon who had provided similar advice to Henry 
Ford´, whom Sheldon had successful represented before the same Judge in a patent dispute 
involving automobiles.508 The practical effect of these moves were that it forced the Wright Bros. 
Co. to re-litigate the infringement. This re-litigation was necessary because while the changes 
made by Curtiss could conceivably be covered by a liberal interpretation of their first claim, the 
first claim had not been cited in the former suits, and as such had not yet been adjudicated.509 
Obviously this was a blatant effort to use "legal attrition" to avoid the injunctive relief prescribed 
by the court. That said it would appear to be the only rational and even the most appropriate 
response, to the Wright efforts to appropriate Curtiss innovations and monopolise the industry. 
Despite winning the case it was not long after that Wright Co. dropped their strategy of 
attempting to create an aircraft monopoly and began to instead license their patents in return 
for a 20% royalty. With the revenues received from this royalty licensing Orville bought out 
almost all of the other shareholders in Wright Co.510 It has been suggested in the Wright 
Brother's authorized biography that Orville’s did this to eliminate the commitment to stay with 
the company that both he and Wilbur Wright had made when the company was established.511 
A suggestion that is supported by his decision to sell the company after buying out the other 
shareholders.512 However an alternative explanation is just as likely.  
That alternative explanation can be derived from a series of fatal crashes of Wright aircraft 
bought by the U.S. Army between 1912-1913. These cashes which resulted in 7 deaths called 
into question the safety and design of the Wright aeroplanes. A government investigation said 
the Wright C was "dynamically unsuited for flying," primarily because of its pusher engine design 
which tended to crush the pilot when they crashed.513  Orville Wright cooperated with the Army 
investigation but resisted changing the design, presumably because it may have harmed the 
patent infringement suit against Curtiss.  
Curtiss on the other hand had not hesitation in changing his designs, particularly when the 
Signal Corp banned pusher motors. This not only allowed him to make better aircrafts and 
continue to make sales to the Signal Corps, it also provided him with a better defence against 
Wright Co. efforts at a court mandated monopoly. The practical effect of this was that by the 
time 1915 rolled around, Orville Wright must have known that the aircraft he was building were 
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inferior to the Curtiss aeroplanes, not to mention the airplanes which were being produced in 
Europe at the time.514 The European aircraft industry having not been subject to the same 
degree of protracted legal battles clearly demonstrated that integrating the innovations of 
multiple creative efforts; resulted in much faster and much better technological advances. 
Figure 5 providing a clear indication of the lack of creativity which had engulfed Wright Bros, 
when compared their 1914 model C, to those of its competitors.  
 
 
Figure 5: 1914 Aircraft Competition; Clockwise; Wright Model C, Avro 501, Curtiss Model F, 
Bristol Scout. 
These practical considerations clearly out weighted the legal victory achieved in January of 
1914. Faced with an unrelenting tide of technological advances made and the loss of their 
technological leadership position, there was no way that the Wright Co. could maintain their 
ambitions to be the sole manufacturer of aircraft in America. For even if subsequence court 
cases upheld the liberal interpretation of their patent, there was a high probability that the 
competitors who they had forced out of the market, would deny Wright Co. the use of their 
patented innovations, which would mean that Wright Co would be doomed to producing sub-
standard aircraft. This new reality was of course entirely inconsistent with the initial plans for 
establishing a monopolistic aircraft company in the US and may have opened up the Wrights to 
charges of investor misrepresentation. These circumstances provide a quite compelling 
alternative argument as to why Orville Wright bought back the shares. 
As to why two years later he sold the company and got out of the aviation industry, this can 
be put down too many potential causes. First there was the death of his brother, then there was 
also his lack of enthusiasm for daily corporate management or the desire to use the money for 
other business interests, but it could also have been because he was disillusioned with the 
                                                          
514 Tom D. Crouch, The Bishop’s Boys: A Life of Wilber and Orville Wright “The standard Wright production of 1913, 
the Model C, was an obsolete machine. Compared to contemporary European aircraft, it was slow, tail-heavy, and 
unstable. Other flying machine builders, notably Esnault-Pelterie and Bleriot, pioneered a natural control 
arrangement combining the use of a stick and rudder pedals. Orville retained the cumbersome and confusing 






seemingly never ending legal and financial intrigue involved in the industry. Regardless of why 
Wilber sold his interest, the Wright Martin Company continued to engage in active litigation, 
demanding $1,000 per aircraft from every airplane manufacturer operating in the United States. 
7.2 The American Aeronautics Association 
To the extent this litigation threat remained an impediment to the advancement of the 
United States airplane industry; and particularly as the government was examining its  aircraft 
production needs for the impending American involvement in World War 1, the US Government 
set up a National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics. The purpose of this committee was to 
consider and advise the President and the departments on aeronautical problems and to 
consider and devise some plan to remedy the existing difficulties.'515 The 'Committee forthwith 
proceeded to consider the problem confronting the Government and on March 23, 1917, the 
subcommittee on patents of the National Advisory Committee rendered a report recommending 
the formation of the Aircraft Manufacturers Association among all aircraft manufacturers and 
suggesting the details of a cross-license agreement among its members.'516 While the Wright 
Martin Company was opposed to the agreement, they eventually embraced it after Congress 
began to consider using a compulsory purchase to end the patent disputes.517  
On June 14th a subcommittee on patents and representatives of Wright Martin and Curtiss 
Burgess met and approved a plan and the legal counsel of both companies worked together to 
prepare a form of agreement. One month later, on the 10th of July, this form of agreement was 
presented at meeting which included the subcommittee on patents, various airplane 
manufacturers and representatives of the Wright and Curtiss Companies. The form of 
agreement included the rules for membership for and general terms of the proposed cross 
licensing agreement.518  
The proposed Association would be made up of eleven shareholders who 'were responsible 
manufacturer of airplanes, airplane engines, or parts and accessories used in airplanes; a 
responsible manufacturer who intends to become bona fide producer of airplanes or airplane 
engines, parts, or accessories; or a manufacturer to whom the Government has given a contract 
for the construction of ten or more complete airplanes or airplane engines.'519 These members 
and only these members would be able to participate in the cross licensing agreement.  
The cross-licensing agreement itself specified that a;  
'licenses to use patented devices for airplanes owned or controlled by it [its 
members]  and called for the payment of a royalty to the association at the rate of $ 
200 an airplane until October 1933. ... [The Association] was authorized to retain up to 
12 1/2 per centum of all royalties received for the purpose of meeting its expenses of 
administering the agreement and for other purposes. ... the remaining 87 1/2 per 
centum of the royalties received from all sources in declared proportions of 67 1/2 
percent to the Wright-Martin Aircraft Corporation and 20 percent to the Curtiss-
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Burgess Airplane & Motor Corp., Inc. The agreement also contained a provision to the 
effect that within the period prior to November 1933, whenever .... the payments to 
Wright and Curtiss had equalled a maximum of $ 2,000,000 for each, the rate of royalty 
to be paid to plaintiff was automatically to change to a sum not exceeding $ 25 an 
airplane'520 
In addition to the initial 130 patents covered by the cross-licensing agreement, it also 
included a mechanism to cover patents granted after the formation of the Manufacturers 
Aircraft Association. Under this mechanism these “after acquired” patents would be eligible for 
royalties if they covered innovations which;  
'secures the performance of a function not before known to the art or constitutes 
an adaptation for the first time to commercial use of an invention known to the 
industry to be desirable of use but not used because of lack of adaptation, or is 
otherwise of striking character or constitutes a radical departure from previous 
practice, or if either the price paid therefore or the amount expended in developing 
the same is such as to justify such compensation.'521  
The determination as to if a patent met the requirements for inclusion was to be undertaken 
by a formal arbitration procedure which involved a 3-member board of arbitrators, which also 
would set the appropriate royalty rate.522  
It is worth noting that Association’s members were also allowed to license their patents 
independently to non-members so long as the terms were no more favourable than those 
provided to members. Further, any member could withdraw from the Association at any time, 
but any patents which were previously covered by the cross-licensing agreement, would remain 
available as part of the cross- licensing arrangements.523 Taken together the Association and the 
adoption of the cross-licensing agreement effectively created a patent pool for licensing patents 
essential to the manufacturing or sale of aircraft in America.  
While there are many that viewed this as a simple method of reducing transaction or 
licensing costs,524 not long after its creating it became subject of anti-trust investigations. 
Ironically the initial investigations in 1935 had the support of President Roosevelt, who had been 
the Secretary of the navy when the originally Associations and cross licensing agreements had 
were structured and signed.525 The suspicions that there was some sort of anti-competitive 
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collusion between members of the Association at that time was not at all surprising, as it was 
widely believed that the Great Depression had resulted from the misbehaviour of corporations 
who were intentionally rigging the markets against American Consumers.526 Regardless of the 
suspicion the Association and its patent pool it remained active until 1975, when it was found 
to be in breach of the nine-no-noes527 and dissolved under a consent decree.528 This requirement 
to abide by prohibitions on how property is used being consistent with the prevailing view that 
governments should regulate property use by proscribing certain types of behaviour.529 Of note 
in the 1975 decision was the concern that the Association's cross licensing agreements reduced 
competition in research and development. 
In the Final Judgment provided in the consent decree the members of the Manufacturers 
Aircraft Association ordered 'to take appropriate steps to wind up the affairs, and to terminate 
the existence, of the defendant Manufacturers Aircraft Association,' including cancelling each 
license issued pursuant to the cross-licensing agreement, within ninety days.'530 Further the 
decree prohibited all members who were patent owners from either forming or participating in 
any future patent pools or cross licensing agreements with respect to all 'the existing and/or 
future airplane patents of primary significance.'531 
7.3 Mandatory Licensing Provisions  
Having effectively banned coordinated action of the patent owners, the decree subsequently 
ordered mandatory licensing provisions which the members had to follow. These provision 
included an obligation to offer a 'a nonexclusive, non-discriminatory license' to any party which 
had previously participated in the cross licensing arrangements, on terms 'no less favorable to 
the licensee' than the royalty terms provided under the cross licensing agreement.532 This 
provision being supported by additional mandatory reciprocal licensing provisions which 
required licensees who were granted a licence from former Association members 'as a condition 
of receiving such a license,' to license any aircraft patents held by the licensee to the Association 
members if the court determined that 'it would be equitable or in the public interest to permit 
imposition of such condition.'533 In addition to instigating mandatory licensing the decree also 
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provided that any licensee the right to request from any former Association member such 
technical information that 'persons reasonably skilled in the art may need to practice the 
inventions claimed in the licensed patent by any mode used by the defendant in practicing such 
invention.'534 after the receipt of a license. Although this directive would appear to be 
redundant, as one of the principle requirements of patent law is that a patent owner provide 
the technical knowledge required to work and invention, its presences clearly indicates a 
concern that former members were not complying with that requirement. 
After the Association was wound up there was once again a situation whereby owners and 
users would be required to negotiate individual licences on a case by case basis, albeit on terms 
governed by the provisions include in the decree. Under these terms any intellectual property 
essential to the development of modern aircraft owned by former Association members were 
effectively subject to mandatory licensing on what can be described as Fair, Reasonable and 
Non-Discriminatory or "FRAND" terms. That these provisions were not applicable to entities 
which were not members of the Association, does not mean that they did not honour this 
practice. Given that since the time of the decision there has never been anything which can be 
described as a patent war between aircraft manufacturers, this would appear to indicate that 
most, if not all, owners of aircraft patents owners have consistently offered licensing terms 
which do not include unreasonable royalties demands or anti-competitive conditions.  
Evidence of the fact that the practice of mandatory FRAND licensing was adhered to in the 
aviation industry can be found in the 2005 European Union Commission Decision relating to the 
merger of Boeing and McDonnell Douglas.535 The Case was subject to an EU Commission review 
because at the time of the proposed merger 'Boeing would have increased its market share of 
for large commercial aircraft from 64% to 70%.'536 Initially the Commission opposed the merger 
for two reasons. First because of its potential effect on suppliers and buyers. Second because 
of; concerns about U.S. government subsidies of research and development of military aircraft 
would provide the merged companies with a competitive advantage over Airbus. After the 
merger Airbus would be their only competitor in commercial aircraft, and there were concerns 
that the merged entity could use the combined patent portfolios of the two companies to 
forestall future competition.  
'There are more than 500 published patents which belong to Boeing and might be 
of relevance for commercial aircraft. MDC is estimated to hold around 150 such 
patents ( 17 ). 86 Boeing patents and 26 MDC patents could potentially restrict access 
to important future technology.'537 
It should be noted that prior to merger decision both Boeing and Airbus were able to develop 
their aircraft businesses even though they were not part of the former Association and to do so 
they must have used the intellectual property which was essential to the manufacturing of 
aircraft owned by others. This observation proves that were they able to secure licensing 
agreements for essential intellectual properties, which did not include unreasonable terms and 
conditions which would have prevented them from effectively competing in the market. While 
these licensing agreements are not public, this conclusion is also supported by the absence of 
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extensive patent litigation in the aircraft industry prior to the merger. As such it can be assumed 
that it was not just the legal obligations established when the Association was wound up that 
encouraged owners to offer licenses on a FRAND basis, but good business practices. Regardless 
of the rational for offering FRAND licenses, what is clear from the merger decision is that after 
Boeing made a commitment to continue to offer FRAND licensing terms, the Commission 
changed its decision and authorised the merger. The Boeing Commitment being articulated in 
the decision as follows:  
'Boeing will, upon request by a commercial aircraft manufacturer, license on a non-
exclusive, reasonable royalty-bearing basis, any 'government-funded patent' which 
could be used in the manufacture or sale of commercial jet aircraft. Boeing will also 
licence the know-how related to such a patent which is necessary for the full, effective 
and rapid exploitation of the patent. 'Government-funded patent' means any patent 
which claims an invention conceived or first actually reduced to practice by Boeing in 
the performance of one or more of its contracts with the US Government, and which 
Boeing legally may so license.  
Boeing also will license on a non-exclusive, reasonable royalty-bearing basis any 
blocking patent, including the related know-how as defined in the first paragraph, to 
another aircraft manufacturer which agrees to similar terms for cross-licensing of its 
blocking patents.  
If Boeing and the other commercial aircraft manufacturer cannot agree on the 
royalty or whether the patent is a 'government-funded patent' which could be used in 
the manufacture or sale of commercial jet aircraft or whether the patent is blocking, 
such disagreement shall be submitted to independent arbitration under terms and 
procedures to be mutually agreed between Boeing and the other manufacturer.'538 
Included in this commitment is not only an undertaking by Boeing to license any government 
funded or blocking (essential) intellectual properties on a FRAND basis, but also a reciprocal 
requirement that other owners of aircraft related intellectual properties would do the same if 
they wanted to receive such a license from Boeing. As Boeing is the owners of a significant 
number of essential intellectual properties, such an arrangement effectively ensures that all 
practicing entities would licence on FRAND terms. Whether non-practicing entities would do the 
same, is of course debatable as they would not need a license to Boeing's portfolio of intellectual 
properties.  
To the extent that this brief history of intellectual property rights in the aircraft 
manufacturing industry represents a framework for the general evolution of intellectual 
property right, there would appear to be a number of observations which can be drawn from it.  
7.4 Lessons from the Aircraft Industry 
The first of these is that most advanced technologies rely on inherently integrated or 
correlated intellectual property which is provided by the creative efforts of numerous inventors 
and is seldom based on the creative efforts of a single entity, regardless of how brilliant they 
                                                          






are. This does not mean that there are not significant thresholds overcome and advances made 
by a single inventor. Certainly, in the case of the Aircraft industry, the Wright Brothers' creative 
efforts with respect to coordinating all the controls and improving power of the propellers 
overcame a huge threshold by facilitating the first controlled flight. However, those very 
inventions would not have been possible without numerous inventions developed by others 
prior to and the concurrent with their own efforts. 
The second observation which can be drawn from this history is that it is generally not the 
inventors who abuse their intellectual property rights to appropriate rewards from the 
intellectual property of others, but rather their financiers. In the case of the Wright Brothers it 
is matter of public record that they started to engage in patent litigation just before they secured 
investors for the project. Prior to such investments they appeared to be perfectly willing to focus 
more on the inventive process, than curtailing competition. Naturally there is nothing wrong 
with litigating to ensure that an inventor is properly compensated for the use of their intellectual 
property. However, using that intellectual property to try to secure a monopoly in an industry 
where multiple inventors have contributed to the technological product, is an abuse of 
intellectual property rights which most inventors would reject, just as they would reject 
someone else try to appropriate the rewards from their efforts from them. Conversely the fact 
that such behaviour can be considered a profit maximizing method makes it entirely consistent 
with investor interests and as such would be perfectly acceptable to them. 
The next and one of the most important observation from an inventive prospective, is that 
granting correlated patent owners with absolute intellectual property rights will likely result in 
inferior technological products. Evidence of this can be seen in photos of the 1914 aircraft 
provide earlier, which clearly illustrates how far behind the Wright Brothers were in aircraft 
development 10 years after their initial success. This lack of development progress being in no 
small part due to the fact that their effort to prevent their competitors from using their patents 
obstructed their ability to gain access to intellectual property from those same competitors. 
Why after all should those competitors license them, when they were seeking to eliminate them 
from market. 
A related observation to the former is that when faced with abusive licensing demand, 
competitors will quite understandably resort to abusive legal procedures to avoid those 
demands. Evidence of this is available in the form of Curtiss's reaction to the Wright Brother's 
litigation. Once Curtiss had exhausted the appeal process he simply put the defendant company 
"Herring-Curtiss" into bankruptcy and founded another manufacturing company named the 
“Curtiss Aeroplane and Motor Company”. While this legal manoeuvre is more extreme than 
engaging in the legal attrition which is practiced today, it highlights the willingness of other 
inventors to engage in any available defence, including abusive legal practices, in order to avoid 
being held hostage by an abusive intellectual property owner. 
The next observation with this history relates to the movement away from an absolutist right 
regime, to a government directed regime. While it could be argued that the Association was a 
voluntary arrangement, it is clear that because of the government's buying power, it was the 
effectively the Subcommittee on Patents which insisted on the creation of the Association and 
the determined the terms of the cross-licensing arrangements adopted by it.  
The next observation is that; while the Association and its cross-licensing agreement did 
resolve the underlying anti-commons tragedy faced by the industry, it did so in a biased manner 






potential participants in the industry. The bias is evident in the favourable aggregate royalty rate 
which was established in the agreement. It should be recalled that prior to the Association 
Wright Bros. Co. were demanding $1,000 in royalty per aircraft for their own patents. To the 
extent that the Government forced all the Association to accept $200 per indicates a huge 
discount on the what would have been a reasonable royalty payment. This bias obviously 
favoured the government over the aircraft manufactures. It was discriminatory because the 
agreement provided for payment of royalties to only two of the initial eleven members who 
owned patents, Wright-Martin and Curtiss-Douglass. That the other nine owners were denied 
royalties for the use of their patents is clearly discriminatory. That the Association and 
agreement prevented the participation in the industry of certain parties is directly connected to 
the non-payment of royalties to other parties. Clearly if independent inventors were not able to 
receive any royalties from their inventions, it would only be those who could make money on 
manufacturing, who would have an incentive to develop advances in the aircraft industry.  
The penultimate observation is that patent pools have an inherent potential for anti-trust 
behaviour. The main concerns being that; 1) those in the pool may try to prevent outsiders from 
contributing to the pool, 2) the pool may not properly value the individual contribution it and 3) 
a pool forces users to purchase all of the patents in the pool, many of which may not be needed. 
It is the first two concerns which are of the greatest significance from an intellectual property 
owner's prospective. Obviously if they are unable to have their property include in a pool which 
defines the technical requirements of an industry, they will be will effectively foreclosed from 
participating in that industry. Alternatively, if their properties are included; but they do not 
receive revenues equivalent to the proportional value that their properties contribute to the 
aggregate value, then their value contributions will have effectively been appropriated by 
others. This appropriation can happen in three ways. First the pool may undervalue the 
aggregate, in which case it is the pool licensees or users who are appropriating value. Second 
their proportional contribution may be undervalued in which it is some other pool member or 
members who are appropriating their rewards. Third it may be that both the aggregate and their 
contribution which are undervalued, in which case both users and possibly other contributors 
are appropriating the value of their contribution. Conversely the third concern is primarily 
applicable to licensees or users as forcing them to purchase usage rights to patents that they do 
not need may increase their costs. However, it would also be of concern to contributors if their 
proportion of the aggregate is diluted, because some of that aggregate revenues is being paid 
to owners of redundant patents which provide no value to the technological product.539 
The final observation that can be discerned from this history is that given most owners 
aircraft intellectual properties are effectively committed to provide grant a FRAND license to any 
party who is engaged in aircraft manufacturing, this situation is not that different from the 
outcome which would occur if the aircraft industry was governed by the correlated rights 
doctrine. Indeed, if applied the doctrine would specify that: As multiple parties have individual 
property claims on an inherently integrated intellectual property needed to manufacture aircraft, 
each is legally entitled to their proportional share of the technological value of all aircrafts 
manufactured and the law should protect that share from being appropriated by others, 
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including other owners. The main difference between current state of affairs and applying the 








8. Defining and Appling Correlated Intellectual Property Rights 
Before going into the specifics of defining an application of the correlated rights doctrine it 
is useful to underscore the difficulties which judges are faced with whenever they are 
adjudicating correlated intellectual property disputes. At the forefront of this debate has been 
Chief Judge Randall R. Rader who at a 2012 intellectual property forum made the following 
statement; 
'The problem is not the character of the party, not the term non-practicing entity, 
the problem is when anybody sues to obtain more than the patent is worth. The 
problem is asserting a $10,000 patent to obtain millions of dollars. The real key comes 
in finding the proper valuation of advances, small advances deserve small returns and 
too often we have allowed small advances to obtain disproportionate results. It’s the 
same problem regardless of who is doing it, and that is what we need to address, is to 
make sure we properly value the technology.'540  
In this statement by Chief Judge Rader is acknowledging a change in circumstance by pointing 
out that not all innovations can be represented as standalone properties and that some are 
merely small advances in existing properties, which although he does not use the term, is 
essentially the definition of correlated intellectual properties. In addition to acknowledging a 
change in circumstances; he also provided a critical insight by pointing out that it is not the 
nature of the owner which needs to be addressed, but rather the behaviour of the owner or 
more appropriately the “misbehaviour of the owner”. 
Another prominent judge which has expressed concern about the state of the law is Judge 
Richard Posner, who decided Apple v. Motorola.541 This case focused on amount of damages 
which should granted when correlated intellectual properties were in dispute. Despite its name 
this case really represented one battle in an ongoing litigation war between two leading 
competitors in the field of mobile telecommunications, Apple and Google, both of which were 
which were relative new entrants to the field.542 In this lawsuit Apple was asserting four patents 
and Motorola was countersuing over one patent. While there were valid questions about the 
infringement of the patents being asserted on both sides, Judge Richard Posner ordered the case 
dismissed with prejudice on what can be described as a technicality. That technicality being that 
neither party had provided sufficient proof of damages, when they had a chance to do so, as 
demonstrated in the following sentences;  
'By failing to present a minimally adequate damages case, Apple has disabled itself 
from arguing that damages would not provide a complete remedy, going forward in 
the form of running royalties, as well as backward.... In fact neither party is entitled to 
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an injunction. Neither has shown that damages would not be an adequate remedy. 
True, neither has presented sufficient evidence of damages to withstand summary 
judgment—but that is not because damages are impossible to calculate with 
reasonable certainty and are therefore an inadequate remedy; it’s because the parties 
have failed to present enough evidence to create a triable issue. They had an adequate 
legal remedy but failed to make a prima facie case of how much money, by way of such 
remedy, they are entitled to. That was a simple failure of proof.'543 
It is worth noting that it was entirely within the authority of Judge Posner to provide the 
parties with a chance to make up for this deficiency, but he did not to do so and instead 
dismissed the case with prejudice. What this implies is that the technical rational was likely only 
an expedient justification for a more substantive concern that Judge Posner had with the case 
and other cases like it. That concern revolving around the entitlement to injunction or excessive 
royalties for integrated intellectual property in general and standard-essential patents in 
particular. This implication being confirmed by comments included in his final opinion on the 
case which specifically address these substantive issues.544 In this opinion he questions an 
intellectual property owner’s entitlement to injunction by referring to a recent Federal Trade 
Commission a policy statement on injunctive relief where they detailed the potential economic 
and competitive consideration that should be made relative to the  impact of injunctive relief 
on disputes involving SEPs [standard essential patents].545 The specific concern expressed by 
Judge Posner in his opinion being as follows;  
'a royalty negotiation that occurs under threat of an exclusion order may be 
weighted heavily in favor of the patentee in a way that is in tension with the RAND 
commitment. High switching costs combined with the threat of an exclusion order 
could allow a patentee to obtain unreasonable licensing terms despite its RAND 
commitment, not because its invention is valuable, but because implementers are 
locked in to practicing the standard. The resulting imbalance between the value of 
patented technology and the rewards for innovation may be especially acute where 
the exclusion order is based on a patent covering a small component of a complex 
multi-component product. In these ways, the threat of an exclusion order may allow 
the holder of a RAND-encumbered SEP to realize royalty rates that reflect patent hold-
up, rather than the value of the patent relative to alternatives.'546 
Inclusion of this comment reflecting a sentiment in judicial circles that precedents which 
grant almost automatic injunctive relief, are contributing to inequitable outcomes. A sentiment 
being echoed by Judge Posner in an article he authored shortly after he dismissed the case. In 
that article he makes the following comments;  
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“Patent trolls are companies that acquire patents not to protect their market for a 
product they want to produce -- patent trolls are not producers -- but to lay traps for 
producers, for a patentee can sue for infringement even if it doesn't make the product 
that it holds a patent on.'547 
Obvious by challenging injunction entitlement, Judge Posner is indirectly challenging the 
capacity of plaintiff to extract excessive royalty demand from defendants. But his challenge to 
this excessive royalty does not end with his challenge to injunction entitlement. It he also 
challenges these same demands when it comes to calculating damages for past infringement. In 
his opinion he takes specific issue with the notion, that there is no linear correlation between 
damage requests and the number of patents being infringed. The clearest annunciation of this 
challenge in his opinion being as follows; 
'if Apple had wanted to license any of the patents in Motorola’s standards-essential 
portfolio, the license fee would have exceeded the product of the percentage of the 
portfolio represented by the patent and the value of the entire portfolio. Suppose the 
portfolio contained 100 patents and they would command a reasonable royalty of 
$700 million to a firm that licensed all 100. One patent is 1 percent of 100 patents and 
1 percent of $700 million is $7 million. But according to Donohoe’s declaration, the 
license fee for that single patent, if licensed on its own rather than as part of a package 
deal that comprised the entire portfolio, would be “up to” 40 to 50 percent of the 
royalty for the entire portfolio—that is, up to $350 million. That “up to” covers a lot of 
ground. Even a royalty of only $14 million would be mathematically disproportionate 
(Donohoe’s term is “nonlinear”) for using a single patent in a portfolio of 100 patents 
worth in the aggregate a $700 million royalty, because $14 million is 2 percent of $700 
million rather than 1 percent (1 out of 100 patents). How to pick the right nonlinear 
royalty?'548  
While Judge Posner does not answer the question which he posed, it is perhaps sufficient 
that he asks the question in the first place. For by asking the question he is indicating that he is 
not satisfied with the existing solutions and is open to the possibility for consideration of 
alternative solutions. That fact that both judges are open to new solution as to how to determine 
reasonable royalties is obviously quite encouraging, even if they do not address the problem as 
being specifically related to an evolution of the innovation process. 
When looking at Judge Posner’s decision it appears clear that one of the biggest obstacles to 
finding a solution has been the predisposition to try and apply singular rules to what is a diverse 
set of patented intellectual properties. No one should be surprised that this predisposition 
results inequitable outcomes, any more than they should be surprised if singular rules were used 
in any other body of law.  
While these inequity outcomes have always existed in intellectual property law, they have 
for the most part been ignored because historical most outcomes were equitable. This equity 
being derived from the fact that rules based on exclusive rights were being applied to cases 
which primarily involved standalone intellectual property. What has changed and made this 
                                                          







inequity less tolerable, is the frequency of its occurrence. A frequency of occurrence which can 
be directly attributed to the fact that correlated intellectual property has replaced standalone 
intellectual property as the dominate form of intellectual property.  
Given this change in the dominate nature of intellectual property, one way of reducing 
inequitable out comes would be to simple change the singular rules which is applied, to one 
which is more appropriate for correlated intellectual properties. However, such a solution would 
also seem to be unacceptable. This because standalone intellectual property owners who had 
previously been treated equitably, would subsequently be treated inequitably. As such it would 
appear that equitable solution must be that one which accepts that there are different forms of 
intellectual properties and applies different doctrines to those different forms. To do this it is 
essential that those different forms of intellectual properties are identified, which is why this 
chapter will first categorize those form, before defining the correlated intellectual property 
rights which could be applied to correlated properties. 
8.1 Categorizing Intellectual Property  
Theoretically if possible, any classification should be done using characteristics which are 
already being used to differentiate between various forms of patented intellectual properties, 
as this will help facilitate the adoption of the overall classification system. 
Remarkably, given huge variety of types of patented intellectual properties, there appears to 
be only one characteristic which is currently used to differentiate between intellectual 
properties under existing patent laws. That characteristic has to do with the essential nature of 
the underlying intellectual property. It is primarily this characteristic which is used to determine 
the possibility of being granted a compulsory license: when owners are either absent from a 
market, or charge what are considered to be excessive prices for their property. Although 
somewhat poorly and inconsistently defined; because this characteristic is already a determining 
factor in how intellectual properties are treated, it is entirely logical that it be used in a 
classification system. Indeed, assuming that it can be more clearly defined, it represents as good 
a characteristic as any for creating categories. The definition which would appear to be the most 
logical being definition is one which defines essential intellectual properties as:  
‘properties which are necessary for the wellbeing of citizens in a society’. 
 Such a definition would provide a reasonably clear contrast with discretionary properties 
which are merely desired, while at the same time creating a category broad enough to 
encompass a range of essential intellectual properties. 
Clearly to progress beyond the current differentiation at least one more characteristic needs 
to be utilised. In keeping with the core theme of this work, it is only rational that that this 
additional characteristic should be related to the correlated nature of the intellectual property. 
The objective of using this characteristic being; to separate intellectual properties between 
those which are created on a standalone basis and those which are built upon existing 
intellectual properties. A standalone intellectual property being defined as:  
‘patented innovations one which is developed solely by a single entity and which 
requires no integration with any other entities' valid and enforceable intellectual 






Whereas a correlated intellectual property being defined as:  
‘patented innovations which have been built upon exiting intellectual property and 
which must be integrated with other entities' valid and enforceable intellectual 
property to fulfil its claims.’ 
Taken together these two characteristics allow intelctual properties to be divided into four 
categories; Standalone Essential, Standalone Discretionary, Correlated Essential and Correlated 
Discretionary as shown in Figure 8 
Independent Innovation Intergrated Innovation
Discretionary Innovations Standalone Discretionary Correlated Discretionary
Essential Innovations Standalone Essential Correlated Esssential
 
Figure 8 
Although it would be entirely possible to expand the calcifications into more categories by 
adding additional characteristics or moving from a binary division of these two characteristics, 
it is not clear that further categories would provide substantial benefits. More explicitly it should 
be recognised that if any expansion the classification system is to be undertaken, it should only 
be done if it can add to the clarity of the categories which in turn would allow for even more 
specific doctrines to be applied for each new category.  
8.2 Defining Correlated Intellectual Property Rights 
Once it is accepted that intellectual properties can and should be categorised depending on 
whether they are standalone or correlated the question of what doctrine should be applied to 
correlated intellectual become readily apparent. Just like the correlated water and oil and gas 
properties described in chapter six, correlated intellectual properties should be subject to the 
correlated rights doctrine.  
To determine how the correlated rights doctrine could be applied in intellectual property law 
it is worth repeating the key paragraph included in Katz v. Walkinshaw549, and key articles of 
administrative law that covers oil and gas. The key paragraph in Katz v. Walkinshaw reads as 
follows: 
“Disputes between overlying landowners, concerning water for use on the land, to 
which they have an equal right, in cases where the supply is insufficient for all, are to 
be settled by giving to each a fair and just proportion.”550 
The key article in oil and gas administrative law reading as follows:  
'means to afford a reasonable opportunity to each owner to recover, or to receive 
without causing waste, a just and equitable share of the production.” With a just and 
                                                          







equitable share of production being defined as; “that fraction of the authorized 
production from a reservoir that corresponds reasonably to the proportion that the 
amount of recoverable oil or gas under the developed area of that separately owned 
tract or combination of tracts bears to the recoverable oil or gas in the total of the 
developed areas in the reservoir.'551 
This paragraph and article perfectly describe the core of correlative rights, which is when 
parties have separate ownership claims on what is effectively a common property, they each 
have a proportional right to the common property, rather than an absolute right to the entire 
property.  
The reason why correlative property rights should be applied in some intellectual property 
disputes is the same reason that it has been applied in water and oil and gas disputes. That 
reason is that when separate intellectual properties are willingly contributed for integration into 
a product, they become an inseparable part of that larger whole innovation. And just like an 
underground aquifer or an oil reservoir, when each owner has a property interest in a large 
integrated property, equity dictates no owners should be allowed to take more than their fair 
share of the value inherent in that integrated property, as to do so would harm the other 
contributors. Given this obvious similarity in circumstance and objective it appears entirely 
sensible that the correlative rights doctrine should migrate into intellectual property law, where 
it could be generally defined as follows; 
'When separately owned intellectual properties are determined to be inherently 
integrated with other intellectual properties, the individual property owners shall have 
proportional property rights with respect to the whole property and shall not 
disproportionately enrich themselves to the detriment of the other intellectual 
property owners.'552 
8.3 Rules for Apply Correlated Intellectual Property Rights 
Whilst providing a general definition is creates a foundation for the application of correlated 
rights, it is not all that is required to fully apply the doctrine. To fully apply the doctrine, it is also 
necessary to know and describe what are the rules governing its application. From this 
prospective there appears to be four rules which are essential for the application of the 
correlated intellectual property rights doctrine. These are; 
1) Court must be allowed to differentiate between standalone and correlated intellectual 
properties. 
2) It must be possible for ever intellectual property owner to be granted preliminary 
injunctive relief and permanent injunctive relief whenever technology manufactures are 
unwilling to participate in good faith negotiations which require them to make a reasonable 
counteroffer to any reasonable licensing offer, regardless of the size of their contribution to an 
integrated technological product or the fact that they are a non-practicing entity. 
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3) The courts must have the possibility of withholding both preliminary injunction relief and 
injunctive relief when intellectual property owners are unwilling to license their property on 
reasonable terms. 
4) The court must have the authority and the discretion needed to calculate and order 
payments of reasonable royalties for past and ongoing use to intellectual property owners, until 
the owner is willing to license their property on reasonable terms. 
With respect to the first rule it is clear that if the correlated rights doctrine is to be applied, 
it should only be applied in cases involving correlated properties which are practiced in an 
integrated technological product. To do so requires an ability to differential between standalone 
and correlated intellectual properties. To do otherwise to do other would be a violation of the 
relatively exclusive rights of standalone properties owners and would discredit the validity of 
the application of the correlated rights doctrine. 
The second rule is rather straight forward, as it is only rational that when an unauthorised 
user is unwilling licensee it would be entirely appropriate for the court to provide both 
preliminary and permanent injunctive relief against that use. This rule being in line with the 
historical protections provided to property owners when there are repeated and ongoing 
infringements of their properties by entities which flagrantly and unlawfully disregards the 
property rights of a property owner. This rational is valid regardless of the size of an owner’s 
proportional contribution to the technological product or whether the owner is also a 
technological manufacturer. That said in some jurisdictions; courts are required to balance the 
negative impact to society of granting preliminary injunctive relief against the benefits the 
owner of providing such relief. In those jurisdictions it may be necessary to first provide a ruling 
which requires the technological manufacturer to pay lump sum and rolling damages to owners, 
which if unpaid would require the courts to provide permanent injunctive relief. In either case 
there can be no disputing the fact that the requirement to provide injunctive relief is as critical 
to enforcing the collated property rights, as it is to enforcing absolute property rights for 
standalone intellectual properties when unwilling licensees are infringing an owner’s intellectual 
property.  
The third rule is undoubtedly the most critical and contentious of the rules. It is critical 
because without the ability to withhold injunctive relief it would be impossible to apply the 
correlative rights doctrine. It is contentious because it adds an additional defence against the 
historical presumption of a right to injunctive relief when infringement is found. Adding this 
defence will be controversial to historical IPR proponents because, it would dramatically 
diminish the cases in the presumption of injunctive relief would prevail. The objections of the 
historical IPR proponents will be amplified because such a dramatically reduction of cases where 
injunctive relief is provided could be interpreted as creating a liability rule in intellectual 
property law. It would be controversial to IPR proponents focused on patent holdup because it 
would alter the rational for denying injunctive relief; from one which is based upon the nature 
of the property owner, to one based upon their behaviour. This change in rational replacing a 
simple objective categorisation, with a subjective analysis. It should be kept in mind that prior 
to eBay553 many jurisdictions granted automatic injunctive relief whenever a finding of 
infringement was made by the courts. The granting of automatic injunctive relief representing 
                                                          






the logical legal manifestation of providing intellectual property owners with absolute /exclusive 
rights to their property and withholding that relief would represent a challenge to that absolute 
right. Fortunately, this historical practice was and is generally based upon precedent rather than 
legislative directives. Legislatively what determines how much flexibility judicial authorities have 
for withhold injunctive relief can be entirely dependent upon one of two words being used in 
the statute. One of which designates a hard and fast rule and while the other designates a 
standard. If the law states that courts "must" provide injunctive relief, it is a rule and this rule 
clearly eliminate the courts flexibility to withhold such relief. If the law states that courts "may" 
provide injunctive relief, then it is a standard and this standard provides the courts with the 
flexibility to withhold such relief. 
The ability to withhold the injunctive relief and should not be confused with the legislative 
acts which provide judicial authorities with the right to grant compulsory licenses. A compulsory 
license represents a proactive action taken by a government, through which the government 
and not the owner, provides the users with a license to use the intellectual property of others. 
Although this may provide a similar result, as in both cases users are allowed to continue to use 
an intellectual property without direct authorization from the owner, there are two significant 
differences between the two actions. First there is the fact that a compulsory license effectively 
puts some state body in the position of the licensor, removing the owner from the bargaining 
table. The second is that it compulsory licenses tend to represent a settled state of affairs; 
whereas withholding injunctive relief can be considered a transitional arrangement which 
provides litigants with an opportunity review their positions and conclude a bilateral licensing 
arrangement between themselves. Both of these differences make withholding injunctive relief 
a superior alternative to providing a compulsory license, because the final solution is less 
dependent upon ongoing governmental involvement in the dispute. However, if judicial 
discretion is not available, having a compulsory licensing option is certainly preferable to not 
having one, as it restricts the coercive potential of automatic injunctive relief.  
Almost as contentious will be the implications of the fourth rule. Not because; it would allow 
judicial authorities to determine the amount of damages which should be paid to owners for 
infringement of their intellectual property. But because it is under this rule that the courts would 
be allowed to provide damages which reflect the value provided by the property, rather than 
the heavily discounted damages recommended by patent holdup scholarship. Ironically the only 
limiting factor on this authority may be provision in some legislation which require that such 
damages be equal to, or greater than, a reasonable royalty rate for use of the intellectual 
property. These provisions are ironic, because they are violated by the discounted damages 
proposed, yet would be entirely compatible with correlated rights doctrine.  
Under an application of the correlated rights doctrine the only issue which should arise is 
how to discourage owners from engaging in abusive behaviour if the owner will always be 
awarded the same reasonable damages. Obviously if damages are always the same, owners will 
have nothing to lose if they by engage in abusive behaviour which could provide them with a 
better result. However, this dilemma is easily overcome since determining reasonable royalty 
rate is a subjective decision which can and should produce a range of rates rather than one 
absolute rate. As such if it is determined by the court that an owner has behaved in an abusive 
manner, the court would have the authority to set the damages at the low end of the reasonable 
royalty range, as a punishment for engaging in that behaviour. Equally as important, the courts 






engaging in the abusive behaviour. Equally obvious is the fact that setting damages at the low 
or high end of a reasonable royalty range does not violate either the letter or the intent of the 
legislation which have such a provision.  
One potentially controversial aspect of this fourth rule is whether legislation provides courts 
with the authorities to impose rolling damages for ongoing unauthorised use. However, this 
should only an issue in jurisdictions where legislation mandates automatic injunctive relief. In 
such jurisdiction; the requirement to grant automatic injunctive relief would make redundant 
the need to grant rolling damages because there would be no ongoing unauthorised use. As 
stated above because automatic injunctive relief without the option of a compulsory license 
would make applying the correlative rights doctrine virtually impossible, it would also make this 
question redundant. 
Assuming the first of these rules on determining when the correlated rights doctrine should 
be applied is not actually part of the doctrine, then the following three questions need to be 
asked to determine if the correlated rights doctrine is compatible with existing legislation. 
1) Do judicial authorities have the discretion needed to grant preliminary injunctive 
relief and/or permanent injunctive relief on an entire integrated technological product 
when it is determined that unauthorised users are unwilling to license or are unwilling to 
pay reasonable royalties to an owner of an integrated intellectual property, regardless of 
the size of their contribution to that integrated technological property or their 
manufacturing participation.? 
2) Do judicial authorities have the discretion needed to withhold injunctive relief for 
ongoing unauthorised use of integrated intellectual property, when it is determined that 
an intellectual property owner is abusing their rights to injunctive relief to coerce users to 
pay more for the use of their intellectual property than value their property contributes 
to the integrated technological product? 
3) Do judicial authorities have the discretion needed to make rulings which set the 
level of damages which intellectual property owners should receive for past and ongoing 
unauthorised use of integrated intellectual property at a level which corresponds to the 









9. Milestones, The Path Backwards and The Path Forward 
Included in this chapter are two most important precedential cases from which the 
correlated rights doctrine can be extracted, as well as a number of other cases and decisions 
that have adopted the precedents set by them. The doctrine can be extracted from these cases 
because they each represent a legal milestone which sought to prevent intellectual property 
owners from using the threat of injunctive relief to force correlated property owners to pay 
excessive royalties for intellectual properties provided to integrated technological properties. 
As the title indicates, although these cases represent critical milestones on the path towards 
correlated rights, they also included components which both bolster and detract from the 
ultimate objective or a full application of the doctrine. The components which bolster the 
application representing constraints included in the decisions which are intended to prevent 
intellectual property owners from charging excessive royalties for the use of their properties. 
The components which detract from the application being the constrains included in the 
decisions which prevent intellectual property owners from pursuing royalties which reflect the 
value that their properties provide to an integrated technological product. While these 
precedents played a critical role in solving the problem of patent holdup, because they were a 
reactionary response to holdup rather than a constructive response to a change in the 
innovative process, they appear to have created an even bigger problem. Specifically, in the 
effort to drive down the royalty rates charged by patent trolls, they have also driven down the 
royalty rates of all intellectual property owners.554 Assuming that this second problem was an 
unintended consequence of solving the first, it should be possible through this analysis to 
describe how this consequence occurred and how it can be corrected.  
In this chapter the milestones, and the steps backwards and forwards will be analysed in 
three separate parts. The first to these parts will describe the two milestone cases which broke 
with precedent in either side of the Atlantic, the US Supreme Court's decision in eBay Inc. v. 
MercExhange L.L.C. (eBay v MercExchange)555 and the German Federal Courts decision in KZR 
(Orange Book).556 The two other parts will then examine subsequent cases and competition 
authority decisions which can be described as being either on the path backwards and forward 
in the pursuit of an application of the correlated rights doctrine. This analysis will be framed as 
a discussion the two issues which need to be addressed whenever the courts are asked to 
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The two cases eBay Inc. v. MercExhange and Orange Book must be considered milestones on 
the path to an application of the correlated rights doctrine because; they eliminated the 
presumption that automatic injunctive relief would be provided whenever an infringement is 
found. The significance of this change with respect to an application of the correlated doctrine 
is hard to overestimate, as the threat of seeking injunctive relief was the primary method used 
in patent holdup, which by extension ensured that others would not receive their fair rewards. 
Just as significantly it also provided a justification for allowing other owners to engage in patent 
holdout to prevent patent holdup. When injunctive relief is not automatic both these 
consequences are significantly reduced.  
9.1.1 eBay v MercExchange  
In April of 1995, Thomas Woolston filed his first patent application involving online marketing 
technology,557 which was expanded to a family of patents, which totalled 35 in number. For the 
most part each of these patents can be described as business method patent, which provide no 
detailed information about computer codes required to facilitate these methods. Rather they 
are simply the inventor's concept of the basic computer architecture require to facilitate online 
sales over the internet. That these patents anticipated the movement of product sales from 
bricks and mortar stores, to online stores is undeniable. What was questionable was the validity 
of these patents, as before they were granted there were already several enterprises seeking to 
develop online product sales. As such the possibility being granted a patent for the concept of 
selling over the internet, would appear to run afoul of the patentability requirements which 
stipulate that the innovation must be both original and non-obviousness. Indeed, it was the lack 
of these characteristics which were used by eBay to challenge the validity of the patents during 
the patent dispute. Regardless of whether the patent office made a mistake in granting the 
patents, once they were granted Woolston, quite naturally sought to monetize their value. He 
did this through MercExchange, a company owned by Woolston and set up for the primary 
purpose of licensing the properties. As this company was primarily engaged in an effort to 
license the properties rather than exploit them, it fell under the definition of a non-practicing 
entire, a classification which was created after MercExchange began its licensing efforts. One of 
the companies which was the target of these licensing efforts was eBay.  
The company eBay was formed in 1995 by Pierre Omidyar, who claimed to have written the 
original software for eBay's website over a Labour Day weekend. This software remains at the 
core of operations and processes of the enterprise. Under the eBay model, buyers and sellers 
deal directly with each other and conclude the transactions themselves.  
The direct relationship between buyers and sellers is significant as it raises questions about 
whether eBay actually infringed MercExchange's patents which envisioned that trades would 
                                                          






take place through consignment to a "trusted dealer". While the primary business of eBay (or 
AuctionWeb as it was then called) was facilitating online sales, it is worth noting that there was 
also a secondary business which was evolving which involved licensing eBay's software to assist 
other companies run their own online auctions. To this end, in November of 1996 eBay 
negotiated its first third party licensing deal with Electronic Travel Auctions, who used eBay's 
software to sell plane tickets and other travel products. This deal was so successful that Omidyar 
began to believe that eBay would make most of its money licensing its technology.  
This licensing business is significant because it indicates that eBay was much more than just 
a business method but had actually developed software tools which could be used by others to 
improve their business. The expectation of the licensing business surpassing the online business 
was however soon overturned by events. In January of 1997 the online site hosted 2,000,000 
auctions, which was an exponential increase over the 250,000 auctions hosted during the whole 
of 1996. 
Given this rapid growth eBay began to seek venture capital to expand their own business. 
Toward the end of 1997 a venture capital group called Benchmark Capital invested $6.7 million 
in the company. With those funds eBay hired more experienced staff, including Meg Whitman 
who was hired as President and CEO in March of 1998. At that time the company had 30 
employees, half a million users and revenues of around $4.7 million. With this additional talent 
the exponential growth continued. The company went public on the 21st of September 1998 at 
$18 a share which rose to $53 a share in the first day of trading. By the year 2000 eBay had 
become one of the internet's great success stories establishing a dominate 90% share of the 
online auction market.558  
According to eBay, in 2000 when it became involved with dispute with "Bidder's Edge", 
MercExchange's patent attorney and co-owner, John Phillips, contacted them with an offer 
which would allow them to use to use its patents in that dispute. Again, according to eBay this 
approach involved meetings which were primarily directed towards a review of MercExchange's 
prosecution files and although eBay did show an interest in acquiring MercExchange's patent 
portfolio. However, these were subject to due diligence which MercExchange never allowed 
eBay to conduct. eBay claimed that because of the unwillingness allow a thorough due diligence, 
the talks broke down before negotiations ever got started. They also claimed that during this 
interaction MercExchange 'carefully avoided any suggestion that eBay infringed, even though it 
secretly planned to sue eBay.'559 
According to MercExchange, in June of 2000 eBay was looking for ways to offer goods for 
sale other than at auction and approached MercExchange to discuss eBay's interest in buying 
MercExchange's patent portfolio. MercExchange claims that they were very interested in 
establishing a working relationship with eBay that would provide them with the capital they 
need to transform MercExchange into an operating company. They also claimed that negotiation 
broke down because; eBay made it clear that they were only interested in buying the patents 
and not interested in entering into an extended business relationship. They further claimed that 
after negotiation 'broke down, eBay began using MercExchange's technology without 
authorization. That 'by the fall of 2000-only two months after eBay had unsuccessfully tried to 
buy MercExchange's patents-eBay incorporated into its web site a fixed-price sales capacity 
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using the "electronic market" system of MercExchange's 265 patent for the purchase of goods 
and the transfer of funds in an electronic marketplace.'560 
Regardless of why the negotiations broke down the net result was that MercExchange 
brought suit for infringement against eBay on in September of 2001. This lead to a series of court 
cases which lasted seven years, the most significant of which were obviously the Supreme 
Court's instructions on how lower courts should make decisions on injunctive relief, and the 
District Court's application of those instructions with respect to the renewed motion for 
injunctive relief filed by MercExchange. 
It should be noted that the Supreme Court Decision focused solely on the general question 
of when injunctive relief should be granted and not on the specifics of the dispute. As such it did 
not take a position on whether MercExchange's patents were valid, and not even whether they 
should be granted a permanent injunction. From a correlated rights’ prospective the most 
significant component of this decision can be found in the court’s pronouncements about the 
categorical granting or withholding of injunctive relief;  
'Just as the District Court erred in its categorical denial of injunctive relief, the Court 
of Appeals erred in its categorical grant of such relief'561 
In a single sentence the court basically eliminated the "per se" rule with respect to either 
granting or denying injunctive relief.562 As a result of this elimination of this "per se" rule, the 
court was obliged to provide guidance on when injunctive relief should be provided. They did 
this by imposing a duty to use the historical four-factor test, which they outlined in their slip 
opinion: 
"Held: The traditional four-factor test applied by courts of equity when considering 
whether to award permanent injunctive relief to a prevailing plaintiff applies to 
disputes arising under the Patent Act. That test requires a plaintiff to demonstrate: (1) 
that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law are 
inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that considering the balance of hardships 
between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the 
public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction. The decision to 
grant or deny such relief is an act of equitable discretion by the district court, 
reviewable on appeal for abuse of discretion. These principles apply with equal force 
to Patent Act disputes. “[A] major departure from the long tradition of equity practice 
should not be lightly implied.” Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U. S. 305, 320. 
Nothing in the Act indicates such a departure."563 
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Although this ruling sought to provide a straight forward instruction on when to provide 
injunctive relief, the message was to a certain extent overshadowed by an implication that when 
analysing these four-factors; the "non-practicing" nature of the property owner could be a 
consideration.564 This implication persisting despite the court's statements that a "non-
practicing entity" could also be granted injunctive relief; 
"Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals below fairly applied these 
traditional equitable principles in deciding respondent's motion for a permanent 
injunction. Although the District Court recited the traditional four-factor test, 275 F. 
Supp. 2d, at 711, it appeared to adopt certain expansive principles suggesting that 
injunctive relief could not issue in a broad swath of cases. Most notably, it concluded 
that a "plaintiff's willingness to license its patents" and "its lack of commercial activity 
in practicing the patents" would be sufficient to establish that the patent holder would 
not suffer irreparable harm if an injunction did not issue. Id., at 712. But traditional 
equitable principles do not permit such broad classifications. For example, some 
patent holders, such as university researchers or self-made inventors, might 
reasonably prefer to license their patents, rather than undertake efforts to secure the 
financing necessary to bring their works to market themselves. Such patent holders 
may be able to satisfy the traditional four-factor test, and we see no basis for 
categorically denying them the opportunity to do so. To the extent that the District 
Court adopted such a categorical rule, then, its analysis cannot be squared with the 
principles of equity adopted by Congress. The court's categorical rule is also in tension 
with Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co.,210 U.S. 405, 422-430 (1908), 
which rejected the contention that a court of equity has no jurisdiction to grant 
injunctive relief to a patent holder who has unreasonably declined to use the 
patent."565 
Why this statement did not correct the impression is likely because; while this paragraph 
contents that "Such patent holders [non-practicing entities like university researchers or self-
made inventors] may be able to satisfy the traditional four-factor test", it provides no guidance 
on how they could do so.566 An omission which Justice Kennedy's tried to rectify, but may have 
compounded in his concurring comments which read as follows:  
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'An industry has developed in which firms use patents not as a basis for producing 
and selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees. ... When the 
patented invention is but a small component of the product the companies seek to 
produce and the threat of an injunction is employed simply for undue leverage in 
negotiations, legal damages may well be sufficient to compensate for the infringement 
and an injunction may not serve the public interest.'567 
In this concurring opinion it is clear the Justice Kennedy wanted to underline the fact that it 
is the act of seeking to leverage the threat of injunction to provide a better negotiation position 
which was the problem. However, because he prefaced this comment by referring to what is 
effectively a "non-practicing entity", he made the identification of "non-practicing entity" a 
proxy for seeking to employ undue leverage. Taken together the ruling and the concurring 
opinion initiated a heated debate as to whether all "non-practicing entities" were in fact "patent 
trolls".568  
As essential as this debate is, it had the unintended consequence of diverting attention away 
from the real question which should have been the focus of the ruling. That question being 
whether the imposition of generalised historical four-factor test from an old case was the most 
appropriate way of deciding whether injunctions should be provided in a modern and 
complicated patent disputes. 
Another question gained significance as a result of this case; was the question of how to 
calculate running royalties. Obviously if injunctive relief is not granted, and an entity continues 
its unauthorised use the court must address the issues of ongoing royalties (which would 
otherwise be done through private negotiations after an injunction is granted). While the case 
itself did not specifically address this question, the joint concurring opinion of Chief Justices 
Robert, Justice Scalia and Justice Ginsburg included a passage which has appeared to indicate 
that this too should be adjudicated using a generalised historical analysis:  
"From at least the early 19th century, courts have granted injunctive relief upon a 
finding of infringement in the vast majority of patent cases. This “long tradition of 
equity practice” is not surprising, given the difficulty of protecting a right to exclude 
through monetary remedies that allow an infringer to use an invention against the 
patentee’s wishes—a difficulty that often implicates the first two factors of the 
traditional four-factor test. This historical practice, as the Court holds, does not entitle 
a patentee to a permanent injunction or justify a general rule that such injunctions 
should issue. ...  At the same time, there is a difference between exercising equitable 
discretion pursuant to the established four-factor test and writing on an entirely clean 
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568 See for example: McDonough, James F., The Myth of the Patent Troll: An Alternative View of the Function of 
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slate. “Discretion is not whim, and limiting discretion according to legal standards helps 
promote the basic principle of justice that like cases should be decided alike.” Martin 
v. Franklin Capital Corp., ... When it comes to discerning and applying those standards, 
in this area as others, “a page of history is worth a volume of logic.” New York Trust 
Co. v. Eisner, 256 U. S. 345, 349 (1921) (opinion for the Court by Holmes, J.)."569 
What this passage appears to imply is that the courts ought to look back at earlier Supreme 
Court cases to determine how they should be calculated, rather than adopting a new standard 
for assessing reasonable royalties in modern patent disputes. This quite naturally has increased 
the focus on the fifteen factors included in the 1970 Georgia Pacific case570. Like the four-factors 
for deciding injunctive relief, these fifteen factors will be considered under the step backwards 
analysis which is provided in the next part of this chapter. 
9.1.2 Orange Book Standard 
To put this case into the proper context it is necessary to briefly mention an earlier case 
decided by the German Federal Supreme Court (BGH) which involved the development of a 
standardised plastic chemical barrel by for the German market, Standard-Spundfass.571 In that 
case the German owners of the patent for the standardised barrel, refused a licence to a German 
subsidiary of an Italian barrel manufacturer and sued for infringement when the Italian 
subsidiary began supplying German chemical companies with barrels which were equivalent to 
the German standardized barrels. In its defence the Italian subsidiary argued that the refusal to 
licence; effectively barred them from participation in the German market, was in breach of EU 
and German competition laws, and that they should be granted the same free license that their 
German competitors had been granted.  
The BGH indicated that when a patent was part of a standard, and the owner used that 
position to restrict market access; they were abusing their dominate market position and this 
could result in an obligation to grant a compulsory license in order to ensure competition in the 
market place. 572 However the BGH also pointed out that; even if there was an obligation to 
license this did not mean that it had to offer a totally non-discriminatory license, which provided 
their most favoured licensing terms to all licensees. That so long as the underlying terms could 
be justified using sound economic and business considerations; unequal terms would not 
conflict with an application of competition law considerations.573 In the ruling the BGH left it 
open to lower courts of decide if this refusal to license justified withholding injunctive relief and 
further confirmed that damage claims could not be excluded; even if the patent owner had 
violated competition laws by denying the patent infringer a license when they were a willing 
licensee.574 It was this case which fully inserted competition law into the mainstream of German 
patent disputes and significantly reduced the need to seek a compulsory license from the Patent 
Office. 
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The Orange Book is the informal name Philips and Sony used to describe the patented 
technical specifications they jointly developed with two other companies (Taiyo Yuden and 
Ricoh) for producing recordable compact discs, (CD-R) and rewritable compact disc (CD-RW). In 
the early 1990 the four companies which contributed to the Orange Book standard decided to 
aggregate all the patent intellectual properties into two patent pools and license them together; 
in order to reduce the transaction cost of licensing them separately. The CD-R patents of Philips, 
Sony and Taiyo Yuden representing the CD-R pool and the D-RW patents of Ricoh, Philips and 
Sony representing the CD-RW pool. Both pools were to be licensed by Philips; with Ricoh, Sony 
and Taiyo Yuden receiving their proportion of any royalties agreed by under those licenses. 
Because the patents in the pools established a standard for CD-R or CD-RW, any manufacturer 
who wanted to participate those markets would be required to take a license to the patents in 
the pools. Further as Phillips was willing to provide licenses to the pool properties to anyone 
who requested a license under using a standardised licensing agreement, it appeared that they 
would not be in breach of either EU and German competition laws. 
The case commenced in the Regional Court when Philips sued several manufactures of CD-
Rs who had did not have a licence to the pools and were therefore on prima facia infringing on 
the patents included in the pools. The defendants denied an infringement of the patents and 
claimed that because Philips was charging other companies a license fee of 3%, as well as failing 
to collect license fees from other companies; the royalty rates which they were being asked to 
pay were discriminatory and therefore prohibited by the EU and German competition laws. The 
Regional Court granted Philips injunctive relief, prohibiting the defendants from manufacturing, 
selling, circulating or importing CD-Rs and CD-RWs without permission from the Philips, as well 
as ordering damages. The defendants first appealed this decision to an appellant court which 
upheld the Regional Courts Decision.575 The defendants therefore appealed to the BGH on points 
of law. Philips counter appealed on points of law and requested that the BGH should settle the 
terms of the case on merit, rather than seeking injunctive relief.  
In considering the defendant's points of law, the BGH rejected the technical issues raised by 
the defendants, as well as their claim of discriminatory licensing practices because they failed to 
provide proof of such discrimination. What they did accept was a general defence against the 
grant of injunctive relief; when a patent owner held a dominate position in the market and a 
refusal to license would prevent the defendant from taking part in market, or when the licensing 
conditions were discriminatory, both of which would represent an abuse of their dominate 
position in the market.576 This defence being justified by referring to the compulsory licensing 
provisions under cartel law, which was articulated in the ruling as follows:  
'To the extent that the "compulsory license defence under cartel law" is accepted 
... it is based on the consideration that, although the party wishing to take a license 
acts unlawfully when using the patent without the consent of the patent proprietor, 
the patent proprietor can still not sue him for injunctive relief, because with the 
request to cease and desist, he would ask for something he would have to immediately 
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give back (in the form of the grant of a license) (dolo petit, qui petit quod statim 
redditurus est), thus violating the principle of good faith (Sec. 242 BGB).'577 
However, the BGH then went on to qualify this defence against the granting of injunctive 
relief by stating that; 
"the patent proprietor who asserts a claim for injunctive relief based on his patent, 
although the defendant is entitled to be granted a license under the patent in suit, only 
abuses his dominant position on the market and only acts in bad faith if two conditions 
are met: Firstly, the party wishing to obtain a license must have made an unconditional 
offer to conclude a license agreement which the patent proprietor cannot reject 
without unreasonably obstructing the party wishing to take a license or without 
violating the prohibition of discrimination, and the proposed licensee must stay bound 
by this offer. And secondly, the proposed licensee has to comply with the obligations 
on which the use of the licensed subject matter depends according to the license 
agreement still to be concluded, if he already uses the subject matter of the patent 
before the patent proprietor has accepted his offer. This means in particular that the 
proposed licensee has to pay the royalties resulting from the contract or ensure their 
payment.'578 
What this decision effectively introduced into German intellectual property law is what can 
best be described as an "assumed license defence" supported by competition law.579 Under this 
concept any property owner who has a property which provides them with a dominate position 
in the marketplace would be effectively prohibited from seeking injunctive relief, whenever an 
infringer makes an irrevocable offer to license their property and backs up that offer by paying 
the royalties which would be payable under the offer to the patent owner or to an account in 
favour of the patent owner. To the extent that the infringer fulfils his obligations under the offer 
by making payment, and as such is not injuncted from infringing, it is as if it is assumed that offer 
was accepted. The basic principle of this part of the ruling being that it protects a good faith 
willing licensee from injunctive relief merely because there is a disagreement on an appropriate 
royalty rate. In its final ruling the BGH upheld the appeals court decision, because the 
defendants had failed to arrange payments of any royalties for an assumed licence. 
Mindful of the requirement on the part of the infringer to make, and back up an offer, the 
final paragraphs of the case addressed the royalties to be paid under this "assumed license" 
concept. The key part of these comments being that the patent owner is 'completely free in 
determining the royalty amount; his determination is inequitable only if it does not stay 
within the limits set by cartel law and if it unjustly obstructs the licensee or discriminates 
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him against other licensees' and that the infringer cannot be 'estopped from asserting that 
a determination of the royalty by the patent proprietor in this amount is inequitable - for 
which assertion he still bears the onus of presentation and proof'580  
While the concept of an assumed license defence, is compatible with an application of the 
correlated rights doctrine: which would limit the granting of injunctive relief to correlated 
intellectual properties; it does not make the application of correlated rights doctrine redundant 
as there are aspects of the decision which are inconsistent with an application of the doctrine. 
The first inconsistency is that unlike the correlated rights doctrine, this case determines whether 
injunctive relief should be available depending on whether the patent owner has licensed their 
properties to anyone else, rather than the nature of the properties themselves. So, for example 
it could be argued that if a standalone patent owner has licensed their properties to anyone else 
it, they are prohibited from withholding a license to everyone who wishes to participate in the 
market.  
Even if the case is interpreted as applying only to patents which form part of a standard and 
therefore correlated; it does not differentiate between correlated essential patents and 
correlated discretionary patents. This lack of differentiation is significant because to suggest that 
every correlated patent owner must provide a license to every potential technology 
manufacturer which would effectively prevent anyone from establishing any form of product 
differentiation. Further this same lack of differentiation could easily impact how reasonable 
royalties are established. Further while it may be that the royalty rates should be the same for 
all licensees, what is missing is any meaningful guidance on what would constitute a reasonable 
royalty.581 That said there can be no denying that establishment of "assumed license defence" 
is clearly a major milestone on the way to the application of the correlated rights doctrine.  
9.2 The Path Backwards 
As stated in the introduction to this chapter these paths backwards and forwards will be split 
into two parts, with the first part examining the factors related to granting of injunctive relief 
and the second part examining the issue of how reasonable royalties are to be calculated.  
9.2.1 Injunctive Relief  
While the elimination of the presumption of automatic injunctive relief in eBay v 
MercExchange was clearly step forward on the path to applying the correlated rights doctrine, 
it is unclear whether a requirement to use an ill-defined four-factor test should be considered a 
step forward or a step backward on the same path. There are four concerns with respect to the 
requirement to use this test. The first is whether a historical test which was relatively unknow 
to intellectual property law, would be appropriate for modern intellectual property disputes.582 
The second is whether is it appropriate to use a basic four-factor injunction test for modern 
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intellectual property disputes.583 The third was the concerns that despite the court's declaration 
there still existed conjecture that existence of "non-practicing entities" could somehow be used 
as a proxy for determining whether the patent owner was engaged in patent holdup.584 The 
fourth concern being when a categorical rule is replaced by a four-factor test that non-practicing 
entities will struggle to meet, it represents exchanging one categorical rule for another. The new 
rule having a discriminatory effect on non-practicing entities.585 
It should be noted that to the extent that this final concern is legitimate, then the court's 
pronouncement that categorical rules cannot be squared with the principles of equity, must 
imply that an application of the four-factor test is also inequitable.586 The question of equity 
resting on the potential of a discriminatory effect which is inherent in a both the categorical rule 
and the four-factor test. For this discriminatory effect to exists it must be possible to show that 
the proposed criteria for proving harm; is dependent on type of owner property owner which 
has brought the case, and not on whether the owner has behaved unreasonably.  
To fully appreciate how this discrimination would occur in the four-factor test, all one needs 
to do is consider real world examples of an inventions developed by major technology 
manufactures like Apple Inc., versus a college student who develops the same innovations. For 
the likes of Apple Inc., it is easy to show that they intend to use the innovations exclusively for 
their own products and that the value of competitive advantage provided by the innovation 
cannot be quantified, which under the four-factor test would effectively ensure their right to 
injunctive relief. Whereas because a college student would not be able to make that same 
argument, the four-factor test would significantly reduce or even eliminate their chances of 
being granted injunctive relief. The main problem for a college student being the impossible to 
proving that compensation would not be sufficient to cure the harm. While such conditionality 
is undoubtedly appreciated by large technology companies, for smaller innovators who only 
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want to license their products, it is a significant obstacle which in most cases will prevent them 
from securing the full value of that their innovation provides to users.  
The existence of this potential discriminatory effect should not be entirely surprising as it 
must be remembered that when this decision was taken the primary concern was about the 
problem of patent hold-up by so called patent trolls. The problem is that this generalised method 
for determining all forms of injunctive relief, cannot target the patent trolls in intellectual 
property disputes without also harming other non-practicing entities. 
A concrete example of how this potential discriminatory effect can manifests itself is 
provided by the ruling which was handed down when the case was returned to district court. 
Like their earlier opinion,587 this opinion withheld in the injunction sought by MercExchange, by 
slightly changing its rational to comply with the Supreme Court ruling.588 An analysis of this 
opinion is provided to demonstrate the potential for discrimination inherent in the Supreme 
Court instruction, which would be a step backwards in term of applying the correlated rights 
doctrine. 
In the first part of the ruling the District Court's ruling, the court stated that it reopened the 
records to allow the litigants 'the opportunity to court on factual developments occurring over 
the past three years.'589 As a result of that process the court concluded that the; 
 
'primary factual developments occurring subsequent to trial that are relevant to 
the instant opinion are: (1) eBay requested that the PTO re-examine the patentability 
of MercExchange's '265 and '051 patents and after granting such request, the PTO 
issued non-final actions indicating that both patents are invalid due to prior art; and 
(2) in 2004, Mere-Exchange granted uBid, Inc. ("uBid"), an online auction and fixed 
price marketplace that competes with eBay for a portion of the relevant market, a non-
exclusive license to its entire patent portfolio. Additionally, in 2006, on the heels of the 
Supreme Court's opinion remanding the injunction dispute, uBid considered selling a 
25% interest in its company to MercExchange in return for an exclusive license to the 
'265 patent.'590   
 
What is conspicuous by its absences, is a specific mention in this section of the decision 
addressing whether eBay had been successful on its efforts to build around or whether they 
were still infringing MercExcange's patents. Clearly if eBay had been successful, this should have 
been the first factual development to be mentioned by the court, as it would have made the 
proceedings redundant. Although there might be an argument that the continued infringement 
should not be considered a factual development if there was no work around attempted, the 
fact that eBay's attempted a work around and those attempts were unsuccessful, would 
certainly appear to be a relevant factual development. While it may be that this lack of success 
may have been ignored because of the validity issues which arose, surely the court ought to 
have identified the failure of the work around and resulting ongoing infringement as a "Factual 
Development". That they did not provides an early indication of the bias against non-practicing 
entities which was subsequently demonstrated in the ruling. 
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The next section of the decision dealt with eBay’s motion for a stay of proceeding, which the 
court rejected with respect to the '265 patent and granted with respect to the '051 patent. 
Although both patents were subject to a negative re-examination by the patent office,591 there 
was a significant procedural difference between the two which provides an explanation for the 
seeming contradictory decisions. In the respect to the '265 patent, the court withheld the stay 
because prior to re-examination; the trial jury had found the patent valid and infringed, and the 
Federal Circuit Court had affirmed that decision. Basically, because the patent had been found 
valid by a jury, the court felt that ignoring that finding could represent a 'manipulation of the re-
examination process.'592 Whereas with the '051 patent, as it has 'never reached the jury'593 the 
court felt that it was appropriate to grant a stay until the patent office finalised its decision. 
Moreover, as the earlier summary judgement questioning the validity of the patent, and this 
supported to the patent office's negative re-examination, the court decided it would have been 
a 'needless waste of judicial resources'594 to determine infringement remedies when it was 
highly likely that the patent would be found invalid. 
Only after these two issues were addressed was the court's decision on MercExchange's 
Renewed motion for a Permanent Injunction provided. In describing this decision the court 
acknowledges that the case was sent back for back for retrial because; 'although it had applied 
the four-factor test, the Supreme Court ruled that it's 'prior analysis could be read to bar 
injunctive relief "in a broad swath of cases."'595 As such the court stated this time they would 
apply 'no special assumptions unique too patent cases' and rather use its equitable discretion to 
apply the four-factor test as it would apply to any case and guided by the facts specific to this 
case.596 To do so the court revisited its analysis of each of the four-factors, to determine if the 
plaintiff had demonstrated '(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies 
available at law are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that considering the balance 
of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that 
the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.'597 
With respect to the issue of irreparable harm, the court first dismisses the presumption of 
irreparable harm by citing that the Supreme Court opinion 'does not imply a presumption, but 
places the burden of proofing irreparable injury on the plaintiff.'598 Using this instruction the 
court then declared that a 'permanent injunction shall only be issued if plaintiff carries its burden 
of establishing that, based on traditional equitable principles, the case specific facts warrant 
entry of an injunction.'599 Unfortunately after making this declaration the court failed to specify 
what it means by "traditional equitable principles" which renders this declaration rather 
ambiguous.  
When specifically addressing the issue of irreparable harm 'the court concludes that 
MercExchange has not established irreparable harm and that the first factor weighs against 
entry of an injunction.'600 In terms of the path forward this sentence is notable because it clearly 
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indicates that the court intended to treat the four-factor test as a balancing test, rather than a 
cumulative series of four binary tests which would be virtually impossible for most non-
practicing entities to pass. 
That said this declaration clearly represents a step on the path backwards, because of the 
rational provided as to why MercExchange had not proved irreparable harm; 
'MercExchange consistently sought royalties from internet companies utilising its 
patents, including eBay, and publicly announced its willingness to license its patents to 
eBay, before, during and after trial, but failed to establish that an injunction was 
necessary to protect its brand name, market share, reputation, goodwill, or future 
research and development opportunities.'601 
This summary of their reasoning is profoundly troubling for several reasons, not the least of 
which is that it is in direct contradiction of the essence of the Supreme Court opinion. The 
summary is contradictory because; 5using MercExchange's efforts to secure payment for the 
use of its patents as an indication of a lack of irreparable harm, was no different from saying that 
non-practicing entities cannot suffer irreparable harm. Likewise; as non-practicing entities by 
definition do not have market share to protect, invoking such a justification is also the same as 
saying that because they are non-practicing entities they cannot suffer irreparable harm. This of 
course is inconsistent with the Supreme Court opinion which admonished the Court for its earlier 
decision which they interpreted as involving a categorically denial of injunctive relief to non-
practicing entities. While it is true that this rational no longer articulates a direct categorical 
denial of injunction relief because MercExchange is non-practicing entity, its effect is precisely 
the same as if such an articulation had actually occurred. Ironically it is clear the court recognised 
this contradiction by paying lip service to the Supreme Court opinion by stating that; 
'The court's determination that MercExchange fails to establish irreparable harm is 
based upon the facts specific to this case and not broad classifications or categorical 
exclusions of certain types of patent holders'602 
and in the same paragraph stating that;  
'although the Supreme Court rejected analysis implying that a categorical exclusion 
prevented injunctions from issuing if a patent holder did not practice its patents and 
existed only to license them, the Court in no way suggested that such facts could not 
be considered as part of the calculus in weighing the traditional equitable factors.'603 
While the later statement is true, (in that the Supreme Court did not specifically instruct them 
to ignore the nature of the patent owner), that they felt justified in using that nature as the 
primary reason for not finding irreparable harm, obviously creates an implied contradiction with 
the Supreme Court and their first statement. However, it is not the implied contradiction with 
the Supreme Court's opinion which is the worst thing about this rationalization. What is far 
worse is the entrenched discrimination that this rationalization represents. For if this rational is 
to be accepted, it would mean that intellectual property rights are not determined by the nature 
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of the property, but by who owns the property. This of course is directly contradictory to an 
equitable principle that everyone should be treated equally under the law.  
Presuming that the court did not intend to contradict the Supreme Court and advocate for 
discriminatory treatment of intellectual property owners; it must be assumed that the 
"traditional equitable principles" mentioned by the court must have been the reason for their 
decision. Given the there is no clear indication of what those principles involve; it must be 
further assumed that they must have something to do with the other factors mentioned by the 
court, namely; '(brand name), market share, reputation, goodwill, or future research and 
development (or the ability to bring a unique product to the market)'604. While none of these 
factors appear to be directly related to equitable principles, given this was the court's 
justification for not granting injunctive relief, it would appear reasonable to presume that some 
form of equitable principles must be incorporated within them. To determine if this presumption 
is correct each will be analysed individually using the previously mentioned hypothetical 
student, to determine if a university student, who represents another form of non-practicing 
owner would also be discriminated against. 
With respect to brand name, Black's Law Dictionary defines this as " A name given by the 
maker to a product or range of products, esp. a trademark"605. Given this definition, it is clear 
that a university student would not have a brand name which would be recognised in any 
industry or consumer market and as such has nothing which could be harmed. Which is not to 
say that a student would not feel a personal harm from an infringement of the property which 
they invented through their creative efforts, just that that harm cannot be defined as harm to a 
"brand name". 
Given "market share" is defined as "total sales volume as a percentage of overall sales,"606 
this would appear to be a rather inappropriate criterion as every patent which is granted is 
supposed to represent a new creation, which pre-supposes a zero-market share. The only way 
in which this can be utilised as a factor is if the owner is already involved in the industry which 
by implication means that they are a practicing entity. Obviously, when a university student 
creates an innovation that innovation has zero market share, and as such using this a factor 
would automatically discriminate against them, just as it would against every other first-time 
inventor. 
Unlike with "brand name" and "market share" there is an equitable principle which could be 
considered relevant to "reputation". That principle being the "rule of clean hands" which 
suggests that the plaintiff 'must be free from reproach in his conduct. But there is this limitation 
to the rule: that his conduct can only be excepted to in respect to the subject-matter of his 
claim.'607 Although this rule is different from the definition of reputation which can be defined 
as 'Reputation of a person is the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he 
is known,'608 it would appear to be reasonable to assume that a plaintiff with "clean hands" 
would have a better reputation than one with "dirty hands". 
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An interesting aspect of this rule is that it could be easily adapted to a correlated rights 
situation. All it would require is that it be modified to hold that when an intellectual property 
owner has done unlicensed research on integrated technological properties owned by others 
for the purpose of contributing to the same integrated technological product, this should 
prevent them from obtaining injunctive action against that other owners if those owners 
chooses to use new property to improve that integrated technological product.  
An obvious obstacle with this interpretation is that doing research on existing intellectual 
property is generally not considered an infringement, even though in some cases merely doing 
research for the purposes of producing generic drugs has been considered an infringement.609 
So if such generalities were to be sustained, it would be difficult to argue that doing that 
unlicensed research would be equivalent to having "dirty hands", even if they have "correlated 
hands". 
That said; if reputation merely refers to the licensing practices of the owner and the desire 
to maximise their licensing revenues is considered as a negative reflection on reputation, this 
could contradict the founding premise on capitalism. Most notably it would institutionalize 
discrimination against non-practicing property owners, who cannot rely on profits from product 
sales to earn the value which is inherent in their properties. For the court to suggest that because 
a plaintiff's, 'has utilized its patents as a sword to extract money rather than as a shield to protect 
its right to exclude'610 would not be sufficient, because every non-practicing entity, including the 
theoretical college student would do preciously the same thing. 
Rather than seeking a royalty equal to the value of the innovative contribution, it must be 
the act of demanding excessive royalties which should establish a negative reputation. 
Conversely when users offer to pay substantially less than what an intellectual property is worth, 
this would also need to be considered to establish a negative reputation.  
With respect to "research and development opportunities" this too clearly creates a bias 
against non-practicing entities, as it could well be the case that they have no desire to do further 
research. Indeed, as nowhere in any patent law does it state that a patent will only be granted 
if the patentee is willing to continue research in the field, it would appear entirely inappropriate 
to make that a requirement for exercising the rights granted to a patent owner.  
Finally, when it comes to the question of harming the ability of a property owner to bring 
unique product to the market. This could be considered closely related to equitable principles 
which provide private property owners with private property rights, including the right to choose 
how they bring their property to the market through sale or lease agreements. Clearly this 
phrase is already applicable to patented invention, given the novel requirements required for 
patenting an invention mean that it must be unique, regardless of whether it is a college student 
or some other non-practicing entity that is the owner. Unfortunately, while this would be a good 
basis for establishing irreparable harm, it is never mentioned outside the summary, so there is 
no way of knowing how the court viewed this issue.  
Indeed, instead of addressing these six factors mentioned in its summary, the body of the 
opinion provides four reasons why there is no irreparable harm. The first of these is was that; 
'MercExchange exhibited a "lack of commercial activity in practicing the [relevant] patents" and 
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instead exhibited a "willingness to license its patents."'611 Second; 'MercExchange's public and 
private actions indicate its desire to obtain royalties from eBay.'612 Third; 'MercExchange never 
sought a preliminary injunction against eBay.'613 And the fourth, 'the '265 patent is both a 
business method patent and a patent which appears to rely upon a unique combination of non-
unique elements present in prior art, and although such patent is presently valid and 
enforceable, the nature of the patent causes the court pause because, as previously recognized 
by this court," there is a growing concern over the issuance of business-method patents which 
forced the PTO to implement a second level review policy."' 614 All of which allowed the court to 
conclude that ;  
'Such factor, similar to those discussed above and below, is plainly not dispositive; 
however, on these fact: it is yet another factor in the calculus indicating both that 
Mere-Exchange is not being irreparably harmed by eBay's infringement and that 
money damages are adequate.'615 
None of these reasons are equitable principles, the first three merely providing the definition 
of a non-practicing entity which desires to maximise the royalties from their property by 
allowing as much use as is possible, and the fourth representing concerns about the validity of 
the patent. As such it must be concluded that their analysis of irreparable harm was more of an 
indictment of non-practicing entities, than an assessment of equitable principles. This 
indictment of non-practicing entities however did not finish with the first factor, it continued in 
the remaining three factors. 
With respect to an "adequate remedy at law" the court basically argued that because 
MercExchange was seeking royalties from eBay, that monetary damages must represent an 
adequate remedy. More specifically they stated that; 
'Utilization of a ruling in equity as a bargaining chip suggests both that such party 
never deserved a ruling in equity and that money is all that such party truly seeks, 
rendering monetary damages an adequate remedy in the first instance.'616  
From a non-practicing entities' prospective this statement is naturally quite concerning, as it 
suggests that because injunctive relief will enhance their bargaining position, it should not be 
provided to them. Such a suggestion is quite extraordinary, for if it were real property it would 
be like saying; because restrictions on trespass enhance the bargaining position of land owners, 
trespass rulings should not be provided to any landowner who indicates a desire to either rent 
or sell their land.  
That said; as it is a truism that because non-practicing entities are primarily interested in 
monetary rewards for the use of their property, it must be true that monetary rewards will be 
sufficient to remedy any damages that they incur. This truism does not however divert attention 
away from the question whether it is the owner or the court which should determine the rate 
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that paid for the use of the property. If this statement creates a binding precedent, then any 
user can infringe upon a non-practicing entities property, secure in the knowledge that the worst 
thing that will happen to them is that at some distant date, they will have to pay court ordered 
damages. The amount paid, and date those damages must be paid, being 
influenced/determined, by the legal resources which they are able to dedicate to the case. 
Obviously for large users with practically limitless legal resources, such a precedent would 
almost entirely eliminate the need to engage in good faith negotiations with small intellectual 
property owners with little legal resources. 
Which is not to say that the owners will not eventually receive damages, or even enhanced 
damages, just that it would provide a significant negotiating advantage to infringers, and 
corresponding disadvantage to owners. While it may be the case that the court accepted eBay's 
contention that MercExchange was a patent troll intent on using injunctive relief as a tool to 
extort excessive royalty payments from eBay, this statement is of such a general nature that 
discriminates against all non-practicing entities regardless of the reasonableness of their 
licensing demands. 
On the third factor relating to "balance of harm" the court reached a conclusion which was 
also based on a discriminatory attitude towards non-practicing entities. This discrimination 
being readily apparent in the following statement;  
'MercExchange appears to exist solely to license its patents to established internet 
companies that either infringe or are fearful of litigation if they potentially infringe; 
MercExchange's specialization in obtaining fees through threatened litigation suggests 
that it will not suffer a hardship from a similar resolution of the instant matter.'617  
The fact that the court states that MercExchange "will not suffer a hardship" even though a 
central pillar of their negotiating power, "the right to exclude" is withheld from them is quite 
reviling. If there were no bias the statement could have been written as follows;  
MercExchange appears to exist solely to license its patents to established internet 
companies that either infringe or are fearful of litigation if they potentially infringe. As 
patent protection generally include the right to exclude and that right is an essential 
part any licensing negotiations, depriving MercExchange of that right; represent a 
hardship in terms of both their patent rights and their ability to negotiate the licensing 
agreements they desire. The question is; whether this hardship is greater than the 
hardship which would be experienced by the infringer if injunctive relief is granted.  
Such a statement in no way eliminates the possibility that the harm to eBay would be greater 
than the harm to MercExchange, indeed it would appear to add more credibility to such an 
assessment as it does not deny the undeniable harm done to MercExchange.  
Finally in terms of "public interest" while the court recognised there was a public interest to 
ensure that the integrity of the patent system was preserved, it stated that public interest 
'cannot be allowed to dominate such analysis lest a presumption results.'618 They then go on to 
state that 'that MercExchange has never sought to defend its right to exclude; to put credence 
in such claim at this late stage would not serve equity nor the public interest' which can be 
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interpreted as suggesting that because MercExchange choose not to invoke their right to 
exclude while either negotiations or the trial were ongoing, there is no public interest in 
defending their right to exclude. In addition to being discriminatory toward non-practicing 
entities, what this analysis fails to recognise is that there exists a public interest in ensuring that 
judicial system does not replace negotiations between owners and users with respect to 
determining what are the appropriate licensing terms. 619 
While it is clear that the District Courts interpretation of the Superior Court ruling was a step 
backwards on the path to correlated intellectual property rights, this does not mean that the 
four-factor test is incompatible with an application of the correlated rights doctrine. This 
compatibility can be demonstrated by using an alternative interpretation of the test. For the 
purposes of illustrate how applying the correlated rights doctrine could conform to the four-
factor test two assumptions will be made. First that the patent owner is a non-practicing entity. 
Second that discretion provided to the courts is not limited to merely ascertaining a cumulative 
series of four binary tests, all of which must favour the defendant in order for an injunction to 
be granted, but rather requires an assessment four subjective tests to determine on balance 
who the sum of those factors most favours.620 This rejection of the notion of some form 
absolutist binary test is assumed because it would be virtually impossible for the vast majority 
of patents owners to meet that cumulative test, and which would represent such a profound 
change with respect to availability injunctive that it would be the equivalent "writing on an 
entirely clean slate".621  
Taking each of four types of intellectual property categorised in Chapter eight in turn, the 
first type to considered under the four-factors is standalone discretionary intellectual properties.  
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With respect to proving that the standalone discretionary owner has suffered and will suffer 
irreparable injury the owner's argument in favour of this factor could revolve around loss of 
control of an independent creation which forms an integral part of the owner's persona.622 The 
very notion that the right to use an innovation which is created solely from the creative efforts 
of an inventor is not under the control of that inventor, would be tantamount to suggesting that 
inventor is somehow deficient and not qualified to make decision as to use of their sole creation. 
Such an implication quite obviously would create irreparable injury and as such would place this 
factor strongly in favour of granting injunctive relief.  
With respect to the inadequacy of remedies at law to compensate for the injury, the primary 
consideration should likely be the inability to quantify the value of a unique standalone property. 
In the case of a non-practicing entity quantifying damages would require the court to make an 
estimate of the life time value any licences that the owner could negotiate on an innovation 
when there is no comparable product in the marketplace, and then divide that value by the 
percentage share of the market place that the infringer is expected to sustain. Given the near 
impossibility of this task this factor must also strongly favour the granting of injunctive relief.  
As to the balance of harm factor since the first factor deals with the harm to the owner, this 
factor must primarily be about the harm to the infringer. It could be argued that without the 
unique creative efforts of the inventor the unique standalone innovation would not exist, and 
as such theoretically being unable to use what would otherwise be a non-existent innovation 
provides no harm. However even assuming that the invention could have been created by 
another inventor, the mere fact that the innovations use is of a discretionary nature suggest 
there can be little harm from providing injunctive relief, as the use is entirely discretionary. This 
negligible harm would mean that this factor also strongly supports granting injunctive relief.  
Finally, there is the factor related to whether public interest would be served by an 
injunction. With respect to this factor the issue should be about the benefits derived by society 
from innovation and competitiveness in the marketplace that results from standalone 
discretionary inventors having access to injunctive relief. If either granting or withhold injunctive 
relief would improve these characteristics obviously society would be better off. However, the 
fact that no western society prohibits injunctive relief for standalone discretionary innovations, 
would tend to support the notion that having access to it is considered to be beneficial to both 
these characteristics. Further the possibility of a major company in one industry being able to 
infringe on the innovation and use their financial and marketing power to become dominate in 
another, would be anathema to the any pretences of enhancing free market competition. As 
such at the very least this factor also at least supports if not strongly support the granting of 
injunctive relief.  
Taken together and given that all four of these factors either support or strongly support the 
granting of injunctive relief it would appear rather obvious that on balance: the four-factor test 
indicates that in most cases injunctive relief should be granted when it is a when it is a 
standalone discretionary property.  
With respect to standalone essential intellectual properties, it is clear that the first factor 
could use the same argument which was used for standalone discretionary properties and would 
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strongly support the grant of injunctive relief, as the owner would suffer the virtually the same 
irreparable injury.   
However, the inadequacy of remedies would be even greater for an essential property. This 
because as any economist will testify, when an innovation is essential for the well-being of an 
individual, the only limit to the amount that they are willing to pay is the amounts that they have 
available to pay. This unlimited potential for draining the wealth of those that need the essential 
property is quite unquantifiable, and as such proves the inadequacy of alternative legal remedies 
to compensate for injuries, making the second factor strongly supportive of the grant of 
injunctive relief. This however is not the case with the next factor.  
Unlike with standalone discretionary properties, because standalone essential properties are 
by their nature essential to the well-being of users, being denied that use would obviously be 
very detrimental to users. Depending on the degree of harm that non-access would represent 
this would make this factor either opposed to or strongly opposed to grant of injunctive relief.  
Assuming that the final factor of public good is focused solely on innovation and competition 
in the market it would naturally provide a similar level of support for injunctive relief. However, 
because most societies maintain a moral conscience which places the well-being of their 
members ahead of corporate profits, it is likely that public interest at best would be neutral and 
may even be opposed to injunctive relief.  
This then provides a situation where two of the factors likely strongly support injunctive relief 
and two do not. Deciding which factors should have the most weight should therefore fall the 
discretion of the court, which should need to balance the harm to potential users against the 
harm to owners.  
When considering the four-factors as they relate to correlated discretionary intellectual 
properties all the arguments change, at least to some extent. The first factor changes because 
unlike with standalone properties the creation of correlated properties does not involve as 
unique a creative effort as there is with standalone properties. Which is to suggest that because 
integrated technological properties are being simultaneously developed by a number of 
inventors, it is almost certain that the invention would have been produced by another party, if 
it had not been done so by the patent owner. Although this should not eliminate the argument 
about being harmed by loss of control the use of their creation, it does perhaps diminish it. This 
diminishment of an integral part of the owner's persona is further diminished by the fact that 
the inventor must have used the innovations from others who had contributed to integrated 
technology to create their invention. To the extent that they did so, it would be hypocritical to 
suggest their loss of control, is more significant than the loss of control which they perpetrated 
on others. Taken together these considerations likely change the analysis from strongly 
supportive of injunctive relief to merely supportive of injunctive relief.  
A similar shift can be seen in the second factor. This because unlike with standalone 
properties, there may exist markets for comparable products which could allow the courts to 
make a reasonably accurate estimate of the value of the innovation. Depending on how accurate 
the estimate is it may even move this factor to a neutral position relative to whether to grant 
injunctive relief.  
With respect to the third factor. Although there is little harm which result from an injunction 
against the use of a discretionary invention, it may harm other contributes to the integrated 






Given this nuance this factor likely moves from being in strong support of injunctive relief to 
merely being support of injunctive relief.  
Finally, the questions about if injunctive relief is in the public interest. This factor is the only 
one which remains in strong support of granting injunctive relief, not because of innovation 
issues but because of competition issues. The argument for this is as follows; if non-practicing 
entities cannot seek injunctive relief against the technology manufacturers who dominate their 
particular technological market, this will mean that those technology manufacturers can 
unilaterally decide whether they want to use any correlated innovation, which means that there 
would be no chance of another competitor developing a competitive advantage which could 
challenge them.  
Balancing all these factors out it would appear a judgement in favour of granting injunctive 
relief for correlated discretionary intellectual properties would be the most likely outcome. 
Finally addressing the analysis of correlated essential intellectual properties according the 
four-factor test. The first two factors remain supportive of injunctive relief as there is not much 
in these factors which differentiate correlated essential properties from correlated discretionary 
properties. There are however big changes with the last two factors.  
In terms of the balance of harm, obviously when correlated properties are essential to an 
integrated technological product; the lack of access to those properties harms not only the 
viability of the infringer, but also the viability of the other owners who have contributed their 
own intellectual properties to the technology. This potential for harm is preciously what so 
called patent trolls use to coerce excessive licensing demands out of users. Obviously if the 
choice is between going out of business and paying an excessive licensing fee there are no good 
options. All of which places this factor firmly in strong opposition to the grant of injunctive relief 
as far as correlated essential intellectual properties.  
Also in opposition, would be the interests of the public. This because unlike with correlated 
discretionary properties non-access to essential properties can eliminate both innovation and 
competition. It eliminates innovation because if the reward of other patent owners are 
appropriated by a patent troll, they will have no incentive to innovate. It eliminates competition 
because if a single owner gets to decide who has the right to produce an inherently integrated 
technological product it is not competition but rather a monopoly.  
Combining the first two supportive with the last two strongly opposing factor it is easy to see 
why this method would generally result in decision that withheld injunctive relief.  
While this example illustrates that the four-factor test could have the same results of 
applying the correlated rights doctrine, it is not as efficient as applying the doctrine. An 
application of the doctrine representing a rather straightforward expansion of the historical 
equitable safety valves which were used to rebut the presumptive rights to injunctive relief 
when repeated and ongoing instances of trespass or infringement were found.623 This expansion 
would involve a determination of the standalone/correlated nature of the disputed IP. If it was 
determined that it involved a standalone IP, which was developed by a single entity and it did 
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not rely on the IP of others to fulfil it claims, the presumptive right to injunctive relief would be 
maintained. If it was determined that it involved a correlated IP which was built upon and relied 
upon other IP to fulfil its claims, the presumptive right to injunctive relief would be nullified.  
It should be noted that just because the presumptive right to injunctive relief would be 
nullified by a determination that the disputed IP was correlated, does not mean the injunctive 
relief would not be available. For example; it would still be available if the owner could prove 
that the infringer was an unwilling licensee or that the ongoing infringement was causing 
disproportional harm to the owner.  
Finally, it will be noted that this analysis was focused on the eBay decisions and did not 
mention the Orange book decision. This is because the German Federal Courts decision with 
respect to providing injunctive relief for the most part can be seen as a step forward on the path 
to applying correlated intellectual rights.624  
9.2.2 Calculating Reasonable Royalties 
Although the Orange Book decision may not have contained a step backwards when it comes 
to injunctive relief issues, both it and the eBay decision do contain an implied step backwards in 
terms of how reasonable royalties would be calculated under an application of the correlated 
rights doctrine. This because inherent in both decisions; is an implied and almost exclusive 
reliance on existing licensing agreements to calculate reasonable royalties using the 
"hypothetical negotiation" methodology. The implied reliance in eBay, is a direct result of Chief 
Justices Robert's concurring opinion, in which he cited quotes suggesting that judicial discretion 
was not a whim, and historical precedents were more valuable than logic.625 As mentioned 
earlier, this quite naturally has increased the focus on the fifteen factors included in the 1970 
Georgia Pacific case, which 'attempts to create a "hypothetical negotiation" between the parties 
for a license that would have occurred prior to the infringement.'626 The reliance in the Orange 
Book case being implied by the references to the 3% royalty rate incorporated in other licensing 
agreements which were concluded for the patent pool in dispute.627  
The problem with using existing licensing agreements to determine a hypothetical 
negotiation is that those agreements tend to undervalue the true value of almost all correlated 
intellectual properties.628 This obviously would be a step backwards in terms of applying the 
correlated rights doctrine, given its intent is to ensure that all intellectual property owners 
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receive their fair share of the total value which the inherently aggregate properties provide to 
the technological product. This tendency of existing licenses to undervalue the value which is 
provided, can be attributed to five issues which are; 1) the use of legal attrition to force 
intellectual property owners to accept lower royalty rates, 2) the downward pressure that 
competition authorities place on property owners to lower their royalty rates, 3) the downward 
spiral which results from non-discriminatory licensing requirements which force property 
owners to lower their royalty rates to the lowest rates previously licensed, and 4) comparisons 
with licenses of other property owners which reflect rates which are lower than the owner's 
licensing rates. To illustrate how these issues can lead to an undervaluation of the disputed 
intellectual property, actual examples of each will be provided. 
Lower Royalty Rates through Legal Attrition and the Threat of Legal Attrition 
A good example of how legal attrition can be used to lower royalty rates charged by 
intellectual property owners, are the litigation delays faced by Telefonaktiebolager LM Ericsson 
(Ericsson) in India.629 Ericsson is one of the three largest contributors of intellectual property to 
the mobile telecommunication industry. In November of 2009 it contacted two companies in 
India, (MircoMax and Intex), alleging that they were selling products which infringed on 
Ericsson's patents and offering to enter into licensing negotiations. Mircomax is an Indian 
company which claims to be the 12th largest mobile phone handset manufacturers in the world. 
Intex is also an Indian company which unlike Micromax sources the mobile phones it sells from 
third party manufactures in China. For the purposes of this example only the Micromax history 
will be discussed but a similar history arose with respect to their interaction with Intex.  
Micromax replied to Ericsson's communication by indicating that they could not respond to 
Ericsson's letter without details of the patents Ericsson alleged they were infringing. In February 
of 2010 Ericsson provided Micromax with details of some of the standard essential patents they 
owned, and which had to be practiced to manufacture mobile phones, once again requesting a 
meeting, as well as asking Micromax to sign an NDA for those meetings.  
One and a half years later, on 28th of April 2011 the first meeting was held during which 
Micromax demanded more information on Ericsson's patents. Almost a year later and after 
further meeting and much correspondence Ericsson and Micromax executed an NDA on January 
12, 2012. Over a year later after seeing no progress in the negotiation Ericsson filed a patent 
infringement claim against Micromax on March 4th, 2013.630 On the 6th of March the High Court 
of Delhi passed an ad-interim order directive the Customs to notify Ericsson when consignments 
of mobile phones were being imported to India by Micromax. Micromax appealed the order 
within days.  
On March 19th the High court in Delhi issued a notice on the appeal and passed an order 
with the consent of the parties which said; 
'1. Ericsson and Micromax agree to negotiate a FRAND License Agreement for the 
next one month, based on FRAND terms. 
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2. Micromax/Customs shall intimate Ericsson's notified person or counsel for 
Ericsson whenever a consignment arrives at the Customs. Ericsson's representative or 
its counsel will, without any delay and within twenty-four hours, take inspection of the 
consignment. 
3. Micromax shall then, pending final determination of royalties payable by the 
parties, agree to abide by the following interim payments as per term sheet enclosed 
with letter dated 05th November, 2012, purely as an ad-interim arrangement and 
subject to the final outcome of its negotiations with Ericsson. 
A. For phones/devices capable of GSM - 1.25% of sale price. 
B. For phones/devices capable of GPRS + GSM - 1.75% of sale price. 
C. For phones/devices capable of EDGE + GPRS + GSM - 2% of sale price. 
D. WCDMA/HSPA phones/devices, calling tablets - 2% of the sale price. 
E. Dongles, data cards - USD 2.50. 
Micromax undertakes to make a deposit of interim payments in Court, as set out 
above, within five working days of the intimation by Customs of the arrival of the 
consignment. Post inspection, Ericsson will forthwith inform the Customs that it has 
no objection to the release of the consignment so that the consignment could 
immediately be handed over to Micromax. 
Both the parties agree that the royalties, if any, for the past period will be 
negotiated as part of the final FRAND agreement that may be arrived at between the 
parties.'631 
This order was extended on the 10th of April 2013 and a mediator was appointed. The 
mediator filed a report that voluntary mediation efforts were unsuccessful and on the 10th of 
May 2013. On the 24th of June 2013 Micromax filed a competition complaint with the Indian 
Competition Authorities.632 On the 12th of November 2014, (five years after Ericsson had first 
contacted Micromax) the interim application was modified by an order of the High Court of 
Delhi. That order directed Micromax to pay royalties as follows:  
'From the date of filing of the suit till 12th November, 2015:- 
i. For phones/ devices capable of GSM - 0.8% of net selling price; 
ii. For phones/ devices capable of GPRS + GSM - 0.8% of net selling price; 
iii. For phones/devices capable of EDGE + GPRS + GSM - 1% of net selling price; 
iv. WCDMA/HSPA phones/devices, calling tablets - 1% of the net selling price. 
From 13th November, 2015 to 12th November, 2016: 
i. For phones/ devices capable of GSM - 0.8% of net selling price; 
ii. For phones/ devices capable of GPRS + GSM - 0.8% of net selling price; 
iii. For phones/devices capable of EDGE + GPRS + GSM - 1.1% of net selling price; 
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iv. WCDMA/ HSPA phones/devices, calling tablets - 1.1% of the net selling price. 
From 13th November, 2016 to 12th November, 2020: 
i. For phones/ devices capable of GSM - 0.8%) of net selling price; 
ii. For phones/ devices capable of GPRS + GSM - 1% of net selling price; 
iii. For phones/devices capable of EDGE + GPRS + GSM 1.3% of net selling price; 
iv. WCDMA/ HSPA phones/devices, calling tablets - 1.3% of the net selling price.'633 
It should be observed that this second order reduced that rates of the first order by nearly 
50%. (GPRS + GSN from 1.75% to o.8%, WCDMA/HSPA from 2% to 1.1%), which clearly indicates 
that legal attrition can help to reduce rates. It should be further mentioned that as of March 
2017 the infringement case has still not been decided by the Court, which means that it has been 
nearly eight years that Micromax has been allowed to use Ericsson's patents without a license. 
Fortunately for Ericsson they have the legal resources to sustain this level of legal attrition, but 
other do not.  
One of the best examples of a situation where a company did not have the resources to 
withstand the effects of legal attrition, is the prolonged litigation encountered by another 
intellectual property owner in the mobile telecommunications industry, Unwired Planet.634 
Unwired Planet were owners of a patent portfolio which included several patents which were 
declared essential for various telecommunications standards.  
Unwired Planet contacted Samsung about licensing its patents in October of 2012 which can 
be considered the commencement of their licensing negotiations with Samsung. In January of 
2013, they dramatically increased the size of their patent portfolio by purchasing a significant 
number of patents from Ericsson, under a Master Sales Agreement, (MSA). 'Unwired Planet's 
initial aim was to contact and commence negotiations with various manufacturers they had 
identified with a view of closing three deals by the end of the year.'635 'By August 2013, according 
to Mr. Robbins, Unwired Plant had contacted 27 manufacturers and was in "active 
conversations" with 14, whilst the remaining 13 had "refused to engage with us at all". In oral 
evidence, Mr Robbins stated that there was not "much market interest in even discussing rates" 
and that he had hardly managed to "speak about economics with anybody", it being "largely 
technology discussions". Before me Unwired Planet contended that this shows that the licensees 
in general were holding out.'636 [italics added] In March of 2014 Unwired Planet sued Huawei, 
Samsung and Google for infringement of six UK patents in the UK. 'After the proceedings began, 
in April 2014, Unwired Planet made an offer to the defendants to license its entire global 
portfolio (SEPs and non-SEP's)'.637 'The defendants denied infringement/essentiality and 
contented that the patents were invalid, counter claiming for revocation. So, they said, no 
license was needed. They also contended that Unwired Planet's offer was not FRAND. In 
addition, Huawei and Samsung raised defences and counter claims based on breaches of 
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competition law.'638 'After the April 2014 offer Unwired Planet made a further offer in July 2014. 
The terms of these and other licensing offers are difficult to summarize but at this stage it can 
be said that the SEP royalty rates in the July 2014 proposals were global rates of 0.2% for 4G/LTE 
and 0.1% for other standards (i.e. GSM/UMTS).  
'The dispute was to consist of a series of trials, ... First would be five "technical" trials relating 
to the validity and infringement/essentiality of the six patents.'639 'After the technical trials 
would be the non-technical trial in autumn 2016.'640 'By about April 2016 three technical trials 
had been completed and the parties agreed to postpone any further technical trials indefinitely. 
By that stage Unwired Planet had won two and lost one of the technical trials. Two of Unwired 
Planet's patents had been found to contain claims which were held valid and were essential to 
the relevant standards while the other two patents were held invalid.'641 
'Also in about April 2016, the claimant company and the tenth party (Unwired Planet LLC) 
were acquired by PanOptis, a group ultimately held by PanOptis Holding LLC.'642 'In the summer 
of 2016 Samsung settled with Unwired Planet and Ericsson. As a result of that settlement, 
proceedings against Samsung ended and, with the court's leave, Samsung's competition law 
counterclaim was discontinued.'643 'the Unwired Planet-Samsung license was entered into on 
the 28th July, 2016.'644  
'Under the license Samsung paid Unwired Planet US [...] and assigned a portfolio of 20 patent 
families in return for a worldwide license under Unwired Planet's SEPs and non-SEPs portfolio 
until [...] together with a release of any past damages. Before one decides how much weight to 
place on any royalty rate information derived from the license, Unwired Planet contends that 
this license cannot be seen in isolation and needs to be considered in the context of a wider 
arrangement between PanOptis and Samsung and the distressed financial position Unwired 
Planet was in when acquired by PanOptis.'645 'Unwired Planet's version of the context relevant 
to understanding this license is the following. PanOptis is a licensing company. It has an existing 
relationship with Ericsson. It had considered buying the Unwired Planet portfolio in 2014 but did 
not. In March of 2015 PanOptis offered $75 million for the portfolio but Unwired Planet wanted 
$100 million and no deal was done. From about July of 2014 PanOptis began having commercial 
discussions with Samsung. They included the possibility of Samsung taking a license under other 
PanOptis telecoms patent portfolio and by the summer of 2015 they included the possibility of 
a wider strategic partnership. In July 2015 Unwired Planet approached PanOptis again, this time 
about purchasing the licensing companies themselves.'646 'There were various negotiations and 
by March of 2016 PanOptis dropped its offer price from $50 million to $40 million due to 
Unwired Planet's worsening financial position.'647 'Mr Ware said that PanOptis was able to 
purchase Unwired Planet for a price which did not represent the value of Unwired Planet's 
patents. In his view that was because Unwired Planet was on the verge of insolvency'648 'Once 
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PanOptis had purchased Unwired Planet it approached Samsung and the license was concluded 
in a very short order.'649  
'My finding on the context in which the 2016 Unwired Planet -Samsung license arose is as 
follows. By the time it was purchased Unwired Planet was in serious financial trouble. The only 
license Unwired Planet had been able to agree was with Lenovo and Unwired Planet was 
engaging in very expensive multinational patent litigation in an effort to establish its rights. By 
late 2015-early 2016 Unwired Planet was close to insolvency. ... As regards his discussion with 
Samsung, the picture Mr. Ware painted of the reality of the high level negotiations with that 
major multinational organization was convincing and credible. PanOptis had the ability and 
means to buy Unwired Planet in any event but I find the key reason why PanOptis did buy 
Unwired Planet when they did and for the price they paid was in order to build trust with 
Samsung and because Samsung were prepared to take a license under the portfolio in a deal 
with a cash component [...]. The purchase was being "de-risked", as Mr Ware put it.'650  
'These findings about the context of the license together with the findings about low rates in 
the licence itself support one another. I conclude that the license does not represent useful 
evidence of the market value of the Unwired Planet patent portfolio.'651 
What this description of events, (all drawn from the Unwired Planet v Huawei case) and the 
Judge's finding prove, is that a well-resourced technology manufacturer like Samsung can 
significantly reduce the royalty rates that pay for intellectual property when they engage in legal 
attrition against a less well-resourced intellectual property owner like Unwired Planet. This is a 
fact which all small intellectual property owners must contend with and why many will except 
lower rates (than what their property is worth) simply to avoid the existential threat of legal 
attrition. 
Downward Pressure by Competition Authorities.  
With respect to competition authorities pressuring intellectual property owners to reduce 
their royalty licensing rates, the best example is likely the pressure which the Chinese 
competition authorities (NDRC) put on Qualcomm Inc.(Qualcomm), one of the leading suppliers 
of intellectual property to the mobile phone industry.652 To put this pressure into to a historical 
context, it should be mentioned that Qualcomm became a major supplier of intellectual 
property when their proprietary Code Division Multiple Access technology was integrated into 
the 3rd generation mobile networks. Before the integration they were producing their own 
proprietary mobile phones and base stations, in competition with the dominate GSM standard. 
Once their CDMA technology was integrated, they sold off both their mobile phone and base 
station operations and focused on production of chipsets and licensing their technology. The 
first major litigation which they faced when licensing their technology was an infringement suit 
against Nokia Corp. (Nokia), who were the largest mobile phone manufacturer at that time.653 
Although this case was settled before the court ruling there were notable features of the 
litigation which are relevant to Qualcomm's ongoing licensing practices, and an application of 
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the correlated rights doctrine. These features were that the litigants disagreed on both the value 
of the aggregate technology and Qualcomm's share of that value. With respect to the value of 
the aggregate technology it appeared that Qualcomm was arguing for a value which was the 
20% of the price of a mobile phone, whereas Nokia argued that the aggregate value should be 
10%. In order to determine Qualcomm's contribution to that aggregate, Nokia sponsored a 
report which indicated that nearly 12% of the essential patents used for the 3rd generation 
standard were owned by Qualcomm.654 This is relevant to Qualcomm's ongoing licensing 
practices, because it can be assumed that Qualcomm has used the same calculation method for 
determining its offered royalty rate in subsequent licensing negotiations. It is relevant to an 
application of the correlated rights doctrine because this is preciously the methodology which 
would be used when determining reasonable royalties under an application of the doctrine.  
It should be further noted that in their general licensing negotiation, Qualcomm has always 
insisted that any technology manufacturer which wanted to purchase their chipsets must first 
agree a licensing agreement with Qualcomm. From Qualcomm's prospective this made 
commercial sense, as every technology manufacturer that wanted to use their chipsets would 
by definition be using their intellectual property and as such refusing to sell chipsets without a 
license ensured that their intellectual property was not used without authorization. Further 
because Qualcomm chipsets are considered to be the best available in the market, this policy 
has resulted in Qualcomm being able to conclude licensing agreements with a highest 
proportion of technology manufacturers in the industry, at royalty rates which are also the 
highest in the industry.  
Unsurprisingly, the fact that Qualcomm has been able to extract the highest level of royalties 
has resulted in some of those technology manufacturers complaining to their local competition 
authorities, in an effort to help them reduce the rates which they were paying. Which is 
presumable the reason why the NDRC investigated Qualcomm's licensing activities in 2014.  
In their decision the NDRC found that Qualcomm had abused their dominate position in both 
the market for its intellectual property and broadband chipsets, to extract "unfairly high-priced 
licensing fees" and fined the company an equivalent of USD 975 million.655 While the dominance 
of Qualcomm in the two markets is incontrovertible, the proposition that they were charging 
excessive licensing fees is less sustainable.656 This because all of the four activities which the 
NDRC described as abusive can and should be considered entirely in keeping with reasonable 
licensing behaviour and the NDRC provide no proof what so ever that the company was charging 
more than their fair share of the aggregate value that the combined intellectual properties 
provide to the current smartphone products. 
The first allegedly abusive behaviour was derived from the proposition that included in the 
portfolio of intellectual property which Qualcomm was licensing were patent which had 
expired.657 This of course is a natural consequences of granting patent protection for a limited 
time period and would have been a valid complaint if Qualcomm was not also continually adding 
new patents to its portfolio of licensed patents, to make up for the patents which were expiring. 
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Indeed, recent estimates suggest that since the Nokia litigation, Qualcomm's share of essential 
patents for later standards has risen from 12% to 13%.658 Given this increase in their percentage 
share of the aggregate value provided their rates would theoretically be too low rather than too 
high. 
The second alleged abuse was derived from the fact that Qualcomm's licensing agreements 
included clauses which required some licensee to license their intellectual properties back to 
Qualcomm for free.659 While it is possible that such a licensing term would be abusive, it is not 
abusive if the license agreement is viewed as a cross licensing arrangement. Under a cross 
licensing arrangement whichever party has the highest proportion of intellectual property 
receives a net royalty payment from the party with lower levels of property. To be abusive a 
cross licensing agreement would have to charge the same royalty rate to all licensees regardless 
of the properties owned by the licences, and there was no evidence provided that suggested the 
Qualcomm was doing so. In fact, given that the decision states that "some licensees and not all 
licensees" were forced to provide a free reverse license, it would appear that Qualcomm was 
willing to recognise and license existing patents from their licensees. As to requiring the licensee 
to provide free reverse licenses for their future intellectual property, it should be pointed out 
that under a portfolio licensing agreement Qualcomm would be expected to provide its future 
intellectual property to the licensee at no extra cost, i.e.: for free. If Qualcomm was expected to 
provide future intellectual property to the licensees for free, why should the licensees not 
provide Qualcomm with access to their future intellectual property for free? 
The third alleged abuse involved Qualcomm including its non-essential patents in the patent 
portfolio which it was licensing; rather than just licensing its essential properties.660 While it is 
true that they could unbundle these patents and licence them separately, because royalty rates 
in the mobile communications industry are based on the licensor's share of essential patents, 
the royalties for just the essential patents would be the same as for the entire portfolio. Forcing 
technology manufacturers to license the non-essential patents separately would only drive up 
their licensing costs. The only real anti-competitive aspect of this bundle was that it could harm 
alternative supplier of non-essential patents, this however was not addressed by the NDRC, 
although they did acknowledge that the licenses did not contain any obligation to use 
Qualcomm's non-essential patents.  
The fourth alleged abuse had to do with Qualcomm's unwillingness to sell chipsets to 
technology manufacturers  who did not have a technology licensing agreement with them.661 
According the NDRC this was an abuse because they were using their dominate position in the 
chipset market to force technology manufacturers  to pay higher licensing fees for the use of 
their technology.662 Clearly requiring Qualcomm to provide chipsets to technology 
manufacturers who do not have a license will encourage the unauthorised use of Qualcomm's 
intellectual property, just as giving keys potential car renters before they sign licensing 
agreements will encourage theft. In a best-case scenario, it will severely harm the negotiating 
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positions of Qualcomm, and provide technology manufacturers with greater possibility of 
engaging in legal attrition.  
Conspicuous by its absence in the NDRC decision is any mention of how a reasonable royalty 
should be calculated. Rather there is simply an assertion that Qualcomm royalty rates are too 
high, presumable because they charge more than other licensors. 
The decision concluded with a number of orders which require Qualcomm to:  
 Provide licensees with list of patents and not charge for expired patents 
 Stop including non-essential patents in their licensing portfolio 
 Stop using the whole machine price as a basis for calculating royalties 
 Stop requiring free reverse licenses 
 Stop including licensing terms which prevent licensees from challenging the validity 
of patents included in the portfolio. 
 To pay a USD 975 million fine for the alleged abuses. 
Given the questionable nature of the alleged abuses, it would appear rather obvious that 
prime rational for taking the action and the order which resulted from it; was merely an effort 
on the part of the NDRC to pressure Qualcomm to reduce its licensing rates. This should not be 
in any way surprising as the NDRC obviously would want to assist its local technology 
manufacturers in their licensing activities. 
Equally unsurprising is that the competition authorities in South Korea (KFTC) the USA (FTC) 
subsequently took a similar action to reduce royalty rates for their local technology 
manufacturers, (Samsung and Apple).663 Surprisingly neither of these authorities justified their 
actions by indicting that they were attempting to protect their technology manufacturers from 
low cost competition, rather they simply reiterated one of the Chinese authorities rather 
questionable alleged abuse claims. In both actions the principle alleged abuse was that: 
Qualcomm was using its dominate position in the baseband chipset market to force technology 
manufacturers to accept higher royalty rates.664 And again both actions merely supposed that 
the higher royalty rates were unjustified because licensees are able to obtain lower royalty rates 
from other licensors.665  
It is worth noting that the EU Competition authority has also filed two Statements of 
Objections on exclusive payments and predatory pricing to Qualcomm. Interestingly unlike the 
Chinese, South Korean and US actions, these are a much more straightforward complaint about 
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rebates and predatory pricing which harms other chipset vendors, rather than a complaint about 
unreasonable royalty rates charged to technology manufacturers. 666  
While it may be that such actions could be justified by a general desire of competition 
authorities to avoid patent holdup and reduce prices for consumers, this desire should not 
prevent them from considering the true value that intellectual properties provide to a 
technological product and should certainly not allow them to pressure intellectual property 
owners from charging royalties which reflect that value. To do otherwise would be the 
equivalent enforcing maximum wage restrictions on inventors, which force them to accept 
wages which are a fraction of the value that their work contributes to the economy. Something 
which would not be tolerated in relations to a competition authorities’ decision with respect to 
any other workers. Particularly if it was only one other group of workers, for example: marketing 
managers, which were singled out to be the targets of such restrictions. 
The fact the three of the four competition authorities have taken action and two have 
ordered substantial fines because local technology manufacturers desire lower royalty rates, not 
only demonstrates the downward pressure that competition authorities have on existing 
contract, but also confirms the proposition that lower royalty rates in other licenses put 
downward pressure on royalty rates derived from "hypothetical negotiations". What it does not 
demonstrate is an equitable analysis of how reasonable royalties should be calculated.  
Downward Spiral of Non-Discriminatory Licensing  
When intellectual property owners commit to licensing their properties on fair, reasonable 
and non-discriminatory terms (FRAND) terms, the initial focus is always on the fair and 
reasonable part of that commitment. However, as time progresses it is the second part of the 
commitment which can and does force owners to license their properties at rates which can be 
substantially below anything which can be considered reasonable. This because too often the 
non-discriminatory commitment is presumed to be violated whenever intellectual property 
owners make offers which are above the lowest rate they previously offered. This can lead to a 
circular reduction in both negotiated and ordered royalty rates.667  
A good example of how this downward spiral occurs is contained in the previously mentioned 
case of Ericsson v Micromax.668 In that case the Judge reduced the royalty rates to be paid under 
an intern order by approximate 50%, after reviewing Eriksson's other licensing agreements. 
While those agreements are confidential, given Ericsson's FRAND commitments, it is difficult to 
imagine that those other contracts did not include licenses which indicated royalty rates equal 
to Ericsson's offer rate. The fact that nowhere in the ruling does the judge state that Ericsson's 
offer rate was higher than those provided in other licenses, would appear to confirm this 
proposition. This means that in order for the judge to reduce the rate he must have been basing 
it on lower (if not the lowest) rates included in any of those other licenses.  
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An even better example of this phenomena can be found in the recent case of Core Wireless 
v. LG Electronics.669 Like Unwired Planet, Core Wireless holds a mobile telecommunications 
patent portfolio which were in this instance acquired from a major patent owner (Nokia) and 
were previously part of Nokia's patent portfolio. The portfolio was than assigned to Conversant 
Intellectual Property Management, a specialised patent licensing entity, for licensing purposes. 
As part of their licensing efforts Conversant approached LG Electronic seeking to conclude a 
license with them. When these negotiations were not successful the dispute when to court. In 
their ruling which ordered enhanced infringement damages against LG the district court noted 
that:  
' After a long series of meetings between the parties, including seven meetings in 
Seoul, Korea, LG invited Core Wireless representatives to Korea one last time and 
indicated that it would be making a monetary offer for a license. Rather than make an 
offer or engage in serious, good faith negotiations, LG delivered a terse one-page 
presentation stating that a lawsuit was “preferable” to a license, and that LG would prefer 
to wait until another major cell phone manufacturer licensed the portfolio, at which point 
LG intended to be “a follower” in the established royalty scheme.'670 
Given this observation, the one-page presentation is quite literally a declaration that LG 
would be relying on a downward spiral to reduce its licensing rates, as well providing further 
proof of the benefits of using legal attrition to reduce rates.671 
Low Cost External Licensing Comparisons 
While it can be presumed that a hypothetical licensing method would use information from 
all comparable external licenses to determine a reasonable royalty rate, there is evidence to 
show that this is often not the case. That rather than looking at all available license some courts 
simply focus on the lowest rates provide by competitors.  
An excellent example of this is contained in the previously mentioned case of Unwired Planet 
v Huawei.672 In that case, the judge first explained how he decided what benchmark rates should 
be set for a UK license from Unwired Planted to Huawei. As part of that explanation he referred 
to comparable licenses which could be considered as representative of rates the rates in the 
industry. For the most part this external comparable license analysis focused on the royalty rate 
charged by Ericsson, as much of Unwired Planet's patent portfolio had been purchased from 
Ericsson. What is not mentioned in this analysis; is that because of the downward spiral from 
non-discriminatory licensing Ericsson had one of the lowest rates in the industry. Further that 
the reason why Ericsson sold patents to Unwired Planet was because they were hoping the 
Unwired Planet would be able to realise their true value, which under the Master Sale 
Agreement would provide Ericsson with higher rewards than they could achieve themselves. 
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Of course, there is no reason why Ericsson's licenses should not have been part of the group 
of comparable licences, but equity dictates that should not have been the only ones. For a true 
representation of comparable licenses, licenses with higher royalty rates should have also been 
examined. What is particularly egregious about this analysis is that the judge did recognise that 
there were licenses with higher royalty rates but refused to consider them.  
'The only other licenses worth mentioning at all are by Qualcomm. The rates are 
much higher [...]. I will not place weight on the absolute levels of Qualcomm's rates in 
assessing the level of a benchmark rate.'673 
Even more remarkable than this unexplained unwillingness to consider licenses with higher 
royalties, was the judge's decision to arbitrarily lower the benchmark rate of a global license as 
it related to China.  
'The appropriate rate for China is not complicated to arrive at. The comparable 
licenses show that rates are often lower in China than for the rest of the world. The 
relative factors varies, I find that a FRAND license would use a factor of 50%.'674  
What such an arbitrary decision implies is that the actual value provided by the intellectual 
property owned by Unwired Planet is of no consequence, and the only thing which needs to be 
considered is the lowest rates included in external comparable licenses. For if the value provided 
was truly considered, there is no way that that value would be cut in half so arbitrarily. 
To further the point about how external comparable lower rates, it should be noted that 
the royalties set in this case will now become one of the external comparables which may be 
used to decide future cases, like the unresolved Unwired Planet v Micromax case in India.  
9.3 The Path Forward 
Just as with the path backwards, the path forwards will be split into two parts, with the first 
part examining legal trend which are consistent with an application of the correlated rights 
doctrine in terms granting of injunctive relief and the second part examining the trends with 
respect to calculating reasonable royalties.  
9.3.1 Injunctive relief  
As mentioned in the path backwards, the Orange Book case's determination of when 
injunctive relief can be considered on the path forward with respect to applying the correlated 
rights doctrine because; it focuses on the nature of their behaviour rather than the nature of 
the patent owner. As described above it effectively established what can best be described as a 
competition law based "implied license" whenever the patent dispute involves correlated 
essential intellectual properties. Which is not suggest that the Orange Book ruling prevents the 
provision of injunctive relief for correlated essential intellectual properties, but rather that 
injunctive relief properties can only be provided if it is clearly demonstrated that the infringer is 
an unwilling licensee. Given the rather unique nature of the "implied license" defence in the 
Orange Book Case, it was inevitable that its implication would eventually be referred to the CJEU 
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for validation,675 which is preciously what happened in the case of Huawei Technologies v. 
ZTE..676  
In that case the Dusseldorf District Court requested a preliminary ruling on five questions, 
concerning the remedies implied by the Orange Book case. The first question asked whether it 
was an abuse of a dominate position to seek injunctive relief or if an abuse only occurred if the 
patent owner rejected an "acceptable, unconditional offer" from the infringer. The second and 
third questions asked for qualitative guidance on how to define an unwilling licensee, more 
specifically when and what needed to be included in and excluded form an infringer's 
unconditional offer to be defined as a willing licensee. The fourth question asked what measures 
the infringer need to take to fulfil their unconditional offer. The final question asked if similar 
considerations ought to be used for remedies other than injunctive relief. In essence the District 
Court was asking whether the conditions for an implied license defence provide under the 
Orange Book case were compliant with European Law, and more specifically with European 
Competition Law as provide in Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of Europe.677 
Included in the CJEU ruling were number steps which must be considered when deciding 
whether injunctive relief should be granted. The first of these steps was that the intellectual 
property owner needed to provide notice to alleged infringer of the existence an alleged 
infringement. The second step requires that the alleged infringer notify the property owner of 
their willingness of conclude a license. The third step requires that the property owner to 
provide the alleged infringer with a specific, written offer which included the amount of royalties 
that are being requested and how those royalties are calculated. The fourth step requires the 
alleged infringer to reply to the offer in a timely manner. If the offer is considered by the alleged 
infringer to be unreasonable and therefore unacceptable, they must promptly provide a counter 
offer that they consider to be reasonable. According to step five, if the property owner rejects 
the counter offer, the alleged infringer must provide appropriate security to cover the eventual 
payment for its alleged past and ongoing infringement of the intellectual property in dispute. 
The final step outlined by the CJEU was a suggestion that the litigants by common agreement 
could request that the amount of royalties to be paid could be determined by an independent 
third party.  
To the extent that the CJEU had to detail these rather common-sense steps, indicates just 
how divorced from normal commercial practices licensing negotiations have become and why a 
move forward on the path to correlated intellectual property rights is needed. This issue of 
returning to "recognised commercial practices in the field and good faith" being acknowledged 
by the Opinion of the Advocated General.678 
In normal commercial practices an owner of a non-essential intellectual property would make 
an offer to license their property to a potential user. If the potential user wanted to use the 
property but thought that the offer rate was too high they would make a counter offer, and 
negotiations would commence towards a final negotiated price. If those negotiations resulted 
in an agreement a license would be concluded, and the potential user would commence the use 
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of the property under the terms of that license. If the negotiation failed the potential user would 
simple not use the property.  
While it must be accepted that the commercial practices for correlated essential intellectual 
properties are inherently different from those for correlated discretionary properties, the 
general parameters of this methodology should still be followed in order for markets to function 
efficiently. Obviously, the main difference between these two types of properties is the essential 
nature of the properties, with means that users may have to infringe the properties before a 
license is agreed. That said, once technology manufacturers recognise that they must use a 
correlated essential intellectual property to produce a technological product, they should 
immediately notify the owner of their use, and ask for license negotiations in order to legitimise 
that use. Failing this notification, when a patent owner identifies that a technology manufacturer 
is using their patents they should immediately notify the alleged infringer of their suspected use 
and request notification from the alleged user that they are willing to enter into license 
negotiations.  
Once the notification of use and a willingness to enter into negotiations has been received, 
the owner should then be obligated to make a binding offer to license the property on terms 
and condition, which they feel are reasonable. If the infringer considers that some terms are 
unacceptable or the royalties requested are too high, they should (in a timely manner) make a 
binding counteroffer which specifies acceptable terms and the royalty rate which they are 
prepared to pay. Only by the provision of a binding offer and counteroffer can there be any 
reasonable expectation that good faith negotiations to occur. If those negotiations are 
successful, a license will be agreed and there will be no need for judicial involvement. Only if 
those negotiations are unsuccessful would the parties need to utilise the judicial system to 
resolve their dispute. 
As far as infringement relief was concerned, this would only be available if the alleged 
infringer was unwilling to engage in good faith negotiations. This would be indicated by either; 
a failure to respond to an owner's notification of an alleged infringement with an offer to engage 
in negotiations, or a failure to make a binding counteroffer on a timely basis after a willingness 
to negotiate has been provided and the property owners makes an initial offer. This means the 
primary use of the judicial system would be to resolve the differences between two willing 
parties as to the level of royalties which are appropriate for the use to the disputed property. 
Some excellent examples of how this would work can be found in German case law that followed 
the Orange Book case. 
In St Lawrence Communications v. Deutche Telekom679 the Mannheim district court held that 
St Lawrence was entitled to injunctive relief against Deutsche Telekom based on the 
infringement of one of its patents citing a prerequisite for avoiding injunctive being that infringer 
is objectively ready, willing and able to conclude a license agreement. The appeals court in 
Karlsruhe disagreed with the court in Mannheim and suspended enforcement of injunctive relief 
pending appeal.680 On 27th of November when the case return to the District Court, it once again 
granted the injunction, finding that both Deutsche Telekom and HTC (the technology 
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manufacturer which supplied the infringing device) had sufficient  time to respond to the 
notification of alleged infringement and had not responded in a timely manner.681  
In a series of case involving Sisvel v. Haier682 the district court granted an injunction against 
the Haier group, enjoining them from selling UMTS- and GPRS-compliant smartphones and 
tablets in Germany which infringed Sisvel's patents. In this case the plaintiff informed the 
defendants of their alleged infringement and made several licensing offers to them. The 
defendants rejected these offers on the basis that the offers included unreasonable royalties 
and constituted a global licensing offer, rather than a German specific license. This defence was 
not accepted as the defendant failed to make a counteroffer. 
In NTT DoCoMo v. HTC683 a district court granted injunctive relief event thought HTC did made 
a counteroffer to NTT DoCoMo's offer. This because the counteroffer was made eighteen 
months after the initial offer and there were no security arrangements made with respect to the 
counter offer.  
In St Lawrence Communications v. Vodafone684 the district court granted a preliminary 
injunction against Vodafone which was selling infringing phones it sourced from HTC under both 
the HTC and its own label. Again, while the defendant claimed that the licensing offer made by 
plaintiff was unreasonable, the injunction was granted because there was no counteroffer or 
security provided with respect to a counteroffer. An appeals court upheld the injunctive order 
for the same reason.685 
Such a standard methodology is of course not far from the Orange Book decision and what 
the CJEU decided in the Huawei v. ZTE case.686 The main differences between the them being 
that the Orange Book and Huawei decision placed the burden of identification and notification 
on the intellectual property owner rather than the technology manufacturer687 and changed the 
security requirements used to ensure that obligations to pay for the use of the intellectual 
property are eventually fulfilled. Under a standard methodology no security would be provided. 
Under the Orange Book case the intellectual property owner was the one which initially 
established the level of security which needed to be provided. In Huawei v. ZTE if the level of 
security cannot be agreed between parties, they "may" be decided by an independent third 
party.688  
This would appear to be an equitable adaptation of a standard methodology, as the first 
negatively impacts the intellectual property owner and the second negatively impacts the 
alleged infringer. However, placing the burden of identifying an infringement on the property 
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owner should not mean the alleged infringers are free to deny an infringement. If anything, 
when an intellectual property owner notifies a technology manufacturer of an alleged 
infringement and that technology manufacturer denies that they are infringing all of the owner's 
patent portfolio, this can and should be used as evidence as to the unreasonable behaviour of 
the technology manufacturer. The same can be said with respect to the security demands of the 
owner. If the owner request security which is clearly in excess of a reasonable royalty rate, this 
should be used as evidence as to the unreasonable behaviour of the intellectual property owner.  
Regardless of whether an Orange Book or the Huawei methodology is followed; their 
requirements are definitely a forward step on the path towards an application of the correlated 
rights doctrine. This because neither provide the owner with an option to seek injunctive relief 
from a willing licensee who makes a binding reasonable offer to license the disputed property. 
Finally, the that fact that competition law was used as the justification for making the Huawei 
v. ZTE decision does not diminish the argument in favour of applying the correlated rights 
doctrine in intellectual property law. This because competition law by its very nature seeks to 
correct market failures which are not otherwise corrected in other bodies of law, and it does not 
to need be applied when market failures are otherwise proscribed in those other bodies of law. 
So, if an application of the correlated rights doctrine effectively incorporates competition law 
principles in intellectual property law, the application of competition law becomes redundant. 
While this may make the application of actual competition law statutes redundant, this 
should not be considered a negative outcome as it will simplify the adjudication of intellectual 
property disputes. An added benefit of establishing a correlated rights standard licensing 
procedure as part of intellectual property law, is that it will forestall the encroachment of 
competition law authorities into royalty setting activities. This is a benefit because; as history 
has shown command or directed economies in which the government sets the price of goods 
are never efficient or sustainable, regardless of whether the intent is benevolent or otherwise.689 
From a more pragmatic prospective it limits the ability of competition authorities to drive down 
royalty rates for their local technology manufacturers and it will also allow those same 
authorities focus on the traditional anti-competitive behaviours like those initiated by the EU 
Competition Authority against Qualcomm. 690 
9.3.2 Calculating Reasonable Royalties 
If neither; hypothetical negotiations based on existing licenses,691 nor relying on competition 
authorities to establish government mandated royalty rates, represents a step forward on the 
correlated rights path, the question then becomes what method should be used. Obviously to 
be compatible with an application of the correlated rights doctrine they ought to reflect the 
methods which are used in Californian ground water law and U.S. Oil and gas law. In both those 
bodies of law the courts first try to ascertain the aggregate value or capacity of the given 
resource and then divide that aggregate according to the proportional ownership of the litigants. 
As such; under an application of the correlated rights doctrine calculating royalties would 
commence with an evaluation of the aggregate value which all of the correlated properties 
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provide to technological product, and then that value would be apportioned to the all of the 
owners who contributed to that technology, on a proportional basis to the value of their 
contribution. This can be described as a holistic apportionment approach. 
While it is conceded that this approach is contradictory to certain scholarly articles which 
suggest that royalties should be based on the minimum level of return need to justify investment 
in research in development.692 And other scholarly articles which suggest that royalties ought to 
be based solely upon the difference in value that an intellectual property provides over the next 
best intellectual property.693 This does not mean that it is not compatible with the other rules 
which have been used to calculate royalties or a methodology which has not been used in the 
courts. The methods for calculating royalty which are most compatible with holistic 
apportionment being the lost profits rule, the entire market value rule and the smallest saleable 
component rule.  
As described in chapter three the lost profits rule covered situations where it was possible to 
ascertain specific level of the profits which were lost when an infringement occurred.694 The 
principle idea behind this rule was that the owner should be made whole for the profits which 
he lost because of the infringement. It is makes sense that the holistic apportionment approach 
is compatible with the lost profits rule, because at their core both are value-based 
methodologies. To put this value base methodology into context, it is useful to begin by 
assuming that when one entity owns all of the intellectual property incorporated into a 
technological product and that entity will sell its product at the profit maximising price. In such 
a case the difference between its manufacturing and operating cost and that profit maximising 
price will determine its profits. To the extent that an infringer uses those intellectual properties 
to supply a technological product which would otherwise be supplied by the owner, the lost 
profits would be the same as what the owner would have earned on those sales. Interestingly 
those lost profits would theoretically be higher than the value which can be attributed to the 
intellectual properties practiced by the technological product, because they would also include 
the normal profits which can be attributed to the normal business operations.  
This compatibility also exists if it is assuming that an intellectual property owner hires a 
contract manufacturer, to manufacture the product on their behalf. The only difference is that 
the normal manufacturing profits are earned by the contract manufacturer rather than the 
property owner.  
Taking it one step further, it should also work if the intellectual property owner is a non-
practicing entity and licenses its intellectual property out to technology manufacturers which 
manufactures and sells properties under their own brand name. In that instance the price that 
the technological company will charge for the technological product will reflect the royalty 
payments made to the owner who will base their royalty rates on a similar profit maximising 
strategy. 
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Where the lost profit approach will not be consistent with a holistic apportionment approach, 
is if it is based on the actual profits of the infringer or if it is presumed that the property owner 
must license its properties at a royalty rate which is below the rate which would maximise its 
profits. It is not compatible when it is based on the profits of the infringer, as infringers seldom 
price technological products at a price which reflects the full value of the intellectual property 
they are infringing, and usually sell at a steep discount in order to increase sales. Perversely 
when this happens, the entire industry will respond to the availability of lower prices from an 
infringer by demanding lower prices for the owner's own products, which will reduce the 
owner's profits. So, if the infringement is allowed to continue for longer durations, it will also 
mean that a profits loss rule, will not adequately compensate the owner even when it is based 
on when their own profits. 
Next, the holistic apportionment approach can be considered reasonably compatible with 
the entire market value rule because both rely on apportionment of the value that an intellectual 
property provides to an infringer. The entire market value rule using as its royalty base, all value 
which an infringer derives from infringing an intellectual property,695 while the holistic 
apportionments’ royalty base is limited to the inherent value which the intellectual property 
provided to the technological product. 
Even though the smallest saleable component rule, has to a large extent supplanted the 
entire market value rule, the holistic apportionment approach is also compatible with it because 
it too apportions value, albeit on an even smaller royalty base. This rule being established in 
Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard, when Chief Judge Randall Rader referred to the smallest 
saleable unit.696 A concept which was more clearly articulated in Dynamics v. Quanta Computer, 
Inc.697 Whereby the U.S. Court of Appeal for the Federal Circuit tried to clarify the boundaries of 
the entire market rule and focused on the actual value their property provided to the smallest 
component of the integrated technological product.698 The court stating that; 
'Where small elements of multi-component products are accused of infringement, 
calculating a royalty on the entire product carries a considerable risk that the patentee 
will be improperly compensated for non-infringing components of that product. Thus, 
it is generally required that royalties be based not on the entire product, but instead 
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on the “smallest saleable patent-practicing unit.” citing Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett 
Packard Co., 609 F. Supp. 2d 279, 283, 287-88 (N.D.N.Y.  2009).”699  
While it may appear that the smaller royalty base would make the smallest saleable 
component rule incompatible with a holistic apportionment, it does not. This because the two 
rules are not mutually exclusive and can be used concurrently. This concurrent application 
should be used when a technological product includes; components which can be readily 
separated from the overall technological product and others which cannot be separated. An 
example of how this concurrent application can be used to calculate reasonable royalty can be 
found in public information regarding Qualcomm's agreement with the Chinese competition 
authorities.700 According to that information Qualcomm agreed to calculate its 'patent royalties 
on the basis of 65% of net wholesale price of the device sold in China'.701 Presumable this re-
calculation was designed to specifically avoid the royalty payments on components which were 
integrated into to the devices, but which could be bought with intellectual property licenses 
already paid.702  
It should be noted that the net effect of separating out the individual components from the 
technological product, should make little difference in the total amount of royalties paid for use 
of the intellectual property incorporated into the technological product. This because it would 
be assumed that a similar aggregate royalty would be paid on the components as would be paid 
on the technological product, keeping the total aggregate payments the same. The only 
difference would be the that apportionment of the aggregates would be done separately. It 
should also make no difference to the amount of royalties being paid to individual intellectual 
property contributors, as a reduction in the royalty base would be accompanies by a reduction 
in the number of intellectual properties which those lower aggregate royalty payments would 
be shared between. Which is to suggest that in the case of the Qualcomm agreement, a 35% 
reduction in the royalty base, should have resulted in a 35% increase in Qualcomm's 
proportional contribution to the intellectual properties incorporated in that smaller base, and 
therefore they would be entitled to a 35% higher royalty. Likewise, for intellectual property 
owners which contribute properties to the smaller components, although the royalty base is 
much smaller their proportionate claim on that base becomes much larger, which should result 
in a similar rate to what would result from a smaller proportionate claim on a larger base. 
Where the entire product value rule may be described as inconsistent with a holistic 
apportionment approach is when the rule is framed as a method for denying holistic 
apportionment. This has happened when it is impossible show that the intellectual property is 
a "motivating factor" for the purchase of the technological product.703 The problem with this 
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application of the rule and why it is inconsistent with a holistic apportionment approach; is that 
most technological products practice multiple patents, and no single intellectual property can 
be described as providing a clear motivating factor for the purchase of the product. This is 
particularly true with respect to standardised technological products which rely on literally 
thousands of intellectual properties to function, none of which are known to the public. In such 
circumstances because reasonable royalties cannot be calculated using either the entire product 
value rule, or the smallest saleable component rule, it is unlikely that the royalties will reflect 
the value that the contribute to the technological product. However: because this prerequisite 
for a motivating factor can be considered as some sort of methodological choice, separate from 
the rule itself; it can be argued that there the while rule remains consistent with a holistic 
approach, the method of applying it is not. 
As mentioned earlier a holistic apportionment approach starts with an evaluation of the 
aggregate value which all of the correlated properties provide to technological product, and 
then that value would be apportioned to the all of the owners who contributed to that 
technology on a proportional basis to the value of their contribution.  
The first step in this process would be to determine if the intellectual properties in dispute 
are practiced solely by a component of the technological product or whether they are integral 
to the entire product. Obviously, it they are only required for a component, the analysis will 
focus on a calculation of reasonable royalty for the component but if they are integral to the 
entire product those calculation will be for the entire product. 
While the evaluation of the aggregate value which all the correlated intellectual properties 
provide to component or entire product may be "hypothetic", it does not have to be 
"speculative", particularly if the analysis is transparent. All that is required is an economic 
analysis of the demand curves for the component or product. When this analysis is provided it 
will result in competing calculations as to the profit maximising level of aggregate royalties at 
least one provided by the property owner and another provided by the technology 
manufacturer. Ideally the court would also receive amicus briefs from other interested parties 
which would provide their economic analysis of the same aggregate royalty level.  
This aggregated value calculation can be considered analogist to the calculations related to 
the aggregate amount of water which flows into an underground aquifer in a given year, or the 
value of the oil and gas which is extracted from an oil and gas reservoir over a given period. From 
a strictly intellectual property prospective it would be similar to the value calculations which are 
taken in pharmaceutical pricing which focus on the profit maximising potential of the proprietary 
innovations of patented medicine. 
In circumstances where the intellectual property owner has made a FRAND commitment 
which allowed their property to be included in a standard, all parties would then provide analysis 
on how that profit maximizing rate should be adjusted to reflect an aggregate reasonable royalty 
rate for the standardized technological product. This step is necessary when a FRAND 
commitment is made because the standardization process effectively eliminates competition 
from the market and as such the demand curve for the technological product will be higher than 
would be in a more competitive market.  
While it could be expected that the level of the aggregate reasonable royalty rate would vary 
dramatically between the owners and technology manufacturer, this is not the most likely 
outcome. It is not the most likely outcome because most intellectual property disputes involve 






standard, and manufacturer the technological product. This dual role of both owner and user of 
intellectual properties, will have a stabilising effect on the analysis which should result in the 
competing analyses converging on a relatively small difference in the proposed aggregate 
royalty rate. Example of this stabilising effect has been demonstrated in recent patent disputes. 
In the recently decided case of Unwired Planet and Huawei, although an analysis of the 
aggregate rate was not sought, the judge was able to calculate that the implied total aggregate 
royalty burdens of Unwired Planet was 10.8% while Huawei's was 13.3%.704 Further it should 
also be expected that as more and more cases involving a specific technological product are 
heard, there will be a greater likelihood a consensus may emerge on an even smaller spread in 
the aggregate royalty range. This consensus will of course make later cases involving the same 
component or technological product less hypothetical. An added advantage of adopting this 
analysis would be that at any later stage when an integrated technology manufacturer changed 
positions and try to alter their analysis, their old analysis could be used as evidence against such 
a change. The same would be true about any party which provided amicus briefs. 
After evidence on the aggregated profit maximising and reasonable royalty rates are 
provided the case would move over to an analysis of the proportional value contribution of the 
disputed intellectual properties. The first part of this analysis would require a simple analysis of 
the number of intellectual properties which where practiced by the component or integral to 
entire product. The properties integral to the entire product would obviously exclude any 
properties which related solely to small saleable component. Ideally this information would be 
provided by the standardization organization.  
After this information was provided the litigants would provide their own analysis of the 
essential properties which were practiced and the disputed properties value share of those 
essential properties. They would also have to provide arguments to back up the any claims that 
the disputed properties were of greater or lesser value than the average value provided by those 
total properties which they deemed essential.  
If the dispute involved a small saleable component this would be all the evidence which 
would be required, and the judge or jury would decide who made the best arguments in terms 
of aggregate value and the disputed properties proportional share of that value and multiply 
those two factors together to come up with a reasonable royalty rate for the disputed 
intellectual properties. 
It should be noted that this method of determining how an aggregate value should be 
apportioned between correlated intellectual properties was used in the recent case of Unwired 
Planet and Huawei. In that case the judge took evidence about the number of aggregate and 
disputed patents which were practiced, and then had the litigants provide evidence as to what 
percentage of those patents were valid and essential to the technological product.705  
If the dispute involved the entire product the same calculations would be made, but there 
would have to be one further calculation which involved separating out the price of the 
components and the value of any other non-technical factors from the total price of the 
technological product before the calculated reasonable royalty rate would be applied to the 
sales price of the product. The most important non-technical factors which would need to be 
considered being the premium price that technology manufacturer can charge because of their 
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brand. The component costs should be used to reduce the base price which that reasonable 
royalty rate is applied to, because to do otherwise would be to force technology manufacturers 
to pay a double royalty on those components. The brand premium should be used to reduce the 
base price which that reasonable royalty rate is applied to because the brand premium provides 
value which is separate from the value provided by the aggregated intellectual property value. 
Returning to the question of the royalty rates found in existing contracts. Once a reasonable 
royalty is calculated using a holistic apportionment approach, that rate could be compared 
against the royalty rate included in selected existing contracts. However not all contract should 
be used for this comparison. For example, any contracts where there is proof that the rate was 
a product of coercion in terms of; patent holdup, legal attrition, competition authority pressure, 
or corrupt practices should not be used. Assuming these types of contracts are eliminated it is 
likely that the existing contract royalty rates will be fairly close to those calculated using a holistic 
apportionment approach. If they are not the court or jury may want to make some modifications 
to the calculated rate. 
What this path forward seeks to achieve is a situation whereby it is the value that disputed 
intellectual property contributes to the technological product which determines the reasonable 
royalty rate. An objective which is supported by several scholars, albeit using different 
methodologies.706 Such a process would not only create greater clarity in terms of reasonable 
royalties should be calculated, but also improve the equity of the outcomes, as neither patent 
holdup or patent holdout would be rewarded. 
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10. Correlated Rights and Existing Legislation  
As implied by the name, the purpose of this chapter is to analyses the correlated rights 
doctrines compatibility with existing legislation, much as would occur during a de novo review. 
From a conceptual point of view this would be equivalent of assessing whether the ground is 
suitable for a new foundation. Obviously if the current legislation would not allow an application 
of the correlated rights doctrine; it would mean that legislation would have to change before it 
could be applied. Alternatively, if the current legislation did not prohibit the application of the 
doctrine; then its application would only be dependent on the courts willingness to reinterpret 
that legislation.  
By its very nature this analysis is much different from analysing the doctrine's compatibility 
with the current interpretation of legislation. This because by definition the advocacy of a new 
foundation, would suggest that the current interpretation of the legislation have, or at least may 
have, resulted in laws which are different to those which would be provided under a new legal 
doctrine. Which is not to suggest the evolution of the current interpretations of intellectual 
property legislation are not compatible with the application of the doctrine, or that it is not 
capable of providing similar outcomes, merely that such similar outcomes have occurred 
through different means. Moreover, if it is the case that current restrictions placed on the 
exclusive/absolute right foundations of intellectual property law have resulted in outcomes 
which are similar to those which would result for an application of the correlated rights doctrine, 
then it could be asserted that the correlated rights doctrine was “extracted” from those 
interpretation. 
As to the analysis itself, this will be done by examining the respective legislations according 
to critical questions raised in Chapter 8. All of which seek to determine the discretion that the 
respective judicial authorities have in deciding intellectual property cases. Those questions are:  
1) Do judicial authorities have the discretion needed to grant preliminary injunctive 
relief and/or permanent injunctive relief on an entire integrated technological product 
when it is determined that unauthorised users are unwilling to license or are unwilling to 
pay reasonable royalties to an owner of an integrated intellectual property, regardless of 
the size of their contribution to that integrated technological property or their 
manufacturing participation? 
2) Do judicial authorities have the discretion needed to withhold injunctive relief for 
ongoing unauthorised use of integrated intellectual property, when it is determined that 
an intellectual property owner is abusing their rights to injunctive relief to coerce users to 
pay more for the use of their intellectual property than value their property contributes 
to the integrated technological product? 
3) Do judicial authorities have the discretion needed to make rulings which set the 
level of damages which intellectual property owners should receive for past and ongoing 
unauthorised use of integrated intellectual property at a level which corresponds to the 






Assuming that all of these questions can be answered in the affirmative then the relevant 
legislation would clearly be capable of applying the correlated rights doctrine. Further it would 
not be unreasonable to imply that legislative authorization of such flexibility, was and is intended 
to provide the courts with sufficient discretion to thwart the abuses of rights or legal process by 
the litigants. An intent which mirrors the intent of the correlated rights doctrine.  
This analysis of the compatibility of the correlative rights doctrine to legislation, will 
commence with an analysis of the Paris Convention, the TRIPs Agreement, and EU Enforcement 
Directive, before moving on to National legislation from various jurisdictions. This decision to 
begin with broader international Treaties is deliberate, as generally speaking National legislation 
must comply with international treaty obligations, and EU Member States can run the risk of 
State liability if they do not protect rights provided under EU directives. It follows that; if the 
international treaties were not compatible with the correlated rights doctrine, the analysis of 
National legislations would represent a somewhat futile exercise.  
Each analysis will open with a brief description of the legislation, which will be followed by a 
commentary on the relevant articles and their compatibility with the correlated rights doctrine. 
This will be followed by a practical assessment of level of discretion the respective legislations 
provide in the three questions listed above. Also included will as well as a limited assessment as 
to whether current interpretation of the relevant legislation conforms to this practical 
assessment. 
10.1 The Paris Convention 
Prior to the establishment of the Paris Convention707 many countries treated industrial 
property owned by foreigners differently than those owned by their own citizens. The Paris 
Convention changed this by establishing equal protection of industrial property regardless of 
jurisdiction from which the property owners originated.708 It is called the Paris Convention 
because it was initiated at a conference in Paris that began in 1880 and was signed there in 1883. 
It has been revised and amended seven time the most recent of which occurred on the 28 of 
September 1979. It is still in force and is administered by the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO). As of September 2014, there were 176 countries who were signatures. 
Obviously as every signature is obligated to adhere to the Convention, any assessment of the 
legal viability of applying the correlated rights doctrine must also include an assessment of the 
doctrine's compatibility with it. Although the Paris Convention includes thirty Articles there are 
only a few which are relevant to the application of the correlated rights doctrine. 
Commentary on Relevant Articles 
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Article 2: National Treatment for Nationals of Countries of the Union 
(1) Nationals of any country of the Union shall, as regards the protection of industrial 
property, enjoy in all the other countries of the Union the advantages that their 
respective laws now grant, or may hereafter grant, to nationals; all without prejudice 
to the rights specially provided for by this Convention. Consequently, they shall have 
the same protection as the latter, and the same legal remedy against any infringement 
of their rights, provided that the conditions and formalities imposed upon nationals 
are complied with.709 
The clear intent of Article 2 is to establish the principle that in each signature's judicial 
authorities are required to provide the same intellectual property rights and remedies to all 
intellectual property owners regardless of the nationality of the owner. However, this Article 
does not say anything the specifics of those rights. As such as long as the correlated rights 
doctrine is applied equally to both foreign and domestic owners of intellectual property 
signatories to the Convention would be in compliance with this Article.  
Article 5: A. Patents: Importation of Articles; Failure to Work or Insufficient Working; 
Compulsory Licenses 
(1) Importation by the patentee into the country where the patent has been 
granted of articles manufactured in any of the countries of the Union shall not entail 
forfeiture of the patent. 
(2) Each country of the Union shall have the right to take legislative measures 
providing for the grant of compulsory licenses to prevent the abuses which might 
result from the exercise of the exclusive rights conferred by the patent, for example, 
failure to work. 
(3) Forfeiture of the patent shall not be provided for except in cases where the grant 
of compulsory licenses would not have been sufficient to prevent the said abuses. No 
proceedings for the forfeiture or revocation of a patent may be instituted before the 
expiration of two years from the grant of the first compulsory license. 
(4) A compulsory license may not be applied for on the ground of failure to work or 
insufficient working before the expiration of a period of four years from the date of 
filing of the patent application or three years from the date of the grant of the patent, 
whichever period expires last; it shall be refused if the patentee justifies his inaction 
by legitimate reasons. Such a compulsory license shall be non-exclusive and shall not 
be transferable, even in the form of the grant of a sub-license, except with that part of 
the enterprise or goodwill which exploits such license.710 
Article 5 of the Paris Convention represents both a windfall and a challenge to the application 
of the correlative rights doctrine. It represents a windfall because in paragraph (2) it is 
specifically stated that "Union shall have the right to take legislative measures providing for the 
grant of compulsory licenses to prevent the abuses which might result from the exercise of the 
exclusive rights conferred by the patent". This sentence clearly provides not only the discretion 
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but also a recommendation to develop and apply solutions to prevent intellectual property 
owners from abusing their property rights. As the correlative rights doctrine protects integrated 
property owners from abuses which can lead to their property being appropriated by others, it 
obviously meets the objectives of this declaration. The challenge comes from paragraph (4). In 
that paragraph it is stated that when failure to work or insufficient work is the grounds for the 
application there should be a three to four-year delay in allowing applications for a compulsory 
license. The challenge being; does that same delay apply to the withholding of injunctive relief. 
A strict reading would suggest that it does not, and the delay is only applicable to the granting 
of a compulsory license. Alternatively, if it is assumed that when judicial authorities withhold 
injunction relief, it is the legal equivalent of granting a compulsory license to that property, then 
this Article can be interpreted as obliging courts to provide automatic injunctive relief in during 
the same three to four-year period. However, because such an interpretation would be 
inconsistent with the rights provided in paragraph (2), this interpretation would appear to be 
unsustainable. 
Article 28 Disputes 
(1) Any dispute between two or more countries of the Union concerning the 
interpretation or application of this Convention, not settled by negotiation, may, by 
any one of the countries concerned, be brought before the International Court of 
Justice by application in conformity with the Statute of the Court, unless the countries 
concerned agree on some other method of settlement. The country bringing the 
dispute before the Court shall inform the International Bureau; the International 
Bureau shall bring the matter to the attention of the other countries of the Union. 
(2) Each country may, at the time it signs this Act or deposits its instrument of 
ratification or accession, declare that it does not consider itself bound by the 
provisions of paragraph (1). With regard to any dispute between such country and any 
other country of the Union, the provisions of paragraph (1) shall not apply. 
(3) Any country having made a declaration in accordance with the provisions of 
paragraph (2) may, at any time, withdraw its declaration by notification addressed to 
the Director General.711 
Article 28 provides details on how disputes between countries are to be resolved. These 
disputes would arise whenever one country claims that another country has treated their 
nationals in a manner which is contrary to the Convention. While there is every possibility that 
a country which supports strong intellectual property, rights may object to another country 
applying the correlated rights doctrine, there is a possibility that a dispute over application will 
be brought before the International Court of Justice. However just because a dispute is brought, 
does not mean that the correlated rights doctrine cannot be applied. Indeed, given that there 
appears to be nothing in the Convention which prevents its application and Article 5: paragraph 
(2) tends to support its application, it is unlikely that the International Court of Justice would 
rule against its application.  
Answers to Correlated Questions 
                                                          






1) Do judicial authorities have the discretion needed to grant preliminary injunctive 
relief and/or permanent injunctive relief on an entire integrated technological product 
when it is determined that unauthorised users are unwilling to license or are unwilling to 
pay reasonable royalties to an owner of an integrated intellectual property, regardless of 
the size of their contribution to that integrated technological property or their 
manufacturing participation? 
 
As the Paris Convention does not address the details of sovereign court proceedings it does 
not directly answer this question. All that can be said is that it does not prohibit such actions as 
long as the procedures are applied equally to both domestic and foreign intellectual property.  
2) Do judicial authorities have the discretion needed to withhold injunctive relief for 
ongoing unauthorised use of integrated intellectual property, when it is determined that 
an intellectual property owner is abusing their rights to injunctive relief to coerce users to 
pay more for the use of their intellectual property than value their property contributes 
to the integrated technological product? 
This question is not answered it is rendered somewhat redundant by Article 5 which grants 
signature the right to grant compulsory licenses when they find that owners have been engaging 
in abusive behaviour. Naturally this would require that both domestic manufactures and foreign 
importers receive equal treatment. 
3) Do judicial authorities have the discretion needed to make rulings which set the 
level of damages which intellectual property owners should receive for past and ongoing 
unauthorised use of integrated intellectual property at a level which corresponds to the 
value which the intellectual property provides to the technological product? 
The Paris Convention does not address the details of damages, although it does imply that 
both domestic and foreign intellectual property owners must be treated the same way when it 
comes to damages. 
Summary of The Paris Convention Compatibility 
The primary purpose of the Paris Convention was and is to ensure that domestic and foreign 
owners of intellectual property are provided received equal treatment under the laws of the 
signatory countries. It was not intended to provide, nor does it provide, specific details of what 
those laws should be, and what protection should be provided. This lack of detail is evident in 
absence of any requirement to provide either injunctive relief or damages when an infringement 
is found. That said it does include an article which requires that signatures provide their judicial 
authorities with the discretion to be able to provide compulsory licenses when owners abuse 
the rights provided under their respective laws. This requirement is a clear indication that the 
expectation was that rights granted would not be absolute. As the correlative rights doctrine 
asserts; limiting rights in a manner which ensures that the rights cannot be abused to 
appropriate the rewards of other owners who have also provide contribution to an integrated 






10.2 The TRIPS Agreement   
The TRIPS Agreement712 is Annex 1C of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), signed in Marrakesh, Morocco on 15 April 1994. It can be considered 
to be an extension of the Paris Agreement in that it expanded the requirement for an equal 
treatment of intellectual property within borders, to a requirement for equal treatment across 
borders. It did this by setting minimum standards and enforcement procedures that all WTO 
Members had to abide by when adjudicating intellectual property disputes. However, this was 
not the primary objective nor the driving force behind its development and adoption. Indeed, 
the initial impetus was not a governmental action but rather a private action taken by 
multinational corporations which wanted governments to more vigorously defend their 
intellectual property against counterfeits and piracy. 
As provide in much more detail by Duncan Matthews in his book, Globalizing Intellectual 
Property, 713 it all began in the 1970's with the formation of the Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition 
which was an alliance of 100 multi-national corporation attempting to get the national 
governments to increase their protection against counterfeit trademarked goods. This effort 
culminated in an 'Agreement on Measures to Discourage the Importation of Counterfeit 
Goods'714 which failed to advance in the 1979 Tokyo Round of General GATT because of lack of 
evidence. This effort was subsequently pursued at the 1982 GATT Ministerial meeting, however 
the proposal failed to attract sufficient support as developing countries like India and Brazil who 
questioned the need to involve the WTO in a matter which they felt would be more 
appropriately handled by the World Intellectual Property Organization, (WIPO). Despite this 
rejection a Ministerial Declaration was adopted requesting that the Director General of GATT 
hold consultations with his counterpart at the World Intellectual Property Organization. In 1984 
the GATT Council established an Expert Group which eventually presented a report called 'Trade 
in Counterfeit Goods'715to the Council in 1982. In the report the Expert Group concluded that 
action was needed to combat counterfeiting but was not able to agree on whether GATT was 
the appropriate vehicle.  
At the same time as efforts to adopt an anti-counterfeiting agreement were being pursued 
at the WTO, similar efforts were also being pursued at the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO). Although these efforts did not suffer from criticism over the 
appropriateness of the forum, they were unsuccessful because developing countries expressed 
scepticism about the extent of the problem and the potential negative consequence for their 
economies if stronger intellectual property law were enforced. 
To a large extent it was this lack of movement at the WTO and the WIPO that drove US 
corporations to lobby for unilateral protection from the US government. These lobbying efforts 
focused on getting the government to use US trade policy to punish countries who they felt were 
"stealing or pirating" their intellectual property. These efforts were rewarded by the US 
Congress in 1984, when it passed amendments to Section 301 of the Trade and Tariff Act.716 That 
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amendment had three significant components. First, it gave the US Trade Representatives 
(USTR) the right to do general investigations of the intellectual property law of foreign countries. 
Second, allowed for the imposition of trade sanctions if investigations found that countries had 
failed to intelctual property rights. And third, it established effective intellectual property rights 
protections as a prerequisite for maintaining tariff privileges for developing countries imports. 
The first country to feel the effects of this change was to the Republic of Korea, who under threat 
of trade sanction changed their intellectual property law after a complaint from USTR, which 
they in turn had received from the Motion Pictures Association. Shortly thereafter action was 
taken against Brazil.  
These unilateral actions quickly changed the minds of the developing countries, who in 1985 
began to acknowledge the need to address the trade implications inherent in intellectual 
property right protection. This led to the Ministerial Declaration of 1986 which included Trade 
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) as one of the issues to be negotiated 
under the Uruguay Round of Trade negotiations. Those negotiations lasted for eight years with 
the final agreement being signed in 1994.  
This brief history of the origins of the TRIPs Agreement is significant because it highlights that 
the primary purpose of the TRIPs Agreement was to provide international protection against 
counterfeiting and piracy. Such protection representing a protective shield against those who 
would steal or copy intellectual property, rather than a sword with which an intellectual 
property owner can use to coerce integrated manufactures to pay excessive royalty rates or 
acquiesce to unreasonable licensing terms. It is also worth noting that as the Agreement was 
signed in 1994, it was drafted at a time when standalone intellectual properties were the focus 
and as such did not address potential abusive activities related to correlated intellectual 
properties. 
Commentary on Relevant Articles 
'Article 8: Principles 
1. Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and regulations, adopt 
measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the public 
interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological 
development, provided that such measures are consistent with the provisions of this 
Agreement. 
2. Appropriate measures, provided that they are consistent with the provisions of this 
Agreement, may be needed to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by right 
holders or the resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect 
the international transfer of technology.'717 
Article 8 (2) clearly anticipates that it is possible to abuse intellectual property rights. While 
this recognition is significant in and of itself, the further recognition that governments are 
provided with the freedom to adopt "appropriate measures" to deal with such abuses, provides 
a foundation for the application of the correlated rights doctrine. The only question is whether 
applying the correlative rights doctrine is "consistent with the provisions of this agreements". 
                                                          






Because the doctrine itself does not prevent, but rather seeks to protect the right of intellectual 
property right holders to receive fair compensation for their contributions to an inherently 
property, it can be argued that the doctrine is entirely consistent with this Article. 
'Article 28: Rights Conferred 
1. A patent shall confer on its owner the following exclusive rights: 
(a) where the subject matter of a patent is a product, to prevent third parties not 
having the owner’s consent from the acts of: making, using, offering for sale, selling, 
or importing for these purposes that product; 
(b) where the subject matter of a patent is a process, to prevent third parties not 
having the owner’s consent from the act of using the process, and from the acts of: 
using, offering for sale, selling, or importing for these purposes at least the product 
obtained directly by that process. 
2. Patent owners shall also have the right to assign, or transfer by succession, the 
patent and to conclude licensing contracts.'718 
Included in Article 28 is a declaration of "exclusive rights" which was the historical foundation 
of intellectual property law, and which provided intellectual property owners with an absolute 
right to use their property in any way they choose. Such of declaration represents a challenge 
to the correlated rights doctrine because it does not restrict owners from using their properties 
to harm others. Fortunately, this challenge does not have to be litigated because subsequent 
Articles allow for exemptions to this "exclusive right". 
'Article 30: Exceptions to Rights Conferred 
Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent, 
provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation 
of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent 
owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties.'719 
Article 30 represents a generic statement which provides members with the authorization of 
limit "exclusive rights". This potential for limiting rights is however constrained by a requirement 
that such limitation do not prevent property owners from the "normal exploitations of the 
patent" or "unreasonably prejudice" to their "legitimate interests". As primary purpose of the 
correlative rights doctrine is to protect the "legitimate interests" of property owners by 
restricting abusive behaviour of other rights holders, this Article would appear to be entirely 
consistent with the doctrine. Indeed, that fact that this Article specifies the objectives of an 
application of the correlated rights doctrine, it can be asserted that the doctrine can be 
“extracted” from the Article. 
'Article 31: Other Use Without Authorization of the Right Holder 
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Where the law of a Member allows for other use of the subject matter of a patent 
without the authorization of the right holder, including use by the government or third 
parties authorized by the government, the following provisions shall be respected: 
(a) authorization of such use shall be considered on its individual merits; 
(b) such use may only be permitted if, prior to such use, the proposed user has 
made efforts to obtain authorization from the right holder on reasonable 
commercial terms and conditions and that such efforts have not been successful 
within a reasonable period of time. This requirement may be waived by a Member 
in the case of a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency or 
in cases of public non-commercial use. In situations of national emergency or other 
circumstances of extreme urgency, the right holder shall, nevertheless, be notified 
as soon as reasonably practicable. In the case of public non-commercial use, where 
the government or contractor, without making a patent search, knows or has 
demonstrable grounds to know that a valid patent is or will be used by or for the 
government, the right holder shall be informed promptly; 
(c) the scope and duration of such use shall be limited to the purpose for which it 
was authorized, and in the case of semi-conductor technology shall only be for 
public non-commercial use or to remedy a practice determined after judicial or 
administrative process to be anti-competitive; 
(d) such use shall be non-exclusive; 
(e) such use shall be non-assignable, except with that part of the enterprise or 
goodwill which enjoys such use; 
(f) any such use shall be authorized predominantly for the supply of the domestic 
market of the Member authorizing such use; 
(g) authorization for such use shall be liable, subject to adequate protection of the 
legitimate interests of the persons so authorized, to be terminated if and when the 
circumstances which led to it cease to exist and are unlikely to recur. The 
competent authority shall have the authority to review, upon motivated request, 
the continued existence of these circumstances; 
(h) the right holder shall be paid adequate remuneration in the circumstances of 
each case, taking into account the economic value of the authorization; 
(i) the legal validity of any decision relating to the authorization of such use shall be 
subject to judicial review or other independent review by a distinct higher authority 
in that Member; 
(j) any decision relating to the remuneration provided in respect of such use shall 
be subject to judicial review or other independent review by a distinct higher 
authority in that Member; 
(k) Members are not obliged to apply the conditions set forth in subparagraphs (b) 
and (f) where such use is permitted to remedy a practice determined after judicial 
or administrative process to be anti-competitive. The need to correct anti-
competitive practices may be taken into account in determining the amount of 
remuneration in such cases. Competent authorities shall have the authority to 
refuse termination of authorization if and when the conditions which led to such 






 (l) where such use is authorized to permit the exploitation of a patent ("the second 
patent") which cannot be exploited without infringing another patent ("the first 
patent"), the following additional conditions shall apply: 
(i) the invention claimed in the second patent shall involve an important 
technical advance of considerable economic significance in relation to the 
invention claimed in the first patent; 
(ii) the owner of the first patent shall be entitled to a cross-licence on reasonable 
terms to use the invention claimed in the second patent;  and 
(iii) the use authorized in respect of the first patent shall be non-assignable 
except with the assignment of the second patent.'720 
 
To the extent that withholding injunctive relief falls under the definition of a law which 
"allows for other use of the subject matter of a patent without the authorization of the right 
holder, including use by the government or third parties authorized by the government" Article 
31 represents a list of provisions which must be observed if that discretion is provided. Further 
because applying the correlated rights doctrine is dependent on that discretion, applying the 
doctrine must also require observing the same provisions. It should be pointed out that these 
provisions do not represent a singular requirement, but rather a cumulative requirement under 
which a breach of a single provision would make applying the correlative rights doctrine 
incompatible with the TRIPs Agreement. An individual analysis of each provision is provided 
below.  
 The first provision requires that any use be considered on its individual merits. To 
the extent that the doctrine should only be applied in cases where inherently 
integrated properties are involved, an individual determination of that integrated 
nature of a property can be said to meet that provision.  
 The second provision requires that a potential user must have tried to obtain that 
authorization from the rights holder on reasonable terms and those efforts have not 
been successful. This provision effectively requires that the user be a willing licensee 
that is willing to pay a fair price for the use of the property. Assuming that the owners 
is a willing licensor that is asking for fair compensation for the use of their property 
this should result in a mutually agreed license. If such negotiations fail because the 
user is not negotiating in good faith and/or because the royalties that the user is willing 
to pay are substantially lower than the value of the contribution, than both this 
provision and the correlated rights doctrine would prohibit the withholding of 
injunctive relief. Alternatively, if the negotiations fail because in the parties (in good 
faith) cannot agree on a "fair" compensation, the judicial authorities are effectively 
arbitrating a contract between two willing parties rather than permitting unauthorised 
use. It is only if the owner refuses to enter into good faith negotiations or they are 
demanding unreasonable licensing terms that the correlative rights doctrine would 
need to be applied, which suggests that this provision is also consistent with the 
doctrine, as it would be the owner and not the user, who has been unwilling to 
negotiate in good faith. 
                                                          






 The third provision is that any unauthorised use must be limited in scope and 
duration. This too is consistent with the doctrine, as the application of the doctrine is 
ultimately restricted to uses which relate to the inherently integrated technology and 
any other use would be beyond the scope of the doctrine.  
 The non-exclusive principle included in the fourth provision is implied in the 
correlative rights doctrine, as providing exclusivity would render the correlative rights 
of other contributors meaningless.  
 The fifth principle which provides that use rights are not assignable matters little, 
because the withholding of injunctive relief is a specific ruling for an individual case 
which cannot be assigned to other defendants in other cases. That said if other 
defendants in other cases face the same rights abuse, they too should be able to rely 
on the courts to withhold injunctive relief in their own cases.  
 While the sixth provision limiting the allowance of unauthorised use to national 
markets would appear to be incompatible with an application of the correlated rights 
doctrine to global technological product, this is not the case. All this provision demands 
is that the doctrine be applied individually in each domestic market. To the extent that 
it can be applied in some, but not all markets, this provision does not necessarily create 
a significant obstacle international trade, assuming that the major markets apply the 
doctrine. While it will create obstacles to trade in those local markets which are 
unwilling to protect integrated property owners, the unwillingness of apply the 
doctrine in any local market renders mute its compatibility with this provision.  
 As the need to withhold injunctive relief exists only when owners are abusing their 
property rights, the seventh provision which mandates that allowing unauthorised use 
should terminated when that abuse ends are entirely consistent with the intent and 
application of the correlated rights doctrine. Further if the owner the integrated 
technology somehow takes ownership or control of all the other integrated properties 
such that the integrated technology becomes a standalone technology, this should not 
just eliminate the ability to withhold injunctive relief, it should eliminate that possible 
to apply any part of the correlated rights doctrine. 
 The eighth provision requires that property owners are properly compensated for 
the use of their property. Nothing in the correlated rights doctrine would hinder this, 
indeed it is the objective of the doctrine that all property owners are properly 
compensated and that no property owners is allowed to appropriate through abuse of 
their rights value which proportionately belongs to other owners.  
 The ninth provision mandates the possibility for judicial review are not in any way 
inconsistent with the correlated rights doctrine, and therefore entirely compatible 
with its application. 
 The tenth provision was clearly designed to provide the flexibility required to allow 
the application of competition law to intellectual property matters. To the extent that 
the correlative rights doctrine more effectively solves the problems which arise from 
anti-competitive behaviour, it may in fact render this provision obsolete. In any event 
as competition law is not breached by the application of the correlative rights doctrine, 






 The last provision included in this section is perhaps the most relevant to an 
application of the correlated rights doctrine. The idea that the use of a first patent can 
be authorised if it is needed to practice a second patent is obviously directly 
comparable, if not a de-facto application of correlated rights doctrine. This de-facto 
comparison being supported by the sub categories of this provision which like the 
correlated rights doctrine seek to impose reciprocity and reasonable licensing terms 
on the second patent holder. The only difference between this provision and the 
correlated rights doctrine is the magnitude of its participants. Whereas this provision 
is directed towards a bi-lateral relationship, the correlated rights doctrine can 
accommodate multi-lateral relationships involving any number of intellectual property 
owners who make qualitatively and quantitatively different contributions to an 
integrated technology. 
To the extent that the correlative rights doctrine does not breach or is compatible with each 
of these provisions and the last provision de-facto anticipates its use, it can be objectively stated 
that the application of the correlated rights doctrine is entirely consistent with the overall 
Article. 
'Article 40 
1. Members agree that some licensing practices or conditions pertaining to intellectual 
property rights which restrain competition may have adverse effects on trade and may 
impede the transfer and dissemination of technology. 
2. Nothing in this Agreement shall prevent Members from specifying in their legislation 
licensing practices or conditions that may in particular cases constitute an abuse of 
intellectual property rights having an adverse effect on competition in the relevant 
market. As provided above, a Member may adopt, consistently with the other provisions 
of this Agreement, appropriate measures to prevent or control such practices, which may 
include for example exclusive grant back conditions, conditions preventing challenges to 
validity and coercive package licensing, in the light of the relevant laws and regulations of 
that Member. 
3. Each Member shall enter, upon request, into consultations with any other Member 
which has cause to believe that an intellectual property right owner that is a national 
or domiciliary of the Member to which the request for consultations has been 
addressed is undertaking practices in violation of the requesting Member's laws and 
regulations on the subject matter of this Section, and which wishes to secure 
compliance with such legislation, without prejudice to any action under the law and to 
the full freedom of an ultimate decision of either Member. The Member addressed 
shall accord full and sympathetic consideration to, and shall afford adequate 
opportunity for, consultations with the requesting Member, and shall cooperate 
through supply of publicly available non-confidential information of relevance to the 
matter in question and of other information available to the Member, subject to 
domestic law and to the conclusion of mutually satisfactory agreements concerning 






4. A Member whose nationals or domiciliaries are subject to proceedings in another 
Member concerning alleged violation of that other Member's laws and regulations on 
the subject matter of this Section shall, upon request, be granted an opportunity for 
consultations by the other Member under the same conditions as those foreseen in 
paragraph 3.'721 
Like the tenth provision of Article 31, Article 40 is intended to provide the flexibility needed 
to apply competition law to prevent intellectual property rights abuses. The only additional 
significance of this Article is that it creates an obligation for members to consult with the other 
members whose nationals are subject to the application of the competition law restrictions. 
None of this prevents the application of the correlated rights doctrine.  
'Article 41 
1. Members shall ensure that enforcement procedures as specified in this Part are 
available under their law so as to permit effective action against any act of 
infringement of intellectual property rights covered by this Agreement, including 
expeditious remedies to prevent infringements and remedies which constitute a 
deterrent to further infringements. These procedures shall be applied in such a 
manner as to avoid the creation of barriers to legitimate trade and to provide for 
safeguards against their abuse. 
2. Procedures concerning the enforcement of intellectual property rights shall be fair 
and equitable. They shall not be unnecessarily complicated or costly, or entail 
unreasonable time limits or unwarranted delays. 
3. Decisions on the merits of a case shall preferably be in writing and reasoned.  They 
shall be made available at least to the parties to the proceeding without undue delay.  
Decisions on the merits of a case shall be based only on evidence in respect of which 
parties were offered the opportunity to be heard. 
4. Parties to a proceeding shall have an opportunity for review by a judicial authority 
of final administrative decisions and, subject to jurisdictional provisions in a Member's 
law concerning the importance of a case, of at least the legal aspects of initial judicial 
decisions on the merits of a case.  However, there shall be no obligation to provide an 
opportunity for review of acquittals in criminal cases. 
5. It is understood that this Part does not create any obligation to put in place a judicial 
system for the enforcement of intellectual property rights distinct from that for the 
enforcement of law in general, nor does it affect the capacity of Members to enforce 
their law in general.  Nothing in this Part creates any obligation with respect to the 
distribution of resources as between enforcement of intellectual property rights and 
the enforcement of law in general.'722 
Article 41 represents a standard statement of the commitments expected by members in 
respect to the enforcement of intellectual property rights. While references in the first 
paragraph to "any act of infringement" indicates that these commitments were primarily 
designed for standalone intellectual property, the acknowledgement in the same paragraph that 
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there need to be "safeguards against their abuse" indicates that the paragraph could just as 
equally refer integrated intellectual property. Given this duality and specifically given that it 
includes a recognition that members need to protect against property rights abuse, it appears 
clear that this paragraph does not prevent the application of correlated property rights. The 
second paragraph which obligates countries to provide; fair and equitable trials on a timely and 
cost-effective basis is not just compatible, it is supportive of the application of the correlative 
rights doctrine. This because it should prevent users from engaging in abusive legal attrition 
which allows users with substantial legal resources to coerces small owners into accepting 
substantially less for the use of their property than it is worth. As there is nothing in any of the 
other paragraphs which could not just as easily be applied to either standalone or integrated 
intelctual properties the Article is consistent with the application of the correlated rights 
doctrine. 
'Article 42 Fair and Equitable Procedures 
Members shall make available to right holder’s civil judicial procedures concerning the 
enforcement of any intellectual property right covered by this Agreement. Defendants 
shall have the right to written notice which is timely and contains sufficient detail, 
including the basis of the claims. Parties shall be allowed to be represented by 
independent legal counsel, and procedures shall not impose overly burdensome 
requirements concerning mandatory personal appearances. All parties to such 
procedures shall be duly entitled to substantiate their claims and to present all 
relevant evidence. The procedure shall provide a means to identify and protect 
confidential information, unless this would be contrary to existing constitutional 
requirements.'723 
Article 42 is included under the section of the TRIPs agreement which outlines the "Civil and 
Administrative Procedures and Remedies" which ought to be provided in the case of intellectual 
property disputes. The first thing to note is the inclusion of "equitable" in the title. This would 
suggest that it is supportive of the correlated rights doctrine because rules of equity were 
established to as a corrective measure to prevent situations where a dogmatic application of a 
strict reading of a law would result in an unjust outcome. However, this article may provide an 
obstacle to applying the correlative rights because its language is susceptible to abuse in the 
form of legal attrition. This obstacle is highlighted by the sentence "All parties to such 
procedures shall be duly entitled to substantiate their claims and to present all relevant 
evidence". If the words "all relevant evidence" is expanded to include absolutely anything that 
might have a bearing on the case, this would provide users with substantial legal resources with 
the right to engage in legal attrition. However, if those same words are restricted to material 
facts specifically related to the alleged infringement, it should not be a problem.  
'Article 44: Injunctions 
1. The judicial authorities shall have the authority to order a party to desist from an 
infringement, inter alia to prevent the entry into the channels of commerce in their 
jurisdiction of imported goods that involve the infringement of an intellectual property 
                                                          






right, immediately after customs clearance of such goods. Members are not obliged to 
accord such authority in respect of protected subject matter acquired or ordered by a 
person prior to knowing or having reasonable grounds to know that dealing in such 
subject matter would entail the infringement of an intellectual property right. 
2. Notwithstanding the other provisions of this Part and provided that the provisions 
of Part II specifically addressing use by governments, or by third parties authorized by 
a government, without the authorization of the right holder are complied with, 
Members may limit the remedies available against such use to payment of 
remuneration in accordance with subparagraph (h) of Article 31.   In other cases, the 
remedies under this Part shall apply or, where these remedies are inconsistent with a 
Member's law, declaratory judgments and adequate compensation shall be 
available.'724 
Because an abuse of injunctive relief represents the primary method for appropriating 
rewards from other contributors to an integrated technology, limitations on the availability of 
injunctive relief represents a key component of the correlative rights doctrine. Obviously if 
injunctive relief is an absolute right it would make it harder to prevent such abuse. According to 
Article 44 judicial authorities must have the "authority to order a party to desist from an 
infringement,” however that does not mean that they must exercise that authority. This 
discretion is confirmed in paragraph where it is clearly stated that "Members may limit the 
remedies available against such use to payment of remuneration". This is preciously the 
outcome which would be directed under a correlated rights doctrine. As long as a user 
demonstrates a willingness to entering into good faith negotiation for the purposes of 
concluding a reasonable licensing agreement, they should not be coerced into accepting an 
unreasonable licensing agreement because of the threat of an injunctive action. Which is not to 
say that injunctive relief should not be available to owners of integrated intellectual property. 
Rather such relief should be reserved for situations where users; 1) do not respond to offers 
from owners to enter into good faith negotiations, 2) except an offer of good faith negotiation 
but negotiate in bad faith which prevents the negotiations from being concluded in a timely 
manner, and 3) when they do not abide by a mutually agreed or court-imposed licensing 
agreement. Given that Article 44 provides judicial authorities with the discretion needed to limit 
the provision of injunctive relief, it would appear to be entirely consistent with the application 
of the correlated rights doctrine 
'Article 45: Damages 
1. The judicial authorities shall have the authority to order the infringer to pay the right 
holder damages adequate to compensate for the injury the right holder has suffered 
because of an infringement of that person’s intellectual property right by an infringer 
who knowingly, or with reasonable grounds to know, engaged in infringing activity. 
2. The judicial authorities shall also have the authority to order the infringer to pay the 
right holder expenses, which may include appropriate attorney's fees. In appropriate 
cases, Members may authorize the judicial authorities to order recovery of profits 
                                                          






and/or payment of pre-established damages even where the infringer did not 
knowingly, or with reasonable grounds to know, engage in infringing activity.'725 
Given that prime objective of the correlative rights doctrine is to protect the right of property 
owners to receive their fair share of the rewards from an integrated property, Article 45 
represents perhaps the most relevant requirement of the entire Agreement. In order to be 
entirely consistent with the doctrine the Article should require that judicial authorities must 
order infringers to pay adequate compensation to rights holders rather than only having the 
authority of order infringers to pay adequate compensation to infringers. That said this judicial 
discretion does have its benefits in that it allows judicial authorities the flexibility to discount or 
eliminated damages for owners who attempt to abuse their rights to coerce users into accepting 
unreasonable licensing agreements. 
As there appears to be nothing in the specific article which appear to prevent the application 
of the correlated rights doctrine, the only issue which remain to be addressed is what level of 
discretion is provided in the TRIPs agreement for the three critical questions.  
Answers to Correlated Rights Questions 
1) Do judicial authorities have the discretion needed to grant preliminary injunctive 
relief and/or permanent injunctive relief on an entire integrated technological product 
when it is determined that unauthorised users are unwilling to license or are unwilling to 
pay reasonable royalties to an owner of an integrated intellectual property, regardless of 
the size of their contribution to that integrated technological property or their 
manufacturing participation? 
In terms of providing the discretion to grant injunctive relief it should be recalled that 
injunction relief can be granted in three different phases of the trial. It can be granted before 
the trial using a preliminary injunction, it can be a remedy ordered at the conclusion of the trial, 
and it can be ordered after the trial if there is a breach of other remedies ordered by the trail. 
While the TRIPs agreement is silent as to whether injunctive relief is in any way dependent upon 
the size of the contribution to an integrated technology, it is implausible suggest that it 
proscribes the grant of that relief regardless of circumstances. As to Article 42 which stipulates 
that the "These procedures shall be applied in such a manner as to avoid the creation of barriers 
to legitimate trade and to provide for safeguards against their abuse". This should be interpreted 
as meaning that courts have the discretion to withhold injunctive relief, if that relief is being 
abused and not a rule forbidding relief for small owners. Indeed, it would appear to be entirely 
unreasonable if smaller owners were not protected from the abuses perpetrated by larger users, 
particularly if those users were breach other remedies ordered by the courts. 
2) Do judicial authorities have the discretion needed to withhold injunctive relief for 
ongoing unauthorised use of integrated intellectual property, when it is determined that 
an intellectual property owner is abusing their rights to injunctive relief to coerce users to 
pay more for the use of their intellectual property than value their property contributes 
to the integrated technological product? 
                                                          






It appears clear that the Article 42 of the TRIPs agreement allows judicial authorities the 
discretion to withhold injunctive relief in order to avoid creating "barriers to legitimate trade 
and to provide for safeguards against their abuse." This discretion is however constrained by the 
provision included in Article 31. So long as none of these provisions are breached the discretion 
to withhold injunctive relief is compatible with it. 
3) Do judicial authorities have the discretion needed to make rulings which set the 
level of damages which intellectual property owners should receive for past and ongoing 
unauthorised use of integrated intellectual property at a level which corresponds to the 
value which the intellectual property provides to the technological product? 
Discretion as to damages is covered by Article 45, which deals specifically with damages. 
Because the word "shall", and not "must", is used in this Article; the provisions of the Article 
represents a standard which judicial authorities can apply at their discretion. In fact, this 
discretion goes far beyond what would be available when applying the correlated rights 
doctrine; as it does not include rules which would require that intellectual property owners be 
granted some compensation, even if it were equivalent to at the lowest lever of the reasonable 
royalty range. As far as running royalties for ongoing unauthorised use, there appears to be no 
distinction between this and lump sum damages for past use.  
Summary of the TRIPs Agreement Compatibility 
Although the TRIPs Agreement was signed when protecting standalone intellectual property 
was the primary objective, it was drafted in a way which provided a surprising degree of 
discretion to the signatures. While this discretion could not have been intended to provide room 
to apply the correlated rights doctrine, there is no reason why it cannot be used for that purpose. 
Indeed, to the extent that the last provision of Article 31, which requires that an unauthorised 
use of a patent can be granted when it is needed to practice a second, represents a recognition 
of the correlated nature of integrated intellectual properties, it can be considered a de facto 
application of the correlated rights doctrine. This de-facto comparison being supported by the 
sub categories of this provision which like the correlated rights doctrine seek to impose 
reciprocity and reasonable licensing terms on the second patent holder. The only difference 
between this provision and the correlated rights doctrine is the magnitude of its participants. 
Whereas this provision is directed towards a bi-lateral relationship, the correlated rights 
doctrine can accommodate multi-lateral relationships involving any number of intellectual 
property owners who make qualitatively and quantitatively different contributions to an 
integrated technology. 
The real question is whether the large standalone intellectual property owners which 
initiated and supported the TRIPs Agreement are willing to allow it to be reinterpreted in a 







10.3  The European Enforcement Directive 
Like the TRIP's agreement the work on the Enforcement Directive726 was initiated out of 
concern for the harm caused by counterfeiting and piracy of intellectual property. This harm 
having been outlined in a Green Paper published by the Commission on October 22, 1998.727 In 
response to this paper the EU Parliament passed a resolution which called on the Commission 
to "adopt a global and coordinated approach comprising of a preventative and a law 
enforcement aspect" to address this harm including a call to consider the possibility of 
establishing a EU level criteria for calculation damages, and proposals for allocation of duties 
between courts.728 This lead to a proposal for a Directive on measures and procedures to ensure 
the enforcement of intellectual property rights which was presented to Parliament by the 
Commission on January 30, 2003.729 In it, the aims of the proposals were described as; 
'harmonising national legislation, supplementing existing internal market measures, and 
supplementing existing anti-counterfeiting and anti-piracy measures relative to the third 
countries and multilateral agreements, (in particular the TRIPs agreement).'730  
Most significantly, and what made this proposal different from the commitment that the 
Member States had already made when they signed the TRIPs Agreement, was its 
recommendations on for double damages and mandatory criminal penalties for serious 
infringements.731 Serious infringements being defined as intentional infringement on a 
commercial scale.732 Obviously these aggressive penalties were targeted at criminal operations 
which had no intention of paying any royalties for the intellectual property, but they also would 
have caught any integrated technology manufacture who was having a in dispute with owners 
over licensing terms. This possibility of criminalizing a business dispute was clearly not 
recognised, because nowhere in the proposal is there any recognition that such measure could 
be abused to coerce users to accept unreasonable licensing demands. Fortunately, these 
provisions were stripped out of the Directive as a result of responses to the proposal and a desire 
for quick approval. The EU Economic and Social Committee pointing out that 'possible penalties 
cannot be entirely dissociated from the substantive law and abuses of IP-LAP rights by right 
holders must not be overlooked  [and that] The Commission's competence in criminal affairs is 
the subject of a dispute between the Council and the Commission currently before the Court of 
Justice, and the Committee cannot prejudge the issue which will become res judicata in the 
future.'733 In particular the contentious nature of criminal sanctions meant that their inclusion 
would have delayed the approval of the Directive past the accession date for eight Eastern 
European countries and two Mediterranean isles,734 and there was no guarantee that the new 
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Member States would be favourable towards such blunt enforcement tools; when those tools 
could be used by large corporations against their citizens for relatively minor infringements.  
Because the enhanced penalties were stripped out of the enforcement directive, it did not 
have as significant an impact as was initially intended. In fact, because most of what was left 
was already covered by the TRIPs agreement, the true and most significant impact of the 
Enforcement Directive was that by creating this European harmonization objective, it 
unequivocally established European Union competence over intellectual property law. A 
competence which was needed in order advance the ultimate objective replacing national laws 
with a unitary patent system and which had the added benefit of avoiding the possibility of the 
World Trade Organization having a greater influence over the European patents than the 
European Courts. 
Commentary on Relevant Paragraphs and Articles 
'Paragraph (2) The protection of intellectual property should allow the inventor or 
creator to derive a legitimate profit from his/her invention or creation. It should also 
allow the widest possible dissemination of works, ideas and new know-how. At the 
same time, it should not hamper freedom of expression, the free movement of 
information, or the protection of personal data, including on the Internet. 
Paragraph (3) However, without effective means of enforcing intellectual property 
rights, innovation and creativity are discouraged and investment diminished. It is 
therefore necessary to ensure that the substantive law on intellectual property, which 
is nowadays largely part of the  acquis communautaire, is applied effectively in the 
Community. In this respect, the means of enforcing intellectual property rights are of 
paramount importance for the success of the internal market.'735 
Perhaps the most succinct explanation of the purpose of intellectual property law is provided 
in paragraph two of the recitals where it states that; "The protection of intellectual property 
should allow the inventor or creator to derive a legitimate profit from his/her invention or 
creation. It should also allow the widest possible dissemination of works, ideas and new know-
how." The first part of this statement referring to protecting "legitimate profit" embodies in a 
shortened version of the main objective of the applying the correlated rights doctrine 
intellectual property law. That main objective being to ensure that intellectual property owners 
are appropriately rewarded for their contribution to an integrated technological product. The 
second part of the that statement is equally consistent with the correlated rights doctrine 
because when owners receive appropriate rewards it provides an incentive to created new 
innovations. The question of what happens when an owner's right to their "legitimate profits" 
is not protected is the subject of paragraph three. This assessment of the need to protect owners 
because if protects the market corresponding directly to the correlated rights doctrine's desire 
to produce avoid harming the innovation environment by preventing the rewards of owners 
being appropriated by other owners. 
'The TRIPS Agreement contains, in particular, provisions on the means of enforcing 
intellectual property rights, which are common standards applicable at international 
                                                          






level and implemented in all Member States. This Directive should not affect Member 
States' international obligations, including those under the TRIPS Agreement 
Paragraph (6) There are also international conventions to which all Member States are 
parties and which also contain provisions on the means of enforcing intellectual 
property rights. These include, in particular, the Paris Convention for the Protection of 
Industrial Property, the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic 
Works, and the Rome Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of 
Phonograms and Broadcasting Organisations.'736 
Paragraphs five and six of the recitals are noteworthy in that they refer to the need to respect 
the commitments made under the international agreements which came before the 
Enforcement Directive. However, as the early analysis of both the Paris Convention and TRIPs 
agreement have indicated no serious impediment to application of the correlated rights 
doctrine, neither do these two stipulations.  
'Paragraph (7) It emerges from the consultations held by the Commission on this 
question that, in the Member States, and despite the TRIPS Agreement, there are still 
major disparities as regards the means of enforcing intellectual property rights. For 
instance, the arrangements for applying provisional measures, which are used in 
particular to preserve evidence, the calculation of damages, or the arrangements for 
applying injunctions, vary widely from one Member State to another. In some Member 
States, there are no measures, procedures and remedies such as the right of 
information and the recall, at the infringer's expense, of the infringing goods placed on 
the market. 
Paragraph (8) The disparities between the systems of the Member States as regards 
the means of enforcing intellectual property rights are prejudicial to the proper 
functioning of the Internal Market and make it impossible to ensure that intellectual 
property rights enjoy an equivalent level of protection throughout the Community. 
This situation does not promote free movement within the internal market or create 
an environment conducive to healthy competition. 
Paragraph (9) The current disparities also lead to a weakening of the substantive law 
on intellectual property and to a fragmentation of the internal market in this field. This 
causes a loss of confidence in the internal market in business circles, with a consequent 
reduction in investment in innovation and creation. Infringements of intellectual 
property rights appear to be increasingly linked to organised crime. Increasing use of 
the Internet enables pirated products to be distributed instantly around the globe. 
Effective enforcement of the substantive law on intellectual property should be 
ensured by specific action at Community level. Approximation of the legislation of the 
Member States in this field is therefore an essential prerequisite for the proper 
functioning of the internal market.'737 
Paragraphs seven, eight and nine together define why the EU felt there was a need to more 
clearly define the legal treatment of intellectual property in the EU through the Enforcement 
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Directive. The essence of which is that the disparities in the treatment of intellectual property 
rights were causing a loss of confidence the internal market which lead to reductions in 
investment in innovation and creation. These paragraphs are included because the messages 
which they are conveying are as relevant to the appropriation of property through an abuse of 
the legal process, as they are to the appropriation through organised crime. In both cases when 
owners are deprived of their "legitimate profit" they will not be able to invest in innovation and 
creation. Obviously if some Member States applying the correlative rights doctrine while others 
do not, this could just as easily deter the free movement of goods within the market. 
'Paragraph (17) The measures, procedures and remedies provided for in this Directive 
should be determined in each case in such a manner as to take due account of the 
specific characteristics of that case, including the specific features of each intellectual 
property right and, where appropriate, the intentional or unintentional character of 
the infringement. 
Paragraph (23) Without prejudice to any other measures, procedures and remedies 
available, rightholders should have the possibility of applying for an injunction against 
an intermediary whose services are being used by a third party to infringe the 
rightholder's industrial property right. The conditions and procedures relating to such 
injunctions should be left to the national law of the Member States. As far as 
infringements of copyright and related rights are concerned, a comprehensive level of 
harmonisation is already provided for in Directive 2001/29/EC. Article 8(3) of Directive 
2001/29/EC should therefore not be affected by this Directive. 
Paragraph (24) Depending on the particular case, and if justified by the circumstances, 
the measures, procedures and remedies to be provided for should include prohibitory 
measures aimed at preventing further infringements of intellectual property rights. 
Moreover, there should be corrective measures, where appropriate at the expense of 
the infringer, such as the recall and definitive removal from the channels of commerce, 
or destruction, of the infringing goods and, in appropriate cases, of the materials and 
implements principally used in the creation or manufacture of these goods. These 
corrective measures should take account of the interests of third parties including, in 
particular, consumers and private parties acting in good faith. 
Paragraph (26) With a view to compensating for the prejudice suffered as a result of 
an infringement committed by an infringer who engaged in an activity in the 
knowledge, or with reasonable grounds for knowing, that it would give rise to such an 
infringement, the amount of damages awarded to the rightholder should take account 
of all appropriate aspects, such as loss of earnings incurred by the rightholder, or unfair 
profits made by the infringer and, where appropriate, any moral prejudice caused to 
the rightholder. As an alternative, for example where it would be difficult to determine 
the amount of the actual prejudice suffered, the amount of the damages might be 
derived from elements such as the royalties or fees which would have been due if the 
infringer had requested authorisation to use the intellectual property right in question. 






for compensation based on an objective criterion while taking account of the expenses 
incurred by the rightholder, such as the costs of identification and research.'738 
This final selection of paragraphs from the recitals are included because they provide a broad 
outline of the standards which are to be followed when enforcing intellectual property rights in 
Europe. Paragraph 17 effectively stipulates that each case should be judged on their individual 
merits. The integrated nature of the intellectual property clearly represents one consideration 
and a determination which finds abusive behaviour would be another. Paragraph 23 states that 
injunctive relief should be available, but Member States should have discretion over its 
application. Such discretion being essential to the application of the correlated rights doctrine. 
Paragraph 24 outlines additional measures which should be available to discourage 
infringements, these too appear to be left to the discretion of the Member States. In stating that 
these addition corrective measure "should take account of the interests of third parties" with a 
particular emphasis on consumers, the standard it is espousing makes clear that the interest of 
the owner are not absolute, and these have to be balance against the interest of society. As 
society and consumers are disadvantaged when owners and users are able to abuse the legal 
system to appropriate rewards that rightly belong to others, this caveat would appear to support 
the application of the correlated rights doctrine which prevents such appropriations. Finally, 
paragraph 24 outlines the components which should be considered when calculating the 
compensation which be provided when an infringement is found. These apparently should focus 
on the "loss of earnings incurred by the rightholder, or unfair profits made by the infringer and, 
where appropriate, any moral prejudice caused to the rightholder." However, when it is "difficult 
to determine the amount of the actual prejudice suffered" alternative such as "royalties or fees 
which would have been due if the infringer had requested authorisation to use the intellectual 
property". The overall objective being to "allow for compensation based on an objective 
criterion while taking account of the expenses incurred by the rightholder, such as the costs of 
identification and research. Each of these criteria will be analysed on their individual merit.   
The "loss of earnings incurred by the right holder" can be described as the profit that the 
owner would have received (but lost) on the on the sale of their products, when consumers 
bought the infringing product rather than their own product. This calculation is reasonably 
straight forward when it involves standalone intellectual properties where the owner is the sole 
producer of the product and the infringement products have a direct impact on the sale of those 
products. All that is required is to multiply the profit the owner makes on each product it sells 
by the number of products which the infringer sold. Unfortunately, such simple math cannot be 
used when integrated intellectual properties are involved. In order for this calculation to work 
for integrated properties, the courts would have to be able to determine with a reasonable 
degree of certainly what percentage of the owner’s profits can be directly attributed to the 
infringed property, and then multiply that number by the number of units sold by the infringing 
user. It is the first part of that calculation which is difficult, but not impossible, and it may be the 
best way of determining damages for those owners which also produce the technological 
product. That said, this calculation is completely inapplicable when the owner does not actually 
produce the integrated technological product. 
                                                          






Like the "loss of earnings" the "unfair profits made by the infringer" calculation mechanism 
is geared towards the profits made by an infringer who has infringed standalone intellectual 
property or properties which belong to a single owner. All that calculation requires is to find out 
how much profit the infringer made on the infringing products which they sold. It should be 
noted that such a calculation will often be much less than the "loss of earnings" as many 
infringers will sell their products at a substantially lower price than original manufacturers in an 
effort to increase sales. These lower prices will lead to lower profits, which makes the "loss of 
earnings" calculation a more appropriate for calculating damages for standalone properties. As 
with "loss of earnings" this calculation also becomes much more difficult when integrated 
properties are involved. Obviously to the extent that there are more than one owner of the 
infringed integrated properties, at the very least that same profit must be divided between those 
owners. But what if the infringed properties represent an insignificant percentage of the 
integrated properties, and the infringer has a licence to all the other properties? Does that 
infringement entitle the owner to 100% of the user's profits or are they only entitled to some 
pro-rata share of that profit? Assuming that an infringer is only infringing because of a genuine 
dispute over the value of the contribution that the infringed property makes to the integrated 
technological product, would it not be an abuse of the legal system to award damages in excess 
of the highest realist valuation of that contribution?  
Because "moral prejudice caused to the rightholders" involves a subjective assessment which 
mainly applies to standalone property infringements, it does not need to be addressed in a 
correlated property context. 
As an alternative calculation basis, it is suggested that " damages might be derived from 
elements such as the royalties or fees which would have been due if the infringer had requested 
authorisation to use the intellectual property". This would be fine, assuming that the owners are 
willing to license their property on terms which reflect the value that the property contributes 
to the integrated technological product. The problem arises when they demand more than what 
their property contributes, and it is these excessive demands which result in the case coming to 
court. If the calculation is based solely on what the owner's excessive demands than the courts 
would be facilitating the indirect appropriation of property from the user. If, however the royalty 
calculation is based upon the best estimate of an appropriate rate for the infringed products it 
would from a practical prospective applying the correlated rights doctrine.  
Included at the end of the paragraph is an observation which suggests that every calculation 
should take "account of the expenses incurred by the rightholder". As commendable as this 
objective might be, it is unfortunately quite misplaced. This because there is seldom a direct 
correlation between the cost of creating an innovation and it value. Indeed, while some valuable 
innovations represent a virtually costless stroke of genius, others may be virtually worthless 
even though they cost millions to develop. This is not to suggest that research and development 
costs should be excluded from the calculation, they can obviously be used as supporting 
evidence for calculations which determine valuations by other means.  
Regardless of the method of the calculation these various compensation remedies, none of 
them represent hard fast rules and should be considered as standards. The discretion as to how 
those standards should be applied, falling to the Members States. Further because the entire 
recitals represent only guidance on how the actual law should be interpreted, everything in the 






actual articles of the law. Those articles which are relevant to the application of the correlated 
rights doctrine are provided below.  
'Article 3 General obligation 
1.Member States shall provide for the measures, procedures and remedies necessary 
to ensure the enforcement of the intellectual property rights covered by this Directive. 
Those measures, procedures and remedies shall be fair and equitable and shall not be 
unnecessarily complicated or costly, or entail unreasonable time-limits or 
unwarranted delays. 
2.Those measures, procedures and remedies shall also be effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive and shall be applied in such a manner as to avoid the creation of barriers to 
legitimate trade and to provide for safeguards against their abuse.'739 
The most striking things about this Article are the provisions which Member States are to 
abide by when they are enforcing the intellectual property rights. First there is the provision 
which requires that the procedures shall be fair and equitable. This is obviously entirely 
compatible with the correlated rights doctrine. Then there is the provision which stipulates that 
proceedings should not be unnecessarily complicated, costly or time consuming. Each of these 
is perfectly worded to avoid legal attrition, which the correlated rights doctrine also seeks to 
prevent. Then there is paragraph two. If there was ever legal working which came close to 
embodying the correlative rights doctrine this is it. First it requires remedies to be 
proportionally, which mirrors the idea that correlated rights should allow each owner to recover 
their fair or proportionate share of the value of an integrated technology. Then there is the 
requirement which mandates that the enforcement of intellectual property rights should be 
applied in a manner which safeguards against abuses. Again, this is precisely what an application 
of the correlated rights doctrine is intended to do.  
'Article 9 Provisional and precautionary measures 
1.Member States shall ensure that the judicial authorities may, at the request of the 
applicant: 
(a) issue against the alleged infringer an interlocutory injunction intended to 
prevent any imminent infringement of an intellectual property right, or to forbid, 
on a provisional basis and subject, where appropriate, to a recurring penalty 
payment where provided for by national law, the continuation of the alleged 
infringements of that right, or to make such continuation subject to the lodging of 
guarantees intended to ensure the compensation of the rightholder. 
2. In the case of an infringement committed on a commercial scale, the Member States 
shall ensure that, if the injured party demonstrates circumstances likely to endanger 
the recovery of damages, the judicial authorities may order the precautionary seizure 
of the movable and immovable property of the alleged infringer, including the blocking 
of his/her bank accounts and other assets. To that end, the competent authorities may 
order the communication of bank, financial or commercial documents, or appropriate 
access to the relevant information.  ... 
                                                          






6.The competent judicial authorities may make the provisional measures referred to 
in paragraphs 1 and 2 subject to the lodging by the applicant of adequate security or 
an equivalent assurance intended to ensure compensation for any prejudice suffered 
by the defendant as provided for in paragraph 7. 
7. Where the provisional measures are revoked or where they lapse due to any act or 
omission by the applicant, or where it is subsequently found that there has been no 
infringement or threat of infringement of an intellectual property right, the judicial 
authorities shall have the authority to order the applicant, upon request of the 
defendant, to provide the defendant appropriate compensation for any injury caused 
by those measures.'740 
The first thing to note in this Article and which will be noted in other Articles, is that while 
first sentence it makes clear that these provisional measures must be included in Member State 
intellectual property law, their use is at the discretion of the judicial authorities. This 
differentiation between a hard rule and a discretionary standard being indicated by the use of 
"shall" for the former and "may" for the later. This is significant because that judicial discretion 
is an essential element in the application of the correlated rights doctrine. In terms of the 
measures themselves, this Article specifically stipulates that there should be four options which 
the judicial authorities have the discretion to order, these are; 1) preliminary injunction, 2) 
preliminary injunction with recurring penalties for none compliance, 3). withholding preliminary 
injunction but ordering measure to ensure proper compensation if infringement is found and 4) 
closing the operations of the infringer by seizing its assets. To the extent that options two and 
four are focused on users which are not expected to abide by court orders, they will not be 
discussed here. Both options two and three are particularly relevant to the application of the 
correlated rights doctrine because they provide judicial authorities with the tools they need to 
solve two problems.  
The discretion to grant preliminary injunctive relief can be used to solve the problem of 
abusive users, who have been un-willing to engage in good faith negotiation with owners. This 
has significance when it is a small owner with limited financial and legal resources who is suing 
a larger technology producer which have virtually unlimited financial and legal resources. At the 
very least the possibility that preliminary injunction can be ordered, should induce users to take 
seriously and respond to infringement claims in a timely basis. Ideally it will motivate them to 
do an immediate appraisal of the claim and enter into good faith negotiations, if there is a 
possibility that the claim is justified.  
The discretion to withhold injunctive relief while ordering measure to ensure proper 
compensation, can be used to solve the problem of abusive owners who are or have been 
unwilling to license their integrated properties, are only willing to license them on unreasonable 
term which may or may not include excessive royalty rates. In this situation, and assuming that 
the user has shown a willingness to enter into good faith negotiations, the only real concern is 
to ensure that the owner will eventually receive some compensation for the use of their 
property. The very existence of this option indicates that this is a situation which was assumed 
can occur and needed to be addressed.  
                                                          






There is of course another option which while not specifically mentioned in the Article, but 
which is inherent in the discretion provided. That is the option to do none of the above. This 
option may be the most appropriate when there is a willing user and there is no question of 
them being able to and willing to comply with a court order settlement. In such a situation 
preliminary actions are not necessary as it will always be the case that the owner will receive 
the court order compensation which results from the actual trial. 
The provisions in paragraph three and four of this Article are also relevant to the application 
of the correlated rights doctrine because they will act as a deterrent to owners who are 
attempting to abuse the legal system, by threatening preliminary action unless their 
unreasonable licensing terms are met. 
'Article 10 Corrective measures 
1.Without prejudice to any damages due to the rightholder by reason of the 
infringement, and without compensation of any sort, Member States shall ensure that 
the competent judicial authorities may order, at the request of the applicant, that 
appropriate measures be taken with regard to goods that they have found to be 
infringing an intellectual property right and, in appropriate cases, with regard to 
materials and implements principally used in the creation or manufacture of those 
goods. Such measures shall include: 
(a) recall from the channels of commerce 
(b) recall from the channels of commerce or 
(c) destruction. 
2. The judicial authorities shall order that those measures be carried out at the expense 
of the infringer, unless particular reasons are invoked for not doing so. 
3. In considering a request for corrective measures, the need for proportionality 
between the seriousness of the infringement and the remedies ordered as well as the 
interests of third parties shall be taken into account.'741 
Like the provisional measure included in Article 9, this Article also begins with a sentence that 
requires Member States to include the possibility of these corrective measures in their 
intellectual property law, while providing judicial authorities with the discretion to order their 
use. Oddly the way in which this Article is drafted does not constrain the discretion of the judicial 
authorities to order or withhold these measures, but it does constrain their discretion with 
respect to whether the infringer should pay the cost of implementing the measures if ordered. 
Whether this was intended or not cannot be determined, but it really does not matter. Even if 
it was intended, if that discretion was constrained by having a "particular reason for not doing 
so", that reason is always present when the intelctual property is an integrated part of a larger 
technological product. The third paragraph is relevant because it indicates that it was 
anticipated that there would be circumstances in which these measures should not be taken. 
The "seriousness of the infringement" could easily be linked to the proportionate share of the 
integrated technological product that the intellectual property represents. To the extent that 
that proportionate share is 100%, as it would be with the infringement of a standalone 
intellectual property, it would be the most serious infringement. However, if that proportionate 
                                                          






share only represents a tiny fraction of the intellectual properties included in an integrated 
technological product, that seriousness of the infringe would be much lower. A similar 
consideration can be taken with respect the "the interest of third parties". When there are no 
other owners which have contributed to a technological product, third party interest would be 
substantially lower than when there are thousands of owners which have contributed to an 
integrated technological product. The extent that these types of consideration can be used to 
withhold the measures stipulated in this Article it is clearly no impediment to the application of 
the correlated rights doctrine.  
'Article 11 Injunctions 
Member States shall ensure that, where a judicial decision is taken finding an 
infringement of an intellectual property right, the judicial authorities may issue against 
the infringer an injunction aimed at prohibiting the continuation of the infringement. 
Where provided for by national law, non-compliance with an injunction shall, where 
appropriate, be subject to a recurring penalty payment, with a view to ensuring 
compliance.'742 
Like the previous two Articles, this injunction Article begins with a sentence that requires 
Member States to include the possibility of these injunctive relief in their intellectual property 
law, while providing judicial authorities with the discretion to order their use. The unconstrained 
nature of this discretion is a clear indication of its compatibility with the application of the 
correlated rights doctrine, which relies on the ability of the judicial authorities to grant or 
withhold injunctive relief to be effective. A compatibility which is in no way compromised by the 
qualified rule, that Member States shall impose recurring penalty payments for non-compliance. 
Non-compliance to a court order is of course much more significant than a mere infringement, 
as it indicates a contempt for both the law and the court, which is generally only exhibited by 
intentionally abusive or criminal litigants. 
'Article 12 Alternative measures 
Member States may provide that, in appropriate cases and at the request of the person 
liable to be subject to the measures provided for in this section, the competent judicial 
authorities may order pecuniary compensation to be paid to the injured party instead 
of applying the measures provided for in this section if that person acted 
unintentionally and without negligence, if execution of the measures in question 
would cause him/her disproportionate harm and if pecuniary compensation to the 
injured party appears reasonably satisfactory.'743 
As this Article is included in that same section as the Articles 10-11 it is intended to indicate 
when judicial authorities may consider compensation rather than ordering either corrective 
measures or injunctive relief. Unfortunately, its meaning is obscured by a drafting omission 
which fails to indicate whether the condition under which judicial discretion "may" be provide 
are separable or cumulative. According to the Article those conditions are 1) that the user was 
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unaware of the infringement, 2) that measure would cause disproportionate harm and 3) that 
the compensation will cure the harm caused by the infringement. If they are separable than if 
any one of the conditions are met, compensation can be provided in lieu of either corrective 
measures or injunctive relief. If they are cumulative every condition must be met in order before 
either corrective measure or injunctive relief can be withheld. Fortunately, it is not necessary to 
argue over semantics because both the recitals and Articles provide clarity as to the intent. The 
recitals provide clarity as there are numerous references to the concerns about protecting 
parties from intellectual property rights abuse. To the extent that these concerns need to be 
taking into account when interpreting the Articles, this means the conditions must be separable, 
because if they were cumulative, it would be impossible to prevent abuses. The Articles 
themselves provide clarity because of the unconstrained nature of the discretion provided in 
them. If it was intended that discretion was to be so severely restricted, the Articles would not 
have been drafted in the way that they were. Given severable intent; the next question is which 
of the conditions would permit the provision of judicial discretion when the disputes involve 
integrated intellectual properties? The first condition would seldom do this, as owners almost 
always notify users of an infringement claim, which means the users are aware of the potential 
infringement. By contrast the second and third conditions are almost always met when the 
dispute involves an integrated technology. The second is met because the corrective measures 
and/or injunctive relief of an integrated technology, damages everyone who contributed to the 
technology. The third condition is met, because most owners who provide intellectual property 
to be integrated into a technology, do so in order to obtain compensation for their contributions. 
Both conditions are equally applicable the deciding when the correlative rights doctrine should 
be applied.  
'Article 13 Damages 
1.Member States shall ensure that the competent judicial authorities, on application 
of the injured party, order the infringer who knowingly, or with reasonable grounds to 
know, engaged in an infringing activity, to pay the rightholder damages appropriate to 
the actual prejudice suffered by him/her as a result of the infringement. 
When the judicial authorities set the damages: 
(a) they shall take into account all appropriate aspects, such as the negative 
economic consequences, including lost profits, which the injured party has 
suffered, any unfair profits made by the infringer and, in appropriate cases, 
elements other than economic factors, such as the moral prejudice caused to the 
rightholder by the infringement, or  
(b) as an alternative to (a), they may, in appropriate cases, set the damages as a 
lump sum on the basis of elements such as at least the amount of royalties or fees 
which would have been due if the infringer had requested authorisation to use the 
intellectual property right in question. 
2.Where the infringer did not knowingly, or with reasonable grounds know, engage in 
infringing activity, Member States may lay down that the judicial authorities may order 
the recovery of profits or the payment of damages, which may be pre-established.'744 
                                                          






This Article is the first one in the Enforcement Directive which restricts Member state 
authority to grant their judicial authorities with the discretion in intellectual property disputes. 
Specifically, it eliminates their discretion on whether they can award damages to owners when 
the user is aware of their infringement. The requirement to award damages being clearly 
stipulates by the wording that states "Member States shall ensure...damages appropriate to the 
actual prejudice suffered".  However, although this does restrict judicial discretion, it does not 
eliminate it. It is not eliminated because those same authorities are free to set damages under 
the rather extremely loosely defined guideline included in the Article. The looseness of those 
guidelines signified by the phase that "they shall take into account all appropriate aspects", 
which even though it is followed by some suggested methodology, does not specifically stipulate 
that that methodology must be followed. Further even if the suggested methodology is intended 
to be mandatory, each could produce a very different result depending on how they are 
interpreted. The clearest example of how interpretation could change the result would be the 
methodology that requires that the damages be set at a level which represents "at least the 
amount of royalties or fees which would have been due if the infringer had requested 
authorization". Does the least amount mean; the lowest rate which the owner had already 
charged other users, the lowest rate which the owner quoted to the user, or the lowest rate that 
the user is charged by other owners for the use of a similar piece of integrated intellectual 
property? Because none of these calculation methods is specified, it would appear that the 
judicial authorities have the discretion on deciding which would be the most appropriate 
depending on the circumstances. In instances where the owner has been demanding excessive 
royalty rates from users, it would appear entirely appropriate to make that calculation based 
upon the rate that the user pays other owners for the use of similar integrated intellectual 
property. Whereas in the instances where the user is engaging in legal arbitrage to drive down 
the royalty rates below a reasonable royalty range, it would appear entirely inappropriate to use 
their discounted rates and instead make the calculation based on the owners asking rate.  
Regardless of which calculation method is chosen by the judicial authorities, nothing in this 
Article in any way prevents the application of the correlated rights doctrine. This because the 
primary objective of applying the doctrine in intellectual property law is to ensure that 
compensation within a reasonable royalty range is provided to all owners that contribute to an 
integrated technological product. In fact, it could be argued that, to the extent that this Article 
ensures that all owners will get appropriate compensation for the unauthorised use of their 
property, it represents an essential enforcement mechanism for the implementation of the 
doctrine.  
'Article 14 Legal costs 
Member States shall ensure that reasonable and proportionate legal costs and other 
expenses incurred by the successful party shall, as a general rule, be borne by the 
unsuccessful party, unless equity does not allow this.'745 
Like so many others, while Article 14 has the appearance of a rule, it is really just a standard. 
It looks like a rule because it stipulates that Member States "shall" ensure unsuccessful parties 
pay costs. However, it is a standard, because it qualifies this stipulation with the caveat "unless 
                                                          






equity does not allow this".  Obviously, this caveat provides Member States with the flexibility 
to grant their judicial authorities with the they need to decide whether cost should be paid, even 
if litigants found guilty of infringement. Presumably if the reason for the infringement was that 
the owner was demanding excessive royalty rates, equity would prohibit them being awarded 
cost for engaging in this abusive behaviour. This at least would be the positions adhered to when 
applying the correlated rights doctrine. Whether this call for equity provides judicial authorities 
with the discretion to order that the owner pay the cost of the user when they clearly have been 
abusing the legal process, is unclear. However, assuming that the call for equity is serious, then 
this must also open up the possibility to punish owners who do so. 
Given that the recitals and Articles of the enforcement directive tend to support the 
application of the correlated rights doctrine the next step is to assess the implications of the 
directive would have with respect the four fundamental questions included at the beginning of 
this chapter. 
Answers to the Correlated Questions 
1) Do judicial authorities have the discretion needed to grant preliminary injunctive 
relief and/or permanent injunctive relief on an entire integrated technological product 
when it is determined that unauthorised users are unwilling to license or are unwilling to 
pay reasonable royalties to an owner of an integrated intellectual property, regardless of 
the size of their contribution to that integrated technological property or their 
manufacturing participation? 
As the discretions to stay proceedings is not specifically mentioned in either the recitals or 
the Articles, the possibility of doing so would appear to rely on intents included in paragraph 17 
of the pre-amble and subject to Article 3 of the law. In paragraph 17 it is stated that "measures, 
procedures and remedies" should be determined according to the specific characteristics of the 
cases and the specific features of each property right. The inclusion of procedures in this 
invocation indicates that procedures can vary from case to case and should vary according to 
the nature of the property right involved. At the very least this opens up the possibility for a 
short stay in proceedings intended to allow that litigants an opportunity to reconsider their 
behaviour. Paragraph (1) of Article 3 states that "procedures ... shall be fair and equitable and 
shall not be unnecessarily complicated or costly or entail unreasonable time-limits or 
unwarranted delays." While the stipulation against unwarranted delays could be viewed as 
prohibiting any stay in proceeding, this prohibition can only be justified if it is believed that the 
stay is unwarranted. Assuming that the stay is intended to allow litigants to have a brief window 
to reconsider their behaviour and those reconsideration may result in a private settlement 
which avoids the need to go to a full trial, a stay of this nature would appear to be warranted. 
Further in paragraph (2) of Article 3 it is stated that "procedures...shall also be effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive and shall be applied in such a manner as to avoid the creation of 
barriers to legitimate trade and to provide for safeguards against their abuse." To the extent 
that a stay would be generally only be ordered when an owner is attempting to abuse the 
system, this also appears to support the notion of granting judicial authorities with the discretion 






2) Do judicial authorities have the discretion needed to withhold injunctive relief for 
ongoing unauthorised use of integrated intellectual property, when it is determined that 
an intellectual property owner is abusing their rights to injunctive relief to coerce users to 
pay more for the use of their intellectual property than value their property contributes 
to the integrated technological product? 
In terms of providing the discretion to grant injunctive relief when the intellectual property 
remains a small part of the integrated technological product, it should be recalled that injunction 
relief can be granted in two different phases of the trial. It can be granted before the trial using 
a preliminary injunction, or it can be ordered at the conclusion of the trial, as a remedy. The 
discretion to provide preliminary injunctive relief is covered by Article 9 (1)(a) which states that 
"Member States shall ensure that the judicial authorities may ... issue .... an interlocutory 
injunction intended to prevent any imminent infringement". Nowhere in this article is there a 
differentiation based on the size of the contribution to the integrated property. The similar level 
of discretion and lack of differentiation is accorded the judicial authorities with respect the 
remedy of injunctive relief described in Article 11. The only constraint on this discretion when it 
comes to small contributions would appear to be included under paragraph 24 of the recitals 
where it states that; "These corrective measures should take account of the interests of third 
parties including, in particular, consumers and private parties acting in good faith". To the extent 
that the discretion to order preliminary or injunctive relief is only required when users are 
behaving in an abusive manner, this is not readily applicable, as abusive behaviour by users is 
seldom in anyone's interest but their own. Further even if it did apply judicial authorities have 
still have the discretion to provide injunctive relief even when it may increase consumer costs 
and should do so when the integrity of the intellectual property law is at stake. 
3) Do judicial authorities have the discretion needed to withhold injunctive relief 
for ongoing unauthorised use of integrated intellectual property, when it is 
determined that an intellectual property owners are abusing their rights to injunctive 
relief to coerce users to pay more for the use of their intellectual property than value 
their property contributes to the integrated technological product? 
Preciously the same paragraphs and Articles are relevant to the discussions of judicial 
authorities’ discretion on withholding injunctive relief. Just as with ordering the relief, 
withholding the relief there is relatively unrestricted. There is however one restriction stipulated 
under Article 9(1)(a) which is that if injunctive relief is withheld, judicial authorities must ensure 
that appropriate compensation will eventually be paid to the owner. According to the Article 
this can be done by ordering guarantees be made by the user, but such guarantees are not 
compulsory.746  All of which means that assuming a judicial authority is confident that the user 
will be willing and able to pay compensation for unauthorised use they have the discretion to 
withhold preliminary and injunctive relief. In fact, paragraph 9 of the recitals encourages them 
to withhold that relief if it is in the best interest of third parties.  
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3) Do judicial authorities have the discretion needed to make rulings which set the 
level of damages which intellectual property owners should receive for past and ongoing 
unauthorised use of integrated intellectual property at a level which corresponds to the 
value which the intellectual property provides to the technological product? 
Damages is first addressed in paragraph 26 of the recitals with the actual law being stipulated 
in Articles 12 and 13. All of these components provide at least some degree of discretion to 
judicial authorities, although there is a caveat which effectively stipulates that those damages 
should be at least equal to the lowest level of royalties which the intellectual property would be 
granted through private negotiations. This stipulation does not significantly impact the issue 
addressed by this question, as the discretion needed to apply the correlated rights doctrine, 
does not require the ability to set damages below that level. As discussed above, ideally judicial 
authorities should be able to set damages within a range of rates depending on the behaviour 
of the litigants, all of which would fall within what can be considered a reasonable royalty rates 
range. To the extent that the case is brought by an abusive owner, that rates should be at the 
low end of the reasonable royalty range. If it is brought as the result of an abusive user, it should 
be at the high end of that range. This discretion to set the rate depending on the behaviour of 
the litigants providing those litigants with an incentive to avoid abusive behaviour.  
Summary of the European Enforcement Directive Compatibility 
While the European Enforcement Directive was drafted before the idea of applying the 
correlated rights doctrine to intellectual property law was conceived, it incorporates many 
sections which can be considered de facto application of the doctrine. This is not all that 
surprising as European law is derived from the same principles of equity and justice that the 
correlative rights doctrine follows and is less dogmatic about historical precedence which are 
made less relevant by changes in circumstances. Examples of this de facto application of the 
correlated rights doctrine can be found in the articles relating to injunctive relief and damages. 
Both of which provide judicial authorities with the discretion to ensure that intellectual property 
rights are not abused, and owners receive reasonable compensation when infringements are 
found. If this is not sufficient evidence of a de facto application of the doctrine; included in the 
initial paragraphs of the Directive is a phrase which provided as succinct summary of its spirit 
which corresponds directly with the objective of the correlative rights doctrines. That phase 
being " The protection of intellectual property should allow the inventor or creator to derive a 
legitimate profit from his/her invention or creation. It should also allow the widest possible 
dissemination of works, ideas and new know-how." 
10.4 The European Implementation Regulation 
This Implementation Regulation747 represents the latest iteration of attempt to create a EU 
patent program which provides an opportunity to be granted single unitary patent with the 
ultimate ambition of replacing existing Member State patent programs with European wide 
unitary program. It is relevant to the application of the correlated rights doctrine not only 
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because it provides details the rights which are to be granted to unitary patents, but because it 
may ultimately replace the patent rights provided under Member State intellectual property 
law. 
Commentary on Relevant Paragraphs and Articles 
'Paragraph (7) 
Unitary patent protection should be achieved by attributing unitary effect to European 
patents in the post-grant phase by virtue of this Regulation and in respect of all the 
participating Member States. The main feature of a European patent with unitary 
effect should be its unitary character, i.e. providing uniform protection and having 
equal effect in all the participating Member States.'748 
 
While the notion that all unitary patents should provide the same level of protection 
regardless of the jurisdiction would appear self-evident, this paragraph clearly indicates that this 
was a concern and it needed to be directly addressed. From a correlated rights’ prospective the 
uniformity of rights is essential, however equally essential is a uniformity of limitation on those 
rights, which prevents their abuse.  
 
'Paragraph (9) 
The European patent with unitary effect should confer on its proprietor the right to 
prevent any third party from committing acts against which the patent provides 
protection. This should be ensured through the establishment of a Unified Patent 
Court.'749 
 
The fact that Article 9 uses "should" rather than "shall" means that it is a recommendation 
and not a requirement. As such it has no impact on an application of the correlated rights 
doctrine.' 
 
'Paragraph (10)  
Compulsory licences for European patents with unitary effect should be governed by 
the laws of the participating Member States as regards their respective territories. 750 
 
One method of avoiding abusive actions by intellectual property owners it to provide them 
with a compulsory license when those abuses occur. To the extent that the authority to grant 
compulsory licenses is entrusted to Member States and cannot be provided on a European wide 
basis by a central authority, this all but eliminates the possibility that they will be granted 
uniform basis. This lack of uniform clearly contradicts the intention of a unitary patent, and as 
such will hinder its development. While is understandable that the Member States do not want 
to abdicate their authority to grant compulsory licenses, this should not prohibit the possibility 
to be granted an EU compulsory license. From correlated rights’ prospective it would obviously 
be far better if a user could apply for one compulsory license rather than twenty-eight. Although 
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it should be recognised any possibility to be granted a compulsory license when an owner is 
being unreasonable is better than none.  
 
'Paragraph (13)  
The regime applicable to damages should be governed by the laws of the participating 
Member States, in particular the provisions implementing Article 13 of Directive 
2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the 
enforcement of intellectual property rights.'751 
 
From a correlated rights’ prospective the questions about the awarding of damages are 
perhaps the most important issues that a court must tackle once it has been determined that an 
infringement has occurred. Under ideal circumstances the court will always award damages 
within a reasonable royalty range, with the levels being at the higher end of the range when the 
owners have behaved in a reasonable manner, and at the lower end of the range when they 
have behaved in an unreasonable manner. To the extent that Article 13 of Directive 2004/48/EC 
(analysed above) grants Member States the discretion to order damages in a manner consistent 
with this practice, this paragraph does not prohibit the application of the correlated rights 
doctrine. However just as with paragraph on compulsory licenses, by entrusting the ordering of 
damages to the Member States it is inevitable that there will be inconsistencies the awarding of 
damages across jurisdictions. That said given The Agreement on a Unified Patent (Court 2013/C 
175/01) (analysed below) grants the Unified Patent Court the authority to grant EU wide 
damages for an infringement of a unitary patent, this inconsistency has been rendered 
redundant. 
 
'Paragraph (15)  
In order to promote and facilitate the economic exploitation of an invention protected 
by a European patent with unitary effect, the proprietor of that patent should be able 
to offer it to be licensed in return for appropriate consideration. To that end, the 
patent proprietor should be able to file a statement with the EPO that he is prepared 
to grant a license in return for appropriate consideration. In that case, the patent 
proprietor should benefit from a reduction of the renewal fees as from the EPO’s 
receipt of such statement.'752 
 
Paragraph 15 is clearly intended to provide an incentive for owners of unitary patents to offer 
open licenses to anyone who desires one. This incentive is entirely consistent with the 
application of the correlated rights doctrine which requires that all integrated intellectual 
property should be available for license on reasonable licensing terms. 
 
'Article 3  
European patent with unitary effect 
1. A European patent granted with the same set of claims in respect of all the 
participating Member States shall benefit from unitary effect in the participating 
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Member States provided that its unitary effect has been registered in the Register for 
unitary patent protection. A European patent granted with different sets of claims for 
different participating Member States shall not benefit from unitary effect. 
2. A European patent with unitary effect shall have a unitary character. It shall provide 
uniform protection and shall have equal effect in all the participating Member States.  
 
Article 5  
Uniform protection  
1. The European patent with unitary effect shall confer on its proprietor the right to 
prevent any third party from committing acts against which that patent provides 
protection throughout the territories of the participating Member States in which it 
has unitary effect, subject to applicable limitations.  
2. The scope of that right and its limitations shall be uniform in all participating 
Member States in which the patent has unitary effect.'753 
 
Assuming that Articles 3 and 5 are enforced, this would presumably mean that the protection 
and therefore limitation on the protection provided by a patent should be consistent across 
Member States. It is hard to envisage how this can occur if the level of protection against 
intellectual property rights abuse, particularly when the authority to grant compulsory licenses 
and damages is entrusted individual Member States which do not include identical provision in 
their respective patent laws. 
 
'Article 8  
Licences of right  
1. The proprietor of a European patent with unitary effect may file a statement with 
the EPO to the effect that the proprietor is prepared to allow any person to use the 
invention as a licensee in return for appropriate consideration.'754 
 
Article 8 represents an enactment of the intent to provide an incentive to patent owners to 
offer an open license, as indicated in Paragraph 15. This enactment is entirely consistent with 
the application of the correlated rights doctrine.  
Answers to Correlated Questions 
1) Do judicial authorities have the discretion needed to grant preliminary injunctive 
relief and/or permanent injunctive relief on an entire integrated technological product 
when it is determined that unauthorised users are unwilling to license or are unwilling to 
pay reasonable royalties to an owner of an integrated intellectual property, regardless of 
the size of their contribution to that integrated technological property or their 
manufacturing participation? 
Not covered by this regulation. 
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2) Do judicial authorities have the discretion needed to withhold injunctive relief for 
ongoing unauthorised use of integrated intellectual property, when it is determined that 
an intellectual property owner is abusing their rights to injunctive relief to coerce users to 
pay more for the use of their intellectual property than value their property contributes 
to the integrated technological product? 
Not specified by this regulation, but rather left to national courts. 
3) Do judicial authorities have the discretion needed to make rulings which set the 
level of damages which intellectual property owners should receive for past and ongoing 
unauthorised use of integrated intellectual property at a level which corresponds to the 
value which the intellectual property provides to the technological product? 
Not specified by this regulation, but rather left to national courts. 
Summary of the Implementation Regulation Compatibility 
While it could be expected that any EU regulation which was intended to create a legal 
structure for a unified patent system which would be implemented throughout the EU would 
include a clear definition of the rights provided to patent owners, including limitation on those 
rights, this regulation does not do so. Further the language of the Regulation which included 
numerous uses of the word "should" reduces the regulation to little more than a 
recommendation. The reason for this lack of specificity and stronger claims of authority can be 
attributed to an unwillingness on the part of the Member States to relinquish their sovereignty 
in matters related to intellectual property rights, and the unwillingness of the European Patent 
Organization to recognise the authority of the CJEU. The net result is all the difficult decisions 
are left with Member state courts, until a Unified Patent Court can be established. While there 
is little in this regulation which supports the application of the correlated rights doctrine, there 
is also nothing in it which would prohibit its application. 
10.5 The European Unified Patent Court Agreement 
This Unified Court Agreement755 establishes a Unified Patent Court to adjudicate disputes 
related to the EU's unified patent program. It is relevant to the application of the correlated 
rights doctrine because it describes how the rights which are created by the granting of a unitary 
patent will be protected. Although the volume of the patents granted under the unified program 
is still relatively small, if the ambition of replacing Member State patent programs with a unitary 
EU program are realized, the relative importance of this Court will be significantly enhanced.  
Commentary on Relevant Paragraphs and Articles 
'CONSIDERING that, as any national court, the Unified Patent Court must respect and 
apply Union law and, in collaboration with the Court of Justice of the European Union 
as guardian of Union law, ensure its correct application and uniform interpretation; 
the Unified Patent Court must in particular cooperate with the Court of Justice of the 
                                                          






European Union in properly interpreting Union law by relying on the latter's case law 
and by requesting preliminary rulings in accordance with Article 267 TFEU'756 
This introductory statement clearly indicates that the Unified Patent Court, is not to be an 
autonomous legal entity which operates outside European Union Law, but rather a part of the 
same EU legal hierarchy which operates within EU Law. While this integration might appear 
obvious, it must be recalled that the European Patent Convention (EPC); which created the 
European Patent Office (EPO) under the auspices of the European Patent Organization, was an 
international treaty and not an EU Directive. This indicates that there was a significant reluctance 
in the relatively autonomous European Patent Office to submit to EU legal authority. This is 
significant with respect to the application of the correlated rights doctrine because as discussed 
above EU enforcement directives provide de facto support for the application of the correlated 
rights doctrine.  
'RECALLING the primacy of Union law, which includes the TEU, the TFEU, the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the general principles of Union law as 
developed by the Court of Justice of the European Union, and in particular the right to 
an effective remedy before a tribunal and a fair and public hearing within a reasonable 
time by an independent and impartial tribunal, the case law of the Court of Justice of 
the European Union and secondary Union law.'757 
This introductory statement is relevant because it clearly states that the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, represents part of the Union Law which will has primacy over the 
operations of the Unified Patent Court. This primacy is important because it can be argued that 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms mandates an application of the correlated 
rights doctrine as will be discussed in Chapter 11. 
'Article 1 
Unified Patent Court 
A Unified Patent Court for the settlement of disputes relating to European patents and 
European patents with unitary effect is hereby established. 
The Unified Patent Court shall be a court common to the Contracting Member States 
and thus subject to the same obligations under Union law as any national court of the 
Contracting Member States. 
Article 20 
Primacy of and respect for Union law  
The Court shall apply Union law in its entirety and shall respect its primacy.  
Article 24  
Sources of law  
                                                          







(1) In full compliance with Article 20, when hearing a case brought before it under this 
Agreement, the Court shall base its decisions on:  
(a) Union law, including Regulation (EU) No 1257/2012 and Regulation (EU) No 
1260/20121; 
(b) this Agreement;  
(c) the EPC;  
(d) other international agreements applicable to patents and binding on all the 
Contracting Member States; and  
(e) national law.'758 
These articles are relevant because they validate the introductory statements which indicate 
that unified patents are subject and subservient to EU Law, including the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and Freedoms. 
'Article 22  
Liability for damage caused by infringements of Union law  
(1) The Contracting Member States are jointly and severally liable for damage resulting 
from an infringement of Union law by the Court of Appeal, in accordance with Union 
law concerning non-contractual liability of Member States for damage caused by their 
national courts breaching Union law.  
(2) An action for such damages shall be brought against the Contracting Member State 
where the claimant has its residence or principal place of business or, in the absence 
of residence or principal place of business, place of business, before the competent 
authority of that Contracting Member State. Where the claimant does not have its 
residence, or principal place of business or, in the absence of residence or principal 
place of business, place of business in a Contracting Member State, the claimant may 
bring such an action against the Contracting Member State where the Court of Appeal 
has its seat, before the competent authority of that Contracting Member State. 
The competent authority shall apply the lex fori, with the exception of its private 
international law, to all questions not regulated by Union law or by this Agreement. 
The claimant shall be entitled to obtain the entire amount of damages awarded by the 
competent authority from the Contracting Member State against which the action was 
brought.'759 
Article 22 provides both owners and users of an integrated intellectual property (which has 
been granted a unitary patent) an extremely useful tool for ensuring that the courts treat their 
disputes in a fair and reasonable manner by awarding damages within the reasonable royalty 
range. If courts award damages which are below a reasonable royalty range, the owner can 
theoretically sue the contracting state for the difference. Alternatively, if the courts award 
damages which are substantially above a reasonable royalty range, the infringer can 
theoretically sue contracting state for that difference.  
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Right to prevent the direct use of the invention  
A patent shall confer on its proprietor the right to prevent any third party not having 
the proprietor's consent from the following:  
(a) making, offering, placing on the market or using a product which is the subject 
matter of the patent, or importing or storing the product for those purposes;  
(b) using a process which is the subject matter of the patent or, where the third 
party knows, or should have known, that the use of the process is prohibited 
without the consent of the patent proprietor, offering the process for use within 
the territory of the Contracting Member States in which that patent has effect;  
(c) offering, placing on the market, using, or importing or storing for those purposes 
a product obtained directly by a process which is the subject matter of the patent. 
Article 26  
Right to prevent the indirect use of the invention  
(1) A patent shall confer on its proprietor the right to prevent any third party not having 
the proprietor's consent from supplying or offering to supply, within the territory of 
the Contracting Member States in which that patent has effect, any person other than 
a party entitled to exploit the patented invention, with means, relating to an essential 
element of that invention, for putting it into effect therein, when the third party 
knows, or should have known, that those means are suitable and intended for putting 
that invention into effect.'760 
These articles provide a standard description of the exclusive rights which are provided to an 
intellectual property when it is patented. If these Articles are not somehow limited by other 
Articles they would provide owners with an absolute right, which would be immune from the 
application of the correlated rights doctrine. Those limitations are described below. 
'Article 32  
Competence of the Court  
(1) The Court shall have exclusive competence in respect of:  
(a) actions for actual or threatened infringements of patents and supplementary 
protection certificates and related defences, including counterclaims concerning 
licences;  
(b) actions for declarations of non-infringement of patents and supplementary 
protection certificates;  
(c) actions for provisional and protective measures and injunctions;  
(d) actions for revocation of patents and for declaration of invalidity of 
supplementary protection certificates;  
(e) counterclaims for revocation of patents and for declaration of invalidity of 
supplementary protection certificates;  
                                                          






(f) actions for damages or compensation derived from the provisional protection 
conferred by a published European patent application;  
(g) actions relating to the use of the invention prior to the granting of the patent or 
to the right based on prior use of the invention;  
(h) actions for compensation for licences on the basis of Article 8 of Regulation (EU) 
No 1257/2012;'761 
Article 32 is relevant to the application of the correlated rights doctrine because it defines 
the remedies which the court can impose as a result of an infringement. These include; 
injunctive relief, (Article 32c), damages (Article 32f), and setting compensation rates for a 
voluntary open license contract, (Article 32h). Noticeable by its absence it the authority to issue 
compulsory licenses to users when an owner is unreasonable in their licensing demands. As was 
discussed in the analysis of Regulation (EU) 1257/2012 (provided above) this authority is 
reserved for Member State courts.  
'Article 42  
Proportionality and fairness  
(1) The Court shall deal with litigation in ways which are proportionate to the 
importance and complexity thereof.  
(2) The Court shall ensure that the rules, procedures and remedies provided for in this 
Agreement and in the Statute are used in a fair and equitable manner and do not 
distort competition.'762 
While Article 32 provides the court with the authority to impose various remedies, it does 
not provide any guidance on how that authority is to be used. As such Article 42 perhaps best 
represents the approach that the courts are expected to take when dealing with unitary patent 
disputes. Significantly this article states that court "shall ensure" not "should ensure" that the 
remedies provided for in this Agreement and in the Statute; “are used in a fair and equitable 
manner and do not distort competition". The use of "shall" and not "should" places much more 
of a burden on the courts comply with the terms included in the Article. Just as significant than 
the use of "shall" are the terms which need to be applied when constructing remedies. The 
requirement that the remedies be "fair and equitable" representing the principle justification 
for applying the correlative rights doctrine to integrated intellectual properties. Indeed, to the 
extent that it is practically impossible for a court to construct "fair and equitable" remedies 
without using some measure of value which is proportional to the intellectual properties’ 
contribution to the integrated technology, this Article could have just easily incorporated a 
requirement to apply the correlated rights doctrine when they are involved. 
'Article 61  
Freezing orders  
(1) At the request of the applicant which has presented reasonably available evidence 
to support the claim that the patent has been infringed or is about to be infringed the 
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Court may, even before the commencement of proceedings on the merits of the case, 
order a party not to remove from its jurisdiction any assets located therein, or not to 
deal in any assets, whether located within its jurisdiction or not. 
Article 62  
Provisional and protective measures  
(1) The Court may, by way of order, grant injunctions against an alleged infringer or 
against an intermediary whose services are used by the alleged infringer, intended to 
prevent any imminent infringement, to prohibit, on a provisional basis and subject, 
where appropriate, to a recurring penalty payment, the continuation of the alleged 
infringement or to make such continuation subject to the lodging of guarantees 
intended to ensure the compensation of the right holder.  
(2) The Court shall have the discretion to weigh up the interests of the parties and in 
particular to take into account the potential harm for either of the parties resulting 
from the granting or the refusal of the injunction.  
(3) The Court may also order the seizure or delivery up of the products suspected of 
infringing a patent so as to prevent their entry into, or movement, within the channels 
of commerce. If the applicant demonstrates circumstances likely to endanger the 
recovery of damages, the Court may order the precautionary seizure of the movable 
and immovable property of the alleged infringer, including the blocking of the bank 
accounts and of other assets of the alleged infringer. 
Article 63  
Permanent injunctions  
(1) Where a decision is taken finding an infringement of a patent, the Court may grant 
an injunction against the infringer aimed at prohibiting the continuation of the 
infringement. The Court may also grant such injunction against an intermediary whose 
services are being used by a third party to infringe a patent.  
(2) Where appropriate, non-compliance with the injunction referred to in paragraph 1 
shall be subject to a recurring penalty payment payable to the Court.'763 
All three of these articles relate to some form of injunctive relief. Articles 61 and 62 
representing something akin to preliminary injunctive relief, with Article 63 representing 
injunctive relief as a remedy ordered in resolution of the dispute. One of the most noteworthy 
aspect of each of these Articles is that in each uses the word "may" rather than "shall", which 
means that all of them provide the courts with discretion to decide whether such relief should 
be granted. The fact that the court can withhold injunctive, even relief when infringement has 
been proven; is supportive of the application of the correlated rights doctrine, because it means 
that the court is allowed to differentiate between a pirate and a commercial royalty rate dispute. 
Obviously while it would be appropriate to provide injunctive relief against infringers who can 
be described as pirates, the same cannot for an integrated technology manufacturer who is in 
royalty dispute with an unreasonable owner. This would appear to be precisely the sort of 
considerations which Article 62(2) is designed to address. While it may be in the interest of the 
                                                          






owners to coerce manufacturers of an integrated technological product into paying excessive 
royalty rates for their contribution, the interest of the manufacturers to be able to pay a 
reasonable price for the use of an integrated property, outweighs that interest. Alternatively, 
while it may be in the interest of manufacturers to pay a trivial amount for the use of an 
integrated intellectual properties, that interest is outweighed by owner's interest in receiving in 
a reason return on the value that his property contributes to the integrated technological 
product. It should be noted, that these interests can be juxtaposed both on an aggregate and 
individual basis, and there is nothing in these articles which would prevent the granting or 
withholding of injunctive relief based upon the size of the contribution to the integrated 
intellectual properties which are required for the technological product. 
Article 64  
Corrective measures in infringement proceedings  
(1) Without prejudice to any damages due to the injured party by reason of the 
infringement, and without compensation of any sort, the Court may order, at the 
request of the applicant, that appropriate measures be taken with regard to products 
found to be infringing a patent and, in appropriate cases, with regard to materials and 
implements principally used in the creation or manufacture of those products.  
(2) Such measures shall include: (a) a declaration of infringement; (b) recalling the 
products from the channels of commerce; (c) depriving the product of its infringing 
property; (d) definitively removing the products from the channels of commerce; or 
(e) the destruction of the products and/or of the materials and implements concerned. 
UPC/en 68  
(3) The Court shall order that those measures be carried out at the expense of the 
infringer, unless particular reasons are invoked for not doing so.  
(4) In considering a request for corrective measures pursuant to this Article, the Court 
shall take into account the need for proportionality between the seriousness of the 
infringement and the remedies to be ordered, the willingness of the infringer to 
convert the materials into a non-infringing state, as well as the interests of third 
parties.764 
While this Article includes five measures which may be ordered by the court, the use of the 
word "may" means that it is not significantly different from Articles 61-63 when it comes to 
injunctive relief. If anything, the invocation that the court should act "proportionally" and take 
into consideration the "interest of the "interests of third parties", enhances the notion that 
when dealing with integrated intellectual property the court should apply the correlated rights 
doctrine. 
Article 68  
Award of damages  
                                                          






(1) The Court shall, at the request of the injured party, order the infringer who 
knowingly, or with reasonable grounds to know, engaged in a patent infringing activity, 
to pay the injured party damages appropriate to the harm actually suffered by that 
party as a result of the infringement.  
(2) The injured party shall, to the extent possible, be placed in the position it would 
have been in if no infringement had taken place. The infringer shall not benefit from 
the infringement. However, damages shall not be punitive. 
(3) When the Court sets the damages:  
(a) it shall take into account all appropriate aspects, such as the negative economic 
consequences, including lost profits, which the injured party has suffered, any 
unfair profits made by the infringer and, in appropriate cases, elements other than 
economic factors, such as the moral prejudice caused to the injured party by the 
infringement; or  
(b) as an alternative to point (a), it may, in appropriate cases, set the damages as a 
lump sum on the basis of elements such as at least the amount of the royalties or 
fees which would have been due if the infringer had requested authorisation to use 
the patent in question.  
(4) Where the infringer did not knowingly, or with reasonable grounds to know, engage 
in the infringing activity, the Court may order the recovery of profits or the payment 
of compensation.765 
From a correlated rights’ prospective the questions about the awarding of damages are 
perhaps the most important issues that a court has to tackle once it has been determined that 
an infringement has occurred. Under ideal circumstances the court will always award damages 
within a reasonable royalty range, with the levels being at the higher end of the range when the 
owner has behaved in a reasonable manner, and at the lower end of the range when they have 
behaved in an unreasonable manner. As it is possible under the instructions provided in Article 
68 facilitates this kind of outcome, it must be considered supportive of the application of the 
correlated rights doctrine. The requirement that the court order damages can be found in the 
paragraph (1) of the article where it states that the court "shall, at the request of the injured 
party, order the infringer who knowingly, or with reasonable grounds to know, engaged in a 
patent infringing activity, to pay". Only in the case of a where the infringer did not know they 
were infringing, does the court have any discretion as to not ordering damages. It should be 
pointed out that while the intent of this subsection of the article is to protect unwitting infringers 
from facing charges for their accidental infringement, it has the unintended consequence of 
encouraging wilful ignorance and increasing the possibilities of legal attrition. It increases wilful 
ignorance because it rewards ignorance and it facilitates legal attrition because it allows 
infringers to claim ignorance. The requirement that damages stay within a reasonable royalty 
range is evident in the fact that the Article states that damages "shall" cover "harm actually 
suffered" and "shall not be punitive". The discretion to set damages at the higher end of the 
range is provided by paragraph 3(3) of the Article. This because every owner that offers a license 
to their integrated intellectual property on at rates within the reasonable royalty range must be 
considered reasonable, even if that royalty is at the high end of that range. Presumably if the 
                                                          






court views the owner as a reasonable and willing licensor, they should set damages according 
to that paragraph. Alternatively, if the owner of an integrated intellectual property is either an 
unwilling licensor or demands a rate which is higher than the reasonable royalty range the court 
can set damages according to paragraph 3(a), which rather than focusing exclusively on the 
impact on the owner, also takes into consideration the "unfair profits" made by the infringer. 
Assuming that the reasonable royalty range, represents a subjective range of the value which 
the integrated intellectual property provides to the integrated technological product, this value 
must also represent a subjective range of the unfair profits made by the infringer, well as the 
actual harm suffered by the owner. Further assuming a court determines that the only reason 
why the case has come to court is because the owner has been demanded excessive royalties, 
it would appear entirely inappropriate to not reward that behaviour by setting royalties at the 
high end of the range. Rather they should set it at the low end of the range which would not 
only punish the owner’s unreasonable behaviour but provide a disincentive to other owners 
considering behaving in the same manner. In either case so long as the court sets the rate within 




The parties may, at any time in the course of proceedings, conclude their case by way 
of settlement, which shall be confirmed by a decision of the Court. A patent may not 
be revoked or limited by way of settlement.'766 
Article 79 is relevant only in so far as it helps to answer the question about whether the court 
can encourage a settlement by staying the case.  
Answers to Correlated Questions 
1) Do judicial authorities have the discretion needed to grant preliminary injunctive 
relief and/or permanent injunctive relief on an entire integrated technological product 
when it is determined that unauthorised users are unwilling to license or are unwilling to 
pay reasonable royalties to an owner of an integrated intellectual property, regardless of 
the size of their contribution to that integrated technological property or their 
manufacturing participation? 
According to Articles 61-63 the court is granted the discretion to decide whether various 
forms of injunctive relief should be ordered. As there are no limitation placed upon that 
authorization which would prevent them from ordering injunctive relief, this would tend to 
suggest that they can order it even when the infringed intellectual property represents a small 
contribution the technological product, even when the owner is a non-practicing entity. 
2) Do judicial authorities have the discretion needed to withhold injunctive relief for 
ongoing unauthorised use of integrated intellectual property, when it is determined that 
an intellectual property owner is abusing their rights to injunctive relief to coerce users to 
                                                          






pay more for the use of their intellectual property than value their property contributes 
to the integrated technological product? 
According to Articles 61-63 the court is granted the discretion to decide whether various 
forms of injunctive relief should be ordered. As there are no limitation placed upon that 
authorization which would prevent them from withholding injunctive relief, this would tend to 
suggest that they can withhold the relief when they find that intellectual property owners are 
abusing their rights. Assuming that the court withholds injunctive relief even when an 
infringement is found, the question then becomes one of determining the ongoing damages 
which are required to be paid for an ongoing infringement. 
3) Do judicial authorities have the discretion needed to make rulings which set the 
level of damages which intellectual property owners should receive for past and ongoing 
unauthorised use of integrated intellectual property at a level which corresponds to the 
value which the intellectual property provides to the technological product? 
Article 68 both requires the court to pay damages and sets the range of damages that the 
court can order to be paid at a level which can be described as falling within the reasonable 
royalty range. It also provides the court with the discretion to order damages within that range, 
which means that damages can be set at different levels depending on the reasonableness of 
both the owner and user. In a case where the court withholds injunctive relief the infringer 
obviously would be a knowledgeable of the infringement, so the same rules would apply. 
Summary of the Unified Court Agreement Compatibility 
There is nothing in this agreement which would prevent the application of the correlated 
rights doctrine. In all of the matters central to its application the court has sufficient discretion 
to ensure the rights provided under a unified patent are both protected and protected from 
abuse. Further the agreement clearly incorporates a spirit of equity and reasonableness which 
can only be achieved through the application of the doctrine. Even more important than spirit, 
is the recognition of the primacy of EU Law, including the Charter of Fundamental Rights and 
Freedoms which arguably mandate the application of a de facto correlated rights treatment, if 
not the doctrine itself.  
10.6 The German Patent Act 
Germany's Patent Act767 was selected for analysis because it is the principle law which 
protects new innovations in Germany. Included in it is the requirements for patentability, the 
legal proceedings for determining infringement and the remedies available when infringement 
is found. In its 36-year history it has been amended many times, including the 2013 amendments 
which brought the law into conformity with the EU Enforcement Directive. Like in most 
countries, this law was initially drafted at a time when standalone intellectual property was the 
primary type of intellectual property being protected. While the remnants of objective are still 
visible it is clear that there have been significant efforts to modify this law because of the 
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increases in integrated technologies which have contributions from multiple intellectual 
property owners.  
Commentary on Relevant Sections 
'§9 The patent shall have the effect that the proprietor of the patent alone shall be 
entitled to use the patented invention within the scope of the law in force. In the 
absence of the consent of the proprietor of the patent, any third party shall be 
prohibited from 
1.producing, offering, putting on the market or using a product which is the subject-
matter of the patent, or from either importing or possessing such a product for the 
purposes referred to; 
2.using a process which is the subject-matter of the patent or, if the third party knows 
or if it is obvious from the circumstances that use of the process is prohibited in the 
absence of the consent of the proprietor of the patent, from offering the process for 
use within the territorial scope of this Act; 
3.offering, placing on the market or using a product which is produced directly by a 
process which is the subject-matter of the patent, or from either importing or 
possessing such a product for the purposes referred to.'768 
Section 9 represents a standard initial declaration of the exclusive rights provided to 
innovators who are granted protection under patent law and a prohibition of their unauthorised 
use by others. The nature of the right being drawn from the initial exclusive rights which were 
the foundations of intellectual property law. However, these rights are seldom as unrestricted 
as initially presented as later sections will generally curtail the absolute nature of the initial 
declaration. If these exclusive rights are not restricted in subsequent sections, the correlative 
rights doctrine cannot be applied. 
'§23 (1) Where a patent applicant or the person entered in the Register as the 
proprietor of the patent (section 30 (1)) declares to the German Patent and Trade Mark 
Office in writing that he is willing to allow anyone to use the invention in return for 
equitable remuneration, the annual renewal fees due in respect of the patent 
following receipt of the declaration shall be reduced to one half. The declaration shall 
be recorded in the Register and published in the Patent Gazette (Patentblatt). 
(2) The declaration shall be inadmissible as long as there is an entry in the Register 
regarding the grant of an exclusive licence (section 30 (4)) or an application is pending 
before the German Patent and Trade Mark Office for such entry to be made. 
(3) Any person who, subsequent to the declaration being entered, wishes to use the 
invention shall inform the proprietor of the patent of his intention. The information 
shall be deemed to have been effected if it has been dispatched by registered letter to 
the person entered in the Register as the proprietor of the patent or to his registered 
representative or the person authorised to accept service (section 25). The information 
shall indicate how the invention is to be used. Subsequent to the information, the 
informing party shall be entitled to effect use in the manner he has indicated. He shall 
                                                          






be obliged, after the expiry of each calendar quarter, to inform the proprietor of the 
patent of the use effected and to pay the remuneration for that use. If he does not 
fulfil this obligation in due time, the person registered as proprietor of the patent may 
set him a reasonable extension of time for payment and, following expiry without the 
obligation being fulfilled, may prohibit further use of the invention. 
(4) The remuneration shall be fixed by the Patent Division upon the written request of 
a party. Sections 46, 47 and 62 shall apply mutatis mutandis to the procedure. The 
request may be directed against more than one party. When fixing the amount of the 
remuneration the German Patent and Trade Mark Office may make an order requiring 
the party opposing the request to bear the costs of the procedure in whole or in part. 
(5) After the expiry of a period of one year following the last fixing of remuneration, 
any party affected thereby may apply for its adjustment if in the meantime 
circumstances have arisen or become known which make the remuneration fixed 
appear obviously inappropriate. In other respects, subsection (4) shall apply mutatis 
mutandis. 
(6) Where the declaration is made in respect of an application, the provisions of 
subsections (1) to (5) shall apply mutatis mutandis. 
(7) The declaration may be withdrawn in writing vis-à-vis the German Patent and Trade 
Mark Office at any time, as long as the proprietor of the patent has not been informed 
of any intention to use the invention. The withdrawal shall take effect when it is filed. 
The sum by which the annual renewal fees have been reduced shall be paid within one 
month of the withdrawal of the declaration. If the difference is not paid within the 
time limit specified in the third sentence, it may still be paid together with the 
surcharge for late payment before the expiry of a period of a further four months.'769 
Section 23 can be described as a section intended to incentivise arbitrated licensing 
negotiation of intellectual property rights. Under this clause the government provides owners 
with a 50% reduction in their annual renewal fees, in return for the owner making a registered 
commitment to offer licenses at reasonable rates to all potential users. The clear idea being that 
those owners who want to license their property will take advantage of this discount to both 
lower their costs and advertise their willingness to license. Presumably this registered 
commitment will encourage potential users to notify owners of the intended use of their 
property so that the owners can bill them for that use. This section becomes an arbitration 
mechanism because if the user does not except that the owner’s rates are reasonable they can 
request that the Patent Division fix the remuneration.  
From a correlated rights’ prospective this section provides both the owner and the user the 
opportunity to declare that they are willing licensor and licensee respectively. It also provides 
for a system to resolve any licensing disputes which may occur. Assuming that this dispute 
resolution is done in a fair and equitable manner there can be little question that process results 
in the same outcome as would happen under an application of the correlated rights doctrine. 
The primary problem which may arise as a result of this process is that it may force owners to 
eventually license abusive users who engage in legal attrition at the same rate that they who 
engage in good faith licensing negotiations. Obviously that problem would be avoided if the 
                                                          






Patent Division has the discretion of fix rates anywhere within the reasonable royalty range 
depending on the behaviour of the user. 
'§24 (1) The non-exclusive authorisation to commercially use an invention shall be 
granted by the Federal Patent Court in an individual case in accordance with the 
following provisions (compulsory licence) where 
1.a licence seeker has, within a reasonable period of time, unsuccessfully 
attempted to obtain permission from the proprietor of the patent to use the 
invention on reasonable commercial terms and conditions, and 
2.the public interest calls for the grant of a compulsory licence. 
(2) Where a licence seeker cannot exploit an invention for which he holds protection 
under a patent with a later filing or priority date without infringing a patent with an 
earlier filing or priority date, he shall be entitled, in respect of the proprietor of the 
patent with the earlier filing or priority date, to the grant of a compulsory licence from 
the proprietor of the patent if 
1.the condition under subsection (1) no. 1 is fulfilled, and 
2.his own invention demonstrates an important technological advance of 
substantial economic significance compared to that of the patent with the earlier 
filing or priority date. 
The proprietor of the patent can require the licence seeker to grant him a cross-licence 
on reasonable terms and conditions for the use of the patented invention with the 
later filing or priority date. 
(3) Subsection (2) shall apply mutatis mutandis where a plant breeder cannot obtain 
or exploit a plant variety right without infringing an earlier patent. 
(4) A compulsory licence under subsection (1) may be granted for a patented invention 
in the field of semiconductor technology only where this is necessary to eliminate 
those anti-competitive practices pursued by the proprietor of the patent which have 
been established in court or administrative proceedings. 
(5) Where the proprietor of the patent does not apply the patented invention in 
Germany or does not do so predominantly, compulsory licences in accordance with 
subsection (1) may be granted to ensure an adequate supply of the patented product 
on the German market. Import shall thus be equivalent to the use of the patent in 
Germany. 
(6) The grant of a compulsory licence in respect of a patent shall be admissible only 
after the patent has been granted. The compulsory licence may be granted subject to 
limitations and made dependent on conditions. The extent and the duration of use 
shall be limited to the purpose for which the compulsory licence was granted. The 
proprietor of the patent shall be entitled to remuneration from the proprietor of the 
compulsory licence, such remuneration being equitable in the circumstances of the 
case and taking into account the economic value of the compulsory licence. Where, in 
relation to recurrent remuneration payments due in the future, there is a substantial 
change in the circumstances which governed the fixing of the amount of remuneration, 
each party shall be entitled to require a corresponding adjustment. Where the 






and if their recurrence is improbable, the proprietor of the patent can require 
withdrawal of the compulsory licence. 
(7) A compulsory licence in respect of a patent may be transferred only together with 
the business which is involved in exploiting the invention. A compulsory licence in 
respect of an invention which is the subject-matter of a patent with an earlier filing or 
priority date may be transferred only together with the patent with a later filing or 
priority date.'770 
While the compulsory licensing opportunities in Section24 are not a direct result of the 
application of the correlated doctrine, there can be no doubt that they are a legislative 
embodiment of it. The section embodies the doctrine because it provides integrated 
owners/users with the right to a compulsory license they have "within a reasonable period of 
time, unsuccessfully attempted to obtain permission from the proprietor of the patent to use 
the invention on reasonable commercial terms and conditions" and "the public interest calls for 
the grant of a compulsory licence". It should be noted that the second condition can be readily 
overcome by the simple deduction that public interest requires that complex technological 
products be available in the German market and not excluded because of an injunction granted 
on a small contribution to the intellectual property integrated into that technology. Presuming 
the second conditionality is met, this means the principal circumstances under which a 
compulsory licensee would be granted would be; when an owner is abusing his rights to coerce 
users into accepting unreasonable licensing demands. It is preciously this sort of situation which 
the correlative rights doctrine seeks to address and to the extent that the compulsory license 
does address it, there can be no doubt that the two are interwoven. In fact, it may merely be 
the case that as the doctrine underlying the pragmatic expansion of compulsory license practices 
has yet to be identified, but if identification were sought, it will result in identifying the 
correlated rights doctrine. 
'Revocation and compulsory licence proceedings 
§81 (1) Proceedings for revocation of the patent or invalidity of the supplementary 
protection certificate, or on account of the grant or withdrawal of the compulsory 
licence, or on account of the adjustment of the remuneration for a compulsory licence 
determined by court judgment shall be initiated by filing an action. The action shall be 
directed against the proprietor of the patent entered in the Register or against the 
holder of the compulsory licence. An action against the supplementary protection 
certificate may be consolidated with an action against the patent on which it is based 
and may also be based on the fact that there is a ground for revocation (section 22) of 
the patent on which it is based. ... 
(6) Claimants whose habitual residence is not in a Member State of the European 
Union or a Contracting Party to the Agreement on the European Economic Area shall, 
at the request of the defendant, provide security in respect of the costs of the 
proceedings; section 110 (2) nos 1 to 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure shall apply 
mutatis mutandis. The Federal Patent Court shall determine the amount of the security 
                                                          






at its reasonable discretion and shall determine a time limit within which it is to be 
paid. If the time limit is not observed, the action shall be deemed to be withdrawn.'771 
This section describes the mechanism which makes compulsory licenses a reality. It is 
included in order to emphasize that this method of applying this correlative rights doctrine is 
universally available to all intellectual property users, regardless of their nationality.  
'Legal infringements 
§ 139 (1) Any person who uses a patented invention contrary to sections 9 to 13 may, 
in the event of the risk of recurrent infringement, be sued by the aggrieved party for 
cessation and desistance. This right may also be asserted in the event of the risk of a 
first-time infringement. 
(2) Any person who performs the act intentionally or negligently shall be obliged to 
compensate the aggrieved party for the damage caused. When assessing the 
compensation, consideration may also be given to the profit which the infringer has 
obtained by infringing the right. The claim for compensation may also be calculated on 
the basis of the amount which the infringer would have been required to pay as 
equitable remuneration if he had obtained permission to use the invention.'772 
Section 139 covers both an owner's right to injunctive relief and their right to damages which 
result from an infringement of their intellectual property. In the first paragraph it is clearly stated 
that owners can ask the courts to issue cease and desist orders against users and/or potential 
users. What it omitted from this section is a paragraph which provides discretion to the courts 
to decide whether injunctive relief should be provided or whether the courts must automatically 
issue those orders if an infringement is found or likely to be committed. This therefore leaves 
open the question of judicial discretion as to the provision of injunctive relief. To answer that 
question of whether the courts have discretion in this matter it may be necessary to return to 
the Section 9 which creates a prohibition against any unauthorised use. As mentioned when 
analysing that section, if there is nothing in the later parts of the act which restrict or otherwise 
limit this prohibition it must be interpreted as being absolute. The consequence of this absolute 
prohibition on unauthorised use are however mitigated by the possibility of being granted a 
compulsory license, which would authorize the use.  
While the judicial discretion on injunctive relief might be subject to interpretation, there is 
no such requirement when it comes to damages. This is because paragraph two states that all 
users "shall be obliged to pay". rather than all users “may be obliged to pay". It is the use of 
"shall", which this creates an unequivocal requirement that the courts ensure that owners are 
compensated for their damages. The court's only discretion in this matter is the method and 
level of damages which they order to be paid. But even this discretion is limited by a requirement 
that the damages reflect either the profit earned by the infringer or the royalty which would 
otherwise be charged by the owner. To the extent that this requirement falls within the range 
of reasonable royalty rates it would obviously be compatible with an application of the 
correlated rights doctrine. 
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'§140a (1) Any person who uses a patented invention contrary to sections 9 to 13 may 
be sued by the aggrieved party for destruction of products held or owned by the 
infringer which are the subject-matter of the patent. The first sentence shall also apply 
in the case of products which have been produced directly by means of a process which 
is the subject-matter of the patent. 
(2) Subsection (1) shall apply mutatis mutandis to materials and implements which are 
owned by the infringer and were predominantly used for manufacturing these 
products. 
(3) Any person who uses a patented invention contrary to sections 9 to 13 may be sued 
by the aggrieved party for recall of the products which are the subject-matter of the 
patent or for definitive removal of the products from the channels of commerce. The 
first sentence shall also apply in the case of products which have been produced 
directly by means of a process which is the subject-matter of the patent. 
(4) The claims under subsections (1) to (3) shall be ruled out if such a claim is 
disproportionate in an individual case. When examining proportionality consideration 
shall also be given to the legitimate interests of third parties.'773 
Section 140a does not provide for an absolute right to sue for the destruction of infringing 
products and manufacturing processes because paragraph 4 limits that right if it is considered 
to be disproportionate, with particular consideration being given the "legitimate interest of third 
parties". It is worth noting that there is no such paragraph in Section 139 which deals with 
injunctive relief and damages. To the extent that courts have discretion in this matter, it is 
compatible with the application of the correlated rights doctrine. More significantly the fact that 
an integrated technology manufacturer can apply for a compulsory licence renders this section 
at least partially redundant. That said; when unauthorised users of integrated technologies are 
unwilling to engage in good faith negotiation or do not bother to apply for a compulsory licence 
when those negotiations fail, this section would certainly become applicable. 
'§142 (1) Any person acting without the requisite consent of the proprietor of the patent 
or of a supplementary protection certificate (sections 16a and 49a) who 
1.manufactures or offers, places on the market, uses a product which is the subject-
matter of the patent or of the supplementary protection certificate (section 9, 
second sentence, no. 1) or either imports or holds the product for one of the 
purposes mentioned, or 
2.uses or offers for use within the territorial scope of this Act a process which is the 
subject-matter of the patent or of the relevant protection certificate (section 9, 
second sentence, no. 2) shall be liable to imprisonment for no more than three 
years or a fine. 
The first sentence, no. 1, shall also apply to the case of a product which has been 
manufactured directly by a process which is the subject-matter of the patent or of the 
supplementary protection certificate (section 9, second sentence, no. 3). 
(2) Where the offender acts on a commercial scale, the penalty shall be imprisonment 
for up to five years or a fine. 
(3) An attempt shall be punishable. 
                                                          






(4) In the cases referred to in subsection (1), the offence shall be prosecuted upon 
motion only, unless the criminal prosecution authorities consider ex officio 
intervention imperative on account of the particular public interest in criminal 
prosecution. 
(5) Objects to which the criminal offence relates may be confiscated. Section 74a of 
the Criminal Code shall apply. Where the claims referred to in section 140a are upheld 
in proceedings pursuant to the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure 
(Strafprozessordnung) governing compensation for the aggrieved person (sections 403 
to 406c), the provisions on confiscation shall not apply. 
(6) Where a penalty is imposed, an order shall be made upon motion by the aggrieved 
party and upon demonstration of a legitimate interest to the effect that the conviction 
be made public upon demand. The nature of the publication shall be laid down in the 
judgment.'774 
Section 142 addresses the criminal consequences which can flow from the unauthorized use 
of patented intelctual property. According to this section unauthorized users can be imprisoned 
for up to five years when that use is on a commercial scale, which it always would be whenever 
integrated technological products are involved. While it can be assumed that this section is 
intended to act as a deterrent to traditional counterfeiting and piracy and not as a punishment 
for willing licensees who refuse to be coerced into accepting by unreasonable licensing 
demands, it may still be applicable to integrated technology disputes. If for example 
manufacturers pretend to be willing licensees but refuse to engage in good faith negotiations 
and are not willing to apply for a compulsory license should those good faith negotiations fail, 
what makes them any different than a pirate? Assuming this section is only applicable when 
unauthorised users show a clear effort to take advantage of the legal option available to gain 
authorised use, this rather draconic penalty remains compatible with the application of 
correlated rights doctrine. 
Answers to the Correlated Rights Questions  
1) Do judicial authorities have the discretion needed to grant preliminary injunctive 
relief and/or permanent injunctive relief on an entire integrated technological product 
when it is determined that unauthorised users are unwilling to license or are unwilling to 
pay reasonable royalties to an owner of an integrated intellectual property, regardless of 
the size of their contribution to that integrated technological property or their 
manufacturing participation? 
Using a strict analysis and according to the wording in §9 the answer to this question would 
be yes. An answer which is supported by responses to questions about the current 
interpretations of German IP law.775 These responses indicate that under current law a German 
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Court view intellectual property rights as absolute776 and will grant almost automatic injunction 
relief whenever an infringement is found.777 Neither the strict reading of the law nor this 
interpretation in any way suggests that such relief cannot be provided when the intellectual 
property represents a small contribution to an integrated technological product. Nor do they 
suggest that a non-participating intellectual property owner would be prohibited from being 
granted relief. However, despite this legislative wording and its interpretations, it appears that 
the courts do have the discretion to withhold injunctive under exceptional circumstances. And 
one of those exceptional circumstances appears to be when the intellectual property owner is a 
non-practicing entity.778 Obviously if being an owner is prevented from being granted relief 
merely because they are a non-practicing entity, this would also prevent the application of the 
correlated rights doctrine, as the doctrine does not allow for discrimination between owners. 
However, it may be that this discrimination does not flow from German patent law but rather 
from an application of competition law.779 
2) Do judicial authorities have the discretion needed to withhold injunctive relief for 
ongoing unauthorised use of integrated intellectual property, when it is determined that 
an intellectual property owner is abusing their rights to injunctive relief to coerce users to 
pay more for the use of their intellectual property than value their property contributes 
to the integrated technological product? 
Under the German patent law a user can petition the courts to withhold injunctive relief 
whenever an intellectual property owner is using their intellectual property rights in a way which 
is against the principles of equity and good faith.780 However, according to a strict reading of the 
law the primary method for dealing with abusive owners in the requires the user to seek a 
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compulsory license § 36.781 Although compulsory licensing is the anticipated solution to this 
problem under German patent law, recent precedents appear to favour solving this problem by 
applying competition law to intellectual property disputes.782 The reason why competition law 
has taken over as the primary method of dealing with intellectual property owners who abuse 
their rights can be directly attributed to the complexity and difficulty of being granted a 
compulsory license.783  
In effect the need to apply competition law to intellectual property disputes indicates a 
deficiency with respect to the patent law in this matter. A deficiency which apparently was not 
able to be addressed by a reliance on the principles of equity and good faith. Although the 
application of competition law to avoid injunctive relief is not ideal, it does at least indicate that 
German courts have the ability/discretion to withhold injunctive relief. The only real issue being 
the justification for withholding that relief. 
3) Do judicial authorities have the discretion needed to make rulings which set the 
level of damages which intellectual property owners should receive for past and ongoing 
unauthorised use of integrated intellectual property at a level which corresponds to the 
value which the intellectual property provides to the technological product? 
According to § 139, intellectual property owners can choose between three methods for 
assessing damages for past infringement; actual loss, reasonable royalty and infringer’s 
profits.784 Regardless of the method chosen, the courts have a degree of discretion in terms of 
determining the actual rate which will be applied. With respect to rates for ongoing 
unauthorised use it has to be presumed that although courts do not appear to have the 
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discretion to allow continued infringement, that inherent in the ability to grant a compulsory 
license and the discretion to accept an antitrust defence against applications for a cease and 
desist remedy the courts must also have the discretion to set running reasonable royalties for 
ongoing infringements.785 The central discrepancy with respect to German reasonable royalties 
and those which would be calculated using the correlated rights doctrine is that the former 
focuses on existing license comparisons, whereas the latter focuses of attempting to determine 
the proportional value by provided by the IP owners contribution to the integrated technological 
product.  The question as to whether the discretion of the court provides it with the flexibility to 
grant damages equivalent to the value which an intellectual property provides to an integrated 
technological product is not entirely clear, however given that a strict of §139 requires the court 
to pay damages it can be inferred that those damages can and ought to be equivalent to the 
true value of the intellectual property.786 
Summary of the German Patent Act Compatibility 
The German Patent Act clearly reflects an assumption that intellectual property being 
protected represent standalone innovations (§9), and those properties need to be protected 
against criminal infringement (§142). That said, it has at least begun to recognise that there may 
be instances where the innovations are integrated. The most visible indications of this is the 
section which allow owners to reduce their patent maintenance cost by declaring that they are 
open to licensing, (§23) and sections covering compulsory (§24 & §81). The disjoint nature of 
the Act is also evident in the instructions with respect to remedies. When it comes to damages 
the court is mandated to ensure the owners receive compensation which is equitable, (§139(2) 
which can be taken to mean proportional to the damages. However, when it comes to injunctive 
relief (§139(1)) there is no requirement for proportionality. While this does not mean that 
injunctive relief will be automatic, it does mean that it can be granted to owners who abuse their 
rights to coerce uses to pay a higher royalty rate than their contribution to an integrated product 
merit. These conflicting objective and methodologies mean that while the German Patent Act is 
capable of applying the correlated rights doctrine, it may not do so if it is interpreted in using 
traditional precedents. Also of concern, is the bureaucratic interference which occurs when a 
declaration of a willingness to provide an open license is declared. Rather than let owners set a 
royalty rate within a reasonable royalty range for their license, this Act allows the patent office 
to dictate what the rate should be. While this clearly represents a desire to avoid excessive 
pricing, such interference in the free market is always controversial, because of its susceptibility 
to incompetence and capture. It would be far better to allow potential users to challenge the 
reasonableness of the royalty rates in the courts, where the burden of proof to show that the 
rate was unreasonable would fall on the potential user. Similar but far less concerning are the 
royalty calculations of which are required when injunctive relief as the result of a competition 
law defence. This because while there may be significant adjustments which need to be made 
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to comparable licensing terms in order to get them to reflect the value of the correlated property 
contributed by the IP owner, at least there is a starting point for those calculations.  
That said given recent developments in the application of German patent law it appears to 
be clear the courts have allowed a de-facto application of the correlated rights doctrine which 
means that an actual application of the correlated rights doctrine would also be consistent with 
the legislation.787 
10.7 The United Kingdom Patents Act  
The UK Patent Act of 1977788 as selected for analysis because it is the principle law which 
protects new innovations in the United Kingdom. With its amendments it represents the latest 
incarnation of intellectual property law that which has been protecting property rights in the 
United Kingdom for nearly 400 years. While the earliest laws were primarily designed to protect 
the privileged trading rights of a few fortunate beneficiaries of the Monarch's patronage, this 
changed with the passage of the Statute of Monopolies in 1623, which voided all royal 
monopolies accept for those which were limited in term. The idea of providing temporary 
monopolies to encourage innovative advance representing the foundation of modern 
intellectual property law. Like in most countries, this current Act was initially drafted at a time 
when standalone intellectual property was the primary type of intellectual property being 
protected. While the remnants of objective are still visible, it is clear that there have been 
significant efforts to modify this law because of the increases in integrated technologies which 
have contributions from multiple intellectual property owners.  
Commentary on Relevant Articles 
Compulsory licences: general  
'48. -(1) At any time after the expiration of three years, or of such other period as may 
be prescribed, from the date of the grant of a patent, any person may apply to the 
comptroller on one or more of the relevant grounds - 
(a) for a licence under the patent;  
(b) for an entry to be made in the register to the effect that licences under the 
patent are to be available as of right; or ... 
(2) Subject to sections 48A and 48B below, if he is satisfied that any of the relevant 
grounds are established, the comptroller may -  
(a) where the application is under subsection (1)(a) above, order the grant of a 
licence to the applicant on such terms as the comptroller thinks fit;  
(b) where the application is under subsection (1)(b) above, make such an entry as 
is there mentioned;  
(c) where the application is under subsection (1)(c) above, order the grant of a 
licence to the person specified in the application on such terms as the comptroller 
thinks fit.  
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(3) An application may be made under this section in respect of a patent even though 
the applicant is already the holder of a licence under the patent; and no person shall 
be estopped or barred from alleging any of the matters specified in the relevant 
grounds by reason of any admission made by him, whether in such a licence or 
otherwise, or by reason of his having accepted a licence.  
(4) In this section “the relevant grounds” means -  
(a) in the case of an application made in respect of a patent whose proprietor is a 
WTO proprietor, the grounds set out in section 48A(1) below;  
(b) in any other case, the grounds set out in section 48B(1) below.  
(5) A proprietor is a WTO proprietor for the purposes of this section and sections 48A, 
48B, 50 and 52 below if -  
(a) he is a national of, or is domiciled in, a country which is a member of the World 
Trade Organisation; or  
(b) he has a real and effective industrial or commercial establishment in such a 
country.  
(6) A rule prescribing any such other period under subsection (1) above shall not be 
made unless a draft of the rule has been laid before, and approved by resolution of, 
each House of Parliament.'789 
The first section of the UK patent act which impacts the potential to apply the correlated 
rights doctrine is Sections 48, which describes the general conditions under which a compulsory 
license can be granted. Compulsory licensing is relevant to the application of the correlated 
rights doctrine if they can be granted to integrated technology manufactures when individual 
owners are unwilling to license their integrated intellectual property on reasonable terms. 
Although the grounds for granting a compulsory license provided in following sections are not 
entirely compatible with the correlated rights doctrine, the mere fact that a compulsory licence 
is available is at the very least an indication that intellectual property rights provided under the 
Patent Act are not absolute. If there is one aspect of this section which does challenge the 
application of the correlated rights doctrine, it is the 3-year time period which needs to be 
observed before a compulsory license can be granted. While this 3-year period can technically 
be reduced, the probability of both House of Parliament passing the required resolution are so 
low that it makes the probability of a shorter period a legal illusion. Assuming that the 3-year 
period stands, what this would mean in the first three years an abusive owner would be able to 
demand unreasonable licensing terms from integrated technology manufactures and an 
integrated technology manufacturer would have to acquiesce to those demands if they wanted 
to incorporate the newest advances in their products. Although paragraph 3 of this section 
stipulates that licensee who have been coerced into accepting unreasonable licensing demands 
have the right to apply for a compulsory license, it is unclear whether there is the possibility of 
claiming damages for the time which the unreasonable license was in place. Even if it is possible 
to make a retroactive claim which allows licensees to recover the excess fees that they were 
charged during the first three years and it may be all but impossible to retroactively correct the 
effects of other unreasonable licensing terms which may have permanently changed the market. 
As such this particular aspect of the section conflicts with an application of the correlated rights 
                                                          






doctrine which would proscribe the coerced acceptance of an unreasonable licensing agreement 
even if it was only temporary. 
'Compulsory licences: WTO proprietors  
48A. (1) In the case of an application made under section 48 above in respect of a 
patent whose proprietor is a WTO proprietor, the relevant grounds are -   
(b) that by reason of the refusal of the proprietor of the patent concerned to grant 
a licence or licences on reasonable terms -  
(i) the exploitation in the United Kingdom of any other patented invention which 
involves an important technical advance of considerable economic significance 
in relation to the invention for which the patent concerned was granted is 
prevented or hindered, or  
(2) No order or entry shall be made under section 48 above in respect of a patent 
whose proprietor is a WTO proprietor unless -  
(a) the applicant has made efforts to obtain a licence from the proprietor on 
reasonable commercial terms and conditions; and  
(b) his efforts have not been successful within a reasonable period. 
(4) No order or entry shall be made under section 48 above in respect of a patent on 
the ground mentioned in subsection (1)(b)(i) above unless the comptroller is satisfied 
that the proprietor of the patent for the other invention is able and willing to grant the 
proprietor of the patent concerned and his licensees a licence under the patent for the 
other invention on reasonable terms.  
(5) A licence granted in pursuance of an order or entry so made shall not be assigned 
except to a person to whom the patent for the other invention is also assigned.  
(6) A licence granted in pursuance of an order or entry made under section 48 above 
in respect of a patent whose proprietor is a WTO proprietor -  
(a) shall not be exclusive; 
(b) shall not be assigned except to a person to whom there is also assigned the part 
of the enterprise that enjoys the use of the patented invention, or the part of the 
goodwill that belongs to that part;  
(c) shall be predominantly for the supply of the market in the United Kingdom;  
(d) shall include conditions entitling the proprietor of the patent concerned to 
remuneration adequate in the circumstances of the case, taking into account the 
economic value of the licence; and  
(e) shall be limited in scope and in duration to the purpose for which the licence 
was granted.'790 
Section 48A provides the relevant grounds under which a compulsory license can be granted. 
Those grounds include circumstances where an "applicant has made efforts to obtain a licence 
from the proprietor on reasonable commercial terms and conditions" and those "efforts have 
not been successful within a reasonable period." This criterion reflects precisely the 
circumstances under which the correlated rights doctrine would be applied. It is worth noting 
that in exchange for providing integrated technology manufactures with an opportunity to be 
                                                          






granted a license to the innovations they need on reasonable terms; this section also includes a 
reciprocal component which mandates that the applicant must be willing to licence any 
correlated intellectual property they have on reasonable terms to the unreasonable property 
owner. While it would be more equitable if such a reciprocal arrangement were to require the 
manufacturer to license their integrated intellectual property on reasonable terms to all 
potential users, this at lease is a step in the right direction as it has the potential to establish 
terms which can be considered reasonable for the use of their property, and this would make 
them subject to a compulsory license application if they do not offer those same terms to other 
manufactures. The first three condition include in paragraph 6 are all compatible with an 
application of the correlated rights doctrine, as the doctrine is the antithesis of exclusivity, and 
does not require the ability assigned nor extra-territorial effect. The fourth condition included 
in paragraph 6 is obviously goes to the core of the justification for applying the correlated rights 
doctrine, which is to ensure that all intellectual property owners receive appropriate 
compensation for their contribution to an integrated technological product.  
'Provisions about licences under section 48 
49.-(1) Where the comptroller is satisfied, on an application made under section 48 
above in respect of a patent, that the manufacture, use or disposal of materials not 
protected by the patent is unfairly prejudiced by reason of conditions imposed by the 
proprietor of the patent on the grant of licences under the patent, or on the disposal 
or use of the patented product or the use of the patented process, he may (subject to 
the provisions of that section) order the grant of licences under the patent to such 
customers of the applicant as he thinks fit as well as to the applicant.  
(2) Where an application under section 48 above is made in respect of a patent by a 
person who holds a licence under the patent, the comptroller  
(a) may, if he orders the grant of a licence to the applicant, order the existing licence 
to be cancelled, or  
(b) may, instead of ordering the grant of a licence to the applicant, order the 
existing licence to be amended.'791 
Section 49 describes the actions which a controller can make in response to a successful 
compulsory license application. Assuming that an integrated manufacture cannot apply for a 
compulsory license for three years after the grating of the patent, and as such is forced to accept 
an unreasonable licensing agreement during that period, controller can either; grant a new 
license while cancelling the existing license or order the existing license to be amended. As 
mentioned earlier even if the new licensing terms are reasonable, this section leaves open the 
question about what can be done about the damages which the licensee suffered during the 
first three years. Does cancelling or amending the contract mean that the contract is cancelled 
or amended retroactively or do the new terms only take affect at the time of the decision? If it 
is retroactive then at least the difference between the new reasonable royalty and the 
unreasonable royalties paid should be returned to the licensee. If not, the licensor has effectively 
had their unreasonable behaviour rewarded, by allowing them to keep three years of excessive 
royalties. Further even excessive royalties are returned, it may be impossible to retroactively 
                                                          






correct the effects of other unreasonable licensing terms, which may have permanently changed 
the market. 
'Powers exercisable following merger and market investigations  
50A. (1) Subsection (2) below applies where -  
(a) section 41(2), 55(2), 66(6), 75(2), 83(2), 138(2), 147(2), 147A(2) or 160(2) of, or 
paragraph 5(2) or 10(2) of Schedule 7 to, the Enterprise Act 2002 (powers to take 
remedial action following merger or market investigations) applies;  
(b) the Competition and Markets Authority or (as the case may be) the Secretary of 
State considers that it would be appropriate to make an application under this 
section for the purpose of remedying, mitigating or preventing a matter which 
cannot be dealt with under the enactment concerned; and  
(c) the matter concerned involves -  
(i) conditions in licences granted under a patent by its proprietor restricting the 
use of the invention by the licensee or the right of the proprietor to grant other 
licences; or  
(ii) a refusal by the proprietor of a patent to grant licences on reasonable terms.  
(2) The Competition and Markets Authority or (as the case may be) the Secretary of 
State may apply to the comptroller to take action under this section.  
(3) Before making an application the Competition Markets Authority or (as the case 
may be) the Secretary of State shall publish, in such manner as it or he thinks 
appropriate, a notice describing the nature of the proposed application and shall 
consider any representations which may be made within 30 days of such publication 
by persons whose interests appear to it or him to be affected. 
(4) The comptroller may, if it appears to him on an application under this section that 
the application is made in accordance with this section, by order cancel or modify any 
condition concerned of the kind mentioned in subsection (1)(c)(i) above or may, 
instead or in addition, make an entry in the register to the effect that licences under 
the patent are to be available as of right. 
Powers exercisable in consequence of report of Competition and Markets Authority  
51. (1) Where a report of the Competition and Markets Authority has been laid before 
Parliament containing conclusions to the effect -  
(a) [repealed]  
(b) [repealed]  
(c) on a competition reference, that a person was engaged in an anti-competitive 
practice which operated or may be expected to operate against the public interest, 
or  
(d) on a reference under section 11 of the Competition Act 1980 (reference of public 
bodies and certain other persons), that a person is pursuing a course of conduct 
which operates against the public interest, the appropriate Minister or Ministers 






(2) Before making an application the appropriate Minister or Ministers shall publish, in 
such manner as he or they think appropriate, a notice describing the nature of the 
proposed application and shall consider any representations which may be made 
within 30 days of such publication by persons whose interests appear to him or them 
to be affected.  
(3) If on an application under this section it appears to the comptroller that the matters 
specified in the Competition and Markets Authority’s report as being those which in 
the opinion of the Competition and Markets Authority operate, or operated or may be 
expected to operate, against the public interest include -  
(a) conditions in licences granted under a patent by its proprietor restricting the use 
of the invention by the licensee or the right of the proprietor to grant other licences, 
or  
(b) a refusal by the proprietor of a patent to grant licences on reasonable terms he 
may by order cancel or modify any such condition or may, instead or in addition, 
make an entry in the register to the effect that licences under the patent are to be 
available as of right.  
(4) In this section “the appropriate Minister or Ministers” means the Minister or 
Ministers to whom the report of the Competition and Markets Authority was made.'792 
While §50A and §51 can be considered relevant to the application of the correlated rights 
doctrine in that they provide alternative method for securing a compulsory license, they are to 
a large extent made redundant by the more efficient method of acquiring a compulsory license 
which are provided by §48 and §48A. This inefficiency is obvious if all the various step which are 
required to get to a compulsory license using this method are analysed.  
The first step requires an integrated technology user to convince the Competition and 
Markets Authority or the Secretary of State (competition authorities), that the unreasonable 
terms demanded by a patent owner rises to the level which can be described as anti-competitive 
behaviour. This may or may not be possible depending how anti-competitive behaviour is 
defined. If it is defined as behaviour which seeks to create a monopoly, unreasonable licensing 
terms probably will not be sufficient to justify any action. Assuming the unreasonable licensing 
terms are recognised as being anti-competitive, the next step requires the authority to decide 
to pursue an action. This may or may not happen depending on their resources, their willingness 
to act, and their fear of being countersued by the patent owner. If they do not have the 
resources to pursue the case, it may lay dormant until resources are freed up. If they believe 
that the case is likely to be too expensive to pursue they won't pursue it. If they judge that the 
risk of a counteraction against them could result in significant damages they may also not be 
willing to pursue it. Assuming the competition authorities decide to pursue the case, the next 
step involve them publishing "a notice describing the nature of the proposed application" and 
considering "any representations which may be made within 30 days of such publication". To 
the extent that representations are made, and those representation a nothing more a 
continuation of the legal attrition strategy, the competition authorities are required to show 
them due deference. Assuming that the representations do not contain a sustainable rebuttal 
to the proposed application, the next step involves the competition authority making an 
                                                          






application to the controller for a compulsory license, an action that the manufacturer could 
have done themselves without taking the earlier steps. While the controller will undoubtedly 
take seriously any application from the competition authorities, this does not mean that the 
application will be automatically approved. Just as with an application from any other source 
the controller has the discretion to decide whether they should grant a compulsory depending 
on the specifics of the case placed before them. If this decision is based on the specifics of the 
case it should not matter who makes the application. 
 
'Meaning of Infringement  
60.-(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, a person infringes a patent for an 
invention if, but only if, while the patent is in force, he does any of the following things 
in the United Kingdom in relation to the invention without the consent of the 
proprietor of the patent, that is to say -  
(a) where the invention is a product, he makes, disposes of, offers to dispose of, 
uses or imports the product or keeps it whether for disposal or otherwise;  
(5) An act which, apart from this subsection, would constitute an infringement of a 
patent for an invention shall not do so if 
(b) it is done for experimental purposes relating to the subject-matter of the 
invention;'793 
Section 60 represents a typical description of acts which constitute an infringement of a 
patent. There is nothing particularly noteworthy about this description other than the fact that 
it suggests that any use of a patent without the permission of the proprietor represents an 
infringement, unless the use is specifically exempted. As this section includes no exemptions for 
a compulsory license this would tend to suggest that a compulsory license which is granted 
despite the objection of a proprietor, is also an infringement. Obviously, this must be considered 
a mere oversight in the drafting process, but if pushed to the strict limits of strict 
constructionalism, it could provide owners with an opportunity for extending their efforts of 
legal attrition.  
'Proceedings for infringement of patent  
61.-(1) Subject to the following provisions of this Part of this Act, civil proceedings may 
be brought in the court by the proprietor of a patent in respect of any act alleged to 
infringe the patent and (without prejudice to any other jurisdiction of the court) in 
those proceedings a claim may be made -  
(a) for an injunction or interdict restraining the defendant or defender from any 
apprehended act of infringement;  
(b) for an order for him to deliver up or destroy any patented product in relation to 
which the patent is infringed or any article in which that product is inextricably 
comprised;  
(c) for damages in respect of the infringement;  
                                                          






(d) for an account of the profits derived by him from the infringement;  
(e) for a declaration or declarator that the patent is valid and has been infringed by 
him. 
(2) The court shall not, in respect of the same infringement, both award the proprietor 
of a patent damages and order that he shall be given an account of the profits.  
(3) The proprietor of a patent and any other person may by agreement with each other 
refer to the comptroller the question whether that other person has infringed the 
patent and on the reference the proprietor of the patent may make any claim 
mentioned in subsection (1)(c) or (e) above.  
(4) Except so far as the context requires, in the following provisions of this Act - (a) any 
reference to proceedings for infringement and the bringing of such proceedings 
includes a reference to a reference under subsection (3) above and the making of such 
a reference; (b) any reference to a claimant or pursuer includes a reference to the 
proprietor of the patent; and (c) any reference to a defendant or defender includes a 
reference to any other party to the reference.  
(5) If it appears to the comptroller on a reference under subsection (3) above that the 
question referred to him would more properly be determined by the court, he may 
decline to deal with it and the court shall have jurisdiction to determine the question 
as if the reference were proceedings brought in the court.  
(6) Subject to the following provisions of this Part of this Act, in determining whether 
or not to grant any kind of relief claimed under this section and the extent of the relief 
granted the court or the comptroller shall apply the principles applied by the court in 
relation to that kind of relief immediately before the appointed day. 
(7) If the comptroller awards any sum by way of damages on a reference under 
subsection (3) above, then -  
(a) in England and Wales, the sum shall be recoverable, if the county court so 
orders, by execution issued from the county court or otherwise as if it were payable 
under an order of that court;  
(b) in Scotland, payment of the sum may be enforced in like manner as an extract 
registered decree arbitral bearing a warrant for execution issued by the sheriff 
court of any sheriffdom in Scotland;  
(c) in Northern Ireland, payment of the sum may be enforced as if it were a money 
judgment.'794 
According to Section 61 patent owners have the option of applying to either the courts or 
the controller for relief when they believe that their patents have been infringed. While both 
can provide relief, the controller can decline to with the application, in which case the matter 
will be referred to the courts. The section further defines three kinds of relief which can be 
provided; injunctive relief, destruction of the infringing product, and damages. Declaration for 
infringement and accounting for profits representing one step on the path to relief, and one 
form of damages, respectively. What this section does not provide is a clear annunciation of the 
obligation of the courts or the controller to provide relief, stating only that "the extent of the 
relief granted the court, or the comptroller shall apply the principles applied by the court in 
                                                          






relation to that kind of relief immediately before the appointed day." This lack of specific 
direction or limitations on the relief which should be provided, representing a hallmark of a 
common law legal process which relies more on precedent than specific legislative direction. 
While this reliance on a precedence can be an obstacle to the implementation of new doctrines 
which may go against it, this reliance is offset by the fact that when circumstances changes 
resulting in the precedent creating and inequitable outcome, that precedent can be replaced by 
a new one. As applying absolutist property rights designed for standalone intellectual property 
to correlated intelctual property results in an inequitable outcome represents just such a 
situation, there is every likelihood that new precedents favourable to the application of the 
correlated rights doctrine will be established. 
‘Restrictions on recovery of damages for infringement. 
62 (3) Where an amendment of the specification of a patent has been allowed under 
any of the provisions of this Act, the court or the comptroller shall, when awarding 
damages or making an order for an account of profits in proceedings for an 
infringement of the patent committed before the decision to allow the amendment, 
take into account the following— 
(a)whether at the date of infringement the defendant or defender knew, or had 
reasonable grounds to know, that he was infringing the patent; 
(b)whether the specification of the patent as published was framed in good faith and 
with reasonable skill and knowledge; 
(c)whether the proceedings are brought in good faith. 
§62 (3) is included because it could be relevant to in a situation where an abusive intellectual 
property owner is seeking damages in excess of the value which the property provides to an 
integrated technological product. By including a requirement that proceedings be brought in 
good faith the Act would appear to provide the court with the discretion to take that behaviour 
into account when deciding damages. This obviously would be entirely consistent with an 
application of the correlated rights doctrine. 
'General powers of the court 
99. The court may, for the purpose of determining any question in the exercise of 
its original or appellate jurisdiction under this Act or any treaty or international 
convention to which the United Kingdom is a party, make any order or exercise any 
other power which the comptroller could have made or exercised for the purpose of 
determining that question.'795 
This section is included only because it provides an indication of the freedom of the court to 
exercise its power under the Act. 
'Offences by corporations  
                                                          






113.-(1) Where an offence under this Act which has been committed by a body 
corporate is proved to have been committed with the consent or connivance of, or to 
be attributable to any neglect on the part of, a director, manager, secretary or other 
similar officer of the body corporate, or any person who was purporting to act in any 
such capacity, he, as well as the body corporate, shall be guilty of that offence and shall 
be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.  
(2) Where the affairs of a body corporate are managed by its members, subsection (1) 
above shall apply in relation to acts and defaults of a member in connection with his 
functions of management as if he were a director of the body corporate.'796 
This section merely indicates that there is no corporate shield from infringement.  
Answers to the Correlated Rights Questions  
1) Do judicial authorities have the discretion needed to grant preliminary injunctive 
relief and/or permanent injunctive relief on an entire integrated technological 
product when it is determined that unauthorised users are unwilling to license or 
are unwilling to pay reasonable royalties to an owner of an integrated intellectual 
property, regardless of the size of their contribution to that integrated 
technological property or their manufacturing participation? 
Because §61 provides for the possibility of injunctive relief, the decision to provide relief 
would appear to be at the discretion of the courts.797 However because the UK is a common 
law jurisdiction this discretion is constrained by precedents not addressed in the 
commentary. The constraining precedents depending upon whether it is preliminary or 
permanent injunctive relief which is being sought. In the case of preliminary injunctive relief 
the constraining precedent requires that the decision be just and convenient.798 This 
precedent would tend to suggest that preliminary injunctive relief would be unlikely to be 
provided even when there is a strong case for infringement, if damages would be an 
adequate form of compensation and the defendant is able to pay the compensation.799 With 
                                                          
796 Id. Section 113 
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Reuters, 2011) (herein after Patent Litgation: UK (2012))"There are a number of remedies potentially open to a 
patent owner: A permanent injunction against further infringement or the patent. An injunction is generally granted 
though it is a discretionary remedy.” at 483 and "An injunction is generally granted though it is a discretionary 
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courts in American Cyanamid v Ethicon [1975] F.S.R. 101: the initial question which the court will consider will be (1) 
is there a serious question to be tried? If the answer to that is, “yes”, then two further related questions arise: they 
are: (2) would damages be an adequate remedy for a party injured by the court’s grant of, or its failure to grant, an 
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799 Id. “If the claimant succeeds at trial, would damages be an adequate remedy for any loss arising from refusal to 
grant an interim injunction? If so, and the defendant can pay, an interim injunction would not normally be granted, 






respect to permanent injunctive relief for non-practicing entities, another precedent 
suggests that this relief would generally not be provided when; their claim was small, the 
value of damages was capable of being estimated, monetary payments could provide 
adequate compensation and injunctive relief would be oppressive to the defendant.800 This 
precedent however assumes that the defendant is a willing licensee, if the defendant is not 
a willing license then there is every possibility that injunctive relief will be provided.801 In 
essence what both a strict reading of the statutes and the application of the law as 
constrained by precedent indicate is that the courts do have the discretion necessary to 
provide both interim and permanent injunctive relief to a non-participating entity when the 
defendant is an unwilling licensee, but the preliminary relief is unlikely to be provided if the 
defendant is capable of paying damages. 
2) Do judicial authorities have the discretion needed to withhold injunctive relief for 
ongoing unauthorised use of integrated intellectual property, when it is determined that 
an intellectual property owner is abusing their rights to injunctive relief to coerce users to 
pay more for the use of their intellectual property than value their property contributes 
to the integrated technological product? 
Like the previous answer, as the UK judicial system is a common law system and Section 61 
provides for the possibility of this form of relief, the question primarily dependents upon the 
precedent which apply, and which have not been addressed in the commentary. As mentioned 
in the answer to the previous question, the precedent which relates to the withholding of 
injunctive relief suggest that this relief would generally not be provided when; their claim was 
small, the value of damages was capable of being estimated, monetary payments could provide 
adequate compensation and injunctive relief would be oppressive to the defendant. In the 
particular instance where the court concludes that the plaintiff is seeking injunctive relief merely 
to improve its bargaining position this could be considered “oppressive”.802 So although there is 
little in a strict reading of the legislation which allows for the withholding of injunctive relief, it 
appears that the flexibility inherent in the UK’s common law system has in fact provided the 
courts with the discretion they need.803 Obviously the existence of this discretion is extremely 
important for the application of the correlated rights doctrine, as it provides the possibility of  
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been refused by the defendants, it may be harder to argue that an injunction would be oppressive. The court is 
reluctant to force an IP holder to accept damages in lieu of an injunction if there is no willingness to do so: “the 
court has always protested against the notion that it ought to allow a wrong to continue simply because the 
wrongdoer is able and willing to pay for the injury he may inflict.” A counter-example is found in Banks v CBS Songs 
[1996] EMLR 452.” at 5 
802 Id. “Where the court considers the claimant’s motives to be such that an injunction should not be granted. For 
example, an injunction may be refused in circumstances where the claimant is seeking an injunction to improve its 
position in negotiating a licence (Banks v EMI Songs (formerly CBS Songs Ltd) (No 2) [1996] EMLR 452).” at 6 
803 Patent Litgation: UK (2012), “The court has discretion to refuse an injunction and award damages in lieu. The 
exercise of the discretion will dependd on the particular circumstances of the case, including the subject matter of 







same sort of outcomes which results from an application of the doctrine, which in turn suggests 
that the doctrine itself can be “extracted” from these precedents. 
Even if withholding injunctive relief was not possible this would not be a catastrophe for the 
application of the correlated rights doctrine because, §48 and §48A opens up the opportunity 
of being granted a compulsory license to correlated property owners. Assuming that a 
manufacturer of an integrated technological product has contributed intelctual property to that 
product, they should be able to apply for a compulsory license whenever they are subject to 
unreasonable licensing demands from other contributors. 
3) Do judicial authorities have the discretion needed to make rulings which set the 
level of damages which intellectual property owners should receive for past and ongoing 
unauthorised use of integrated intellectual property at a level which corresponds to the 
value which the intellectual property provides to the technological product? 
A hallmark of the UK common law system is that the courts are provided broad discretion to 
interpret legislation which requires action but does not specify the action which is to be taken.  
not provide as in the case of §61(c) which merely states that the owner is entitled to sue for 
damages.804 It is perhaps because this discretion was too broad that under a subsequent 
regulation,805 the requirements with respect to defining damages were more specifically 
addressed.806 The first part of the this requirement stating that ‘the damages awarded to the 
claimant shall be appropriate to the actual prejudice he suffered as a result of the 
infringement.’807 A further requirement stating that ‘where appropriate, they may be awarded 
on the basis of the royalties or fees which would have been due had the defendant obtained a 
license.’808 While the first of these requirements would appear to indicate that the courts are 
allowed to awarded damages consummate with the value which their property provides to an 
integrated technological product, the second can be appear as limiting the method of calculating 
that value to some form of “hypothetical negotiation” based upon exiting licenses.809 Obviously 
                                                          
804 Jonathan Moss, Annsley Ward, Rafi Allos, Patrick Cantrill, Robert Hurst, ,Jin Oi, Charlotte Scott, Alice Stagg, 
United Kingdom; Quantification of monetary relief AIPPI Study Question Response (2017) (available at: 
http://aippi.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/05/2017_GB_Study_Question_Quantification_of_monetary_relief_2017-05-30.pdf), (herein 
after AIPPA Monetary Survey UK (2017)) ‘The general rule is that the claimant is to be restored by monetary 
compensation to the position he would have been but for the defendant’s infringement, provided that the loss was 
(i) foreseeable, (ii) caused by the wrong, and (iii) not excluded from recovery by public or social policy. The objective 
is to compensate the claimant for the loss, not to punish the defendant. In some special cases, damages will not be 
available where the defendant’s infringement was innocent. 
805 The Intellectual Property (Enforcement) Regualtion 2006 No. 1028 
806 AIPPA Monetary Survey UK (2017). “Regard also has to be had to the Intellectual Property (Enforcement, etc.) 
Regulations 2006 (which implement the IP Enforcement Directive. Regulation 3(1) (which reflects Article 13(1) of 
the Directive) provides that, for a knowing infringement, the damages awarded shall be appropriate to the actual 
prejudice he suffered as a result of the infringement. Regulation 3(2)(a) explains that all appropriate aspects shall be 
taken into account, including in particular: (i) the negative economic consequences, including any lost profits, which 
the claimant has suffered, and any unfair profits made by the defendant, and (ii) elements other than economic 
factors, including the moral prejudice caused to the claimant by the infringement.’ at 1. 
807 Reg. No. 1028 §3 (1) 
808 Id. §3 (2)(b) 
809 AIPPA Monetary Survey UK (2017) “The reasonable royalty is determined by reference to the outcome of a 
‘hypothetical negotiation’, i.e. the sum that would have been determined by negotiation between the parties, 
provided that each party had made “reasonable use of their respective bargaining positions, bearing in mind the 
information available to the parties and the commercial context at the time that the notional negotiation should 
have taken place.” The hypothetical negotiation is deemed to have taken place on the date of the breach. Where a 






to the extent that those existing contracts were concluded as arms’ length agreements with 
neither party having coercive power over the other, they should have resulted in royalties which 
reflect the value which the intellectual property contributes to the integrated technological 
product. In which case this would mean that the courts would be entirely able to award damages 
at that same rate. However even if the royalties are excessively above or below the value 
contributed by the property it is not necessarily the case that the court must set the rates at 
those levels. This because the precedential case from which the  House of Lords indicated that 
courts are not bound to merely examine existing contracts if in their discretion other 
considerations should be taken into account.810 This precedent, in combination with general 
flexibility of common law to pursue equitable outcomes, would suggest that in all cases the 
courts would have the discretion to grant damages equivalent to the value contributed by the 
intellectual property, regardless of the nature of existing contracts.  
Summary of the UK Patent Act Compatibility 
Because the UK patent law has as its foundation the absolute property rights which were 
deemed essential to protecting standalone intellectual property, it is hardly surprising that the 
UK Patent Act still embodies certain elements of that foundation, and as such is not entirely 
compatible with an application of the correlated rights doctrine. These vestiges of the absolute 
doctrine can be seen in the convoluted measures which the Act proposes for dealing with 
abusive intellectual property owners. For while the Act does provide users with the possibility 
of being granted a compulsory license (§48), as well as the possibility of claiming protection after 
a competition investigation (§50A) it cannot be said that these embrace the correlated rights 
objective of protecting users from abusive patent owners in a timely manner. This because a 
compulsory license can only be granted after a 3-year period and the unfair competition 
protection is dependent upon a cumbersome bureaucratic mechanism. This means under a strict 
reading of the Act a manufacturer of an integrated technological product who abide by the law 
must choose between; accepting the unreasonable licensing demands of an unreasonable 
owner or waiting three years to for a compulsory license before they incorporated the newest 
innovation in their integrated technological products. As neither of these options is 
commercially acceptable it is more likely that they will simply adopt the historical practice of 
infringing the patent and engage in legal attrition once they are sued. This of course places an 
                                                          
breach. However, negotiating damages are considered to be “quasi-equitable” and therefore where a judge 
considers there to be “good reasons” to select a different valuation date, he may do so. The hypothetical 
negotiation is deemed to take place between a willing licensor and a willing licensee. Although it is irrelevant that 
one (or both) parties would not in practice have agreed to make the deal, the willing parties will generally have the 
attributes of the actual licensor and the actual licensee: “They bargain as they are, with their strengths and 
weaknesses, in the market as it exists.”quoting (General Tire and Rubber Co v Firestone Tyre and Rubber [1975] 
1WLR 819 (HL))” at 3  
810 Id. “In circumstances where the IP rights found to have been infringed are not generally exploited by the 
manufacturer but are instead routinely licensed together as a portfolio with other IP rights, the court will generally 
offer compensation on the basis of what royalties are normally sought by the IP owner. Faced with an existing 
licensing regime, the court has the advantage of direct and analogous evidence to assist it in making an 
apportionment between the infringed IP right and the other IP rights especially where previous licences by the IP 
owner already record such an apportionment and royalty rate. However, as Lord Wilberforce held in the House of 
Lords in General Tire, even in this type of scenario, there is no rule of law which prevents the court, even when it 
has evidence of existing licensing practice, from taking other general considerations into account. “…The ultimate 






unnecessary burden on the UK judicial system and severely reduce the chances of smaller 
owners receiving reasonable compensation for the use of their intellectual property. 
That said as the UK has a common law legal system, the courts do not necessarily have to 
adopt a strict reading of the Act and can interpret it in manners which are more efficient and 
provided more equitable outcomes. The precedents flowing from these interpretations 
providing a more accurate representation of the state of a law, than a strict reading of a law 
would provide. At present it is those precedents, more so than the Act itself, which support a 
possible application of the correlated rights doctrine. For not only do they indicate that the 
courts have broad discretion, in terms of granting injunctive relief and awarding damages, they 
also indicate that the courts are not restricted to relying on existing methods for assessing 
damages. This discretion will be key to an application of the correlated rights doctrine, as it is 
entirely possible that new legal precedents will emerge which will recognise and reject the 
inefficiency and inequity of both excessive licensing demands and legal attrition. This possibility 
being strengthened by the fact that the Act itself recognises that abusive behaviour can occur, 
and at least offers one method for correcting it. In fact, a recent case indicts that the 
development of a new precedent which seeks to achieve such goals may have already been 
established.811 
10.8 The United States Patent Law  
The authority to enact this U.S. Patent Law812 is provided in the U.S. Constitution which states 
that 'Congress shall have the power...to promote the progress of ... useful arts, by securing for 
limited times to ... inventors the exclusive rights ... under their discovery.'813 Using this authority 
the US Congress enacted of the first Federal patent statute in 1790. The most modern version 
of that statue is U.S. Patent Act of 1952, as amended, which is documented under Title 35 of the 
United States Code. The Federal Law is selected for analysis as it is the principle and highest 
source of law which deals specifically with patent law in the United States. Like in most countries, 
this law was initially drafted at a time when standalone intellectual property was the primary 
type of intellectual property being protected. While the remnants of this objective are still 
contained in the Act, recent case law has changed how it is interpreted with respect to the 
exclusive rights provided to property owners. This reinterpretation having been made possible 
by the discretion provided to the courts by the law.  
Commentary on Relevant Sections 
'154 CONTENTS AND TERM OF PATENT; PROVISIONAL RIGHTS 
(a) IN GENERAL. 
(1) CONTENTS.—Every patent shall contain a short title of the invention and a grant 
to the patentee, his heirs or assigns, of the right to exclude others from making, 
using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States or 
importing the invention into the United States, and, if the invention is a process, of 
                                                          
811 See Discussion of No. HP 2014 000005, Unwired Planet International and Huawei Technologies Co, Limited, Royal 
Courts of Justice. in Chapter 11 
812 U.S. Patent Law, 35 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (Consolidated as of May 2015) 






the right to exclude others from using, offering for sale or selling throughout the 
United States, or importing into the United States, products made by that process, 
referring to the specification for the particulars thereof.  
(d) PROVISIONAL RIGHTS. 
(1) IN GENERAL.- In addition to other rights provided by this section, a patent shall 
include the right to obtain a reasonable royalty from any person who, during the 
period beginning on the date of application for such patent under section 122(b), 
or in the case of an international application filed under the treaty defined in 
section 351(a) designating the United States under Article 21(2)(a) of such treaty, 
the date of publication of the application, and ending on the date the patent is 
issued- 
(A) (i) makes, uses, offers for sale, or sells in the United States the invention as 
claimed in the published patent application or imports such an invention into 
the United States; or 
(ii) if the invention as claimed in the published patent application is a process, 
uses, offers for sale, or sells in the United States or imports into the United 
States products made by that process as claimed in the published patent 
application; and 
(B) had actual notice of the published patent application and, in a case in which the 
right arising under this paragraph is based upon an international application 
designating the United States that is published in a language other than English, had 
a translation of the international application into the English language. 
(2) RIGHT BASED ON SUBSTANTIALLY IDENTICAL INVENTIONS.- The right under 
paragraph (1) to obtain a reasonable royalty shall not be available under this 
subsection unless the invention as claimed in the patent is substantially identical to 
the invention as claimed in the published patent application. 
(3) TIME LIMITATION ON OBTAINING A REASONABLE ROYALTY.- The right under 
paragraph (1) to obtain a reasonable royalty shall be available only in an action 
brought not later than 6 years after the patent is issued. The right under paragraph 
(1) to obtain a reasonable royalty shall not be affected by the duration of the period 
described in paragraph (1)'814 
As with most intellectual property law, US patent law begins by providing owners with a form 
of exclusive right to use their property. This right is provided under 35§154(a)(1) which grants 
owners the right to "exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention 
throughout the United States or importing the invention into the United States". For the most 
part these exclusive/absolute rights were based on a historical perception which holds that 
inventions are the product of a single inventor operating on his own and would not have been 
invented but for the efforts of the inventor. However recent changes in the innovation process 
towards more integrated technologies have both challenged this historical perception and 
eroded its justification. It is because of the limitations on absolute property rights that outcomes 
can occur which are consistent with an application of the correlated rights doctrine. It is this 
                                                          






consistency which allows for it to be suggested that the correlated rights doctrine can be 
“extracted” from the restrictions placed on exclusive/absolute intellectual property rights.  
One aspect of this section which does not need to be restricted in order to be consistent with 
the correlated rights doctrine is the right to receive a reasonable royalty. This requirement 
representing an acknowledgement that a reasonable royalty rate does exist, and it should be 
applied when there is an early infringement which cannot be properly litigated before the patent 
is granted. However as with FRAND requirements, because there is no definition of reasonable 
royalties, this would appear to be at the discretion of the courts. 
'271 INFRINGEMENT OF PATENT. 
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority makes, uses, 
offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States, or imports into 
the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, 
infringes the patent. 
(b) Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer. 
(c) Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or imports into the United 
States a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination, or 
composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process, 
constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the same to be especially made 
or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple article 
or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial non-infringing use, shall be liable 
as a contributory infringer. 
(d) No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or contributory 
infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse or illegal 
extension of the patent right by reason of his having done one or more of the following:  
(1) derived revenue from acts which if performed by another without his consent 
would constitute contributory infringement of the patent;  
(2) licensed or authorized another to perform acts which if performed without his 
consent would constitute contributory infringement of the patent;  
(3) sought to enforce his patent rights against infringement or contributory 
infringement;  
(4) refused to license or use any rights to the patent; or  
(5) conditioned the license of any rights to the patent or the sale of the patented 
product on the acquisition of a license to rights in another patent or purchase of a 
separate product, unless, in view of the circumstances, the patent owner has 
market power in the relevant market for the patent or patented product on which 
the license or sale is conditioned.'815 
Unsurprisingly Section 271 uses preciously the same language as Section 154 when describing 
acts which can be defined as infringement. In addition to repeating the standard definition of an 
infringement this section also includes specific language which seeks to protect an owner's rights 
to protection, even when they have behaved in a manner which may resulted in accusations of 
patent abuse. This specific language serves to reinforce an interpretation which views an 
                                                          






owners’ rights to claim infringement are relatively absolute. It should be noted that an absolute 
right to claim infringement is very different from an absolute right to claim specific remedies for 
that infringement. 
'35 U.S.C. 281 REMEDY FOR INFRINGEMENT OF PATENT. 
A patentee shall have remedy by civil action for infringement of his patent. 
That the remedies for infringement can be pursued through civil action are in no way 
remarkable as it is entirely consistent with the consistent with the civil action this section is 
common law practices which are the hallmark of US law. Indeed, it is worth noting here that the 
rules governing those infringement relief are defined more by judicial precedent which has been 
developed under the framework of legislative Acts.  
'283 INJUNCTION. 
The several courts having jurisdiction of cases under this title may grant injunctions 
in accordance with the principles of equity to prevent the violation of any right secured 
by patent, on such terms as the court deems reasonable.'816 
The fact that injunctive relief "may" be granted, obviously provides the courts with a 
significant degree of discretion as to when relief is granted. This discretion is however not 
absolute as the courts as it is conditioned on the premise that such relief must be equitable, 
while at the same time securing the rights of the owner. Clearly if an owner is abusing the threat 
of injunctive action to coerce manufacturers of integrated technologies to pay an excessive 
royalty rate, this would not be equitable. It can be presumed that the inclusion of "terms the 
court deems reasonable" represents an effort to signal to the court that it should provide relief 
when the terms offered by the patent owner are deemed reasonable  
'284 DAMAGES. 
Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the claimant damages adequate to 
compensate for the infringement but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the 
use made of the invention by the infringer, together with interest and costs as fixed by 
the court. 
When the damages are not found by a jury, the court shall assess them. In either event 
the court may increase the damages up to three times the amount found or assessed. 
Increased damages under this paragraph shall not apply to provisional rights under 
section 154(d) of this title. 
The court may receive expert testimony as an aid to the determination of damages or 
of what royalty would be reasonable under the circumstances. (Amended Nov. 29, 
1999, Public Law 106-113, sec. 1000(a)(9), 113 Stat. 1501A-566 (S. 1948 sec. 
4507(9)).)'817 
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Because the court "shall" award damages, this Section represents a requirement and not 
some form of discretion to provide damages when an infringement is found.  In addition to the 
requirement of provide damages, is that requirement that the level of damages be at least equal 
to "a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention". The fact that the court also "may" 
use expert testimony is a further indication of an objective desire to find a reasonable rate for 
damages. This requirement obviously is entirely consistent with the principal objective of the 
correlated rights doctrine which is to ensure that owners who contribute their property to an 
integrated technology are able to receive rewards proportionate to the value of their 
contributions. The only aspect of this section which might contradict the application of the 
correlated rights doctrine is the authority to award damages three time the assessed reasonable 
royalty rate, which would likely place the damages well above any reasonable royalty range. 
Answers to Correlated Rights Questions 
1) Do judicial authorities have the discretion needed to grant preliminary injunctive 
relief and/or permanent injunctive relief on an entire integrated technological product 
when it is determined that unauthorised users are unwilling to license or are unwilling to 
pay reasonable royalties to an owner of an integrated intellectual property, regardless of 
the size of their contribution to that integrated technological property or their 
manufacturing participation? 
Under a strict reading of the Code it is clear the courts were provided discretion necessary to 
grant injunctive relief whenever an infringement is found.818 However just as with the UK, 
because the US is a common law country the use of this discretion has been restricted by 
precedent. In so far as preliminary injunctive relief is concerned these precedents suggest that 
it will only be provided if it can be proved that; 1) it likely that an infringement has occurred, 2) 
irreparable harm is likely to occur, 3) equity favours the plaintiff and 4) it is in the public 
interest.819 Because of these requirements, it is unlikely that a court would provide a preliminary 
injunction merely because the defendant is an unwilling licensee. With respect to a permanent 
injunction, recent precedent require that its grant should be decided using a four-factor test. 
This test requires proof of; 1) irreparable harm, 2) monetary damages is an inadequate remedy, 
                                                          
818 Maria Luisa Palmese, United States, in Patent Litigation Jurisdictional Comparisons 2012, 2nd ed. (Thompson 
Reuters, 2011) (herein after; United States Patent Litigation (2012) "Remedies for patent infringement include 
injunctive relief (preliminary and permanent)" at 504.at 504. 
819 Kenneth R. Adamo, Barry L. Cohen, Ethan Horwitz, Griffith B. Price, Andrew H. Simpson, Kevin Tottis, United 
States: Injunctions in cases of infringement, AIPPI Study Question Response (2011) (avialable at: 
http://aippi.org/wp-content/uploads/committees/219/GR219usa.pdf (herein after AIPPI Infringement Survey UK 
(2011)) “As a preliminary matter, under U.S. law, a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded 
as of right. In each case, courts “must balance the competing claims of injury and must consider the effect on each 
party of the granting or withholding of the requested relief“....In exercising their sound discretion, courts of equity 
should “pay particular regardfor the public consequences in employing the extraordinary remedy of injunction.“ 
Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365, 376-77 (2008). (citations omitted) In Winter , the 
district court entered a preliminary injunction, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, on the basis of its finding, among 
other things, that the plaintiff had established at least a “possibility” of irreparable injury if the injunction were not 
granted. The Supreme Court reversed. First the Court set forth the elements of proof for a preliminary injunction: 1) 
a likelihood of success on the merits; 2) a showing of "irreparable harm” without an injunction 3) the balance of 
equities must tip in the plaintiff’s favor 4) a showing that entry of the preliminary injunction is in the public 






3) the balance of harm favouring the to the plaintiff, and 4) it is in the public interest.820 As 
analysed in the previous chapter although the current interpretation of these factors suggests 
that non-participating entities which makes a small contribution to a larger technological 
product may not be entitled to permanent injunctive relief,821 they can be interpreted in a 
manner which may allow for such relief. Such an interpretation being in keeping with the §283 
which allows the courts to provide injunctive relief “in accordance with the principles of equity”. 
2) Do judicial authorities have the discretion needed to withhold injunctive relief for 
ongoing unauthorised use of integrated intellectual property, when it is determined that 
an intellectual property owner is abusing their rights to injunctive relief to coerce users to 
pay more for the use of their intellectual property than value their property contributes 
to the integrated technological product? 
This question is covered by §283, which states that the court may " grant injunctions in 
accordance with the principles of equity". However just as with the answer to the previous 
question, the withholding of injunctive relief depends upon the precedents which have been 
established. This therefore requires a return to the respective test which need to be applied for 
both preliminary and permanent injunctive relief. With respect to the preliminary relief, as relief 
would unlikely to be given even when there is an unwilling licensee, it follows that such relief 
would also be withheld for a willing licensee. In terms of permanent relief. The primary reason 
for reintroducing the four-factor test was to prevent owners from coercing users to pay 
excessive royalties by eliminating the practice of granting automatic junctive relief whenever 
and infringement.822 As such it would appear obvious that the courts do now have the discretion 
to withhold for this purpose, which quite nicely also conforms with the §283 requirement for 
equity, for granting injunctive relief would likely result in an inequitable outcome. 
3) Do judicial authorities have the discretion needed to make rulings which set the 
level of damages which intellectual property owners should receive for past and ongoing 
unauthorised use of integrated intellectual property at a level which corresponds to the 
value which the intellectual property provides to the technological product? 
As § 284 requires the court to award damages adequate to the compensate for an 
infringement and those damages should be no less than the “reasonable royalties” which would 
be due to an owner, it would appear that a strict reading of this section provides the discretion 
needed to award damages at a value which corresponds to the value which an intellectual 
property provides to a technological product. Further, given the lack of a definition for 
reasonable royalties, this would appear to indicate that their discretion was intended to be quite 
                                                          
820 Id. “these criteria are set out in controlling U.S. Supreme Court decision in eBay, Inc. v. Merc. Exchange, LLC., 547 
U.S. 388 (2006), which are the four (4) well-known factors: • Irreparable harm; • Inadequacy of legal remedies 
(money damages); • Balance of hardships; • Public interest favoring / disfavoring injunction.” at 3. 
821 Id. “A number of district and appellate court decisions have cited and discussed eBay and/or Winter v. NRDC in 
refusing requests for both preliminary and permanent injunctions on the ground that the plaintiff’s status as an NPE 
undermined any claim that it would suffer irreparable injury if injunctive relief were not entered. However, there is 
no per se rule that NPE status means that an injunction must be refused.” at 6, “If the patented technology is used 
as only a small component of the infringing technology, a permanent injunction may not result. See Z4 Technologies 
Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437, 440 (E.D. Tex. 2006).” at 7 
822 United States Patent Litigation (2012) “Until recently, grantingof a permanent injunction upon finding of 






broad. However regardless of what was intended, this discretion is now subject to various 
precedents, the most authoritative of which is George-Pacific Corp. v US Plywood Corp, which 
lists 15 factors that can be used to determine reasonable royalties.823. As discussed in chapter 3 
it was perhaps because of the contradictory and ill-defined nature of these factors, that the 
courts have seized upon the last factor, which was “hypothetical negotiations” as the main 
method of determining reasonable royalties.824 The primary resource for defining the theoretical 
results of those hypothetical negotiations being the exiting and comparable industry licensing 
agreements which have been completed.825 Assuming that those comparable agreements did 
not result in undervaluation because of the issues described in chapter 9, there is every 
possibility the courts would still have the discretion needed to make rulings which set the level 
of damages which intellectual property owners should receive for past and ongoing 
unauthorised use of integrated intellectual property at a level which corresponds to the value 
which the intellectual property provides to the technological product.826 
Summary of US Patent Law Compatibility 
When analysing the US Patent Act, it is worth remembering that US legal system is a common 
law system, which traditionally has functioned on the presumption that the enacted laws can 
and should be interpreted by the courts when they do not provide specific details about their 
application. This practice being based on an assumption that the judges can provide an 
important contribution the law and that their contribution should be embraced rather than 
rejected. The clearest evidence of this faith in capacity of judges to provide a positive 
contribution to the legal system being the central role that the courts play as one of three 
branches of government and their position of final arbitrators in matters of constitutional law. 
Given this structure it is hardly surprising that both the constitution and the US Patent Act does 
not provide specific directions on how intellectual property law is to be applied, but rather 
provides the general rules, leaving the specific application of those rule to the discretion of the 
courts.  
                                                          
823 Id. “If the plaintiff cannot make a requisite showing [of lost profits] it is still entitiled to a reasaonable royalty on 
the infringing sales. The amount of the reasoanbel royalty is determined by considering a host of factors known as 
the Georgia-Pacific factors, after the case George-Pacific Corp. v US Plywood Corp. The determination of a 
reasonable royalty is fact intensive and includes consideration of factors such as royalty rates previously agreed by 
the patent owner and comparative royalty rates in the industry.” at 506 
824 Peter C. Schechter, David W. Hill, MaryAnne Armstrong, Patrick J. Coyne, Michael J. Frodsham, Charles J. Rogers, 
Elise J. Selinger, Joseph R. Snyder, John M. Carson, United States; Quantification of monetary relief AIPPI Study 
Question Response (2017) (available at: http://aippi.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/05/2017_US_Study_Question_Quantification_of_monetary_relief_2017-05-08.pdf), (herein 
after; AIPPA Monetary Survey US (2017))  “In cases where the measure of damages is a “reasonable royalty,” both 
the patentee’s, as well as the infringer’s net and gross profit margins, may be considered in a legal and economic 
“hypothetical negotiation” employed by courts to determine the royalty percentage.” at 2 
825 Id. “License agreements must be comparable in economic form and for the same patents or similar technology. 
Courts may give weight to licensing customs in the industry and actual licenses on patents for similar technologies 
in determining both the structure and amount of the royalty award (e.g., running royalty, milestone payments, and 
fully-paid up lump sum amounts.) Comparables are typically determined based on expert testimony comparing and 
contrasting the material terms of licenses that are alleged to be comparable. Although the Court may exclude 
certain evidence that may be inflammatory or unduly prejudicial, the degree to which a particular license is 
comparable and how much weight it should be given are fact issues that are typically submitted to the jury.” at 3. 
826 Id. “The courts encourage the use of comparable license agreement but only if the use of those agreements is 
accompanied by an appropriate analysis of the differences between those agreements and the hypothetical license, 
including any adjustments to the comparable license royalties that should be made to arrive at a reasonable 






As such when analysing the compatibility of US Patent Act with respect to the application of 
the correlated rights doctrine the primary question is not whether the Act requires the 
application of the doctrine, but rather does the Act allow for the application of the doctrine. The 
answer to this question in the affirmative the Act must provide the courts with the discretion 
needed to ensure that abuses of patent rights by owners and abuses of the legal process by 
users can be sanctioned by the courts. 
With respect to owners; it is clear that the court has the discretion to withhold injunctive 
relief from owners who abuse their property rights in order to coerce users into agreeing to 
unreasonable licensing terms including paying excessive royalty rates. This discretion being 
provided by Section 283, which states that the court " may grant injunctions in accordance with 
the principles of equity to prevent the violation of any right secured by patent, on such terms as 
the court deems reasonable". Although this discretion is provided using a positive test which say 
that the court "may grant injunctions" a valid negative transposition of this statement would be 
that the court "may withhold injunctive relief in accordance with the principles of equity to 
prevent the abuse of any right secured by patent, on such terms as the court deems reasonable". 
That said there appear to be limitation on placed on this discretion by Section 271. According to 
this section owners cannot be denied relief when they engage in five acts which are; 1) deriving 
revenue from others who are authorised by the owner to practice the patent, 2) licensing others 
to practice the patent, 3) seeking to enforce patent rights against infringers, 4) refusing to license 
or use rights or 5) making a license of a patent conditional on the licensing of another patent 
when there exists no market power in the patent subject to the condition. To the extent each of 
these acts represents a "safe harbours" in which owners can act without affecting the relief 
available to them, each needs to be examined to determine if they constitute what would 
otherwise be abusive behaviour by an owner. Obviously the first two safe harbours need little 
examination as neither receiving compensation nor licensing their patents to others, should in 
any way be considered an abuse of patent rights and both are completely compatible with the 
application of the correlated rights doctrine. The fifth safe harbour is also not an issue, because 
integrated intellectual properties inherently have market power, with the integrated 
technological product. Safe harbours three and four however may represent an issue. If the third 
safe harbour is interpreted to mean that owners cannot be denied injunctive relief, this would 
obviously greatly enhance their ability to coerce users into accepting unreasonable licensing 
demands under the threat of injunctive action. However, as such an interpretation would 
eviscerate the discretion provided in Section 283, a more reasonable interpretation would be 
that this safe harbour provides owners with the possibility, but not the certainly, of being 
granted injunctive relief when they seek to enforce their patent rights against infringers. Under 
the later interpretation, as with an application of the correlated rights doctrine the courts would 
be free to provide injunctive relief if they thought it was appropriate, but it would not be 
required to do so as an automatic remedy. A similar interpretation would be required for the 
fourth safe harbour, in the circumstances where an owner who sought to have their intellectual 
property integrated into a technological product and then refused to license that property to 
the manufactures of that technological product. The determining factor in the application of the 
court's discretion being the reasonableness of the owner's behaviour. 
With respect to users, there can be little doubt that the act provides the courts with ample 
discretion to severely punish users who knowing infringe patent and subsequently abuse the 






award damages at three time the assessed rate under Section 284, as well as the discretion to 
order injunctive relief under Section 283. The problem appears to be that because these 
sanctions are so severe and can be applied to any form of infringement, the courts appear to 
have decided that they should allow defendants virtually unlimited opportunities to mount a 
defence. This acquiescence to a virtually unlimited right to defence is the root cause of legal 
attrition, as it has fostered protracted discovery processes, as well as deceptive claims regarding 
the validity and the use of the patented technology. While this acquiescence may have been an 
equitable response to a statutory obligation on the court to automatically order the most severe 
remedies, it hardly appears appropriate when the court has the discretion to withhold injunctive 
relief and ordering reasonable damages, particularly when the cases involves integrated 
intellectual properties. Indeed, any arguments about the equity of allowing legal attrition, would 
appear to be nullified by the inequity of forcing small integrated intellectual property owners 
with limited legal and financial resources to engage in a protracted legal battle with large 
integrated technology product manufacturer who have virtually unlimited legal and financial 
resources. So, as the act does provide the courts with the discretion to prevent legal attrition it 
is entirely compatible with the application of the correlated rights doctrine. The real question 
being whether the courts will utilise that discretion.  
10.9 The Chinese Patent Law  
China's patent laws827 are promulgated by the National People's Congress with judicial 
interpretation provided by the Supreme People's Court. China's first Patent Law was passed by 
the Standing Committee of the People’s Congress on March 12, 1984 and came into force on 
April 1, 1985. As at that time most industry was owned by the state, the Law followed a 
Yugoslavian-Romanian model which set up a state firm to purchase patent rights from owners. 
This state-owned firm would "hold" the invention and other state-owned firms would have the 
right to practice state owned inventions, subject to a royalty payment to them. In 1989 as part 
of Sino-US Trade Negotiations China and the US began negotiations on amendments to China's 
law which would better protect US companies. After the US threatened trade sanction in 1991, 
a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was reached in 1992. Under the MOU the Chinese 
agreed to 1) protect pharmaceuticals and chemical products, 2) provide protection to patented 
processes 3) limiting and clarifying the authority to grant compulsory licenses. 4) extending the 
patent term from 15 to 20 years and 5) to pass the changes by end of 1992. These amendments 
were duly passed on September 4, 1992, and the amended Patent Law came into force on 
January 1, 1993. In return for passing these amendments the US ended its trade sanction 
procedures. Additional amendments to the Patent Law were made adopted by the National 
People's Congress in August 25, 2000 and became effective on July 1, 2001. These amendments 
which were made in order to fulfil the requirements for joining the World Trade Organization 
and brought the Patent Law into compliance with the TRIPs agreement. The most significant of 
these amendments were provision of rules for damages and the authorizing of a preliminary 
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injunction remedy.828 Unlike early amendments, the 2008 amendments were not driven by 
external factors, but more of an internal exercise which may explain why they did not provide 
substantive changes. Overall it must be acknowledged that China's Patent Laws has historically 
been focused on ensuring Chinese access to foreign patents, rather than protecting the 
intelctual property rights of owners. This however may change as more and more Chinese 
companies are becoming big patent owners.  
Commentary on Relevant Articles  
'Article 11 After the patent right is granted for an invention or a utility model, unless 
otherwise provided for in this Law, no unit or individual may exploit the patent without 
permission of the patentee, i.e., it or he may not, for production or business purposes, 
manufacture, use, offer to sell, sell, or import the patented products, use the patented 
method, or use, offer to sell, sell or import the products that are developed directly 
through the use of the patented method.  
Article 12 Any unit or individual that intends to exploit the patent of another unit or 
individual shall conclude a contract with the patentee for permitted exploitation and 
pay the royalties. The permittee shall not have the right to allow any unit or individual 
not specified in the contract to exploit the said patent.'829 
Article 11 and 12 provides the foundation for the rights of an intellectual property owner. 
Unlike most other jurisdictions, this right does not originate from a positive proposition which 
grants a patent owner the exclusive right, instead it is the result of an instructional declaration 
and a negative prohibition which details how, "no unit or individual may exploit the patent 
without permission of the patentee". While this may appear to be an odd judicial construction, 
it is entirely understandable as historically most of the intellectual property used by Chinese 
units belong to others, and as such this Act was likely drafted from a user’s rather than an 
owner’s prospective.  
'Chapter VI Compulsory License for Exploitation of a Patent 
Article 48 Under any of the following circumstances, the patent administration 
department under the State Council may, upon application made by any unit or 
individual that possesses the conditions for exploitation, grant a compulsory license 
for exploitation of an invention patent or utility model patent:  
(1) When it has been three years since the date the patent right is granted and four 
years since the date the patent application is submitted, the patentee, without 
legitimate reasons, fails to have the patent exploited or fully exploited; or  
(2) The patentee's exercise of the patent right is in accordance with law, confirmed as 
monopoly and its negative impact on competition needs to be eliminated or reduced. 
Article 51 If an invention or utility model, for which the patent right has been obtained, 
represents a major technological advancement of remarkable economic significance, 
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compared with an earlier invention or utility model for which the patent right has 
already been obtained, and exploitation of the former relies on exploitation of the 
latter, the patent administration department under the State Council may, upon 
application made by the latter, grant it a compulsory license to exploit the earlier 
invention or utility model. Under the circumstance where a compulsory license for 
exploitation is granted in accordance with the provisions of the preceding paragraph, 
the patent administration department under the State Council may, upon application 
made by the earlier patentee, grant it a compulsory license to exploit the later 
invention or utility model. 
Article 54 A unit or individual that applies for a compulsory license in accordance with 
the provisions of Subparagraph (1) of Article 48 or Article 51 of this Law shall provide 
evidence to show that it or he has, under reasonable terms, requests the patentee's 
permission for exploitation of the patent, but fails to obtain such permission within a 
reasonable period of time. 
Article 57 The unit or individual that is granted a compulsory license for exploitation 
shall pay reasonable royalties to the patentee, or handle the issue of royalties in 
accordance with the provisions of the relevant international treaties to which the 
People's Republic of China has acceded. The amount of royalties to be paid shall be 
subject to consultation between the two parties. In the event of failure to reach an 
agreement between the two parties, the patent administration department under the 
State Council shall make a ruling.'830 
To the extent that the granting of compulsory licenses is one method of applying the 
correlated rights doctrine, the fact that compulsory licenses are readily available under Chinese 
patent law would suggest that correlated rights are imbedded in the law. However, this 
suggestion may be mistaken because of the ease at which it appears that a compulsory license 
can be granted may undermine the fundamental purpose of applying the correlated rights 
doctrine. It should be remembered that, the fundamental purpose of applying the doctrine is to 
ensure that owners of integrated intellectual properties are able to receive rewards which are 
proportional to the value their contribution to the integrated technology. Obviously when an 
owner will only lease their patents at royalty rates which are disproportionate to their 
contribution to an integrated technology, and a compulsory license can be used to rectify this 
situation by permitting users to use the property at a rate which is proportional to the 
contribution, this would represent an application of the correlated right doctrine. Just as 
obviously, when an owner offers to lease their patents at royalty rates which are proportionate 
to their contribution, and a compulsory license is used to reduce this rate to a rate which is 
below the value of the contribution, this not would not represent an application of the 
correlated right doctrine. As such to determine whether these articles are consistent with the 
application of the correlated rights doctrine, requires a case by case analysis of the terms 
included in the compulsory license.  
Under Article 48 if an owner exercising their patent rights in a way which negatively impacts 
competition, a compulsory license can be granted to "eliminate or reduce" that impact. The 
                                                          






problem with this article is that, it is so broad it could be interpreted as applying to any 
intellectual property which is not provided for free. This interpretation being based on the 
premise that even reasonable royalty requirements can and do impact competition in that they 
will both will raise the price of the technological product or prevent manufactures which are 
unwilling to pay that reasonable royalty from competing in the market. If it is assumed that a 
higher price or less competition represents a negative impact, than this article would apply. 
These concerns would of course be misplaced if the original Chinese version of the law stipulated 
that an "unreasonable negative impact" rather than just a negative impact. 
These concerns are however somewhat mitigated by Article 53 which place restrictions on 
the ability to apply for a compulsory license. Included in this article there is a prerequisite which 
requires that any applicant who applies for a compulsory to "provide evidence to show that it 
or he has, under reasonable terms, requests the patentee's permission for exploitation of the 
patent, but fails to obtain such permission within a reasonable period of time." Whilst this is a 
positive measure, it does create two new issues in that; it shifts the pricing prerogative from the 
owner to the user, as well as the burden of proof with respect to proving what is reasonable or 
unreasonable from the user to the owner. This is no small matter, for whereas it is normal 
assumed that an owner has the right to set the price for their property, this article reverses this 
by allowing the user to set the price for the property. Specifically, it requires the user to show 
that they have made a reasonable offer to license the property, without regard to whether the 
owner has offered to license the property on reasonable terms. The practical consequence of 
this reversal of pricing prerogative is that it allows a user to be granted a compulsory license if 
they can show that they made an offer at the lowest level of a reasonable royalty range, but the 
owner rejected it because they were offering licensing terms at the higher end of the range. 
Further, if the user claims that they have made a reasonable offer and that proof is accepted by 
the authorities, it is then up to the owner to prove the offer was unreasonable. Contrasted 
against a system where the owner claims that they made a reasonable offer is taken as evidence 
that their offer is reasonable, and a user is required to prove that the offer is unreasonable, it is 
easy to recognise a definitive shift in the burden of proof. This combined with the reversal of the 
pricing prerogative clearly undermines the property rights of owners and makes the compulsory 
licensing options somewhat, but not entirely contradictive to an application of the correlated 
rights doctrine. It is not entirely contradictive because it should at least ensure that owners are 
granted the lowest level of rates in a reasonable royalty rate range, whenever a compulsory 
license is granted. To be completely compatible with an application of the correlated rights 
doctrine an owner should not have to prove that an applicant's offer is below the reasonable 
royalty range, they should only have to prove that their rate is within a reasonable royalty range, 
and as such only if the applicant can prove the owner’s price is outside the range, should a 
compulsory license be granted. 
It should be acknowledged that even if an applicant is able to prove that they are entitled to 
apply for a compulsory license, this does not mean that the compulsory license will be granted 
or that it will be granted on terms which would be at the lowest level of the reasonable royalty 
range. This observation is based on the first sentence of Article 57 which states that; " The unit 
or individual that is granted a compulsory license for exploitation shall pay reasonable royalties 
to the patentee." If this sentence is enforced it should obviously ensure that an owner will always 
be paid a reasonable royalty, which might mean that it is set at the rate offered by a reasonable 






in the article which state that "The amount of royalties to be paid shall be subject to consultation 
between the two parties. In the event of failure to reach an agreement between the two parties, 
the patent administration department under the State Council shall make a ruling." Noticeably 
absent in both these sentences is the word reasonable. While it can be argued that the early 
requirement for a reasonable royalty is covers these last sentences of the article, it can just as 
easily be argued that it does not, and as such the authorities have nothing which compels them 
to set a reasonable rate. Further even if there is a compulsion to set a reasonable rate, there 
certainly is no compulsion to set the rate at the high end of a reasonable royalty range, when 
that is the rate offered by the owner. It is because the article is drafted in such an open ending 
fashion that it has the potential of preventing a proper application of the correlated rights 
doctrine. 
 
'Article 60 If a dispute arises as a result of exploitation of a patent without permission 
of the patentee, that is, the patent right of the patentee is infringed, the dispute shall 
be settled through consultation between the parties. If the parties are not willing to 
consult or if consultation fails, the patentee or interested party may take legal action 
before a people's court and may also request the administration department for 
patent-related work to handle the dispute. If, when handling the dispute, the said 
department believes the infringement is established, it may order the infringer to 
cease the infringement immediately; 
-The administration department for patent-related work that handles the call 
shall, upon request of the parties, carry out mediation concerning the amount 
of compensation for the patent right infringement. If mediation fails, the parties 
may take legal action before the people's court in accordance with the Civil 
Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China.'831 
 
Article 60 is included in the Chapter VII of the Act which is titled "Protection of Patent Rights". 
It is relevant to the application of the correlated rights doctrine because it provides authorities 
with the authorization to grant injunctive relief when infringement is found. The most notable 
component of this authorization is that it is drafted in a way which appears to provide the 
authorities with absolute discretion in terms of granting relief. This discretion is evident in the 
of the use of the word "may" rather than "shall".  
Also, notable in this article is the absence of any reference to an owner’s exclusive right to 
their intellectual property. In fact, nowhere in this Chapter, nor entire Act, is there any mention 
of an owner's exclusive right to use their intellectual property. Like Article 11, this article instead 
refers to an absence of permission to use a property. While the implication may be that a 
permission is required because of an exclusive right, the lack of a clear and definitive mention 
of an exclusive right, suggests that a there exist no strongly held belief in exclusive intellectual 
property rights, which should only be limited in special circumstance like when the property is 
contributed to an integrated technology. Whether this terminology reflects the attitude of the 
authorities can only be determined by the outcomes court proceedings produce. If the court 
grants injunctive relief when it is shown that an owner was offering licensing terms within a 
reasonable royalty range, this would be an affirmation of intellectual property rights in general 
                                                          






and correlated intellectual property rights more specifically. If they do not grant an injunction 
when an owner is offering reasonable terms, this would tend to suggest a disregard for both 
absolute and correlated intellectual property rights. 
 
'Article 65 The amount of compensation for patent right infringement shall be 
determined according to the patentee's actual losses caused by the infringement. If it 
is hard to determine the actual losses, the amount of compensation may be 
determined according to the benefits acquired by the infringer through the 
infringement. If it is hard to determine the losses of the patentee or the benefits 
acquired by the infringer, the amount of compensation may be determined according 
to the reasonably multiplied amount of the royalties of that patent. The amount of 
compensation shall include the reasonable expenses paid by the patentee for putting 
an end to the infringement. If the losses of the patentee, benefits of the infringer, or 
royalties of the patent are all hard to determine, the people's court may, on the basis 
of the factors such as the type of patent right, nature of the infringement, and 
seriousness of the case, determine the amount of compensation within the range from 
10,000 yuan to 1,000,000 yuan.'832 
 
The principle justification for applying the correlative rights doctrine to intellectual property 
law is to ensure that every intellectual property owner is able to receive their fair share of 
rewards from their contributions to an integrated technology. As Article 65 deals with 
compensation for unauthorised use, it's is central to determining whether the overall Act is 
capable of and likely to pursue the same purpose. Obviously, the degree to which the article 
pursues this purpose will determine how compatible it is with the doctrine.  
According to Article 65, the court has four; sequentially ordered options which they can use 
to calculate this compensation. The sequence of these options is significant because latter 
options can only be pursued if earlier options are "hard to determine", which effectively means 
that the latter options are legally subordinated to the earlier options. 
The option which has the highest superiority, and that the court "shall" use to try to 
determine compensation is the "patentee's actual loss". Assuming that “actual loss” refer to the 
profits which were lost because of lost product sales, this option would only apply to practicing 
entities, where the infringer is the only competition in the industry. It would only apply to 
practicing entities because non-practicing entities do not have product sales. It would not apply 
to multi-firm industries because it would be difficult to determine what percentage of the 
product sales made by the infringer would by the owner and what percentage would have been 
made by other manufacturers.  
Intriguingly, under an application of the correlated rights doctrine “actual loss” could also be 
considered a licensing loss, which would be determined by calculating the royalty payments 
which were lost because the user did not accept licensing offer. Assuming that offer was within 
the reasonable royalty range which corresponds to the value which the intellectual property 
provides. If there was not an offer rate, or that offer rate was considered to be above the 
reasonable royalty range, the next best alternative for determining the "actual loss" would be 
for the court to choose a rate which is within the reasonable royalty range to determine the 
                                                          






licensing loss. If the court wanted to deter other patentee's from setting excessive rates, it could 
set the rate at the lower end of this range and still be in conformity with the first option. Only if 
it is not possible to determine a reasonable royalty range should the first option be considered 
"hard to determine". 
If it is not possible to determine the “actual loss”, the second option which "may" be used 
for determining compensation, involves examining the " benefits acquired by the infringer ". To 
make this calculation it could be assumed that it would be necessary to first determine the 
profits made by the infringer and then try to determine what percentage of those profits can be 
attributed to the intellectual property which was used without authorization. This method being 
more clearly defined in the recent Supreme People’s Court of China’s guidance on the 
‘Application of Law in the Trial of Disputes over Infringement of Patent Rights’833 Which states 
that:  
 
‘Where it is difficult to determine the actual losses suffered by the right holder from 
infringement, the courts shall require the right holder to adduce the evidence to prove 
the profits gained by the infringer from infringement according to Paragraph 1 of Article 
65 of the Patent Law; if the right holder has adduced preliminary evidence to prove the 
profits gained by the infringer, while account books or materials relating to patent 
infringing acts are mainly controlled by the infringer, the courts may order the infringer 
to provide the account books or materials; if the infringer refuses to provide the account 
books or materials without justifiable reasons, or provides false ones, the courts may 
determine the profits gained by the infringer from infringement according to the claims 
of and evidence provided by the right holder.’ 
 
The problem with this method is that the infringers who do not pay for the intellectual 
property they use, will most likely not be charging a price for the integrated technological 
product which reflect the true value of the intellectual property included in it. This will mean 
that the infringer's profits will be substantially below what they would have been if they were 
charging the same price as other manufacturers who paid royalties. All of which means that 
dividing the profits earned by such an infringer, will likely result in compensation well below the 
reasonable royalty range. If this is the outcome this method would clearly be incompatible with 
the correlated rights doctrine.  
The third option which "may" be used only if the first two option are too "hard to determine" 
involves determined the compensation "according to the reasonably multiplied amount of the 
royalties". Strictly read, this formulation would involve multiplying the licensing offer rate by the 
number of products sold, assuming the licensing offer rate is reasonable. If the offered rate was 
not within a reasonable royalty range, the multiplied rate would be calculated by somehow 
attempting to determine a rate within the reasonable royalty range. An assessment which is 
confirmed by the recent statutory declaration on the interpretation of patent law under Article 
24, which states that; 
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 ‘Licensing conditions as stated in Paragraph 2 of this Article shall be determined 
through negotiation between the patentee and the accused infringer. If no agreement is 
reached after sufficient negotiation, the parties may request the courts to determine such 
conditions. The courts in determining such licensing conditions shall take into 
comprehensive consideration on the factors such as the degree of innovation and the role 
of patent in standards, the technical field which technical standards belong to, the nature 
of the standards, the application scope of the standards and relevant licensing conditions 
according to the "fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory" principle.’834  
 
Because this what would have occurred with an application of the correlated rights doctrine 
under the first option, an application of the correlated rights doctrine would render this option 
redundant. However, because the first option likely only applies to lost profits from lost sales, 
this option is likely the first to refers to lost licencing revenues. The fact that lost licencing 
revenue is considered to have a lower legal status than infringer profits, clearly would be 
incompatible with an application of the correlated rights doctrine. Particularly if the “reasonably 
multiplied amount of the royalties” is significantly below that value which the intellectual 
property contributes to the technological product. 
The final option which "may" be use, only if all the other options are "hard to determine". 
Under this option the court simply considering all the relevant evidence is authorised to set 
"compensation within the range from 10,000 yuan to 1,000,000 yuan" which at current 
exchange rates would be equivalent to between 1,500 to 150,000 euros. While these amounts 
may be appropriate for minor infringements of rather inconsequential technological products, 
there is virtually no possibility that they would be sufficient to compensate for a major 
infringement of a significant technological product. Indeed, the cost of pursuing an infringement 
claim would be so much higher than the possible compensation, that it would make suing for 
infringement counterproductive. 
Answer to Correlated Rights Questions 
1) Do judicial authorities have the discretion needed to grant preliminary injunctive 
relief and/or permanent injunctive relief on an entire integrated technological product 
when it is determined that unauthorised users are unwilling to license or are unwilling to 
pay reasonable royalties to an owner of an integrated intellectual property, regardless of 
the size of their contribution to that integrated technological property or their 
manufacturing participation? 
According to the wording of Article 60, injunctive relief can only be provided after some form 
of consultation has failed. Further stating that if the court or the administrative department of 
the office has been convinced that an infringement has occurred may they "order the infringer 
to cease the infringement immediately".835 Which would indicate that the courts do have the 
discretion to grant injunctive relief whenever an infringement is found. However, in practice this 
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discretion appears to be curtailed by preliminary injunction criteria which includes; irreparable 
harm, a deposit being provided by the petitioner, and no harm to public interest.836 While there 
is nothing that suggests how the patent department will determine if an infringement has 
occurred, it can be assumed that unless it is a straightforward case of piracy, they will wait for a 
verdict from the court. If this is the case than preliminary injunctive relief is not possible. With 
respect to permanent injunctive relief, this discretion is similarly curtailed by criteria which 
require that an injunction; would not harm public interest, and would not cause a significant 
unbalance to the interests of the parties.837 That said there is nothing in this article which 
indicates that injunctive relief cannot be provided, if an infringement is found on only a small 
contribution to an integrated technology, and the use of the word "may" in the instructions 
indicates that any decision should be at the discretion of the authorities.  
2) Do judicial authorities have the discretion needed to withhold injunctive relief for 
ongoing unauthorised use of integrated intellectual property, when it is determined that 
an intellectual property owner is abusing their rights to injunctive relief to coerce users to 
pay more for the use of their intellectual property than value their property contributes 
to the integrated technological product? 
As with the previous answer although the wording of the legislation does not appear to be 
any limitation on the discretion to provide injunctive relief, the practical application of injunctive 
relief is constrained by criteria which would tend to support withholding that relief. Further, as 
the overall Act tends to be drafted from an intellectual property user’s prospective, it is highly 
unlikely that any perceived abuse of patent rights would be granted the fullest protection under 
the law, which could justify injunctive relief being withheld under the described circumstances. 
This assessment being fully confirmed by the Supreme People’s Court of China, in their 2016 
guidance on the Application of Law in the Trial of Disputes over Infringement of Patent Rights. 
Included in this statutory declaration is Article 24 which states that;  
‘Where recommended national, industrial or local standards explicitly disclose 
information on an essential patent that is relevant to such standards, and the patentee is 
intentionally in breach of its licensing obligations on "fair, reasonable and non-
discriminatory" terms as promised in the process of formulating the standards when the 
patentee and the accused infringer negotiate about the patent licensing conditions, 
thereby resulting in failure to reach a patent licensing contract and the alleged infringer 
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has no obvious faults in the negotiations, the courts generally shall not uphold the right 
holder’s claim for stopping the act of implementing the standards.’838 
3) Do judicial authorities have the discretion needed to make rulings which set the 
level of damages which intellectual property owners should receive for past and ongoing 
unauthorised use of integrated intellectual property at a level which corresponds to the 
value which the intellectual property provides to the technological product? 
Damages are governed by Article 65 which includes four hierarchically ranked methods the 
court can use to set damages. Within each option the court has a certain amount of discretion 
to set the rate at which damages will be paid. Under the first option the court has the discretion 
to set damages at a level that believe represents the actual damages to the owner, which can 
be assumed to relates to the profits which were lost because of lost product sales.839 Under the 
second option the court has the discretion to set damages according the benefits provided to 
the infringer.840 This would likely result in damages below the reasonable royalty range, as 
unauthorised users seldom charge customers the true value of the unauthorised properties they 
are using so that they can offer a lower price to their potential customers. The third option 
presumably allows the court to set the damages on FRAND term, but which is likely involve 
determining reasonable royalties according to the rates paid under comparable patent 
licenses.841 While this rate should be within the reasonable royalty range, it is somewhat 
redundant as the same method could be used in the first option. The final option allows the 
court the discretion to order a lump sum payment between 10,000 to 1,000,000 yuan.842 Even if 
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839 Tao Li, Hong TAI, Dapeng Wen, Jiang Li, Dongli Zhang, Lizhe Jiang, Guigui Chen, Wenqing Li, Jiangbin Xie, Zhao 
Wang, Yanjie Zhen, Xince Sui, Lei Zheng, Lijun Zhao, Jian Zhou, Yongji Wei, China; Quantification of monetary relief 
AIPPI Study Question Response (2017) (available at: http://aippi.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/05/2017_CN_Study_Question_Quantification_of_monetary_relief_2017-05-04.pdf), (herein 
after; AIPPA Monetary Survey China  (2017)) ‘The actual losses suffered by the right holder due to the infringement 
may be computed by the total reduction in the volume of sale of the patented products/the goods sold in the 
market due to the infringement times the reasonable profit of each patented product/the unit profit of goods of the 
registered trademark. Where it is difficult to determine the total reduction in the volume of sale by the right holder, 
the total of the infringing products/the goods sold in the market times the reasonable profit of each patented 
product/the unit profit of goods of the registered trademark may be deemed to the losses suffered by the right 
holder due to the infringement’ at 1. 
840 Id. ‘a) If the right holder has adduced preliminary evidence to prove the profits gained by the infringer, while 
account books or materials relating to patent infringing acts are mainly controlled by the infringer, the courts may 
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infringer from infringement according to the claims of and evidence provided by the right holder. Moreover, the 
volume of infringement sale can be investigated through public announcement, advertisement of the infringer or 
through the infringer's client and is submitted to the court as evidence. b) In Chinese juridical practice, the profit 
margin must be considered[3] when the actual losses suffered by the right holder is calculated. The kinds of profit 
margin to be considered include net profit margin, industry profit margin, average profit margin, self-confessed 
profit margin, the unit profit of goods of the registered trademark etc’ at 1 
841 Id. ‘When quantifying a reasonable royalty, the following factors shall be considered, i.e. whether there is the 
most similar royalty in the same industry, whether any interest is existed between the parties of license 
agreements, whether the license agreement has been fulfilled etc. If there is no existent, reasonable and 
comparable royalty, this method is not applicable. a) the royalty base can be the royalty in the IP contract signed by 
the plaintiff with the others on the involved Intellectual Property before litigation, or can be the royalty of the most 
similar IP right in the same industry. b) The comparability of the license agreements is defined by considering the 
following factors e.g. the comparable license agreement shall be real and effective, has been fulfilled and is 
universal as much as possible.’ at 2 
842 China Patent Litigation (2012) ‘Monetary remedies are calculated based on either the plaintiff's loss of profit 






the rate is set at the highest level under his option, it is highly likely that it would be substantially 
below the reasonable royalty range.  
Summary of Chinese Patent Law Compatibility 
Given that the Chinese patent law has to potential of being equitably interpreted in a way 
which would protect both owners and users from abusive behaviour, it can be regarded as being 
compatible with an application of the correlated rights doctrine. This compatibility is however 
somewhat compromised by both spirit, and two specific provisions of the law which tend to 
disproportionally favour users over owners. This spirit of disproportionate support for users can 
be found in the fact that nowhere in the act does it declare that owners have property rights, 
instead it implies those rights by creating an obligation on users to acquire permission to use 
intellectual property of others. 
The first provisions which disproportionally support users can be found in Article 53 which 
covers the granting of compulsory licenses and allows the user rather than the owner to 
determine what is a reasonable price for the intellectual property. Assuming that it is accepted 
that there is not a single rate but a range of rates which can be considered reasonable, this can 
have the practical consequence of forcing owners to accept royalty rates at the lower end of the 
reasonable royalty range, thereby eliminating their ability to maximize the reasonable 
compensation that they can receive for use of their property. The second provision which 
disproportionately favour users in Article 65 which describes four ways in which damages can 
be calculated; two of which would result in reasonable compensation, and two of which would 
result in a compensation rate below a reasonable royalty range. The first of the reasonable 
compensation methods requires the court to base the calculation on the owner's "actual losses" 
which should ensure that the damages are set at the higher end of the reasonable royalty range. 
However, this method does not have to be used if court finds that the "actual lose" is "hard to 
determine". Theoretically "hard to determine" might mean that an owner is not able to prove 
that they have licensed the very same properties to a number of other users at a specific rate, 
something which is all too common in integrated licensing agreements. If the court finds that 
calculating the actual loss is hard to determine than it can move on the second method which 
involves calculating the "benefits acquired by the infringer". While this may appear like an 
equitable way of determining damages, it disproportionately favours users because infringers 
seldom charge customers the true value of the unauthorised properties they are using as lower 
prices are the best way of attracting potential customers. Using this discounted royalty rate will 
therefore generally mean that owners are granted compensation well below a reasonable 
royalty range. The third method the courts can use if it is "hard to determine" either the actual 
loss or the benefit to the infringer, involves calculating the damages" according to the 
reasonably multiplied amount of the royalties". Assuming this means that the damages will be 
calculated based on the royalties paid for comparable properties, it should result in damages 
being set within the reasonable royalty range. However, given this method could just as easily 
be used for the first method it raises the question whether it would ever be properly considered, 
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which leads to the fourth and most discriminatory method. This method involves granting a 
lump sum payment of between 1.500 Euros to 150,000 Euros to the owner. This is discriminatory 
because in most cases even the highest end of this range would result in a payment which would 
represent an insignificant fraction of true value of the intellectual property being used by 
multinational technology producers. Not to mention the lower end of the range which would 
render any infringement suit a pointless waste of legal and financial resources. 
That said, while the Chinese Patent law is tilted in the favour of the Chinese manufacturers 
it does provide the courts with sufficient discretion to mitigate that bias, if they choose to do so. 
Further given that Chinese entities are fast becoming major intellectual property owners, it may 
be that the nationalist sentiment will quickly evolve into a correlated rights sentiment.  
10.10 The Indian Patents Act 
Although patent laws existed in India prior to 1970, because they were based upon British 
Patent Laws which were amended to accommodate the consolidation of economic power in 
British hands, it would be unfair to describe them as Indian patent laws. To find the first truly 
Indian patent law it is necessary to find the first law on patents which was passed the Indian 
Legislature after it gained independence from British rule in 1947. This would be the patent Act 
of 1970. 843 Under the 1970 Act all medicine, food, and agro-chemicals products were transferred 
from the label of product patents and placed into a new group of process patents. The clear 
purpose of this transfer was to shorten the duration of the patent period on these items. 
Whereas product patents held terms of 14 years, process patents were only valid for 7 years 
from the date of the patent application. Although this change may have appeared somewhat 
arbitrary and unreasonable, it was almost certainly done to protect the health and welfare of 
the Indian public who were being denied access to life saving or otherwise essential products, 
because too many did not have the financial resources to pay the prices being charged by most 
manufacturers who refused to sell their patented products at more affordable prices. While the 
1970 Patent Act was amended in 1999 and 2002, it was not until 2005 that the redefined 
products were transferred back to the product patent coverage. In addition to the return 
transfer and in keeping with TRIPs agreement requirements, that same amendment extended 
the product patent period from 14 years to 20 years. While this change could be seen as betrayal 
of the poor Indian public; it was not because of the extensions of the compulsory licensing 
provision included in the amendment allowed those essential patented products to be provided 
to the local market at affordable prices. 
Interestingly it can be argued that it was the complaints that multinational manufacturers 
made about the Indian government's refusal to allow its citizens to die for want affordable 
medicine which was the primary driver behind the overthrow of the notion of absolute 
intellectual property rights. If the multinationals would have accepted the Indian governments 
shortening of what were effectively "absolute patent rights" there is every possibility that 
compulsory licensing would not have become such a dominate feature in the TRIP's agreement. 
Indeed, it was the developing countries; lead by India, who insisted on having explicit provisions 
in the TRIP's agreement which allowed them to continue providing compulsory licences when 
the health and welfare of their nations were placed in jeopardy by the patent owners.844 By 
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including relatively general authorisation to include compulsory licensing provisions in national 
intellectual property law, the TRIP's agreement universally eviscerated the sanctity of the 
absolute intellectual property rights, thereby ensuring its demise. Only if property rights are 
absolute can they be withheld regardless of the circumstances, once that absolute notion is 
breached, it was only a matter of time when its validity would be challenged by new 
circumstances other than those which initiated the breach. The most significant of those new 
circumstances being the evolution of innovation from a standalone to an integrated 
development process. So, in many ways this thesis owes a great deal to India intellectual 
property law, for without India's determination the prospect of correlated intellectual property 
rights would have been inconceivable. 
Analysis of Relevant Articles 
'CHAPTER VIII GRANT OF PATENTS AND RIGHTS CONFERRED THEREBY  
48. Rights of patentees. Subject to the other provisions contained in this Act and the 
conditions specified in section 47, a patent granted under this Act shall confer upon 
the patentee— (a) where the subject matter of the patent is a product, the exclusive 
right to prevent third parties, who do not have his consent, from the act of making, 
using, offering for sale, selling or importing for those purposes that product in India;'845 
As with most intellectual property rights legislation Section 48 provides owners with "the 
exclusive right to prevent third parties who do not have his consent, from the act of making, 
using, offering for sale, selling or importing" the infringing product. If this exclusive right is not 
limited by subsequent sections, it would represent an absolute right which it is incompatible 
with the correlated rights doctrine. 
'CHAPTER XVI WORKING OF PATENTS, COMPULSORY LICENCES AND REVOCATION  
83. General principles applicable to working of patented inventions. Without prejudice 
to the other provisions contained in this Act, in exercising the powers conferred by this 
Chapter, regard shall be had to the following general considerations, namely;  
(a) that patents are granted to encourage inventions and to secure that the 
inventions are worked in India on a commercial scale and to the fullest extent that 
is reasonably practicable without undue delay;  
(b) that they are not granted merely to enable patentees to enjoy a monopoly for 
the importation of the patented article;  
(c) that the protection and enforcement of patent rights contribute to the 
promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of 
technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological 
knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a 
balance of rights and obligations;  
(d) that patents granted do not impede protection of public health and nutrition 
and should act as instrument to promote public interest specially in sectors of vital 
importance for socio-economic and technological development of India;  
                                                          






(e) that patents granted do not in any way prohibit Central Government in taking 
measures to protect public health;  
(f) that the patent right is not abused by the patentee or person deriving title or 
interest on patent from the patentee, and the patentee or a person deriving title 
or interest on patent from the patentee does not resort to practices which 
unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer of 
technology; and  
(g) that patents are granted to make the benefit of the patented invention 
available at reasonably affordable prices to the public.'846 
The principles contained in Section 83 provide a description of the expectation of how 
protection should be utilised, as well as addressing usage requirements and prohibited uses. 
From a correlated rights’ prospective the most relevant prohibitions and use requirements are; 
the prohibition on abuse contained in 83(f) and the requirement to make "the patented 
invention available at reasonable prices" included in 83(g). Obviously when a patentee attempts 
to coerce a manufacturer of an integrated technological product into paying an excessive price 
using the threat of injunctive action, they would be in breach of both of these conditions. 
'84. Compulsory licences. 
(1) At any time after the expiration of three years from the date of the grant of a 
patent, any person interested may make an application to the Controller for grant of 
compulsory licence on patent on any of the following grounds, namely: 
(a) that the reasonable requirements of the public with respect to the patented 
invention have not been satisfied, or  
(b) that the patented invention is not available to the public at a reasonably 
affordable price, or  
(c) that the patented invention is not worked in the territory of India. '847 
The opening statement on when compulsory licenses are to be provided under Section 84(1) 
was likely drafted to specifically ensure that medicine that is needed for the nation is readily 
available at affordable prices.848 While this statement may be justified with respect to the 
ensuring the vital health care needs of the nation, it does not follow that they should also be 
applied to every product which incorporate patented intellectual properties. For if they did 
apply; it would mean that virtually every patented technological innovation, regardless of the 
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reasonableness of licensing conditions, would be susceptible to a compulsory license 
application. This because a conditionality which demands satisfying "reasonable requirements 
for the public" at "reasonably affordable price" can be interpreted to suggest that every citizen 
should both have access to every modern technological consumer product and that the access 
should be at a price they can afford. Such a requirement would of course be impossible to 
achieve, even if patent licenses were granted for free. Assuming that it is not the intention of 
this section to eliminate paid patent licenses, the question becomes how these terms can be 
interpreted in a more conservative manner, which is what paragraph 7 of this section attempts 
to accomplish. From a more general prospective this statement would have been much more 
compatible with the correlated rights doctrine if "at a reasonably affordable price" would have 
been truncated to "at a reasonable price". Another issue which raises question of compatibility 
with the doctrine is the fact that there appears to be a waiting period of three years before an 
application for a compulsory license can be submitted. In fast moving technological fields three 
years without access the latest innovations would severely damage the market position of most 
manufacturer. 
'84(2) An application under this section may be made by any person notwithstanding 
that he is already the holder of a licence under the patent and no person shall be 
estopped from alleging that the reasonable requirements of the public with respect to 
the patented invention are not satisfied or that the patented invention is not worked 
in the territory of India or that the patented invention is not available to the public at 
a reasonably affordable price by reason of any admission made by him, whether in 
such a licence or otherwise or by reason of his having accepted such a licence.'849 
Section 84(2) is notable because it provides a mechanism under which a licensor can 
challenge the validity of license which they were coerced to accept. If this option was not open 
it would allow licensees to contract out of any correlated rights obligations. 
'84(4) The Controller, if satisfied that the reasonable requirements of the public with 
respect to the patented invention have not been satisfied or that the patented 
invention is not worked in the territory of India or that the patented invention is not 
available to the public at a reasonably affordable price, may grant a licence upon such 
terms as he may deem fit.'850 
Like the first paragraph of this section, this paragraph is so vague and broad it could result in 
the grant of licensing terms which are totally incompatible with the correlated rights doctrine. 
While a certain amount of discretion is needed, if that discretion is not constrained by some 
reasonable measures, it will inevitably lead to unjust outcomes, many of which may arise out of 
judicial capture by a litigant. 
'84(7) For the purposes of this Chapter, the reasonable requirements of the public shall 
be deemed not to have been satisfied—  
(a) if, by reason of the refusal of the patentee to grant a licence or licences on 
reasonable terms, 
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(i) an existing trade or industry or the development thereof or the establishment 
of any new trade or industry in India or the trade or industry of any person or 
class of persons trading or manufacturing in India is prejudiced; or  
(ii) the demand for the patented article has not been met to an adequate extent 
or on reasonable terms; or  
(iii) a market for export of the patented article manufactured in India is not being 
supplied or developed; or  
(iv) the establishment or development of commercial activities in India is 
prejudiced; or  
(b) if, by reason of conditions imposed by the patentee upon the grant of licences 
under the patent or upon the purchase, hire or use of the patented article or process, 
the manufacture, use or sale of materials not protected by the patent, or the 
establishment or development of any trade or industry in India, is prejudiced; or  
(c) if the patentee imposes a condition upon the grant of licences under the patent 
to provide exclusive grant back, prevention to challenges to the validity of patent or 
coercive package licensing; or  
(d) if the patented invention is not being worked in the territory of India on a 
commercial scale to an adequate extent or is not being so worked to the fullest extent 
that is reasonably practicable; or  
(e) if the working of the patented invention in the territory of India on a commercial 
scale is being prevented or hindered by the importation from abroad of the patented 
article by—  
(i) the patentee or persons claiming under him or  
(ii) persons directly or indirectly purchasing from him; or  
(iii) other persons against whom the patentee is not taking or has not taken 
proceedings for infringement.'851 
As mentioned above Section 84(7) seeks to better define the opening statement and more 
specifically what is meant by " reasonable requirements of the public. it does this by providing 
a list of actions which would not satisfy this requirement. As this list is drafted in a way which 
makes each action severable, they will need to be analysed on an individually basis. The first 
unsatisfactory action would be a "refusal of the patentee to grant a licence or licences on 
reasonable terms" which; prejudices trading or manufacturing in India, results in a shortage of 
supply, limits India's export potential or prejudices commercial activity in India. The key to this 
criterion is the notion of a "refusal to license or license on reasonable terms". As long as 
reasonable licensing terms are offered this should prevent the granting of a compulsory license, 
regardless of the consequences for the local and export market. The second unsatisfactory 
action involves the requirement purchase of unpatented products or services as a condition of 
a license. Otherwise known as tie-ins this measure is intended to prevent patent monopolies 
being expanded beyond their original scope. So long there are no such requirement in the 
licensing terms, this cannot be used as a reason for granting a compulsory license. The third 
unsatisfactory action is the imposition of licensing conditions which require exclusive grant back, 
or the prevention to challenges to the validity of patent or coercive package licensing. It should 
                                                          






be noted that it is "exclusive grant backs" which are unsatisfactory, not grant backs. The overall 
theme of these actions is that they prevent licensors from competing against or legal challenging 
a licensee's business. Again, if these terms are not included in the licensing agreement they 
cannot provide grounds for a compulsory license. The fourth unsatisfactory action should 
actually be described as an inaction, as it involves not properly working the patent. This action 
(inaction) can be easily avoided by non-practicing patent owners if they provide open licenses 
to all interested parties. Whereas it may provide grounds for a compulsory license if 
manufacturers seek to maintain an exclusive right their contributions to an integrated 
technological product, regardless of whether they are essential or discretionary patents. The 
final unsatisfactory action which can provide grounds for compulsory license appears to involve 
licensing terms which prevent the establishment of domestic manufacturing operations, 
because imported products are too competitive. This is perhaps the most vague and contentious 
of the unsatisfactory actions. To the extent that a lack of domestic manufacturing is the result 
of domestic inefficiencies, it should not be the responsibility of licensees to make them 
competitive by offering those domestic manufactures better licensing terms than they do their 
foreign competitors. Indeed, the idea that licensing conditions should vary between countries 
depending on the efficiency of their manufacturing sectors, is antithetical to the correlated 
rights objective of ensuring that owners receive fair compensation for their contribution to an 
integrated technological product. This because if owners have to subsidized inefficient 
manufacturers, they can only do so out of the value which they would otherwise deserve and 
would receive if reasonable royalty rates were paid.  
'90. Terms and conditions of compulsory licences. 
(1) In settling the terms and conditions of a licence under section 84, the Controller 
shall endeavour to secure 
(i) that the royalty and other remuneration, if any, reserved to the patentee or 
other person beneficially entitled to the patent, is reasonable, having regard to 
the nature of the invention, the expenditure incurred by the patentee in making 
the invention or in developing it and obtaining a patent and keeping it in force 
and other relevant factors; 
(ii) that the patented invention is worked to the fullest extent by the person to 
whom the licence is granted and with reasonable profit to him; 
(iii) that the patented articles are made available to the public at reasonably 
affordable prices; 
(iv) that the licence granted is a non-exclusive licence;  
(v) that the right of the licensee is non-assignable;  
(vi) that the licence is for the balance term of the patent unless a shorter term 
is consistent with public interest;  
(vii) that the licence is granted with a predominant purpose of supply in the 
Indian market and that the licensee may also export the patented product if 
need be in accordance with the provisions of sub-clause (iii) of clause (a) of sub-
section (7) of section 84;'852 
                                                          






Section 90 provides the parameters which are to be observed when granting a compulsory 
license. While the first parameter requires that the royalty reserved for the owner be 
reasonable, it this may not be consistent with the correlated rights doctrine because it appears 
to derive what is reasonable from the cost of developing the innovation, rather that value that 
it creates. This is a problem for two obvious reasons. First there are many innovations which 
cost very little to develop and add tremendous value, and second there are more innovations 
which cost a tremendous amount to develop but are virtual worthless. That said at least there 
is a requirement for some form of reasonable royalty payment. None of the other compulsory 
licensing are particularly contentious or incompatible with the correlated rights doctrine. 
'91. Licensing of related patents. 
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the other provisions of this Chapter, at any 
time after the sealing of a patent, any person who has the right to work any other 
patented invention either as patentee or as licensee thereof, exclusive or otherwise, 
may apply to the Controller for the grant of a licence of the first mentioned patent on 
the ground that he is prevented or hindered without such licence from working the 
other invention efficiently or to the best advantage possible.  
(2) No order under sub-section (1) shall be made unless the Controller is satisfied 
(i) that the applicant is able and willing to grant, or procure the grant to the 
patentee and his licensees if they so desire, of a licence in respect of the other 
invention on reasonable terms; and  
(ii) that the other invention has made a substantial contribution to the 
establishment or development of commercial or industrial activities in the 
territory of India.  
(3) When the Controller is satisfied that the conditions mentioned in sub-section (1) 
have been established by the applicant, he may make an order on such terms as he 
thinks fit granting a licence under the first mentioned patent and a similar order under 
the other patent if so requested by the proprietor of the first mentioned patent or his 
licensee: Provided that the licence granted by the Controller shall be non-assignable 
except with the assignment of the respective patents.  
(4) The provisions of sections 87, 88, 89 and 90 shall apply to licences granted under 
this section as they apply to licences granted under section 84.'853 
Section 91 is intended to cover a situation where a single patent cannot be practiced without 
the use of another patent. While there are no doubt circumstances where this may occur, in the 
clear majority of cases integrated technologies involve more than just a couple of patents held 
by two owners. Usually they involve literally hundreds, if not thousands, of patent held by 
multiple owners. It is a recognition of this reality which drives the need to apply the correlative 
rights doctrine. As helpful as this section is, because it only addresses a small subset of correlated 
innovations, it cannot be considered to be represent a comprehensive application of the 
correlated rights doctrine, although it certainly can be considered to be a step in the right 
direction which lays the foundations for a more comprehensive application of the doctrine. 
Particularly laudable in this section is a requirement that the anyone who seeks a related patent 
                                                          






license must be willing to license their patent to other on reasonable terms. Also laudable is the 
fact that there does not appear to be a three-year waiting period before an application for a 
related licence can be granted, which means that manufacturers with patents will not have to 
wait three years before they can legally incorporate the latest innovations from third parties in 
their products. Taken together these requirements for reasonable licensing reciprocity through 
a rapid procedure are essential if the correlated rights doctrine is to be applied and competition 
between manufacturers of integrated technologies is to thrive.  
108. Reliefs in suit for infringement. 
(1) The reliefs which a court may grant in any suit for infringement include an 
injunction (subject to such terms, if any, as the court thinks fit and, at the option of the 
plaintiff, either damages or an account of profits.  
(2) The court may also order that the goods which are found to be infringing and 
materials and implements, the predominant use of which is in the creation of infringing 
goods shall be seized, forfeited or destroyed, as the court deems fit under the 
circumstances of the case without payment of any compensation. 
109. Right of exclusive licensee to take proceedings against infringement.  
(1) The holder of an exclusive licence shall have the like right as the patentee to 
institute a suit in respect of any infringement of the patent committed after the date 
of the licence, and in awarding damages or an account of profits or granting any other 
relief in any such suit the court shall take into consideration any loss suffered or likely 
to be suffered by the exclusive licensee as such or, as the case may be, the profits 
earned by means of the infringement so far as it constitutes an infringement of the 
rights of the exclusive licensee as such. 
These sections provide a rather brief explanation of the right to seek relief from infringement 
and relief which can be granted for infringement. Section 109 provides the right to seek relief 
and the types of relief that can be sought, while Section 108 describes the relief which can be 
provided. Like most intellectual property laws this relief include the right to seek and possibility 
of being granted; damages, injunctive relief and destruction of infringing goods. As Section 108 
allows courts to provide relief "as the court thinks fit" it would appear to be; entirely at the 
discretion of the court whether to provide relief, and to determine how much relief is provided 
when it is provided. Noticeable by its absence it any requirement on the court to provide at least 
a minimum amount of damages when infringement is found. This lack of a minimum 
requirement for damages means that damages could be set below a reasonable royalty range 
which would be inconsistent with an application of the correlated rights doctrine.  
Answers to the Correlated Rights Questions 
1) Do judicial authorities have the discretion needed to grant preliminary injunctive 
relief and/or permanent injunctive relief on an entire integrated technological product 
when it is determined that unauthorised users are unwilling to license or are unwilling to 






the size of their contribution to that integrated technological property or their 
manufacturing participation? 
According to Article 108 injunctive relief is always available854 and judges have significant 
discretion with respect to the grant of both preliminary injunctive relief855 and permanent 
injunctive relief. 856 
2) Do judicial authorities have the discretion needed to withhold injunctive relief for 
ongoing unauthorised use of integrated intellectual property, when it is determined that 
an intellectual property owner is abusing their rights to injunctive relief to coerce users to 
pay more for the use of their intellectual property than value their property contributes 
to the integrated technological product? 
This question is made somewhat redundant by Section 91 which provide the option of 
applying for a "related patent" license. Just as with a compulsory license, the court can grant 
related patent license if the applicant can demonstrate that they have sought a license from the 
patent owner, but the owner was unwilling to license or unwilling to license on reasonable 
terms. Although withholding injunctive relief for essential intellectual properties is also 
practiced in India.857 
3) Do judicial authorities have the discretion needed to make rulings which set the 
level of damages which intellectual property owners should receive for past and ongoing 
unauthorised use of integrated intellectual property at a level which corresponds to the 
value which the intellectual property provides to the technological product? 
The level of past damages is governed by Section 108 which provides the court with 
unrestricted discretion to award damages. Although the question of future damages is made 
somewhat redundant by the possibility of being granted a related patent license which is 
provided under Section 91. However, Section 90 also provides that under a related patent the 
court with has a certain amount of more discretion in setting reasonable royalties for past 
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856 India: Patent Litigation (2012) ‘Though there is no judicial precedent in this regard, theoretically, the grant of a 
permanent injunction does not necessarily follow a finding of patent infringement and a court does have judicial 
discretion to deny the grant of a permanent injunction notwithstanding a finding of patent infringement." 
857 Amarjit Singh Monga & Sagar Chandra, India: Relief in IP Proceedings other than injuction of Damages, AIPPI 
Study Question Response (2013) (avialable at: http://aippi.org/wp-
content/uploads/committees/236/GR236india.pdf) (Herein after: AIPPI Infringement Alternative Survey, India 
(2013)) ‘The Court in case of an essential patent may be subject to a requirement that it be licensed on fair, 
reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms. In a standard essential patent infringement case such as 
Ericsson v. Micromax, the court requested the parties to enter into a temporary arrangement for licensing on Fair, 






damages than it has for ongoing damages.858 As such there is nothing which would prohibit the 
court for setting past or ongoing damages within a reasonable royalty range.859 
 
Summary of Indian Patent Act Compatibility 
As mentioned in the introduction it was the Independent Indian Government's desire to 
ensure that its citizens had affordable access to lifesaving pharmaceutical and otherwise 
essential patented products which provided the impetuses to end the notion of absolute 
property rights on the international stage. As such it is hardly surprising that Patent Act of 1970 
(as amended) would be drafted in a way which ensures that owners would not be able to abuse 
their patent rights to the determent of the Indian public. What was not known at the time of the 
drafting was that those same provisions which protected the public from abuse, could so easily 
be re-interpreted to protect correlated intellectual property owners and integrated 
technological manufactures from the abuse of other owners. The primary tools to prevent this 
abuse being provided by the sections covering compulsory licensing, and specifically § 91 which 
allows a compulsory license to be granted if it is needed to work a related patent. Because of 
this provision can be easily interpreted as providing the courts with the discretion they needed 
to grant compulsory license when it is a correlated owner who is behaving in an abusive manner, 
it clearly is capable of applying the correlated right doctrine against abusive owners. However, 
to be fully compatible with the correlated rights doctrine it must also be capable of protecting 
owners from abusive users. 
The capacity to protect owners requires a minimum of two authorizations. The first being the 
authority to grant injunctive relief when it is clear that the user has not been dealing in good 
faith with the owner, and the second the authority to grant damages equal to the damages 
suffered by the owner as a result of an infringement. As this Act includes the authority to provide 
both injunctive relief and reasonable damages under Section 108, it can be stated that it meets 
the minimum requirements necessary to be able to apply the correlated rights doctrine when it 
is user who are behaving in an abusive manner. Whether the courts will utilise this authority is 
of course another matter altogether.860  
                                                          
858 Id. 
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settlement with Micromax and Intex, who on the other hand, appear to have been manufacturing/dealing with 
products using patented technologies without either obtaining a license from Ericsson or approaching the 






10.11 Summary of International and National Compatibility  
A summary of the compatibility of the correlated rights of doctrine with existing intellectual 
property law is quite simple. There appears to be nothing in either international intellectual 
property law, or national intellectual property laws which were reviewed, that indicates applying 
the correlated rights doctrine would be prohibited by law. In fact, in most cases those laws 
support the notion that every intellectual property owner should receive fair compensation for 
their intellectual property. Specifically, almost all legislation (the notable exception being 
Germany) would appear to provide their courts with the discretion to withhold injunctive relief, 
when owners of correlated intellectual properties are making unreasonable royalty demands or 
including anti-competitive licensing terms in their licensing agreements. The only potential 
obstacle which was found was that a few jurisdictions are so focused on compulsory licensing as 
a solution to unreasonable licensing practices, that they may impede the provision of running 
royalties when owners and users are unable to negotiate a mutually agreeable licensing 
arrangement. However as compulsory licenses are also compatible with the doctrine, this is not 
necessarily an issue.  
This analysis should not come as surprise to anyone familiar with the discretion provided to 
judicial authorities under the respective legislation. Indeed, it could be argued that this lengthy 
analysis could have been replaced by a short description of the assumed discretion provide to 
judicial authorities, and a conclusion that assumed discretion would be consistent with an 
application of the correlated rights doctrine. However, while such a summary may have been 
sufficient, it could be considered entirely too presumptive, and likely would have been described 
as a false assumption before 2006, when the U.S. Supreme court overturned the presumed 
automatic right to injunctive relief. As such although this chapter may have been a tedious and 
repetitive, it can at least be viewed as good start on proving the compatibility of the correlated 
doctrine with existing international and domestic legislation. 
  
                                                          
the potential to abuse patent rights and the need to respect un-abused patent rights, it could be that India is on the 








11. A European Requirement to Apply the Correlated Rights 
Doctrine.  
While a review of the legislative language of various jurisdictions indicated that an application 
of the correlated rights doctrine appears to be compatible with existing intellectual property 
laws, this does not constitute a requirement to apply the doctrine. However, this lack of a 
requirement to apply the correlative rights doctrine in intellectual property law, does not 
necessarily mean that there is no requirement to apply the doctrine. In this chapter it will be 
argued that in the European Union legal hierarchy there exist laws; which are superior to 
intellectual property laws, and which establish a legal requirement to apply rules which would 
be substantively similar to the correlated rights doctrine. Obviously if the analysis of this 
superiority and legal requirement are correct; these laws should guarantee the inevitable and 
swift application of the correlated rights doctrine in European Union. The legal instruments 
which potentially create this superior legal obligation on all intellectual property law in Europe 
Union are the Treaty on The Functioning of the Europe Union (TFEU)861 and the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, (The Charter). 862 
This chapter it will be divided into two parts, the first will explain how the competition law 
Articles include in the TFEU, have been interpreted to in a manner that is consistent with the 
application of the correlated rights doctrine in intellectual property law. Because both the 
superiority of Treaty Articles and the actual competition components of the Treaty are well 
documented, this part will focus primarily on the specific case which provides that 
interpretation. The second part will analyse the Charter; to reveal how it was too can to be 
interpreted as requiring the application of the correlated rights doctrine in intellectual property 
law. This part will be divided into three subparts; the first will examine the Charter's standing in 
EU law, the second will describe the implications which flow from the Charter with respect to 
intellectual property by analysing the actual articles in the Charter, and the final part will 
describe how this superiority and these implications can be easily tested and confirmed by 
requesting a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). 
11.1 Competition Law in The Treaty on the Functioning of Europe 
It should be mentioned at the outset that is somewhat surprising that the competition 
articles included in the TFEU, can be relied upon to require the application of the correlated 
rights doctrine in intellectual property disputes. Not because the articles themselves could not 
provide the necessary protection, but rather because the method in which they were utilized 
was not anticipated. It can be recalled that in the Chapter 3 the possibility of utilizing the 
competition law to resolve the problems of patent hold up and legal attrition were not pursued 
because of a recognition that regardless of how well intended competition laws or authorities 
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are; the market will always out manoeuvre them, any action they took would usually be too late 
to prevent the harm done by the abusive behaviour and the remedies provided under 
competition law would do nothing to compensate those harmed by the abuse. This realization 
was based on the assumption that in order to pursue a competition action; the injured party 
would have to first make a complaint to the competition authorities and wait for them to decide 
to take the case, review the case and make a decision before that decision could be reviewed by 
the courts. What was not anticipated was the that CJEU could be approached directly to 
interpret the impact of the competition Articles on a specific case. The absence of this possibility 
being based upon a presumption of unwillingness of CJEU to circumvent the authority of the 
European Competition Commission as expressed in commentaries on European competition 
law,863 and case law. ARD v Commission, provides a good example of this case law. In it the Court 
stated that it would be;  
'Limiting its own review to one of 'manifest error', which the court is nevertheless 
legitimated in undertaking, due to 'the prospective nature of the economic analysis 
carried out by the Commission,´ the Court of Justice thus implicitly confirmed  that it 
will continue to maintain the legal position, ... that - in the field of the application of 
competition policy - it will not develop an independent standard of free competition, 
or a subjective right to 'free and fair' competition conditions, which might be asserted 
by individual Europeans above the legislative provisions of EU competition policy.'864  
However, these expectations turned out to be mistaken as despite earlier pronouncement, 
in the case of Huawei Technologies v. ZTE865 the CJEU effectively did develop an independent 
standard of free competition. 
To fully appreciate the consequence of the decision in Huawei, a brief description of the 
competition Articles and their legal hierarchy in EU law, will be provided before the analysis of 
the case is commenced. Articles 101 and 102 are the Articles in the TFEU which relate to 
competition laws in the European Union. Article 101(1) states that: 
 
The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market All 
agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and 
concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have 
as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within 
the internal market. 866 
 
Following this declaration is a non-exhaustive list of examples the types of agreements 
covered by the declaration.867 Article 101(2) states that these types of agreements will be 
automatically void, whereas Article 101(3) describes situations in which Article 101(1) may be 
inapplicable and the limits of those exemptions. The primary targets of Article 101 are classic 
cartels which restrict competition through collusion to maintain either prices or market shares 
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in a horizon markets, but it also covers vertical market abuses where agreements between 
buyers and sellers have the same objective as the horizontal market abuses.868 
 
Article 102 states that:  
'Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the internal 
market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal 
market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States.869 
 
Following this declaration is a non-exhaustive list of the potential abuses of a dominate 
position which are proscribed by the declaration.870 The principle objective of this Article is to 
proscribe the use of market power to limit competition in the market place.871 
While there are other works in which can be found which provide a detailed description of 
the relationship between EU competition law and intellectual property rights,872 for the 
purposes of demonstrating EU competence in this area it should be sufficient to identify few key 
cases and quick mention discussion of the block exemption which was enacted to reduce some 
the conflicts between these two bodies of law. As the most profound questions in competition 
revolve around collusion and abuse of power, cases involving these issues would appear to be 
the most appropriate for demonstrating the EU's competence in this field with respect 
intellectual property rights. 
Two of the earliest cases which made its way to the ECJ were the Cases 56/64 and 58/64 
Consten.873 The case involved application for the annulment of a competition authority decision 
which found that the exclusive distribution agreements between Consten and Grudig were in 
breach of competition laws as set out in the Treaty.874 In its decision the competition authority 
held that the trademark protection did not provide justification for imposing territorial 
restrictions in exclusive distribution agreements which prevented distributors from exporting to 
other EU markets. The Commission's decision was upheld by the ECJ.875 
Another early case establishing Article 102 implications for intellectual law was Case 24/67 
Parke Davis v Probel.876 This case was referred to the ECJ by the Gerechtshof (Netherlands' Court 
of Appeal) which requested an interpretation on how EU competition law impacted the rights 
of patent holders granted patents by member states. More specifically the Gerechtshof asked 
whether concepts prohibited under articles 85(1) and 86 TEC included prohibitions on the 
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actions of patent holders, who by virtue of their patents request that national courts prevent all 
commercial dealing in the protected products coming from another member state which does 
not provide protection to the product, and if so how the possible application of the articles 
would be affected by the fact that the patent holder offers the protected product at a higher 
than unpatented imports. The ECJ ruled that it did not.877 
Although this ruling, combined with later cases,878 established a fairly high threshold for 
finding an abuse of dominate position for intellectual property holders; they did established 
authority of the Commission to use Article 101 in intellectual property disputes, thereby 
establishing a general EU competence in intellectual property law.  
This competence no doubt provided the CJEU with the authority to develop an authoritative 
standard for intellectual property owner behaviour in the case of Huawei Technologies v. ZTE, 
which as will be explained effectively requires an application of components of the correlated 
rights doctrine. The case itself related to the right of Huawei, the owner of standard essential 
intellectual property (SEP), which had provided a FRAND (fair, reasonable and non-
discriminatory) licensing commitment to the standardization body (ETSI) for any properties 
which were included in the standard, to seek injunctive relief. The injunctive relief being sought 
against ZTE, who allegedly were using the Huawei's SEPs, but were unwilling to license the 
disputed intellectual property on the terms offered by Huawei. 
The case originated in the German courts where after a breakdown in negotiations, Huawei 
sought; an injunction prohibiting the continuation of an infringement, an order for the rendering 
of accounts, the recall of products and the assessment of damages. In its defence ZTE argued 
that the action for a prohibitory injunction constituted an abuse of a dominate position, 
prohibited by Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU.  
While the German court of Landgericht Dusseldoft, 'accepted the ZTE's use of the patents at 
issue was unlawful' ... it considered 'that the action for prohibitory injunction could be dismissed 
on the grounds of the compulsory nature of the license-on the basis of Article 102 TFEU, in 
particular - if it could be found that, by pursuing its actions for prohibitory injunction, Huawei is 
abusing 'the dominate position which it unquestionably holds'.879 However as the Court was not 
entirely sure how the Article 102 was should be applied in standard essential patent disputes, it 
made a request for a preliminary ruling by the CJEU. This request for a preliminary ruling 
representing an alternative method of enforcing the Article 102, which traditionally would have 
required ZTE or any other undertaking to file a complaint with the EU Competition Commission. 
In that preliminary ruling request, they asked a number of questions all of which have 
implication for an application of the correlated rights doctrine.  
The first question which they asked was:  
 
'(1) Does the proprietor of [an SEP] which informs a standardisation body that it is 
willing to grant any third party a licence on [FRAND] terms abuse its dominant market 
position if it brings an action for an injunction against a patent infringer even though 
the infringer has declared that it is willing to negotiate concerning such a licence? or 
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Is an abuse of the dominant market position to be presumed only where the infringer 
has submitted to the proprietor of the [SEP] an acceptable, unconditional offer to 
conclude a licensing agreement which the patentee cannot refuse without unfairly 
impeding the infringer or breaching the prohibition of discrimination, and the infringer 
fulfils its contractual obligations for acts of use already performed in anticipation of 
the licence to be granted?'880 
 
In asking this question the German Court is essential asking; when is seeking injunctive 
relief in order to coerce an infringer into accepting the owner's licensing terms, a breach of 
EU competition law. The first part and second parts of the question attempting to ascertain 
whether an infringer's declaration of a willingness to negotiate is sufficient or whether that 
declaration has to be backed up by a reasonable and unconditional counteroffer. Implied 
in this question is that assumption that when there exists a demonstrably willing licensee, 
it would be a breach of Article 101 if the owner of that SEP still sought injunctive relief.  
This question goes to the heart of the application of the correlated rights doctrine, 
which would suggest that whenever there is demonstrably willing licensor and licensee of 
a correlated intellectual property, the court should withhold injunctive relief and instead 
focus on arbitrating between the offer and counteroffers made by the respective parties.  
The second question asked was:  
 
'(2) If abuse of a dominant market position is already to be presumed as a consequence 
of the infringer’s willingness to negotiate: 
Does Article 102 TFEU lay down particular qualitative and/or time requirements in 
relation to the willingness to negotiate? In particular, can willingness to negotiate be 
presumed where the patent infringer has merely stated (orally) in a general way that 
it is prepared to enter into negotiations, or must the infringer already have entered 
into negotiations by, for example, submitting specific conditions upon which it is 
prepared to conclude a licensing agreement?'881 
 
This question is a follow up question to the first part of the first question, in that it is 
designed to get the CJEU to specify the definition of "willingness to negotiate". Obviously if an 
infringer merely has to declare that they are willing to negotiate they could do so but still not 
engage in good faith negotiation. If this situation occurs, it would force the owner to return to 
court and to bear the burden of proving that the infringer is not engaging in good faith 
negotiations all of which would delay the case. Such a delay could and should be considered an 
effective part of a legal attrition strategy. A strategy which would be incompatible with the 
application of the correlated rights doctrine. Alternatively requiring the infringer to make a 
counter offer is entirely compatible with an application of the doctrine. 
The third question which was asked was; 
 
'(3) If the submission of an acceptable, unconditional offer to conclude a licensing 
agreement is a prerequisite for abuse of a dominant market position: 
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Does Article 102 TFEU lay down particular qualitative and/or time requirements in 
relation to that offer? Must the offer contain all the provisions which are normally 
included in licensing agreements in the field of technology in question? In particular, 
may the offer be made subject to the condition that the [SEP] is actually used and/or 
is shown to be valid?882 
 
This question is a follow up question to the second part of the first question, in that it is 
designed to get the CJEU to specify the definition of what can be represents as a confirmation 
of willingness to negotiate. Included in it, is an indication of what the German court likely regards 
as a prerequisite; namely that the counteroffer be acceptable and unconditional. They also 
appear to imply that terms which would prevent the infringer from challenging the validity of an 
intellectual property are not required. Assuming that these implications are correct, the 
substance of the question then becomes about the timing of the counteroffer and any other 
terms that the CJEU feel need to be included.  
As the question is intended to define the nature of a good faith counteroffer it could just as 
easily be asked if it was a question about an application of the correlated rights doctrine. 
Although a question about such an application would refrain from using the term "acceptable" 
instead of "reasonable" as this would appear to add an additional element of confusion to what 
is already a very complicated issue with respect to intellectual property disputes. Like the 
implied intent of the German court, an application of the correlated rights doctrine would likely 
suggest that the counteroffer must be reasonable and unconditional, and forbid terms which 
would prevent a later suit on the validity of a patent, while leaving the timing and additional 
terms to the CJEU.  
The fourth question asked was: 
 
(4) If the fulfilment of the infringer’s obligations arising from the licence that is to be 
granted is a prerequisite for the abuse of a dominant market position: 
Does Article 102 TFEU lay down particular requirements with regard to those acts of 
fulfilment? Is the infringer particularly required to render an account for past acts of 
use and/or to pay royalties? May an obligation to pay royalties be discharged, if 
necessary, by depositing a security?883 
 
This question appears to be redundant. It is redundant because one would assume that any 
reasonable offer or counteroffer by definition must include a requirement to pay for past 
unauthorised use and the only way that could be calculated would be by the rendering o 
accounts as to the quantum of past abuses.  
The final question which was asked was: 
 
(5) Do the conditions under which the abuse of a dominant position by the proprietor 
of a [n SEP] is to be presumed apply also to an action on the ground of other claims 
(for rendering of accounts, recall of products, damages) arising from a patent 
infringement?’884 
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This question would appear to be something which ought to fall within the discretion of the 
German court depending on its perception of the reliability of a specific infringer to meet its 
obligations. That damages are mentioned in this question, really is unnecessary as any 
reasonable counter offer must surely cure past infringements. 
Before moving on to the opinion of the Advocate General (AG) and the CJEU, it is worth 
pointing out that had ZTE filed a complaint with the EU Commission asking the same questions, 
this case would still likely be unresolved. This because the EU Commission would have first had 
to; decide to investigate the complaint, then commenced an investigation which may have 
involved a public inquiry, before rendering an opinion, which would then be subject to a review 
by the European General Court (EGC), before finally being reviewed by the CJEU. That there is a 
mechanism for circumventing these protracted legal proceeding by requesting a preliminary 
ruling is undoubtedly the most efficient and effective way of filling in the gaps of EU law.  
Included in the opinion of the Advocate General, is the recommendation that seeking 
injunctive relief is not necessarily constitute an abuse of dominate position and should be 
available to an SEP owner under the following conditions: 1) The owner of the SEP has made the 
infringer aware of their infringement, 2) The owner of the SEP has made a made an offer to 
license its SEP's to the infringer on reasonable terms. 3) The infringer has not promptly 
responded to the owners offer, by either excepting their offer or making a counteroffer to the 
owner which outlines any clause in the original offer which it finds unsatisfactory. 4) The 
infringer subsequently does not engage in good faith negotiations to resolve the disputed 
clauses in a timely manner and fails to indicate willingness to allow the courts or an arbitration 
panel to fix the terms of the licensing agreement.885 
In the actual ruling the CJEU accepted and more fully developed the opinion provide by the 
Advocate General, setting out the steps which must be taking to be granted or to avoid injunctive 
relief. That the highest Court in Europe would have to articulate and ordered these steps, 
provides an indication of just how common abusive behaviour has become. For each of the steps 
is consistent with what would be expected in a normal commercial transaction between a willing 
licensor and a willing licensee, and if either owners or infringers did not follow them before the 
court made the order, the only reason for doing so would have been to abuse their rights or to 
defend against an abuse of their rights. Although these steps are so clear they need little 
interpretation, each will be summarized and analysed according to both; normal commercial 
behaviour and an application of the correlated rights doctrine. 
The first step ordered is included in paragraphs 60-61 of the judgement which reads:   
 
'60 Accordingly, the proprietor of an SEP which considers that that SEP is the subject 
of an infringement cannot, without infringing Article 102 TFEU, bring an action for 
a prohibitory injunction or for the recall of products against the alleged infringer 
without notice or prior consultation with the alleged infringer, even if the SEP has 
already been used by the alleged infringer. 
                                                          






61 Prior to such proceedings, it is thus for the proprietor of the SEP in question, first, 
to alert the alleged infringer of the infringement complained about by designating 
that SEP and specifying the way in which it has been infringed.'886 
 
This step establishes that it is up to the owner to notify the infringer that they have identified 
an unauthorised use of their intellectual property by the infringer. While it could be argued that 
the infringer ought to notify the owner and sought a license before that any use, given the 
complexity of modern technological products and the myriad of intellectual properties which 
may or may not be used in producing a technological product, its not necessarily inapproriate 
that the burden of identifying an unauthorised use should fall on the owner. That said; when the 
intellectual property in question represents part of the recognised standard essential patents 
(SEP) required to produce a technological product and there is no reason why the infringer 
would not be aware of the use. Which suggests placing the burden on the owner is major 
concession to infringers, a concession which ought to be reciprocated in the later steps. A 
requirement to notifying infringers of their infringement is naturally consistent with an any 
action involving intellectual property rights including ones in which the correlated rights 
doctrine is to be applied.  
The next two steps in the ruling are include in paragraph 63 which reads as follows: 
 
'63 Secondly, after the alleged infringer has expressed its willingness to conclude a 
licensing agreement on FRAND terms, it is for the proprietor of the SEP to present 
to that alleged infringer a specific, written offer for a licence on FRAND terms, in 
accordance with the undertaking given to the standardisation body, specifying, in 
particular, the amount of the royalty and the way in which that royalty is to be 
calculated.'887 
 
This paragraph includes two steps in that are attempting to establish that the existence of 
both a willing licensor and a willing licensee. Obviously if the infringer does not respond to the 
owner by indicating that they are willing to conclude a licensing agreement on FRAND terms, 
they are not a willing licensee and should be treated as such. Alternatively, if the owner does 
not provide the infringer with a written offer for a license they are not a willing licensor and 
should be treated as such. The most contentious aspect of this paragraph is the assumption that 
FRAND terms are a readily identifiable concept, which they are not. From a normal commercial 
prospective, obviously having both parties indicate they are willing to negotiate, and requiring 
the owner to make the first offer are entirely in keeping with a tradition commencement of 
negotiation. From a correlated rights’ prospective it indicates a respect for the correlated rights 
of the owner. 
Paragraphs 65-66 outline the fourth step as follows: 
 
'65 By contrast it is for the alleged infringer diligently to respond to that offer, in 
accordance with recognised commercial practices in the field and in good faith, a 
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point which must be established on the basis of objective factors and which implies, 
in particular, that there are no delaying tactics. 
66 Should the alleged infringer not accept the offer made to it, it may rely on the 
abusive nature of an action for a prohibitory injunction or for the recall of products 
only if it has submitted to the proprietor of the SEP in question, promptly and in 
writing, a specific counter-offer that corresponds to FRAND terms.'888 
 
All these two paragraphs require is that the infringer make a good faith and timely response 
to the owners offer. That response can come in the form of an acceptance of the offer or by 
making a counteroffer which corresponds to their perception of FRAND terms. As with any 
ordinary commercial negotiations this counteroffer should be based on amendments to the 
original offer, but there is nothing in these paragraphs which would prevent the infringer from 
making a counteroffer based in licensing agreements they have already concluded with other 
intellectual property owners. While the definition of a timely response is not provided, such a 
definition could and should take account of the major concession provided to infringers in the 
first step. Allowing them to use intellectual property without first seeking a license for that use 
makes an otherwise unlawful use, lawful, and ought to require that they respond almost 
immediately to the owners offer. From a correlated rights’ prospective one of the most 
important elements of these paragraphs is the requirement to make the counteroffer on a 
timely basis, which reduces the risk of legal attrition. Again, the most contentious aspect of this 
paragraph is the assumption that FRAND terms are a readily identifiable concept, which they are 
not. 
Paragraphs 67-68 outline the next steps in the process as follows:  
 
'67 Furthermore, where the alleged infringer is using the teachings of the SEP before 
a licensing agreement has been concluded, it is for that alleged infringer, from the 
point at which its counter-offer is rejected, to provide appropriate security, in 
accordance with recognised commercial practices in the field, for example by 
providing a bank guarantee or by placing the amounts necessary on deposit. The 
calculation of that security must include, inter alia, the number of the past acts of 
use of the SEP, and the alleged infringer must be able to render an account in 
respect of those acts of use. 
68 In addition, where no agreement is reached on the details of the FRAND terms 
following the counter-offer by the alleged infringer, the parties may, by common 
agreement, request that the amount of the royalty be determined by an 
independent third party, by decision without delay.'889  
 
These paragraphs constitute the conditions under which negotiations should occur and how 
they should be resolved if they fail. Paragraph 67 is intended to provide the owner with the 
confidence to know that they will eventually be paid for the unauthorised use by the infringer. 
Obviously, this dramatically levels the playing field in terms of negotiations, for if the owner does 
not have these assurances, the uncertainly of payment could be used against them in their 
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negotiation. While this could be considered a concession with respect to the infringer, it is a 
concession that would appear to be wholly justified by the courts willingness to overlook their 
ongoing unauthorised use of the owner’s intellectual property. Paragraph will 68 is merely a 
statement of the obvious; in that if negotiations fail the infringer should be willing to allow an 
independent assessment of what terms should be included in license if they want to avoid the 
granting of injunctive relief. Alternatively, the owners should also be willing to allow an 
independent assessment of the same terms before they are granted injunctive relief. These 
chapters are entirely compatible with the correlated rights doctrine in that they provide for a 
mechanism to ensure that owners are paid for the use of their intellectual property and would 
allow the application of the correlated rights doctrine by the courts to resolve failed 
negotiations. 
Overall this ruling is entirely consistent with the application of the correlated rights doctrine, 
as it ensures that reasonable owner will be protected from unwilling or unreasonable infringers 
and that reasonable infringers will be protected from unreasonable owners. Further it provides 
that; when there exist disagreements over licensing terms, the courts can resolve those 
difference according to the intellectual property rights of the litigants. Indeed, this decision is so 
compatible with an application of the correlated rights doctrine, that it may appear redundant 
to suggest that any further action by the court is required. There is however one unresolved 
issue with respect of these types of disputes which has not been clearly addressed in this ruling. 
That unresolved issue relates to the definition of FRAND, and outside the situations where a 
FRAND commitment has been made, the definition of reasonable royalties when correlated 
intellectual properties are in dispute. A deficiency which was openly recognised by the AG 
Wathetet in his opinion.  
 
 'the matter at dispute before the referring court, which, in my view, stems largely 
from a lack of clarity as to what is meant by 'FRAND terms' and as to the requisite 
content of such terms, could not be adequately -if not better -resolved in the context 
of other branches of law or by mechanisms other than the rules of competition law.'890  
 
This is an interesting observation because what it suggests is this problem would be better 
resolved if it was possible to use another body of law to determine the definition of 
FRAND/reasonable royalties. Clearly given the legal hierarchy of EU law, if that body of law was 
the hierarchically superior Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedom, it would go a long way 
towards mitigating these types of disputes.  
11.2 The European Charter of Fundamental Rights 
It should be acknowledged that the Charter's relationship with intellectual property law was 
ambiguous until relatively recently. An example of that ambiguity can be observed in the 
Directive 2004/48/EC on the enforcement of intellectual property rights (Enforcement Directive) 
which was issued by the European Parliament and Council of Europe in 2004891. According the 
recitals the underlying legal justification for that Directive was based upon the freedom of 
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movement of goods.892 That the free movement of goods was used to justify this directive is not 
at all unexpected, as ever since they were introduced in the original Treaty of Rome the freedom 
of movement of capital, people, goods and service provision have been used by European Union 
(EU) lawmakers to justify most expansions of European Union Law.893 What was somewhat 
unexpected was that; the initial Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union894 
received only a passing mention as something which should be respected in that Directive.895 
The relatively insignificant role of the Charter in the Enforcement Directive is unexpected 
because; there was a considerable amount of effort expended to create and proclaim the 
Charter just three years earlier, and it included specific references to intellectual property rights 
as one of the rights in the list of fundamental rights which were protected by it. Given this effort, 
and the specific mention of intellectual property rights, it would have appeared entirely 
appropriate for the Enforcement Directive to invoke the Charter as a secondary, if not primary 
foundation for its legal justification. The main reason why this invocation did not occur can be 
directly related to questions about legal status of the Charter.  
Whilst its status should have been resolved shortly after its proclamation,896 it in fact 
remained unresolved for many years after the Enforcement Directive was issued. It was as a 
direct result of this uncertainty, that two years after its proclamation the European Parliament 
took the unusual step of passing a  resolution which simultaneously admitted that ‘the Charter 
is not directly justiciable’ whilst at the same time describing how ‘The Commission is determined 
to regard the Charter as binding upon itself’.897 As this contradiction still prevailed when the 
Enforcement Directive was issued, it was perhaps only prudent not to use it as a legal foundation 
for EU directives, until the uncertainly of its legal status was resolved.  
That said, prudence does not explain the failure to reference any of the precedents which 
established the superiority of fundamental rights over fundamental freedoms, in EU case law 
for a foundation.898 Logically until such a time as the legal status of the Charter was resolved, 
these cases represented the dominate and binding legal obligation with respect to the role of 
fundamental rights in the EU law. A role which by definition should be acknowledged as a 
foundational cornerstone to any EU legislation. That these cases were ignored would tend to 
suggest that it may not have been just prudence which was the determining factor in the minor 
role played by the Charter, but it may reflect an attitude of condescension towards fundamental 
rights in EU legislation. This condescension, if it did exist, was more than likely being driven by 
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the ideological portrayal of the European Convention on Human Rights899 and by extension the 
Charter as a "villain's charters".900  
Regardless of why the Charter, and fundamental rights in general, were granted such a 
diminutive role in the Enforcement Directive, subsequent events indicate that this neglect may 
soon become history. The reason why it might become history is because in the ten years since 
the issuing of the enforcement directive: the legal status of the Charter and its application to 
intellectual property rights; have significantly advanced in a manner which has established the 
Charter as having legal superiority to both EU and Member State intellectual property law.  
The Charter was established as a superior EU law by the Lisbon Treaty which was signed in 
December of 2007, eventually ratified by all Member States in November of 2009, and which 
came into force on December 2009.901 There are three key declarations which are included in 
this Article, the first of which is that the Charter 'shall have the same legal value as the Treaties', 
the second that 'the Charter shall not extend in any way the competences of the Union as 
defined in the Treaties' and the third that 'The rights, freedoms and principles in the Charter 
shall be interpreted in accordance with the general provisions in Title VII of the Charter'902  
The statement that the Charter "shall have the same legal value as the Treaties" is obviously 
the most significant statement in terms of the legal status of the Charter. By putting the Charter 
on the same level as the Treaty this statement to elevates the Charter from a mere declaration 
of rights, to a legally binding source of primary EU law. This supremacy of Treaty Articles can be 
traced back to what many consider to be a landmark case in EU law, 903 which is referred to as 
Van Gend en Loos.904 In that case the European Court of Justice (ECJ), now the Court of Justice 
of the European Union (CJEU), ruled that provisions of the Treaty Establishing the European 
Economic Community were capable of creating legal rights which could be enforced by both 
natural and legal persons before the courts of the Community's member states. A principle 
which is now called the "direct effect". The key paragraph in that ruling reading as follows:  
'The Community constitutes a new legal order of international law for the benefit of 
which the states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields and the 
subjects of which comprise not only member states but also their nationals. 
Independently of the legislation of member states, community law therefore not only 
imposes obligations on individuals but is also intended to confer upon them rights which 
become part of their legal heritage. These rights arise not only where they are expressly 
granted by the treaty, but also by reason of obligations which the treaty imposes in a 
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clearly defined way upon individuals as well as upon the member states and upon the 
institutions of the community."  Judgment of the Court of 5 February 1963.'905  
Obviously after the Charter was raised to the level of Treaties, this ruling is now just as 
consequential for Charter Articles as it has been for Treaty Articles.906 Insofar as that is the case; 
this requires that all secondary EU laws and member state laws must adhere to the Charter when 
those laws are implementing EU law.907 While this adherence does not automatically apply to 
autonomous Member State laws, the principle of effectiveness which is enshrined in Article 19 
(1) TEU which requires that 'Member States shall provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective 
legal protection in the fields covered by Union Law'908 should ensure that the protections 
provided under the Charter do not become 'an empty promise'.909 This principle of effectiveness 
having been regularly stated by the CJEU910 is also stated under Article 47 of the Charter which 
governs individual rights to an effective remedy and a fair trial. Which is not to suggest that 
when Member State implementing their own intellectual property laws, it does not fall under 
the category of implementing EU laws, rather that even if they were not considered to be 
implementing EU laws, they would still have to maintain the effectiveness of the Charter 
protections when applying those laws. 
As to whether Member States are 'implementing EU law" when their courts are deciding 
intellectual property cases, this would appear to be a relatively straight forward proposition, as 
the Enforcement Directive911 which requires a consistent treatment of intellectual properties 
across Member States in order to promote the internal market,912 is a EU law which must be 
implemented in Member states. The EU competence being further evidenced by the major 
works detailing the role of the EU law in specific intellectual property cases,913 an important 
example of which provided by Huawei v ZTE, mentioned above. 
Assuming it is accepted that Member States must adhere to the protections provided in the 
Charter when implementing of intellectual property law, this naturally leads to an analysis of 
what consequences the Charter has on that implementation. This analysis will be broken into 
five parts. The first part will provide a general overview of the Charter, the second an analysis of 
the articles which protect intellectual property, the third the Charter's implications for royalty 
rates, the fourth a quick discussion of state liability, and the fifth a proposal for testing the 
analysis.  
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11.2.1 Overview of the Charter 
The Charter itself is made up of a preamble and fifty-four Articles. The Articles incorporated 
in the Charter, representing the actual law being enacted. Of these Articles, the first fifty 
describe the various rights, freedoms and principles to be protected which are grouped under 
six Titles; (1) Dignity, (2) Freedoms, (3) Equality, (4) Solidarity, (5) Citizen’s rights and (6) Justice. 
The last four articles describe general provisions on how these rights, freedoms and principles 
are to be applied.  
As with all EU law, the preamble is used to outline the general spirit or intent of the law being 
enacted and is incorporated into all EU law to prevent an unjust interpretation of the law 
resulting from an unintended strict reading of the underlying law. While the preamble is more 
significant in terms of providing guidance on a general interpretation, there is included in the 
preamble one sentence which provides a such a clear indication on how the Charter should be 
applied to all rights, that it deserves to be included in an analysis of a strict interpretation of the 
Charter. That key sentence reads as follows; 
 
'Enjoyment of these rights entails responsibilities and duties with regard to other 
persons, to the human community and future generations.'914 
 
Regardless of the judicial ideology there can be no doubt that this sentence is meant to 
indicate that there is no such thing as an absolute right, and the enjoyment of rights are 
restricted by a responsibility and duty, to use them in a manner which takes account of how that 
use would affect others. At a minimum these responsibilities and duties must require that rights 
holders not use their rights in a manner which intentionally and unjustly harms others or the 
rights of others, as such malicious behaviour would negate any responsibilities or duties. It 
would also likely include any action which treats the rights of others as subordinate to the rights 
of other similar rights holders, as such behaviour would imply a superiority of one right holder 
over another in breach of the principle of equality before the law. It would not however include 
a blanket prohibition against doing harm to others, as there are undoubtedly circumstances 
where the exercise of a right will restrict the rights of others, which may be considered to a harm 
to those rights. Those restrictions would obviously not be unjust, so long as it did not place the 
rights of a rights holder, above the rights of the property rights being restricted. 
Whether this sentence entails more than a requirement to abstain from intentional and 
unjust harm is of course a much more complicated question. There are some rights which clearly 
should have priority over other rights. For example, Title I includes; the right to life, the 
prohibition of torture and the prohibition on slavery, all of which should have priority over the 
freedom to conduct a business or the right to property. Fortunately, a discussion of the priority 
of all rights is beyond the scope of this thesis, as it merely seeks to merely address the issue of 
the treatment of intellectual property rights between intellectual property owners, which 
because of this Charter are endowed with identical rights which entail identical responsibilities 
and duties. Viewed from this context the Charter represents a shield rather than a sword in 
terms of determining how intellectual property rights should be treated under EU law.  
                                                          






11.2.2 Articles Protecting Intellectual Property 
Because the Charter has several Articles which have implication for the implementation of 
intellectual property law, this analysis will deal with each of the relevant Articles individually. 
Each individual analysis will commence with the text of the Article and the test of the EU 
Explanatory Notes which covers the Articles.915 This will be followed by a discussion of the 




Freedom to Conduct Business 
 
The freedom to conduct a business in accordance with Union law and national laws 
and practices is recognised.  
 
Explanation on Article 16 — Freedom to conduct a business  
This Article is based on Court of Justice case-law which has recognised freedom to 
exercise an economic or commercial activity (see judgments of 14 May 1974, Case 4/73 
Nold [1974] ECR 491, paragraph 14 of the grounds, and of 27 September 1979, Case 
230-78 SpA Eridiana and others [1979] ECR 2749, paragraphs 20 and 31 of the grounds) 
and freedom of contract (see inter alia Sukkerfabriken Nykøbing judgment, Case 
151/78 [1979] ECR 1, paragraph 19 of the grounds, and judgment of 5 October 1999, 
C-240/97 Spain v Commission [1999] ECR I-6571, paragraph 99 of the grounds) and 
Article 119(1) and (3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which 
recognises free competition. Of course, this right is to be exercised with respect for 
Union law and national legislation. It may be subject to the limitations provided for in 
Article 52(1) of the Charter. 
 
The freedom to conduct business is sourced from the constitutional traditions of the Member 
states, which is implied by the constitutional rights to property and to work.916 It can be viewed 
as an EU effort to emphasis a shift in Europe away from a national political economy to a more 
market based economy where individuals have greater freedom to engaging in commercial 
activities917 Which more plainly can be described as an effort to shift away from government 
involvement and interference in commercial activities. A central tenant of this freedom is the 
concept of economic autonomy for private businesses within the boundaries of the legal and 
economic framework which defines the European Economic Constitution.918 The most notable 
boundaries being those provide under European competition laws,919 State aid laws,920 the free 
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movement of goods,921 and the freedoms of work, establishment, services and capital.922 While 
the Charter has enshrined the freedom to do business as a right, there is already an extensive 
record of the CJEU extrapolating this freedom in conjunction with the right to work and 
constitutional principles,923 and as such the Charter merely codifies these rights. 
As indicated in the pre-amble this freedom also had to be balanced against all the other 
various rights provided in the Charter. This limitation being evident in the case of Sky Österreich 
where Advocate General Bot stated that: 
 
'It is clear from the case-law of the Court that the right to property, like the right 
freely to exercise an economic activity, is one of the general principles of law of the 
Union. However, those principles are not absolute but must be viewed in relation to 
their social function. Consequently, restrictions may be imposed on use of the right to 
property, and the right to freely pursue an economic activity, provided that those 
restrictions correspond to objectives of general interest pursued by the Union and do 
not constitute, with regard to the objective pursued, a disproportionate and 
intolerable interference affecting the very substance of the rights thus guaranteed.'924 
 
A limitation which is also confirmed in Article 52(1) of the Charter.925 Further limitation on 
the freedom of business flow from a recognition of the need to regulate business for the general 
good of the citizens of the EU.926  
Despite these limitations the inclusion of the Article 16 in the Charter does increase the ability 
of EU individuals to rely on this right; not only to do business, but on how to do business. A key 
aspect of this protection involves the need to provide businesses with a degree of certainly in 
regard to their own economic planning.927 This protection is particularly significant to intellectual 
property owners who engage in the business of developing, patenting and licensing innovation. 
Clearly in order to provide businesses with certainly in terms of their economic planning, they 
need to have confidence that the judiciary will deal with any disputes that they have in an 
efficient and consistent manner.  
Another protection implied by the inclusion of the freedom to do business is the notion of 
contractual autonomy,928 which presumably provide businesses with the freedom to negotiate 
any contract terms within the limitation described earlier, without being subject to government 
interference. Naturally one of most important terms that they will negotiate will be the price of 
the products which they are selling. This autonomy should be equally applicable to all 
businesses, including intellectual property licensing businesses. The caveat being that licensing 
terms must abide by competition law considerations and be balanced against the Charter rights 
of others, including other intellectual property owners. All of which could be facilitated by a 
requirement to apply the correlated rights doctrine, which has preciously the same intent. 
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The Right to Property 
1. Everyone has the right to own, use, dispose of and bequeath his or her lawfully 
acquired possessions. No one may be deprived of his or her possessions, except in the 
public interest and in the cases and under the conditions provided for by law, subject 
to fair compensation being paid in good time for their loss. The use of property may 
be regulated by law in so far as is necessary for the general interest. 
 
2. Intellectual property shall be protected. 
 
Explanation on Article 17 — Right to property  
This Article is based on Article 1 of the Protocol to the ECHR:  
 
‘Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No 
one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the 
conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.  
 
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to 
enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with 
the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.’  
 
This is a fundamental right common to all national constitutions. It has been recognised on 
numerous occasions by the case-law of the Court of Justice, initially in the Hauer judgment 
(13 December 1979, [1979] ECR 3727). The wording has been updated but, in accordance 
with Article 52(3), the meaning and scope of the right are the same as those of the right 
guaranteed by the ECHR and the limitations may not exceed those provided for there.  
 
Protection of intellectual property, one aspect of the right of property, is explicitly 
mentioned in paragraph 2 because of its growing importance and Community secondary 
legislation. Intellectual property covers not only literary and artistic property but also inter 
alia patent and trademark rights and associated rights. The guarantees laid down in 
paragraph 1 shall apply as appropriate to intellectual property.  
 
Before moving on to an analysis of this Article is it worth point out that paragraph two 
explicitly identifies intellectual property as a type of property that is protected by the Charter. 
According to the EU explanation this explicate inclusion was deemed necessary, "because of its 
growing importance". It should also be pointed according the EU explanation, the guarantees 
provided in the first paragraph equally apply to all properties, including intellectual properties.  
Unlike the freedom to conduct business, the right to property has a long history in 
international and Member State constitutions.929 Property rights can be defined as a legal 
phenomenon,930 and the CJEU has defined property rights 'rights with an asset value creating an 
established legal position under the legal system, enabling the holder to exercise those rights 
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autonomously and for his benefit'.931 In evaluating intellectual property it is clear that they do 
have an established legal position and as such the intellectual property rights should  'not be 
regarded as constituting mere commercial interest or opportunity, but as having an asset 
value'.932 
Significantly the right to property not only provide protection against negative and 
unwarranted Member State interference, it also places a positive obligation on them to provide 
the administrative and legal protection administer to ensure the enjoyment of property.933 This 
positive obligation is naturally of a much greater consequence for intellectual properties, as their 
intangible qualities means that owners are almost wholly reliant on legal institutions to ensure 
their enjoyment.  
This does not mean that intellectual property rights cannot be either derogated or limited 
through regulation. These possibilities being stated in sentences 2 and 3 of the first paragraph 
of the Article. Deprivation of property being defined as a formal expropriation of property 'which 
may be based on legislative acts or measures implementing them, i.e. a measure completely and 
permanently depriving the owner of his/her property.'934 The court taking this one step further 
by suggesting that deprivation only occurs when the property is transferred to another entity.935 
From an intellectual property prospective, again because of the intangible nature of knowledge 
and the ability to maintain that knowledge when there is an infringement this must mean that 
a deprivation must occur; not only when the legal title to the intellectual property is transferred 
to another entity, but when another entity is allowed to use the property with compensating 
the owner. Which is to suggest that if the legal system allows the unauthorised use of an 
intellectual property without consideration being granted, it would be a deprivation of the 
owner's property. 
The proposition that denying an intellectual property owner the possibility of profiting from 
their intellectual property is tantamount to depriving that owner of their intellectual property 
being clearly articulated in the Case C-177/10 Luksan936 In that case the director of a 
documentary was challenging an Austrian copyright regulation937 that presumed that the 
exclusive rights for commercial exploitation of documentary were originated with the producer 
of the film in contradiction to EU directives938 which claimed those exclusive rights resided with 
the director. In that case both; the Opinion of the Advocate General939 and Judgement of the 
Court relied upon protections provided by art (17) to make their recommendations940 and 
rulings.941 The final ruling including the following statement:  
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'the fact that national legislation denies him the exploitation rights at issue would 
be tantamount to depriving him of his lawfully acquired intellectual property right.'942 
 
According to the second sentence of Art 17(1) such deprivation can only be justified if three 
criteria are met: the first criteria being that it is in the public interest, the second that it is done 
under conditions provided for by law and the third being a requirement that there is fair 
compensation paid for the loss.  
While the first criteria depend on a highly contentious definition of public interest, it cannot 
be the case that allowing an unauthorised use of intellectual property without compensation 
would be in the public interest merely because it kept down the price of a technological product.  
The second criteria would be equally disqualifying in that there is nowhere in intellectual 
property law or any other EU law in which the conditions for deprivation of intellectual property 
addressed, let alone addressed in sufficiently precise manner which would provide intellectual 
property owners the clarity they need to anticipate such deprivations.943 
The third criteria of course raise the possibility of the Member States providing proportionally 
compensation for such deprivation, if it is in the public good and precisely defined from a legal 
basis. Obviously without such compensation it cannot be justified. 
Deprivation is naturally entirely different from regulating the use of property, which can be 
broadly interpreted as measures limiting the use of property rights,944 which do not require 
compensation. A good description of the limitation on such regulations being stated by AG Bot:  
 
'In line with this case-law, Article 52(1) of the Charter lays down the rules relating 
to the limitations that can be made to the rights and freedoms recognized by the 
Charter. Article 52(1) thus accepts that limitations may be imposed on the exercise 
of rights such as the right to property and the freedom to conduct a business set out 
in Articles 17 and 16 of the Charter, as long as the limitations are provided for by law, 
respect the essence of those rights and freedoms and, in compliance with the 
principle of proportionality, are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general 
interest recognised by the European Union or the need to protect the rights and 
freedoms of others.'945 
 
The justification for regulation of property identified by AG Bot reflecting a requirement set 
out in the third sentence of Article 17(1), which establishes a prerequisite that the regulation be 
in the public interest, which in turn requires that those interests be sufficiently precise and 
proportional. Proportionality being determined by a three-step approach: which requires there 
to be a legitimate objective, the regulations be the least intrusive method of achieving the 
objective and that it be the limitation be proportional to the objective.946  
The legitimacy of an objective can be derived first and foremost from the four freedoms of 
the EU specified in the TFEU and the aims specified under Art (3) TEU and. Include amongst other 
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aims in Art (3) TEU are: offering its citizens and area of freedom, security and justice947 
establishing an internal market with balanced economic growth which is both stable and 
competitive, promoting the social cohesion and solidarity,948 protecting its citizens, and 
promoting fair and free trade. 949  
With respect to the ability of the regulation to achieve the intended objective in the least 
intrusive manner, this criterion essentially relies on an assessment of the alternative regulatory 
methods which can achieve the objective, to determine which is the least intrusive.950 
Finally, the test of proportionally of the limitation in term of the objective, relies on balancing 
negative effect of those limitation on the benefits which are enjoyed as a result of meeting the 
objective. In according to this balance, the greater to public good the greater the possibilities 
for intervention.951 
Interestingly prior to the Charter being raised to the level of a treaty the court had been 
reluctant to rule against measures, unless they were apparently unsuitable or apparently 
inappropriate.952 The question of how the Charter will affect this tradition is still in the process 
of being determined, however if the opinion of AG Bot in Sky Österreich sets the standard it may 
well be that this reluctance may be a thing of the past. This because the methodology he used 
to assess the regulatory measure being challenged thoroughly examined all three of the 
proportional criteria. 953  
From an intellectual property prospective or more specifically from an application of the 
correlated rights doctrine prospective, given that applying the correlated rights doctrine would 
effectively limit the rights of intellectual property owners it would appear prudent to subject it 
to a similar analysis. it should be recalled that the correlated rights doctrine as it applies to 
intellectual property has been earlier defined as; 
 
'When separately owned intellectual properties are determined to be inherently 
integrated with other intellectual properties, the individual property owners shall have 
proportional property rights with respect to the whole property and shall not 
disproportionately enrich themselves to the detriment of the other intellectual 
property owners.'954 
 
With respect to a legitimate objective, clearly this interpretation of existing intellectual 
property law would fall into any number of aims provided for under Article (3) TEU and could 
also be justified by at least two of the fundamental freedoms. To the extent that it ensures 
intellectual property owners are properly rewarded for their creative efforts, it offers citizens an 
area of justice. The same can be said about helping to establish an internal market which is both 
stable and competitive, protecting the rights of citizens and promoting fair and free trade. Not 
to mention the benefits of encouraging economic growth as have been outlined in the 
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conclusion of the thesis. From a fundamental rights’ prospective it would help to ensure the free 
movement of goods and the free movement of capital.  
As to the suitability of an application of the doctrine, there can be little doubt that its 
application will help to achieve the objectives and it is certainly less intrusive than the creation 
of a new set of regulations with would have the same intent.  
Finally, in balancing the aims of the application, with the external effects of an application. 
To do this balancing test the first thing which is required would be to detail those external 
effects. The first effect is that it would prevent intellectual property owners from overcharging 
for the value of their intellectual property, which obviously is a positive, not a negative effect. 
The second effect is that it would likely result in an increase in the price of technological 
products, as its application would allow smaller intellectual property owners to more easily 
conclude licensing agreements which reflect the value of their contribution to an integrated 
technological product. While such an increase would have implication for consumer protection, 
protecting consumers from paying fair value for technological products does not appear like 
something which would shift the balance in favour of overruling an application of the doctrine. 
That said if the intellectual property is essential to either the health of EU citizens or the freedom 
to do business of users there is a strong case that can be made for limiting royalties below a level 
which would be consistent with the value of the intellectual property. Such limitations differing 
markedly from an absolute deprivation of intellectual property rights. 
 
Article 47 
Right to an Effective Remedy and to a Fair Trial 
1. Everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated 
has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance with the 
conditions laid down in this Article.  
 
2. Everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an 
independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law. Everyone shall 
have the possibility of being advised, defended and represented.  
 
3. Legal aid shall be made available to those who lack sufficient resources in so far as 
such aid is necessary to ensure effective access to justice. 
 
Explanation on Article 47 — Right to an Effective Remedy and to a Fair Trial 
The first paragraph is based on Article 13 of the ECHR:  
 
‘Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall 
have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation 
has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.’  
 
However, in Union law the protection is more extensive since it guarantees the right to 
an effective remedy before a court. The Court of Justice enshrined that right in its 
judgment of 15 May 1986 as a general principle of Union law (Case 222/84 Johnston 
[1986] ECR 1651; see also judgment of 15 October 1987, Case 222/86 Heylens [1987] 






According to the Court, that general principle of Union law also applies to the Member 
States when they are implementing Union law. The inclusion of this precedent in the 
Charter has not been intended to change the system of judicial review laid down by the 
Treaties, and particularly the rules relating to admissibility for direct actions before the 
CJEU. The European Convention has considered the Union's system of judicial review 
including the rules on admissibility and confirmed them while amending them as to 
certain aspects, as reflected in Articles 251 to 281 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union, and in particular in the fourth paragraph of Article 263. Article 47 
applies to the institutions of the Union and of Member States when they are 
implementing Union law and does so for all rights guaranteed by Union law.  
 
The second paragraph corresponds to Article 6(1) of the ECHR which reads as follows:  
 
‘In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against 
him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an 
independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced 
publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the 
interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the 
interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to 
the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where 
publicity would prejudice the interests of justice.’  
 
In Union law, the right to a fair hearing is not confined to disputes relating to civil law 
rights and obligations. That is one of the consequences of the fact that the Union is a 
community based on the rule of law as stated by the Court in Case 294/83, ‘Les Verts’ v 
European Parliament (judgment of 23 April 1986, [1986] ECR 1339). Nevertheless, in all 
respects other than their scope, the guarantees afforded by the ECHR apply in a similar 
way to the Union.  
 
With regard to the third paragraph, it should be noted that in accordance with the case-
law of the European Court of Human Rights, provision should be made for legal aid 
where the absence of such aid would make it impossible to ensure an effective remedy 
(ECHR judgment of 9 October 1979, Airey, Series A, Volume 32, p. 11). There is also a 
system of legal assistance for cases before the Court of Justice of the European Union.’ 
 
This Article is included in the analysis of the implications of the Charter on the application of 
the correlated rights doctrine because "legal attrition" has been a major tool used by 
technological product manufacturers to drive down the cost of licensing intellectual property 
which is inherently integrated in their product. Essentially because most technological 
manufacturers have significant financial and legal resources, they can force those intellectual 
property owners to choose between two adverse options. They can either accepting royalties 
which are substantially below the value of their intellectual property contribution or engaging 
in a protracted and expensive legal proceeding. If those intellectual property owners do not have 






choice but to except the undervalued licensing terms proposed by the manufacturer. Assuming 
the multinational manufacturers are even willing to offer terms. 
The inclusion of this Article in the Charter therefore guarantees that breaches of the 
protections provided by the Charter will be provided an effective remedy, although those 
protections do not appear to have an independent meaning.955  
The right to an effective remedy and a fair trial is well established in the corpus of 
international and national human rights laws.956 Any State that breaches the human rights and 
freedoms included in the Charter 'has a primary duty to afford the redress to the victims of the 
violation and in general this redress should provide restitution of the infringed rights or 
freedoms.’957 In cases where the adequacy of the restitution is disputed the State shall bear to 
responsibility of proving that the remedies are sufficient.958 
Further, the right to a fair trial relies on the principle of equality of legal representation.959 
The general expectation being that each side 'must have a bona fide opportunity to have his 
case tested on its merits and, if appropriate, to obtain redress.'960 This right to present a case 
can be subject to limitations which are intended to ensure an efficient provision justice, so long 
as those provision do not restrict the exercise of rights in such a way that the essence of the 
right is impaired.961  
As the speed of a trial can have consequences on the effectiveness of a remedy; the Courts 
have required not only the hearing, but the judgement of the case is required to be completed 
within a reasonable time.962  
Under EU law the right to an effective judicial remedy has been a recognised principle 
essential for ensuring the rule of law and the primacy of EU law.963 Without this right the "direct 
effect" of EU law would in jeopardy. As at in the very early stage of the Community the ECJ has 
required that Member States provide 'direct and immediate protection' of rights arising from EC 
law.964 A requirement which is now codified under Art 47 of the Charter. The right of fair trial 
can be considered an accessory right in that it only is required when another right included in 
the Charter needs to be protected.965  
Under EU law an effective remedy must insure that it offers protection against 'any provisions 
of a national legal system and any legislation administrative or judicial practice which might 
impair the effectiveness of EU law'.966 Effective remedies should ensure rights and freedoms 
included in the charter are respected. The most substantive remedy available under EU law 
requires that Member States make good on damages which have resulted from the lack of 
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protection of rights provide in the Charter.967 The proceedings and procedures which define a 
fair trial are to be determined by a Member States, subject to a general requirement 'of good 
administration and legal certainty, and the principles of effective legal protection'968 Finally 
under EU law an unnecessary delay the length of proceedings can render a remedy ineffective.969  
Putting this analysis in the context of trials involving intellectual property disputes it appears 
self-evident that protracted legal proceeding endangers the provision of an effective legal 
remedy, particularly if those protracted proceeding are instigated on the part of a litigant which 
has an overwhelming advantage in terms of financial and legal resources.  
 
Article 54 
Abuse of Rights 
Nothing in this Charter shall be interpreted as implying any right to engage in any 
activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and 
freedoms recognised in this Charter or at their limitation to a greater extent than is 
provided for herein. 
 
Explanation on Article 54 — Prohibition of abuse of rights  
This Article corresponds to Article 17 of the ECHR:  
 
Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or 
person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction 
of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein or at their limitation to a greater 
extent than is provided for in the Convention. 
 
The inclusion this article in the Charter would appear to relate solely and specifically to the 
interrelation between the various rights and freedoms provided in the Charter,970 just as Article 
17 of the EHCR has generally been enacted to restrict a human right in the name of another 
human right.971 In order for Article 17 of the EHCR to be enacted there must be a clear link 
between the rights claimed and the damages to other rights.972 
Given limited number of cases focused on Article 54 and the apparent lack of cases 
specifically related to the right to property, it cannot be authoritatively claimed that this article 
will protect the property rights of one owner property owner from the abuse of another's 
property rights. However, it would be counterintuitive to suggest that it did not.  
As such it can be presumed that when an intellectual property owner is abusing their 
intellectual property rights to coerce integrated manufactures of technological product, who 
both own intellectual property and manufacture the technological product, to pay more to 
license their intellectual property than the value that the intellectual product contributes to the 
technological product would be a breach of this article. Particularly as the integrated technology 
manufacturer would use rewards that they would otherwise receive from their intellectual 
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property contributions to technological product to, subsidies the excessive licensing fees of the 
abusive owner.  
Even if the technological manufacture does not contribute intellectual property to the 
technological product it could easily be considered a breach of the article as the excessive 
licensing fees would likely represent a breach of the manufacturers freedom to do business. 
Likewise, if a manufacture is abusing the right to an effective remedy and a fair trial to drive 
down licensing cost below the value of an intellectual property owner’s contribution to a 
technological product, this could easily be considered a breach of both the intellectual property 
owners, freedom to do business and their right to property.  
As any of these actions would be a breach of an application of the correlated rights doctrine 
it would appear that any protection provided by this article with respect to these actions, could 
be considered to constitute a protection of application of the correlated rights doctrine.  
11.2.3 Implications for Reasonable Royalties 
The previous part of this chapter the general implications of the Charter on intellectual 
property law was done by individually analysing each of the most relevant articles. Using the 
insights gained from that analysis, this part will use a more holistic approach by analysing the 
protections which can be claimed from the Charter by both owners and users of intellectual 
properties. Particularly when a Member State court set damages and running royalties at 
substantially below or above the estimated range of value which the disputed intellectual 
property contributes to a technological product. This will be followed by an analysis of the 
potential claims which could be made under the Charter if a court applied that correlated rights 
doctrine when determining damages and running royalties.  
Before going into the analysis of the protections provided by the Charter, it evident from the 
comments made in the Opinion of AG Wathelet that there still exists a lack of clarity as to the 
definition of FRAND and by extension reasonable royalties. This lack of clarity not being resolve 
in either his opinion or the ruling of the court. The courts stating that  
 
'In the case in the main proceedings, the parties are not in agreement as to what is 
required by FRAND terms',973 and subsequently opaquely suggesting 'It is for the 
referring court to determine whether the abovementioned criteria are satisfied in the 
present case, in so far as they are relevant, in the circumstances, for the purpose of 
resolving the dispute in the main proceedings.'974  
 
As some sort of reference point is needed for an analysis Charter's protection of royalty rates, 
a broad definition of reasonable royalties will be suggested and used. The suggested reference 
point is a range of rates which represent an estimate of the average value which that intellectual 
property provides to the end users. This reference point is suggested for two reasons. First 
because voluntary transactions between buyer and seller, (which are the cornerstone of a 
market-based economy), seldom exceed the price/value which buyers places on the product. 
And second because sellers seldom lower the price from what users are willing to pay unless 
they are subject to competitive pressures, pressure which an intellectual property owner does 
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not face because of the monopoly position they are granted under intellectual property law. 
While as described below there may be reasons why a reasonable royalty rate could be set lower 
than average value which that intellectual property provides to the end users, this definition 
represents a standard from which such deviation should be required to be justified. 
The most extreme situation in terms of setting rates below the range of value contributed by 
an intellectual property would be when the rate is set at zero. As discussed in the previous part, 
such a decision would likely be considered a deprivation of property as it would effectively 
permanently deprive an owner of all benefits of ownership and transfer those benefits to 
another entity, even if it did not deprive the owner of the actual ownership title. While it may 
be entirely possible that in state of emergency such a deprivation could be justified as being in 
the public interest, this would still require that there exist a specific law authorising the 
deprivation, and that fair compensation be provided to owner for their loss. If any of these 
criteria were not met the owner would almost certainly be entitled to protection under art. (17), 
which technically should mean the state would be liable for damages. An owner who was so 
deprived of his property would also almost certainly have a claim under art. (16) as it being 
unable to be rewarded for his innovation would an intolerable interference effecting the 
owner’s freedom to do business. 
The more difficult question is; will this same deprivation protections apply if the rate is not 
set above zero but substantially below the value contributed to a technological product? 
Presumably if the rate is set at less than fifty percent of the value contributed, it could be argued 
that deprivation could still be claimed as the majority of the benefit of owning the property 
would still have been transferred to the infringer. This argument being supported by further 
claim that such a low rate would constitute an intolerable interference effecting the owner’s 
freedom to do business. 
However if rate was just slightly higher than fifty percent of the value contributed; it is 
unlikely that deprivation could be claimed, as the substantial benefit of the property would still 
be retained by the owner. In such instances it is more likely that any claim for protection under 
art. (17) would involve challenge to the legitimacy of a regulation or alternatively a challenge to 
the court’s illegitimate interpretation of intellectual property law. It would be challenge to the 
regulation, if the regulation included specific language which authorised such rates, and a 
challenge to the interpretation if it did not. This challenge would require the state to show that 
the regulation or its interpretation was in the public interest, suitable for achieving that public 
interest and properly balanced the harm to the owner with the benefits to public interest. As 
described above, in many intellectual property disputes it would difficult to meet all of these 
conditions, but there are others in which they might be met, and there are at least two where 
they likely can be met. The first of which would where the intellectual property in question is 
essential to the health of EU citizens. In such a case the balance of harm would weigh heavily 
against the intellectual property owner. The second is when governments authorizes the 
creation of an industry standard, which by its nature effectively creates a government mandated 
monopoly in an industry. Whenever governments authorize the creation of a monopoly in an 
industry, it could be argued that this provides the government with greater authority to regulate 
prices to ensure the free movement of goods. 
In addition to the right to property, there could also be an actionable claim for protection 
under the freedom to do business: As it could be argued that anything below the estimated 






interference effecting the owner’s freedom to do business. In addition, there would also be the 
possibility of making a claim for protection under art. (47), the right to an effective remedy, 
particularly if it could be shown that the remedy was a deviation from remedies in similar cases. 
Finally, there could be a claim protection under art (47) the right to a fair trial if it was clear that 
the legal resources of the infringer had; so overwhelmed the owner's legal resources that they 
could not properly prosecute their client’s intellectual property rights. 
In the circumstance where a Member State court sets rates substantially higher than the 
value of the intellectual property in dispute, it would be the infringer which would be claiming 
protection under the Charter. The most obviously claims for protection would be ones under Art 
(54) Abuse of rights combined with a claim under art (16) freedom to do business. If the infringer 
both contributes intellectual property to the technological product they manufacture they could 
claim an abusive of rights under art (54) and a claim under art (17), the right to property. The 
first claim would be justified because the excess costs would have to be subsidies out of the 
manufacturers normal operating profits which would be an intolerable interference effecting 
the owner’s freedom to do business. The second claim would be justified because it could be 
argued that the excess cost would have to be subsidies out of the rewards that the manufacture 
would have otherwise retained from its own intellectual property. There could also be a claim 
under art (47) the right to an effective remedy. 
Having looked at the potential decisions which substantially over value or under value 
damages and reasonable royalties, the next step is to see what claims could arise if a court 
applied the correlated rights doctrine when making those same decision. As fundamental 
principle in the doctrine is that intellectual property owners should be paid according to the 
value which their property contributes to an intellectual property, this presupposes that the 
court sets a rate which is within an estimated range of the value which end users place on the 
intellectual property. Obviously if this were the case, the only claim that either an owner or an 
infringer could make would be that in setting such a rate the court was an intolerable interfering 
in their freedom to do business under art. (16). That it is an interference with their freedom to 
do business is undeniable, but whether it is intolerable interference is highly unlikely. For it 
would be easy for the state to justify its interference by claiming that; their objective was to 
protect the freedom to do business and property rights of others, that the doctrine is specific 
enough to provide the necessary clarity in term of how intellectual property law will be applied, 
it is the least intrusive method of determine reasonable royalties, and that the balance of harm 
weighs in favour of protecting the freedom to do business and property rights of others. 
11.2.4 State Liabilities  
At this point it is worth noting that EU law is somewhat unique in that provides European 
citizens and other legal entities the ability to seek damages when a Member State have violated 
EU law. This possibility should provide both EU institutions and Member States a huge 
incentivise to seriously consider applying the correlative rights doctrine or at the very least 
provide them pause when are considering imposing excessively high or low damages or running 
royalties. While actions seeking damages have most often been brought against Member States 






A recent case which acknowledges and tries to clarify the issue of state liabilities is the case 
of Köbler v. Austria.975 In that case the CJEU was asked to clarify whether an Austrian Professor 
could make a claim for damages against the Austrian State because an Austrian court had denied 
his claim for damages against an Austrian university. The university having refused to pay an 
automatic increase in his salary, because he had spent part of his time teaching at a University 
in another Member State. This suit for damages being based on the proposition that; the 
Austrian Court's decision had contravened EU law on the free movement of workers included in 
EU Treaties. The case itself was presented to the CJEU through a preliminary reference made an 
Austrian court, which heard Köbler's appeal. 
While the CJEU rejected Köbler's claims on its merits, it upheld and clarified the theory of 
member state liability; by annunciating the following principles of state liability: 
 
(1) Breaches in EU law can and do give rise to state liability.976 
(2) Member State liability applied to all member state actions which violated EU law, 977 
(3) Court decisions in breach of EU law are actionable978 
(4) Res judicata does not preclude these state liabilities.979  
(5) Member States can decide which courts are to adjudicate cases involving state 
liabilities.980 
 
Having confirmed that courts decisions can give rise to State liabilities, the ruling 
subsequently describing the conditions governing that liability. These conditions were;  
 
(1) The breached EU law was intended to confer rights on individual  
(2) The breach must be sufficiently serious 
(3) There must be a direct causal between the breach and the loss or damages sustained by 
the injured parties.981  
 
While there is nothing outwardly onerous in these conditions, it should be noted that two 
paragraphs later the ruling states that; 
 
'State liability for an infringement of Community law by a decision of a national court 
adjudicating at last instance can be incurred only in the exceptional case where the court 
has manifestly infringed the applicable law. 
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In order to determine whether that condition is satisfied, the national court hearing a 
claim for reparation must take account of all the factors which characterise the situation 
put before it.  
Those factors include, in particular, the degree of clarity and precision of the rule 
infringed, whether the infringement was intentional, whether the error of law was 
excusable or inexcusable, the position taken, where applicable, by a Community 
institution and non-compliance by the court in question with its obligation to make a 
reference for a preliminary ruling under the third paragraph of Article 234 EC.'982 
 
What this explanation of the conditions appears to suggest is that the State must have 
knowingly breached a clear EU law without justification, in order for liability to attach. However, 
that suggestion is belied by an obligation on the States to seek clarification of EU law when they 
have doubt about its implications with respect to the case at hand. If they fail to seek clarification 
this can be taken into consideration when determining state liability. A position reiterated in the 
2006 case of Traghetti Del Medierraneio in which the lack of a preliminary reference was once 
again mentioned as an element which could be used to establish state liability. 983 
When considering this in terms of the Charters effect on intellectual property cases, this 
clearly implies that if a Member State court decides a case in a manner can be considered a 
breach of the Charter, the State may be liable for damages, when they choose not to make a 
reference for a preliminary ruling on whether such a decision would be a breach. This because; 
a) the Charter undoubtedly provides rights to intellectual property owners, b) a breach of those 
rights will be substantive as the amounts involved are often in the millions if not billions of Euros, 
c) there is a direct relationship between the decision and the loss or damages suffered by the 
intellectual property owner, and d) the fact that the implication of Charter on the application of 
intellectual property has yet to be addressed by the CJEU, which means that there is not at 
present clarity as to how it should be applied to avoid a breach. 
 
11.2.5 Enforcing the Charter Requirements in Intellectual Property Law 
Admittedly the assessment of the implication of the Charter on intellectual property rights 
and the question of state liability only represent a theoretical analysis. However, EU law provides 
a very simple and effect way to test its validity. This can be done through a request for a 
preliminary ruling from the CJEU, similar to the ones used in the cases of Huawai, Luksan, Sky 
Österreich, Factortame, and Köbler, mentioned above.  
The ability to make a request for a preliminary ruling has been in place since the 
establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951.984 It is purpose is to 'ensure 
uniform interpretation and application of [EU] law within the European Union.'985 The authority 
of the CJEU to grant preliminary rulings is currently provided by Article 19 (3)(b) TEU and the 
procedures for making a request for a preliminary ruling are currently provided in Art.267 
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TFEU.986 A request for a preliminary ruling can be made whenever a national court or tribunal 
has questions concerning the interpretation or validity of a EU law which is relevant to the case 
which they are hearing.987 A request for a preliminary ruling must be made whenever a national 
court or tribunal is the court of last instance in the Member State, and there are questions 
concerning the interpretation or validity of a EU law which is relevant to the case which they are 
hearing.988 According to the Acte Clair criteria established in CILFIT, questions concerning the 
interpretation of EU law are said to arise whenever a court could not hold that both the 
interpretation of EU law was obvious and that other Member State courts would not come to 
the same obvious interpretation.989 While the level of doubts as to whether other jurisdictions 
would interpret EU law in precisely have same way were relaxed in joined case X and Van Dijk990 
in the case of Ferreira da Silva the CJEU reiterated that: 
 
'a court or tribunal against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under 
national law is obliged, where a question of EU law is raised before it, to comply with 
its obligation to bring the matter before the Court of Justice, unless it has established 
that the question raised is irrelevant or that the provision of EU law concerned has 
already been interpreted by the Court or that the correct application of EU law is so 
obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt.'991 
 
While this ruling is binding on courts of last resort, and clearly implies that a preliminary ruling 
should be made whenever any national court or tribunal has a reasonable degree of doubt about 
how a EU law should be applied, with greater amounts of doubt providing greater incentives to 
make an application.992  
Given that the question arising from effect of the Charter on the treatment of integrated 
intellectual have not yet been tested in the CJEU, and there is a huge degree of doubt about 
what the criteria to be used to determine reasonable damages/royalties it is only right and 
proper that the preliminary reference procedure be utilized by a member state court to seek a 
decision from the CJEU or the ECFI on these issues.  
As to the question which could be asked, a few suggestions are as follows: 
 
 Does Article 17 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms 
required that: the average estimated value that an intellectual property contributes 
to a technological product to be used as the criteria for determining a reasonable 
range of damages/running royalties. 
and 
if not, what is the criteria to be used? 
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 Does Articles 17 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms 
require that: reasonable royalties for standard essential properties or otherwise 
correlated properties be defined as an approximation of the proportional value that 
an intellectual property provides to a technological property, as would be required 
under the application of a correlated rights doctrine.? 
 Does Articles 17 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms have 
the direct effect of making Member States liable for damages, if their judicial 
authorities set damages for infringement of an intellectual property at levels which 
are substantial above or below what would be the reasonable royalty range?  
 Do Articles 16, 17, and 54 of European Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms 
prohibit integrated intellectual property owners from seeking injunctive relief under 
Member State intellectual property law in order to attain disproportionate and 
excessive compensation for the use of their intellectual property which will limit the 
ability of fellow integrated intellectual property owners to receive fair compensation 
for their contributions? 
 Do Articles 16, 17, 47, and 54 of European Charter on Fundamental Rights protect 
intellectual property owners from unreasonably protracted litigation, sanctioned by 
Member State intellectual property law, which will deprive them of their right to a 
fair return from their intellectual property because they have neither the legal nor 
financial resource sustain such actions? 
 
Obviously if the first two question were to be asked and answered by the CJEU, it would go 
a long way towards resolving any underlying uncertainly about determining the reasonable 
royalties, which is always the underlying issue in any correlated intellectual property right 
disputes. The answer to the third question would clarify the responsibility and liabilities of 
Member State judicial authorities in terms of ensure that intellectual property owners receive 
reasonable compensation for the unauthorised use of their property. While the rights of 
correlative intellectual property owners to injunctive relief and the right to a speedy trial have 
already been answered in Huawei v ZTE. Asking similar questions with respect to the Charter 
does carry the added advantage of providing answers from an additional body of law other than 
competition law.  
In summary while the Charter does not clearly state that intellectual property law must apply 
the correlative rights doctrine to integrated intellectual property, it does appear to imply that 
something like it should be applied. Further as the Charter also clearly states that cases should 
be dealt with in a "reasonable time" this should eliminate the possibility of legal attrition. 
Further if European Courts ignore the Charter and fail to provide intellectual property owners 
with fair compensation for the use of their property or fail to do so on a timely basis, they there 
are clear indications that may be liable for damages suffered by intellectual property owners. 
Finally, given that the Charter like the TFEU, represents a hierarchically superior body of law in 
the EU, it appears entirely possible and logical that reference to it could become as common as 
references to articles 101 and 102 to the TFEU. All of which suggest that the Charter effectively 
requires an application of the correlated property rights doctrine or at the very least requires 
that European courts make a reference to the CJEU to allow it to make a preliminary ruling on 






by litigants in a dispute, this obviously also provides intellectual property owners with the ability 
to enforce or at least test the implication of the Charter on intellectual property law.  
In addition, it should be mentioned that if a preliminary ruling were requested and that 
preliminary ruling came back in support of an application of the correlated rights doctrine, this 
could have a dramatic impact on the public perception of Charter. This because it would be 
difficult to portray inventors who are seeking a fair payment for the use of their inventions as 
"villains", just as it would be difficult to portray technology manufacturer which are seeking 
protection from patent trolls as "villains". In fact, the possibility of demonstrating that the 
Charter's principle purpose is to act as a shield to protect EU citizens legal rights would provide 
a concrete example of the benefits of belonging to the European Union. Not to mention positive 
consequence which would flow to the EU and its Member States if an application of the 
correlated rights doctrine were mandated by the CJEU.993 
  
                                                          








12. Correlated Rights and Recent Literature  
Because the correlated intellectual property rights advocated for in this thesis have not 
subject of any other scholarly work, including citations which directly relate to the topic has 
proved impossible. This chapter is included as an attempt to overcome any shortfall in the 
citation required for a thesis, by instead focusing on scholarly work which present arguments 
which can be considered supportive of the propositions underlying correlated intellectual 
property rights. 
When searching for articles which would provide this indirect support, it became evident that 
for the past decade an overwhelming majority of scholarship has been primarily focused on the 
prevalence and solutions related to patent holdup.994 As relevant as these articles are to solving 
the problem associated with exclusive intellectual property rights; because they have 
predominately taken a one sided prospective against the rights of IP owners, they have become 
somewhat antithetical to the application of correlated property rights.995 With the most extreme 
of these patent holdup articles asserting that whenever non-practicing entities litigate to 
enforce their patent rights, it creates overwhelming social costs with little or no social benefits 
to society.996 As can be expected this focus on patent holdup is reflected in many rulings on 
patent disputes,997 and resulted in a situation whereby the availability of injunctive relief for 
non-practicing entities has become significantly eroded when compared to the relief available 
to for practicing entities.998  
Given this antithesis, it is logical that contrarian articles which rebut the foundational 
patent holdup article by Lemley and Shapiro999 would be the best source of citations supportive 
of correlative rights. Whilst relatively few in number, these articles not only challenge the 
dominate analysis and proposed solutions to patent holdup, they also initiate and address the 
issue of patent holdout.1000 It is this analysis of patent holdout, which corresponds most closely 
to the correlated rights analysis included in this thesis. The foundation of this potential indirect 
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support being a clear recognition that abusive behaviour is not the exclusive province of either 
property owners or users.  
This body of this chapter is divided into two parts. The first part summarizes the arguments 
used in the patent holdout literature which can be considered milestone rebuttals of patent 
holdup analysis. The second part provides an analysis of how these arguments relate to 
correlated intellectual property rights. 
12.1 Patent Holdout Literature  
When reviewing the various articles which are intended to either rebut the patent holdup 
articles or alternatively address the issue of patent holdout, it appears that there are many 
reoccurring counter arguments which are used. To facilitate a clearer analysis of these articles 
and arguments, this analysis will open by providing a list of the principle arguments, and then 
provide a chronological analysis of the seven milestone articles which presented these 
arguments. That list is as follows: 
 
1) Patent holdup is not really a problem, as the threat of injunctive action and wilful 
infringement penalties are needed to incentivise private negotiations of intellectual 
property licenses. 
2) There is insufficient evidence to suggest that the problems related to patent holdup are 
sufficient to justify substantial changes in the application of intellectual property law. 
3) Patent holdup has been wrongly defined as any patent licensing activity by non-
participating entities. 
4) Lemley and Shapiro’s proposed reasonable royalty calculation methodology is flawed. 
5) Proposed patent holdup solutions which eliminate injunctive relief for non-practicing 
entities are discriminatory. 
6) Proposed patent holdup solutions which allow courts to impose royalties which are a 
fraction of the value which an intellectual property provides, are inconsistent with the 
application of intellectual property law. 
7) Proposed patent holdup solutions which eliminate injunctive relief for non-practicing 
entities promote patent holdout. 
8) Proposed patent holdup solutions which allow courts to impose royalties which are a 
fraction of the value which an intellectual property provides represents an appropriation 
of patent property, and promotes patent holdout, which also appropriates value from 
patent owners. 
9) Any proposed solution to patent holdup must provide willing licensees with an 








12.1.1 Can Standard-Setting lead to Exploitive Abuse? A Dissonant View on Patent 
Hold-Up, Royalty Stacking and the Meaning of FRAND1001 
In their effort to provides a systematic defence of FRAND commitments in standardized 
technologies, Damien Geradin and Miguel Rato, reflexively provide a clear rebuttal the concerns 
about (and solution to) patent holdup which were being articulated by other scholars. Written 
shortly after the eBay decision this article covers a number of the arguments which would come 
to dominate articles specifically written directly rebutting patent holdup analysis. To put those 
arguments into context, it is essential that an explanation of their arguments in support of 
FRAND be summarized.  
In their first part of the article the authors detail the structure and benefits of 
standardisation bodies and their rational and objective for adopting FRAND commitment 
requirements. In describing the structure, they point out that there are four types of participants 
in any standardizations organization: pure inventors which contribute intellectual properties to 
a technological product but do not manufacture the product, pure manufactures which 
manufacture the product but do not contribute intellectual properties to it, integrated 
manufactures; which both manufacture and provide intellectual properties to a technological 
product, and finally, buyers. This division of participants is provided to explain the divergent 
royalty objectives of the various participants. Pure inventors obviously wanting royalties to be 
as high as possible, integrated manufactures wanting them high enough to reduce competition 
but low enough to encourage demand and both pure manufactures and consumers want them 
as low as possible. They further point out that it is because of these conflicting objectives that 
the FRAND commitment was established.1002  
According to authors the rationale behind the FRAND commitment requirement were 
twofold: ‘(i) to ensure dissemination of the essential IPR contained in a standard, thereby 
allowing it to remain available for adoption by members of the industry, whilst (ii) at the same 
time making certain that holders of those IPR are able to reap adequate rewards from their 
innovations.’1003 In terms of defining the general meaning of FRAND, first and foremost they 
view it as a general commitment to engage in good faith negotiations with any willing licensee 
and second as a waiver of their rights to either avoid licensing negotiations or provide an 
exclusive license to single user.1004 
Using this rationale, they take a contrarian view to those who suggest that fair and 
reasonable royalties are the royalties which a patent owner would have obtained before it was 
adopted in the standard. Suggesting that view is a mistaken because it is based upon the 
unverified assumption that standardization confers market power beyond that already provided 
by the patent. Instead they contend that fair and reasonable relate to the ensuring that owners 
receive a fair reward for their use of their property. To that end they define fair and reasonable 
as ensuring licensing terms which would result from ‘fair, bilateral negotiations between 
individual IPR owner and standard-adopter in accordance with the market conditions prevailing 
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at the time of such negotiations.’1005 Finally they define non-discriminatory as prohibiting 
discrimination ‘between similarly situated competitors active in the markets for the product 
incorporating the standardised IPR would hinder the competitive process’.1006  
After defining what they consider FRAND to mean, the authors provide their interpretation 
of what level of royalties would be consistent with a FRAND royalty. According to their view it 
would follow ‘the merits of long-established model of bilateral negotiations between IPR owners 
and standard-adopters.’ [italic added]1007 This interpretation is distinctly different from one 
which presumes that it is the royalties which would be negotiated before an IP is adopted by a 
standard, as it merely assumes that the license will be negotiated on an arms-length basis, taking 
into account any relevant facts at the date of the negotiations. In explaining why it is not 
necessary to recreate ex-ante negotiations, the authors suggest two factor which make such 
efforts unnecessary. First, they argue that some patents are so essential that they would have 
the same market power regardless of being included in a standard. Second, they argue that 
owner’s royalty rates are moderated by a desire to have future patented innovations included 
in the standard.1008 Given this this interpretation of reasonable royalty effectively maintains the 
status-quo of bilateral negotiations, it indirectly if not directly implies that patent holdup is not 
really that significant of a problem.  
This however is not their strongest argument against the proposed patent holdup solutions. 
That privilege would appear to be the author’s prophetic predictions about what would happen 
if a FRAND commitment was interpreted as waiving an IP owner’s rights to injunctive relief. What 
they predicted was that: if injunctive relief was denied to standardized IP owners, IP users would 
engage in reverse patent holdup (i.e. patent holdout) to drive down their licensing costs. 1009 It 
is this foresight in predicting the advent patent holdout which makes this article a truly 
noteworthy rebuttal to the recently proposed patent holdup solutions.  
Other notable counter-arguments included in the work involve questioning the evidence of 
systemic patent thickets and royalty stacking, the existence of pervasive patent holdup1010. 
While the authors may not have accepted the existence of a systemic problem, this did not 
prevent them from addressing other proposed solutions, like ex-ante negotiation simulation, 
collective royalty negotiations and the potential application of competition law. With respect to 
the ex-ante negotiation simulations they express concerns about eliminating incentives for early 
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licencing by implementors, which would also harm IP owners.1011 The primary concerns with 
collective negotiation, being the restriction of competition and as well as the potential 
infringement of competition law. And the application of competition law being hampered by a 
lack of consensus as to what level of royalties would constitute an abuse of power. 
With respect the overall conclusion with respect to addressing reshaping FRAND licensing 
the authors stated the following: 
‘SSOs have substantially contributed to the dissemination of innovative 
technologies and the enhancement of competition between products. It can be argued 
that, by allowing licensors and licensees to reach mutually satisfactory agreements, 
the prevailing twin policies of early disclosure and FRAND licensing of essential IPR 
have played a significant part in this. The proposals to abandon this proved system 
described above misunderstand (or at least misrepresent) and exaggerate the 
perceived problems allegedly affecting traditional standard-setting processes. Should 
they be adopted, these proposals have in varying degrees the potential to: rigidify or 
simply eliminate the bilateral licensing negotiations between holders of essential IPR 
and implementers; eliminate the competitive aspect of the standardization process 
that allows firms to make different strategic choices as to the desirability to license 
patents before or after the adoption of the standard; create enormous 
implementation difficulties and delays resulting in significant welfare losses; give rise 
to serious competition law concerns; and, in most cases, lead to fundamentally flawed 
and unfair mechanisms of allocating royalties among holders of essential IPR.’1012 
This statement reflecting a strong advocacy in favour relying on bilateral negotiations and 
letting the free market under the auspicious of generalized FRAND commitments, determine 
standardized licensing terms. 
12.1.2 “Patent Trolls” and Patent Remedies1013 
One of the first articles to provide a specific counter-argument against the proposed 
solutions to patent holdup, was “Patent Trolls” and Patent Remedies, by Professor John Golden. 
This article was written shortly after the eBay v MercExchange decision and was clearly intended 
to moderate the ongoing alarmism related to patent holdup. Include in this work are most of 
the arguments included in the above list, including behaviour which would later be termed 
patent holdout. The pragmatic concerns most directly confronted in the article relating to; the 
adoption of a categorical rule which would prevent non-practicing entities from being granted 
injunctive relief, as well as limiting reasonable royalties to small fraction of the value provided 
by an intellectual property.1014 
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In his introduction Professor Golden, begins out by noting that despite the perception that 
there has been a growth in patent assertion which has been detrimental to economic growth, 
the ratio of issued patents to real domestic product has remained relatively constant 70 years. 
He makes this point to refute that the argument that the US patent system is out of balance and 
is in danger of being compromised by the advent of “villainous patent trolls”.1015 The body of the 
articles continues by providing a historical review of the evolution of patent rights. In his review 
of history Golden first points out that since the time of Adam Smith patent rights have been 
regarded as serving societies long term interest.1016 Further that since its enactment, patent law 
and the courts have recognised that patents which simply improve on an existing invention are 
also to be protected.1017 That this protection ordinarily would include the right to injunctive 
relief, even for non-practicing entities.1018 Further that the courts have long recognised the 
potential for patent abuse and have sought to mitigate against such abuse by restricting 
preliminary injunctive relief when it was in the public interest.1019 The purpose of this 
contextualization being to demonstrate that the problems of patent holdup is not new to 
intellectual property law,1020 and to build a foundation to conclude that existing law is capable 
of dealing with patent holdup. 
To provide a context to explain the flaws in proposed patent holdup solutions, Golden 
devotes Part III of the article to an explanation of the relative bargaining prospect of both owners 
and users. This explanation begins with description of the general litigation risks faced by both 
parties, which can be described as de facto patent holdup and holdout risks, both of which are 
increased by anticipated litigation costs.1021 This is followed by a specific discussion of the 
ligation risk faced by infringers and owners.  
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With respect to the litigation risk faced by infringers, Golden explains that risk can be divided 
into three components; the expected damages multiplied by the probability of losing, the 
injunction costs multiplied by the probability of an injunctive order, and the anticipated cost of 
litigation.1022 He then goes on to observe that because the liability cost are closely correlated to 
the strength of the patent, when patent is weak the principle source of patent holdup are the 
litigation costs,1023 alternatively if a patent is strong than it is the potential injunctive cost which 
will drive patent holdup concerns.1024 In either case Golden concludes that an infringer will only 
likely engage in negotiation, if they believe that such negotiations will result in a licensing cost 
which is less than the total litigation costs,1025 and that only in litigation involving strong patents 
is it likely that a stay on injunctive relief would ‘substantially reduce the probability that a patent 
holder will obtain royalties more reflective of exogenous circumstance than the patented 
invention’s more intrinsic economic worth.’1026 
With respect to the litigation risks faced by an owner, Golden begins with the assumption 
that because an owner knows that an infringer will not pay more the anticipated total litigation 
cost, they will offer licenses at a rate lower than those costs.1027 In addition this rate could be 
reduced even further because of information asymmetry, which will apparently handicap the 
bargaining position of patent owners.1028 Another restraint on the rates being sought by patent 
owners being the time and costs associated with litigation. Cost which will have to come directly 
out an owner’s existing resources, for unlike infringers they will not have ongoing profits from 
product sales to finance litigation expenses.1029 In addition to the tangible unfunded litigation 
cost, Golden also highlights the intangible cost associated with pursuing patent litigation is that 
it could effectively eliminate an owner’s potential participation in the technological field by 
delaying the adoption of its properties.  
As such, Golden’s analysis of the bargaining prospects of the potential litigants leads him to 
the conclusion that ‘although the patent holder may possess the threat of an ultimate injunction, 
years of time and a million or so dollars of litigation costs likely stand between such a threat and 
its realization. The potential infringer may very well have a plausible claim that the threat of a 
permanent injunction is no real threat at all—that by the time a permanent injunction could 
issue, the accused product will have long since, and in the regular course of business, been either 
discontinued or substantially redesigned in a way that nullifies any possible claim of ongoing 
infringement.’1030 A conclusion which contradicted the contemporaneous concerns about 
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patent holdup and described that circumstances which would later be called “patent 
holdout”.1031 
This general repudiation to patent holdup concerns, is followed by a direct critique of the 
flaws in Lemley and Shapiro’s patent holdup analysis and their proposed solution. This critique 
being prefaced by a contention that although patent holdout can occur, under compensation 
may be more common than over compensation.1032 The critique itself focusing on alleged 
defects in Lemley and Shapiro’s approach the most significant of which included; tying 
reasonable royalties to the bargaining skills of its owner, asserting that there is a known value 
which can be attributed to the patent, placing an arbitrary cap on royalties, in addition to a 
methodological criticism which challenged the inadequate of the evidence provided to justify 
the use of this new calculation method.1033  
With respect to tying the reasonable royalties to the owners bargaining skills, Golden 
contends that the value of a patented innovation has nothing to do with bargaining power.1034 
Golden defends this contention by stating that there is nothing in the statutory law which 
suggests that patent damages are to be constrained according to the bargaining power of the 
respective owners.1035 This contention obviously implying that Lemley and Shapiro’s formula; is 
fundamentally flawed; because it includes bargaining powers as a significant factor in 
determining reasonable royalty.  
As to questions about the known value of the patented invention, Golden suggests that as 
there is no consensus to what constitutes the value of a patented invention, it cannot be used 
as defined factor in a reasonably royalty calculation. Further that defining it as a rate which could 
be expected if there were no holdup, neither provides clear guidance, nor is it a valid 
assumption. He argues it is not a valid assumption because historically the threat of injunctive 
has been the principle measure which facilitated private settlement of intellectual property 
licenses, and it was those licenses that formed the bases for court ordered damages.1036  
Golden’s objection to the cap that Lemley and Shapiro’s calculations places on reasonable 
royalties, were also based upon a lack of any such constraints in the statutory law.1037 For him 
the essential element of a statutory royalty calculation was that it only stipulated a lower limit, 
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which he also noted could be tripled in the case of intentional infringement. As such setting a 
royalty cap which prohibited the cost of injunctive relief being considered as component of 
reasonable royalties, would be in direct contradiction to both the statutory language of the law 
and historical precedent.1038  
While the bulk of the critique focused on the flaws in the actual calculations, Golden also 
expressed concern with the lack of evidence which was provided to support claims of systematic 
overcompensation, which in turn were used as justification for imposing their formula on 
reasonable royalty calculations. To this point Golden states that the only evidence provided is 
two cases which may have involved overcompensations and a small sample of cases where 
damages for component infringement was two-thirds lower than for integrated 
infringements.1039 According to Golden this small data set was not just inadequate, but 
“unrepresentative of the vast universe of licensing agreements”.1040 
Taken together these critiques of Lemley and Shapiro’s formulation and method leads 
Golden to conclude that the calculation itself cannot be justified.1041 Perhaps even more 
significantly he concluded that if Lemley and Shapiro’s calculations are used, it will result in 
categorical discrimination against and systematic underpayment to non-practicing entities.1042 
Golden backs up these outcome related conclusions by pointing out that Lemley and Shapiro’s 
recommendation that injunctive relief should be available to practicing entities but not non-
practicing entities, clearly represents categorical discrimination. Further, that if it is assumed 
that providing injunctive relief to practicing entities will result in the privately negotiated 
reasonable royalty, then a denial of injunctive relief to non-practicing entities must necessarily 
result in systematic underpayment.1043  
Concurrent with pointing out these potential discriminatory outcomes, Golden also describes 
the redundancy of the proposed rule, in so far as the traditional discretion granted to the courts 
when determining whether to grant injunctive relief, provides them with sufficient flexibility to 
avoid the patent holdup problem Lemley and Shapiro were seeking to resolve.1044 This 
confidence in the reliability of historical adjudication methods being retained by Golden despite, 
an acknowledgement that determining reasonable royalties is a notoriously difficult exercise, 
which can result in significantly different outcomes.1045 The inconsistency of the redundancy 
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criticism and the difficulty of determining reasonable royalties being marginalised by an 
assertion that; while the threat of injunctive relief which helps to ensure that potential infringers 
are willing licensees, the subjectivity of that relief ensure that owners make reasonable licencing 
demands.1046 Supporting this claim Golden cites Lemley and Shapiro who he quotes as stating 
“[S]ince far more patents are licensed or settled than litigated to judgment, the primary 
economic effect of rules governing patent litigation arises through the effect of those rules on 
the licensing terms that are negotiated in the shadow of litigation.”1047 
After identifying the redundancy of Lemley and Shapiro’s construct, Golden resumes his 
critique by examining how their construct would impact technological markets. This analysis 
specifically extrapolates on how their categorical discriminatory against non-practicing entities 
would change the market, according to which he contends that: “Such discrimination could favor 
monopolists and incumbents over competitive firms and new entrants; could discourage 
innovation, patenting, or patent ownership by economically efficient inventors; could impede 
efficient specialization of industry functions and encourage inefficient vertical integration; and 
could prevent patent holders from choosing the most economically efficient, and socially 
beneficial, ways of exploiting their inventions”1048 
The argument that discrimination would favour monopolist and incumbents not merely 
focusing on the underpayment of royalties, but also the fact that it would reduce the ability of 
small firms to leverage their properties to establish themselves in the market. The 
discouragement of innovation resulting from the diminished ability of non-practicing entities to 
secure royalties and financing based upon royalties to fund their research and development. The 
potential to impede efficient industry structure based upon the discrimination against smaller 
intellectual property owners. And the prevention of economically efficient use of patents based 
upon the clear discrimination against licensing rather than producing. 1049  
The ultimate conclusion of this analysis being the adopting Lemley and Shapiro’s construct 
would be anti-competitive.1050 This conclusion being articulated in the conclusion when Golden 
states that:  
In the absence of greater theoretical or empirical support for the proposition that 
the patent system generally overcompensates broad categories of patent holders, 
adoption of a discriminatory system of remedies—one that could substantially close 
the doors of equity to independent inventors, research-oriented start-ups and spin-
offs, universities, and patent holding companies—threatens not only to mock true 
“equity” but also to discourage efficient markets in innovation and patent-rights 
ownership.’1051 
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12.1.3 Elves or Trolls? The Role of Non-Practicing Patent Owners in the Innovation 
Economy1052 
About a year after the Golden article, Damien Geradin, Anne Layne-Farrar and A. Jorge Padilla 
authored another article which also sought to moderate the overreaction related to patent 
holdup. Unlike Golden’s more general article, their article focused on what the authors 
contented was an overly broad definition of “patent trolls”.1053 According to their analysis many 
non-practicing entities made pro-competitive contributions to their respective industries, which 
mean that defining all non-practicing entities as patent trolls was counterproductive.1054  
In their more detailed explanation of the pro-competitiveness, the authors explain economic 
literature reaching back to Adam Smith has always recognised the value of specialization, and 
that non-practicing entities can be view as filling a specialized role in innovation. That while the 
non-practicing entities may not produce products, they may have superior innovative or other 
skills that allow them to make a positive contribution to an industry.1055 
Having explained the potential pro-competitive role of non-practicing entities the author 
then provided an explanation of why the exclusive rights provided by patent law are so critical 
to the success of these innovators. The arguments representing the same arguments used to 
historical justify patent law protection, which are: ‘Once an idea has been shared, it cannot be 
taken away or unlearned. Without rights of some kind, then, recipients of intangible knowledge 
goods would be in the profitable position of taking the property without paying. … By providing 
IP holders with an enforceable right, patents enable the sharing of information without the 
inevitable risk of appropriation. And when knowledge is tradable in this manner, various parties 
can coordinate and contract as necessary to produce a commercial product for a downstream 
market.’ 1056 And ‘[a] second key factor is that patents can facilitate funding for startup 
companies.’1057  
Combining these two elements together the authors more clearly present their argument by 
describing how because patent allow small innovators to finance their research on the 
expectation of licensing agreements, this increase the viability of research specialization, which 
would be lost if every non-practicing entities were treated as an abusive patent troll. That the 
loss of this research specialization would not only harm current innovation and competition, it 
would also harm long term innovation and competition because it would forestall those 
specialists from becoming new entrants in their respective technological fields.1058 This 
argument being supported by functional economic analysis provided in the subsequent section. 
The authors conclude with their article with a discussion of the policy implication of their 
finding, which they summarize in the final paragraph, which is as follows:  
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‘The emphasis on patent trolls, and their incentives and ability to practice hold up, 
has relied on far too sweeping a definition of trolls. In light of the analysis presented 
here it is clear that we cannot provide such a simplistic definition for patent troll as all 
non-practicing entities. Instead, we need to recognize that specialization can enhance 
social welfare, even in the context of patent holders. It can boost competition, raise 
product quality, and increase consumer choice. These procompetitive effects should 
be weighed when evaluating the potential for negative effects arising from the 
combination of patents and vertical disintegration. Ignoring these indirect benefits 
could lead to misguided and even harmful policy.’1059 
 
12.1.4 Reverse Hold-ups: The (Often Ignored) Risks Faced by Innovators in 
Standardized Areas1060 
 
Having identified the pro-competitive benefits of non-practicing entities, two years later 
Damien Geradin returned his attention on the problems of reverse patent holdup, which he and 
Rato had predicted would occur in the event that standardized IP owners were denied injunctive 
relief. Unlike the 2007 article, this article can be considered a specific and directed effort to 
rebut the patent solutions being advocated as part of the ongoing alarmism related to patent 
holdup. While the article repeated the background material included in previous articles, it 
dramatically expanded its critique of the conjecture related to patent holdup and the proposed 
solutions to it. The repeated background material included an explanation of the objectives of 
requiring FRAND Commitments, and the conflicts between their members of standards setting 
organizations,1061 which does not need to be reviewed here.  
As far as a critique of the conjecture related to patent holdup, Geradin begins by stating 
that there is no empirical evidence to suggest that ‘any industry standard has been significantly 
harmed by “holdup”.’1062 A statement which he supports by providing an example of a case 
where harm was claimed, but subsequent proved did not happen.1063 The article then goes on 
to acknowledges that while patent holdup can occur, because such occurrence is rare dramatic 
remedies to it are not justifiable. The significance of this position is that it clearly indicates that 
the conjecture related to patent holdup does not relate to the existence of patent holdup, but 
rather the pervasiveness of the practice.  
According to the article this rarity of the practice can be attributed to four factors. First, 
whenever there are no alternatives to an essential IP, that IP derives its market power from its 
own uniqueness and not from the fact that it is included in a standard, which means that claims 
of patent holdup because of being included in the standard is conjecture. Second, in most 
technological industries, the major IP owners have ongoing licensing programs that are known 
to industry participants before IP is selected for inclusion in a standard, and as such claims of 
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unknown or unavailable licensing terms is conjecture. Third, in most cases standards 
implementors do not invest in manufacturing equipment before a standard is set, and as such 
claims they are locked in is conjecture. And finally, the fact that most standardized IP owners 
face constrains, like the desire to have their IP included in future standards, means that the 
proposition that there are no IP owners once their IP has been included in a standard is 
conjecture.1064  
Taken together the article contents that: if all of this conjecture is eliminated the only IP 
owner which would practice patent holdup would be those which; 1) own an IP which can be 
designed around and owes it market power to inclusion in a standard, 2) is not a practicing entity 
and 3) has no desire to have additional IPs included in the standard. Further contending that 
because so few IP owners match these criteria, it severely limits the practice.1065  
In terms of critique of the proposed solution to patent holdup, the article includes these 
under an examination of the risks which innovators in standardized industries face. In addition 
to the traditional risks faced by any research endeavour, the article points out that standardized 
innovators face two additional risks which are; the risk associated with efforts to lower royalty 
rates by weakening the bargaining power of essential patent owner, the risk of competition rules 
to force essential IP owners to reduce their royalties. While these may have been described as 
risks, in reality they represent the variations of the proposed solution to patent holdup, both of 
which are harshly critiqued in the article. 
With respect to efforts to drive down royalty rates by reducing IP owners bargaining rights, 
the article divides these into three identifiable strategies: proposals for collective negotiations 
of royalties, efforts to deprive essential IP owners of the ability to seek injunctive relief, and 
efforts to redefine the meaning of FRAND in order to constrain royalty rates.  
According to the article, proposals for collective negotiation of royalties would take the 
form of all technological product manufactures engaging in joint negotiations with IP owners. 
The idea being that their collective bargaining power would be sufficient to counter any market 
power an intellectual property owner derived from being included in a standard. Geradin rebuts 
this proposal by pointing out that such overwhelming buying power; would force IP owners to 
settle for royalties which are lower than the value of their invention, would result in unduly rigid 
and suboptimal licensing terms and would likely breach competition law.1066  
As part of the rebuttal regarding the elimination of the ability to seek injunctive relief, the 
article first acknowledges how central this effort is considered for patent holdup solution 
proposals. After this Geradin refers to Golden’s article in which Golden argues that because of 
the time and cost related to litigation, the threat of seeking infringement relief is seldom realized 
and as such not as powerful as is alleged. The more substantive rebuttal however focuses on 
what would happen if injunctive relief would be eliminated. Just as with the prediction provide 
four years earlier, Geradin focuses on how this would create an “infringer’s charter”, in that it 
would eliminate the incentive of users to negotiate licensing agreements before using the IP and 
force owners to seek enforcement of their patents in ‘patent by patent, country by country 
damage claims.’1067 The net result of which would be that: 
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‘Faced with the prospect of spending millions of dollars and several years in the 
courts, patent holders would be forced to settle for royalties that would be lower that 
the true value of their inventions, a result that would be fundamentally un-FRAND.’1068  
The article continues by point out that, if rather than eliminating the right to seek injunctive 
relief for all standardized patent owners, such a rule would only be applied to non-practicing 
entities it would have the same consequence for those entities. A situation which would result 
in the paradoxical outcome in that entities which are ‘most likely to license their (because 
licensing is their business model and they need licensing revenues) would be granted the least 
leverage in licensing negotiations by truncating their rights granted to them by law.’1069 Which 
would ‘tip the market in favour of vertically-integrated incumbents. This would impede 
efficiency-enhancing specialization allowing firms to focus on what they do best and harm 
innovation.’1070 The article concluding this rebuttal of this proposal by claiming that in any event 
the injunction elimination is not supported by either statue or case law. 
With respect to rebutting the redefinition of FRAND which constrained the royalties that 
can be charged by standardized IP owners. The article focuses on three methods which have 
been proposed which would achieve this objective; numerical proportionality, requiring 
equivalent internal ex-post and ex-ante royalty rates, and enforcing theoretical ex-ante royalty 
rates. 
Under the numerical proportionality method, the owner’s royalty would be calculated 
according to their proportion contribution to the standard. In rebutting this method, the article 
maintains that it is unworkable because: it relies on the establishment of a royalty cap, presumes 
that all patents are of equal value and would incentivise patent packing. The scepticism about a 
royalty cap is based upon the fact that any proportionality royalty calculations must multiply the 
determined proportion by some aggregate royalty rate, an aggregate royalty rate which would 
be highly contested. The scepticism about the presumed equal value of all patents being based 
upon the fact that different patents have different values. The scepticism about the patent 
packing being based upon the assumption that if it is the number of patents which determines 
a royalty rate this will incentives standard contributors to generate and seek adoption of 
marginally different but substantively indifferent patents by the standard.1071 
The article’s rebuttal of a method which presumes that FRAND requires licensors to provide 
ex ante royalties rate to ex-post licensees, relies on the difficulty of comparing individual 
licensing situations and the changes in the risk profile of taking a license in the two periods. With 
respect to the difficulty in comparing licenses, Geradin argues that all licences have their own 
peculiarities which can justify different pricing parameters, and as such it could be like 
comparing apples with oranges. In terms of changes in the risk profile he argues that once a 
patent is adopted by a standard, the risks with respect to licensing it are substantially reduced, 
and depriving owners of the ability of giving early licensees preferential terms would prevent 
owners from rewarding those licensees for the additional risk which they incurred. He does 
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however admit that this kind of pricing parameters could be a violation of the non-discrimination 
commitment.1072 
With respect to enforcing theoretical ex-ante royalty rates the article rebuts this method 
by focusing on the questions related to the application of Swanson and Baumol model, which 
Geradin suggest would be basis for determining theoretical ex-ante royalty rates. 1073 Under that 
model the ex-ante royalty rate would be based upon and hypothetical seller auction between IP 
owners of similar properties which were competing to be included in the standard based upon 
the royalties they would charge. What this model implies is that because the incremental cost 
of allowing an additional user to use the patent is near zero, this auction would result in a price 
which does not reflect the value provide by the patent but only the incremental value which the 
patent provides over alternative patents.  
Geradin challenges this use of this model on the basis that it makes too many assumptions 
which are unrealistic, and it could result in serious under compensation. These unrealistic 
assumptions include; an expectation that the IP owners are not integrated manufactures, the 
properties are can be easily substituted, and the bargaining power of all SSO members is evenly 
distributed. The concerns about under compensation resting on the notion that determining 
royalties based upon an incremental benefit may not be sufficient to cover the research a 
development cost of the IP owner. What is not mentioned in this rebuttal was an analysis of; 
why the method would essentially represent a buyer’s cartel, if FRAND was interpreted in this 
manner. 
According to the article the final risk faced by standardized IP owners, was the risk that 
competition authorities would force them to reduce their royalties. To rebut this proposed 
solution to patent holdup, Geradin examines the European Commission investigation of 
Qualcomm. In analysing the case he concluded that in the absence of exclusionary behaviour 
there was little role that competition law could provide, because excessive pricing raised too 
many complex and unresolved issues.1074 
12.1.5 The FTC, IP, and SSOs: Government Hold-Up Replacing Private 
Coordination1075  
This paper was a practical response to a FTC report1076 that recommended the adoption of 
patent holdup solutions which according to the article would ‘distort the operation of the 
intellectual property (IP) marketplace in ways that will hamper the innovation and 
commercialization of new technologies.’1077 Included in this response was; a summary of the 
FTC’s recommendations, a description of an underlying false definition included in the proposal, 
the discussion of the effectiveness of private markets, a rebuttal of the FTC’s reasonable royalty 
proposal, and a recommendation for judicial restraint.  
The authors summarize the FTC proposal by dividing it into three main steps. According to 
them, in the first step the FTC reinterprets the meaning of willing licensor/licensee, by defining 
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a willing licensor as an owner that is willing to accept the maximum price that a potential 
licensee would be willing to pay before the IP was adopted by a standard. In the second step the 
FTC shifts that period from which damage calculations are to be calculated from when the 
infringement occurred, when a time before the IP was adopted by the standard. The third step 
involves defining the amount that a willing licensee would be willing to pay as the incremental 
value which an IP offers over any other IP which could have been selected as a substitute for it 
in the standard.1078 
In addition to concerns about the lack of evidence of a systemic malfunction in the IP 
markets which would warrant these changes, the authors also challenge the validity of key 
definitions used in the proposal, which if correctly defined would dramatically alter its 
outcomes.  
The first definition they challenge is the one provided with respect to the ex-ante 
negotiation period. Under the FTC definition ex-ante negotiation period, is a point in time just 
before the IP has been adopted as part of the standard. In rebutting this definition, the authors 
note that this time selection ‘Either it ignores the fact that the risk of hold-up is bi-directional, 
or it is intentionally calculated to empower the infringer to retroactively “hold up” the patent 
owner so as to drive damages awards (and hence negotiated license fees) as low as possible.’1079 
This because the proposed ex ante period does not acknowledge the sunk cost that licensors 
have made in research and development to create their IP, which “locks in” their costs making 
them just as vulnerable to patent holdup as implementors.  
According to the authors, a true ex ante negotiation period would be ‘at the outset of a 
new technology, before either inventors or manufacturers have made the investments 
necessary to the success of that technology.’1080 Under this true version all standardization 
members would have to agree to a fair distribution of rewards according to the risks that is born 
by the respective entities. For entities engaged in the research and development of the 
underlying technology, these rewards would need to cover the risks related unsuccessful 
research efforts, as well as the risks of not being selected for inclusion in the standard. Only if 
these risks were properly rewarded would there be a stable environment which would provide 
for optimal investment in the technology. The authors go further by suggesting that current 
SSO’s are effectively structured using this true ex ante analysis, in that they appear to provide 
sufficient rewards to each party to ensure ongoing technological advancements. A suggestion 
they support by listing some of the negative responses to the FTC’s proposed changes which 
have been provided by various SSO’s.1081  
The second definition they challenge is the one related to patent holdup. In rebutting the 
FTC’s definition, the authors begin by providing two definition of patent holdout: ‘self-interest 
seeking with guile’,1082 and ‘the capture of the fruits of another’s investment’.1083 They then point 
out that neither of definitions extends to a situation where a patent owner seeks to secure a 
large proportion of value of their patent, nor does it suggest that IP owners must guarantee the 
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profits of IP users. They then compare this definition with the one used by the FTC which suggest 
that holdup as seeking a higher royalty than what a licensee would be willing to pay before the 
design choice, which would only be the incremental value that the IP has over other IP. It should 
be noted that this definition takes no consideration of how much end users value the innovation 
or how much of that value is being captured by the patent owner. So; whilst under a traditional 
definition holdup would only occur in instances where the royalties exceed the total value of the 
innovations, under the FTC’s definition holdup occurs whenever royalties exceed the marginal 
value the IP. The inappropriateness of the FTC’s definition leading the author’s referring to it as 
“government-aided holdup.” This because it would provide government support for potential 
licensors who are seeking to appropriate the fruits of the intellectual property owner’s 
investment.  
As practical support for this definitional difference the authors, explain how the market 
allows for ex ante licensing and formulating an analysis of four reasons why entities do not take 
ex ante licenses. First, there are entities who do not anticipate the inclusion of the IP in the 
standard and prove to be correct. (Because the IP is not included in the standard, there can be 
no holdup.) Second are entities who do not anticipate the inclusion of the IP in the standard and 
prove to be incorrect. (While these parties are susceptible to patent holdup, it was their own 
failure to correctly plan that put them in that position.) Third are parties who anticipate the 
inclusion of a property in a standard but choose to wait until after it is included to seek a license. 
(While these entities are susceptible to patent holdup, their willingness to seek an ex post license 
indicates that they do not view it as a major threat.) Finally, there are those that anticipate the 
inclusion of an IP in a standard but choose not to seek a license as they anticipate that the courts 
will grant them a better rate than the ex ante rate offered by the owner. (While these entities 
are susceptible to patent holdup, there are also practicing (reverse) patent holdup.) They 
therefore contend that this list demonstrates all well-planned entities can avoid patent holdup 
and those companies that choose to be susceptible to it either do not consider it is a problem 
or presume they can use reverse patent holdup to avoid it. A much different analysis than the 
FTC makes, when it assumes patent holdup is only due to imperfect information or differences 
in ex ante valuations.1084 With respect to difference in ex-ante or even ex post valuations the 
authors note that, as licensors are already constrained by future standard participation desires 
and FRAND commitments, it suggest that the last category may be principle reason for claims of 
patent holdup.1085 
With respect to the specific critique of the effects of the FTC’s proposal the authors begin 
by identifying that the proposal is specifically intended to ensure that infringers ‘is to pay no 
more, if identified, sued, and defeated, than he would have had to pay no more than a user 
which took an ex ante license would pay if he had in fact negotiated a license at the time the 
standard was set.’1086 This they assert would not only act as an inducement for users to engage 
in wilful ignorance based infringement, but it would also dramatically increase the litigation 
costs of owners as they would have to pursue a larger number of infringers.1087 Such an outcome 
representing the opposite intent of infringement damages, which were to serve as an incentive 
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for avoiding infringement, by making it more costly to infringe than to enter into private 
negotiations.1088  
In concluding their article, the authors focus attention on the structural change which 
would result from an application of the FTC’s proposal which according to them would: 
‘lead to subtle but important shifts in the commercialization of new technologies 
and the overall structure of the competitive landscape. Many of these changes will be 
to the benefit of large firms which have the means of exploiting their own inventions 
and capturing value through product sales, but to the detriment of overall levels of 
market innovation including efforts by smaller firms and entrepreneurial startups that 
rely on patent protections and licensing revenues. In addition, the FTC proposals 
reduce voluntary contracting and increase patent litigation and potential private and 
regulatory antitrust enforcement actions challenging negotiated license terms. The 
burdens of these developments will fall particularly heavily on startups and market 
entrants, again favoring well-funded incumbents. All of this will discourage the small-
scale entrepreneurship that has historically been a prime catalyst of our high-
technology economy.’1089 
12.1.6 “Holding up” and “Holding Out”1090 
As scholars became aware of both the prospect and practice of “reverse holdup”, there 
came to be a growing recognition that the solution to patent holdup might be worse than the 
problem itself. This recognition was what to lead to articles like this one by Associate Professor 
Chien. She begins the article by lamenting the one-sided description of patent disputes which 
portray innocent patent infringers being abused by unscrupulous patent owners and pointing 
out that the derogatory language used to frame the debate is indicative of that bias. Specifically, 
she illustrates how the use of the terms “patent holdup” and “patent troll” have severely 
negative connotation which cast patent owners as the villains of any patent dispute. Providing 
President Obama’s quotation on patent holdup as an example of that negative connotation.1091  
She continues the article by asking that when patent disputes arise equal consideration be 
given to a practice she calls “patent holdout”. Defining “patent holdout” as ‘the practice of 
companies routinely ignoring patents and resisting patent owner demands, because the odds of 
getting caught are small.’1092 This request being made because of an assertion that patent hold 
out is a widespread phenomenon; which theoretically will be practiced by large companies when 
they are infringing on patents owned by smaller companies, because smaller companies cannot 
afford extensive and expensive litigation.1093 This theoretical outcome, reflecting and explaining 
recent ligation trends in high technology industries. 
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Unlike earlier articles rebutting patent holdup solutions, this article is forthright in its 
acceptance of the reality that patent holdup does occur and has occurred for over 170 years.1094 
The main difference between earlier examples of holdup and the more modern ones being that 
being adopted into a standard provides patent holders with potential “super” holdup potential. 
A super holdup being described as happening when: there is a post ante assertion of a weak 
patent which reads to a standard and results in disproportional remedies for the infringement. 
The problem of patent holdout being address in the courts by: restricting injunctive relief, 
adopting the smallest component rule and more closely scrutinising patent grants. Measures 
which rather than reducing litigation appear to have increase it. 1095 
Chien explains this this increase in litigation by pointing to: the rise of patent assertion 
companies which specialize in infringement actions, the continued grant of record damage 
awards and the ongoing litigation battles in the smartphone industry.1096 In addition to these 
readily obvious causes, she also points to an overlooked cause relating to the escalating usage 
of patent holdout as method of lowering licensing costs. Suggesting that when entities are 
unwilling to enter into pro-active good faith negotiation to license essential intellectual 
property, it is inevitable that a good number of those infringements will be litigated. This patent 
holdout behaviour also representing a historical practice, which has been recognised for 
decades.1097 According to her, included in this reactive litigation is subset of patent holdout, 
called “reverse patent holdup”, which she defines as implementors ignoring licensing requests 
on the pretext that they are not fair of reasonable.1098  
Illustrating the respective claims made by litigants, the article identifies three crucial 
differences between patent holdup and holdout arguments. Whereas defendants often claim 
that owners wait until their IP have been adopted by a standard before assertion, plaintiffs 
counter-claim that their offer to enter into ex ante licensing negotiations are ignored until the 
IP is adopted. Whereas defendants will often claim that their holdout behaviour was based upon 
invalidity concerns, plaintiffs will counter-claim that invalidity defences are too often repetitive 
and spurious. Finally, while defendants claim that patent holdup is driven by excessive remedies, 
plaintiffs counter-claim that high damages are needed not just to cover excessive litigation cost, 
but to offset the deterrent effect of excessive litigation costs.1099 
One of the more remarkable aspect of this article is the balanced approach which it takes 
to the problems, recognising the existence and rational behind both forms of abusive behaviour. 
This balanced approach also being evident in the solutions advocated by Chien which were: the 
elimination of the duplication of infringement actions in multiple jurisdiction, early resolution of 
invalidity and infringement questions, early determination of intellectual property value ranges, 
and promotion of proportional litigation costs. Unlike the one-sided solutions which have been 
proposed to solve patent holdup, proposed solution represent mutually beneficial objectives 
which could be theoretically supported by all parties. 
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12.1.7 Patent “Trespass” and the Royalty Gap: Exploring the Nature and Impact of 
Patent Holdout1100 
Once patent holdout was identified in legal scholarship as a serious legal problem, research 
on the topic intensified, with other articles providing greater insight in to the practice. Included 
in those articles was this one by Professors Heiden and Petit, which provides one of the clearest 
and most comprehensive study of the phenomena.  
This study commences with a discussion of the theory behind economic holdout and 
narrative of how patent dispute thermology has been twisted in a manner which prejudices the 
interests of patent infringers over those of patent owners. In discussing the theory behind 
economic holdout, the author explain that holdout has been a concept that has existed in 
economic theory for a considerable amount of time. That in its simplest form, it refers to a 
situation where economic agents cannot act without the consent of some other agent and that 
consenting agent withhold that consent for any reason. 1101 The historical examples given to 
illustrate this situation: include oil field utilization disputes,1102 land assembly,1103 corporate 
takeovers,1104 and wage negotiations.1105 The author’s point out that as in each of these cases 
the owners effectively use their property rights to extract a high price for their property, it is 
‘unsurprising that the concept of holdout has also been used in relation to intellectual property 
rights (“IPRs”) in general and patents in particular.’1106 An expectation which the authors note 
was identified by Professor Golden when he described “patent holdout” as patent owners 
making demands for better deals (holdout premiums) by using threatening to seek injunctive 
relief (holdout threats) against infringers.1107 A terminology which was later specialized to refer 
to a situation where patent owners sued for excessive royalties for patents which were included 
in a technological standard.1108 
The ability to practice patent holdout being founded on the property rules related to 
exclusive property rights which provided owners with a subjective right to determine the price 
which they could charge for the use of their property. This converse of this rule being that the 
unauthorized of someone else’s property should be treated as ‘trespass, theft, or piracy’,1109 all 
of which are unlawful. What is noticeable about this analysis is that it clearly frames the patent 
infringement in a negative light: with the owner being depicted as merely profit maximising from 
a situation where their properties provide them a strong bargaining position, and infringers 
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being portrayed as criminal entities breaching the property rights as a result of a weak 
bargaining position.1110 
The authors imply that in order to counter this perception it was necessary for patent 
holdup scholars to abandon this historically appropriate terminological description of the 
situation and create a new perception through the introduction of the terminology and theory 
relating “patent holdup”. According to the authors this was in a large part accomplished through 
four policy papers and/or articles, all of which were either authored or co-authored by Professor 
Carl Shapiro.1111 In the first of these papers Professor Shapiro described how “cumulative 
innovation” could be blocked by “blocking patents” which meant that those blocking patents 
were “holding up” technological development.1112 This concept of holdup being expanded to 
include situations where owners of “hidden patents” wait until a product is in large scales 
production before seeking excessive royalties by threating to seek injunctive relief. This 
expansion was likely accepted because both behaviours cast the patent owner as a “bad actor”. 
However, this expansion could have been avoided by recognising the latter behaviour as 
represented a classic “patent holdout” position, particularly when in the same paper the term 
was expanded to include situation where the manufacturer inadvertently infringed on a public 
patent.1113 
In the second paper written with Professor Mark Lemley the “patent holdup” terminology 
was further expanded to any situation where a patent owner sought to charge more than a 
technological product manufacture would have been willing to pay before the patent was 
adopted by a standard. In doings so it became the terminology which was casting the owner as 
a “bad actor”, even though it overturned a patent owner’s historical rights to set the price for 
the use of their properties and forced patent owners to except royalty rates at a lower level than 
the value inherent in their properties.1114 
The third paper further expanded and ingrained this terminology by describing “patent 
holdup” from an economic prospective.1115 The expansion coming in the form of argument which 
suggested that whenever a patent owner use the threat of injunctive relief to secure higher 
royalty rates it should be considered patent holdup, even if the implementor has not made any 
investments before a licensing offer is made. That the mere threat of seeking injunctive relief 
for un-authorised usage is somehow patent holdup. It ingrained the terminology by once again 
using patent holdup rather than patent holdout to describe the owner’s behaviour.1116 
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The finally paper which the authors point to as changing perceptions in patent disputes was 
an antitrust paper which focused on the anticompetitive nature of patent holdup.1117 In this 
paper the authors suggest that Shapiro sought to equate “patent holdup” and “opportunism” 
under a ‘specific field of economics called “transaction cost economics”(“TCE”).’1118 Referring to 
patent holdup as relating to situation where the potential user has invested sunk costs in 
preparation for participating in patent reliant technology, where patent owners and the 
potential user are unable to agree on FRAND royalties. Shapiro suggesting that patent holdup 
can occur even when patent owners not engaged in guile, ambush or deceit and are willing to 
licence their IP at FRAND rates determined themselves. All that is required for this expanded 
definition of patent holdup is that; they refuse to license their patent at rates considered FRAND 
by potential licensees. The antitrust implication being that such behaviour should be treated the 
same as patent holdout which was based upon guile, ambush or deceit.  
Having described how the perceptions of patent disputes have been reversed with patent 
owners cast as the “bad actor” and patent infringers as the victims, the authors turn their 
attention to how this new perception can be overcome. While the most obvious way of doing 
this would be to return to the historical terminology of patent holdup they concede that patent 
holdup has so infiltrated the debate that it would be difficult to return to historical definitions. 
As such they focus their attentions on attempting to frame the terminology which describes 
situations where standard essential IPs are infringed by entities who are unwilling to enter into 
good faith private negotiations with patent owners and instead rely on the threat of excessive 
litigation and user-friendly IP courts to minimize licensing cost. While they concede that this too 
can be described as classical holdout situation,1119 they recommend the use of the term “patent 
trespass”.1120 In framing this type of behaviour as patent trespass, the authors are intentionally 
engaging in the same sort of normative terminology that was used with patent holdup. Which is 
to say that they are casting the behaviour in a negative light, which implies that the infringer is 
engaged in unlawful behaviour. This they argue is the most effective and appropriate response 
to the empirical issues related to patent disputes because it will provide a better balance to the 
debate.1121 In addition to suggesting a method of balance the debate through terminological 
techniques the paper also provides a clear analysis of why this is needed. They do this by 
providing a detailed analysis of what is meant by “patent trespass”, how it occurs and the 
negative consequences for owners of it being allowed to occur. An analysis which they claim is 
totally lacking in holdup literature.1122  
According to the authors ‘patent trespass can be said to arise when a SEP holder’s licensing 
revenue decreases, because some (or all) technology implementers avert, either temporarily or 
permanently, the conclusion of a licensing agreement on terms that correspond to recognized 
industry practices.’1123 Under this definition fits practical behaviour like: avoiding negotiation 
until legal suits are filed or engaging in diversionary legal tactics once suits are filled. This 
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practical behaviour being defined by other scholars as reverse patent holdup,1124and still other 
defining reverse patent holdup as occurring when royalties are fixed below FRAND and/or fair 
market rates.1125 
In terms of why IP users engage in patent trespass, rather than engaging in good faith 
negotiations, the authors state that the consensus is ‘that limitations to the availability of 
injunctive relief – categorically or discretely – contribute to the formation of patent trespass’.1126 
They further explain that when injunctive relief is unavailable and the only remedy for 
infringement is damages which are equal to the royalties which would have been paid before 
the infringement occurred not only eliminates the incentive to enter into ex ante licensing 
negotiations but incentivises patent trespass. This because; in the worst-case situation the 
trespasser will have to pay damages they would have had to pay if they had secured a license, 
in the best the IP owner cannot afford to sue, and they will get to use the IP for free, and in most 
cases IP owners will settle for substantially reduced licensing royalties because they do not want 
to engage in protracted and expensive litigation.1127  
In distinguishing patent trespass from the infringement behaviour contained in patent 
holdup articles the author declare that patent trespass is: 1) an intentional act, 2) which seeks 
to delay the payment of royalties, 3) as well as seeking to reduce or eliminate royalty payments 
to IP owners, 4) by forcing IP owner to choose between engaging in excessive litigation and 
marginal royalty payments 5) for the purpose of providing the infringer with a price advantage 
in a competitive market.1128 This description being significantly different than patent holdup 
description of: an accidental infringer, resisting excessive licensing demands.  
In concluding their description of patent trespass, the authors point out that it is this final 
point about patent trespass, providing a cost advantage in the market that has made the practice 
a systemic concern, as ‘This “race to trespass” effect will be especially true for technology 
implementers with low margins competing on cost advantage strategies.”1129 The potential 
systemic effect of patent trespass theoretically materializing as a ‘decrease in the incentives of 
patent owners to invest in future technologies.. or to participate and contribute technology to 
SSOs. … [which] would manifest itself in the performance or delay in the development of new 
standards’.1130  
Having developed the terminology of patent trespass the authors sought confirmation of 
their analysis by conducting interviews with IP owners. In addition to confirming much of their 
analysis the owners also provided input on additional factors which incentivise patent trespass 
which they describe as follows: First, patent trespass is dependent upon the relative size, 
resources and reputation of the parties. Second, systemic effects occur when more than 30% of 
the relevant market is unlicensed. Third, patent trespass becomes institutionalized when more 
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than 30% of the market is unlicensed. Fourth, lack of clarity in the legal framework induces 
patent trespass. Fifth, the systemic effects are real.1131 
In concluding their paper, the authors suggest that: patent holdup terminology is misguided 
and creates a systemic trap, because the concept of patent holdout does not provide a sufficient 
counterbalance to the normative terminology of patent holdup, patent trespass should be used, 
and empirical evidence supports the systemic effects of that patent trespass. All of which leads 
them to conclude that: ‘that patent trespass is a significant phenomenon, which deserves as 
much attention from courts and policy-makers as the patent holdup narrative.’1132 More 
specifically recommending that: 
‘While the patent holdup narrative has been the driver of several competition 
policy initiatives in the past decade, it is less obvious whether patent trespass has 
received consideration from competition authorities. If our preliminary finding is right 
that patent trespass can generate adverse effects on economic efficiency, this calls 
into question whether competition policy resources are deployed towards the right 
market failure. To be more concrete, should competition policy remedies also be 
deployed towards anti-competitive behavior by SEP implementers that could have a 
systemic impact on economic efficiency, in particular, dynamic efficiency? This could 
manifest itself through collusion to change IPR policies in SSOs to reduce SEP payments 
or through cartelization of actors in emerging markets to avoid SEP payments.’1133 
This recommendation like the overall article provides one of the best articulations of 
the problems, although it appears to be missing a balanced solution which would reflect 
the rhetorical balance it advocates.  
12.2 Patent Holdout Literature and Correlated Rights  
Before attempting to analyse whether and how patent holdout literature provides 
indirect support to an application of the correlated rights doctrine in IP law, it is worth 
repeating the earlier definition on the doctrine, which was as follows:  
'When multiple parties have individual property claims on an inherently integrated 
property each is legally entitled to their proportional share of the total value of that 
property and the law should protect that share from being appropriated by others, 
including other owners and users. 
Despite of intrinsic simplicity and equity of this definition, its application in intellectual 
property law will undoubtedly represent a highly contentious proposition. A contentiousness 
which can be anticipated given the existing contentiousness of the much simpler propositions 
that are contained in patent holdup and patent holdout literature. These controversies even 
going so far as representing an unwillingness to acknowledge the existence of the two problems 
identified by the opposing sides. Assuming this intractability positions were to be maintained, 
the chance of correlated rights being given fair consideration would be minimal. Fortunately, 
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there has been an evolution of patent holdout scholars towards a more balanced position, which 
has provided an opening for eventual support of an application of correlated intellectual 
property rights. Evidence of this potential support being reflected in the similarity of the 
foundational analysis and propositions used for both patent holdout and correlated rights. The 
primary difference revolving around the proposed solution the problems of patent holdup and 
holdout.  
While these similarities could be illustrated by examining how the correlated right’s 
propositions relate to the summary of the patent holdout arguments included in the previous 
part of this chapter, this would result in the reverse of the desired analysis. What is desired is 
not an analysis of whether correlative rights propositions are compatible with patent holdout 
analysis, but rather whether patent holdout analysis is compatible with correlated right’s 
propositions. Obviously to facilitate this type of analysis it is essential that the propositions 
underlying the advocacy of an application of the correlated rights doctrine be clearly listed. 
Those propositions are as follows: 
 
 Intellectual property law is intended to prevent third parties from appropriating the 
value created by innovators and ensure that the inventors can capture the value 
provided by their innovations. 
 Patent holdup is facilitated and will occur when correlated intellectual property 
owners are granted relatively automatic injunctive relief and/or excessive 
damages, based upon exclusive property rights. 
 Patent holdout occurs when intellectual property rights are overly restricted in 
response to patent holdup. 
 Both patent holdup and holdout appropriate value from innovators. 
 Patent holdup and patent holdout are not solved by FRAND commitments 
 Proposed patent holdup solutions contain systemic errors with substantially 
undervalue IP contributions 
 Because the aggregate innovative value provided by correlated technological 
product is dependent upon intellectual property contribution from multiple 
owners, the individual value which individual owners are entitled to; must be 
correlated to the value that their properties contribute to that aggregate value. 
(i.e.: as required by an application of the correlated rights doctrine)  
 
 IP law is intended to prevent third parties from appropriating the value created by 
innovators and ensure that the inventors can capture the value provided by their 
innovations. 
 
As the traditional definition of IP rights is the provision of a monopoly to the inventor of a 
new and useful invention and the traditional justifications provided for granting that monopoly 
right are: to support the capitalistic principle which suggest that individuals are entitled to reap 
the fruits of their labour and to incentivise innovation, it could be assumed that this proposition 
would be uncontroversial. However, it turns out that many authors of patent holdup articles 
disagree with this proposition. Instead, they suggest that an inventor is only entitled to what the 






their invention, which in turn can be determined by a heavily discount calculation methodology 
include in their work.1134 The 80% difference between the value the invention and the price that 
the oligopsony would be willing to pay; being appropriated by the oligopsony members, who 
would theoretically past thought to consumers in the form of lower prices for the technological 
products.1135 
As can be expected this rejection of historical definition and justification is not supported 
in patent holdout article. In addition to adhering to tradition notions of patent rights,1136 they 
also point out that rights are already constrained by several bilateral negotiation 
considerations1137 and there is no statutory provision supporting Lemley and Shapiro’s proposed 
constraints.1138  
 
 Patent holdup is facilitated by relatively automatic injunctive relief and/or excessive damage 
awards 
This proposition is central to an advocacy promoting the application of correlated rights. 
For without a systemic problem like patent holdup, there would be no point in advocating for a 
change in intellectual property law. Notably in the initial patent holdup rebuttals were claims 
insufficient evidence of a systemic problem, which was used to argue against proposed patent 
holdup solutions.1139 An argument which became somewhat theoretical as the application of 
patent holdup solutions effectively eliminated automatic injunctive relief and dramatically 
reduced damage awards. This theoretical debated fuelled by anecdotal examples on one side 
and a lack of pervasive examples on the other. 
What was not disputed in patent holdout articles was that holdup could theoretically occur 
if patents belonging to industrial standards were provided with automatic injunctive relief or 
excessive damage awards.1140 This recognition by patent holdout scholars of a theoretical 
systemic problem, (but for the application of patent holdup solutions), standing in stark contrast 
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to the reluctance to accept the existence of a systemic patent holdout problem by patent holdup 
scholars. An unwillingness that that can be largely attributed to a disagreement over the 
definition of reasonable royalties and how they should be calculated.  
 Patent holdout occurs when intellectual property rights are overly restricted in response to 
patent holdup. 
While like the correlated rights analysis, all patent holdout articles explain how anti-patent 
holdup restrictions placed on historical patent rights patent will encourage patent holdout, this 
does not mean that this analysis and articles are identical. The main difference being that; the 
correlated rights analysis focuses on legal attrition, while most patent holdup articles tend to 
focus on injunctive relief limitations.1141 In the correlated rights analysis, this legal attrition focus 
suggests that after courts started to allow legal attrition to be used as a defence against patent 
holdup, they could not deny the same behaviour when it was being used for patent holdout. 
That regardless of the availability of injunctive relief when infringes are allowed to weaponize 
the legal system by engage in legal attrition it will inevitably result in patent holdout.1142 In the 
patent holdup articles, their injunction relief argument suggest that when the courts limited an 
owner’s right to injunctive relief, it eliminated the incentive to engage in ex ante private 
negotiation.1143  
While this might appear like a trivial difference, given the reciprocating acknowledgement 
of the arguments in the respective analysis, it could have profound implication with respect to 
providing patent holdout scholarly support for correlated rights. This because; if the patent 
holdout scholars require that any solution to patent holdout must include automatic injunctive 
relief, it is unlikely that they will support a correlated rights application which only grants 
injunctive relief against unwilling licensees. If this withdrawal of support is to be avoided; it must 
be understood that while the correlated rights analysis acknowledges that the limitations on 
injunctive relief incentivise patent holdout, it also acknowledges that automatic injunctive relief 
incentivise patent holdup, which means another solution must be found. That solution involves 
provide the courts with the discretion to set higher damages for infringers they believe have 
engaged in patent holdout.  
 Both patent holdup and holdout appropriate value from correlated patent owners 
This proposition provides the driving incentive for seeking a redefinition of patent rights 
under an application of the correlated rights doctrine. While historically strong patent rights 
were designed to protect the appropriation of value from standalone patent owners through a 
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on their investment, in other words terms which would not comply with FRAND, rather than face lengthy, onerous 






grant of injunctive relief, it is clear that the same injunctive relief was abused to deprive 
integrated patent owners of value of their contributions to an integrated technology. While the 
solutions to patent holdup effectively ended that abuse by severely curtailing patent rights, it 
has facilitated the appropriation of patent owner value through patent holdout.  
While there are volumes of patent holdup literature which describe the appropriation 
method of patent holdup, it is only the patent holdout articles which acknowledge that 
appropriation can occur as a result of either patent holdup or patent holdout.1144 
 Patent holdup and patent holdout are not solved by FRAND commitments.  
Unlike the first three propositions this proposition is disputed in several patent holdout 
articles. The most direct rebuttal provided in the articles co-authored or authored by Damien 
Geradin. The first of these articles is specifically writing in defence of FRAND’s role in preventing 
patent holdup1145. The second describing how the proposed patent holdup solution would be 
detrimental to FRAND objectives.1146  
Even in the patent holdout articles which don’t contain an aggressive advocacy for FRAND, 
there is an implied assumption that FRAND will be effective in solving these problems. This 
because; they assume the historical legal treatment is sufficient to solve patent holdup, and 
RAND commitments are part of the that legal status quo. While it is not specifically stated it 
must be assumed this belief in FRAND also leads to the conclusion that a proper application of 
FRAND would resolve patent holdout. This because; if it is the application of patent holdup 
solutions which facilitates patent holdout, FRAND eliminating the need for that solution must 
also prevent patent holdout. 
The trouble with these propositions is that they run aground on the cold hard reality that 
both patent holdup and patent holdout have occurred when FRAND commitments have been in 
place. The former prior to that application of the patent holdout solution and the later after 
their application. If in fact FRAND was capable of preventing these problems, they should not 
have occurred or at least they should not have occurred on a systemic basis.  
While Geradin and Rato try to deny that the lack of a reliable definition for FRAND is a 
problem, they basically do so by assuming that all parties effected by a FRAND commitment are 
themselves reasonable and will negotiate in good faith.1147 If the assumption about reasonable 
                                                          
1144 See for e.g.: Geradin and Rato, A Dissonant View, ‘The intuition is that a manufacture facing shutdown or a 
costly product redesign will be willing to pay considerably more than a patent is “worth” to avoid those costs’ at 23; 
Geradin, Reverse Hold-Up, ‘In light of these developments, innovators may be at risk of “reverse holdups” whereby 
their reward would be inferior to than the contribution of their technology to the standard’ at 8; Epstein et al, 
Replacing Private Coordination, ‘Either it [the FTC] ignores the fact that the risk of holdup is bi-directional, or it is 
intentionally calculated to empower the infringer to retroactively “hold up” the patent owner so as to drive 
damages awards (hence the negotiated license fees) as low as possible.’ at 20; Chien, Holding up and Holding out, 
‘Patent hold-out is widespread, for both legal and practical reasons. While the hold-up story is sympathetic to 
defendants, the hold-out story tells the plaintiffs’ side. Reconsider the story from before, but now put yourself in 
the patentee’s shoes, and imagine that the company selling the product is a large, not small, company. As an 
inventor you had the idea first and wanted to start a business on it. You tried, without luck, to get the product 
commercialized successfully, though you did get a patent. You find the technology being deployed by a large 
company and approach it to sign a license. The company ignores you and refuses to engage or license the patent, no 
matter how strong it is or reasonable your offer.14 The large company is “holding-out” on your patent demand.’ at 
4 
1145 Geradin and Rato, A Dissonant View 
1146 Geradin, Reverse Hold-Up 
1147 Geradin and Rato, A Dissonant View, ‘the fact that FRAND is not further defined cannot be viewed as a 






parties is discarded and good faith negotiations become spurious; a generalised clause which 
does not define the specifics of reasonable behaviour or good faith negotiations will have 
effectively invited abuse.1148 
 Proposed patent holdup solutions contain systemic errors with substantially undervalue IP 
contributions 
Given that most the patent holdout articles dispute the definition and method of calculating 
reasonable royalties it could be suggested that this rejection is in conformity with the second 
proposition underlying an application of the correlated rights doctrine. While in general terms 
this would be a correct inference, that inference must overcome the proviso that the respective 
rejections do not rely on identical reasoning. To determine if the inference is truly correct it is 
necessary to first identify examine how many reasons are common and second check whether 
the discrete reasons used in patent holdout articles are compatible with the rationale used in 
the correlated rights analysis and vis versa. 
In terms of common reasons for rejecting the proposed patent holdup solutions, a 
foundational similarity is that both suggest that the framing of the solution is based upon false 
assumptions related to the nature of the patent owner and users. Particularly the assumptions 
that patent owners use guile to create infringement traps and unsuspecting are ambushed by 
owners who hid their patents until they have made sunk cost investments in manufacturing. 
Assumptions which turns the owner into a villain and the infringer into a victim, thereby 
providing the courts with a justification to take a more favourable view towards the users.1149 As 
correlated rights analysis suggests, and many patent holdout articles make clear; in most patent 
disputes it is the owners who are openly seeking to negotiate with all potential users and the 
users which seek to avoid negotiations.1150  
From a more methodological prospective, the main similarity is a rejection of the notion 
that it is the users which should get to determine what is a reasonable royalty. This notion 
reflecting a role reversal in traditional licensing negotiations where it is the owner that gets to 
determine the price they want for use of their properties. While this may not be as significant if 
the factors used to calculate reasonable royalties are the same regardless of who does the 
                                                          
translatable into concrete terms that bestows on the FRAND commitment the suppleness required to achieve one 
of the fundamental aims of standardization, i.e. to ensure the widest availability of the technology embodied in the 
standard in the widest possible variety of circumstances. In this respect, FRAND is very much akin to a general 
clause. ‘at 11  
1148 Robert Skitol, Concerted Buying Power: Its Potential for Addressing the Patent Holdup Problem in Standard-
Setting, (2005) Antitrust Law Journal 727 
1149 See: Heiden and Petit, The Royalty Gap, ‘holdup thus moves the terms of the debate, in a sense that throws a 
whiff of suspicion on patent owners’ at 28 
1150 See: Geradin, Reverse Hold-Up ‘hold-up conjecture assumes that licensing terms were unknown and unavailable 
prior to standardization, which is often not the case’ at 6; Epstein et al, Replacing Private Coordination, ‘Nor, in the 
large majority of cases, will there be any difficulty in identifying -even prior to the adoption of a standard-the 
counterparties from which a manufacturer will need a license’ at 11; Chien, Holding up and Holding out, ‘patent 
holders need to resort to ex post assertions because manufacturers ignore ex ante demands, and, in many cases 
don’t take steps to clear products prior to their release even though they are arguably in the best position to 
determine whether any patents read on their plans, since they know what they are or aren’t doing. The “troll” isn’t 
lying in wait, but rather languishing, having asked repeatedly for help, and repeatedly been rebuffed.’ at 15; Heiden 
and Petit, The Royalty Gap ‘those specifications fare poorly with the private standard setting context, where patents 
receive exposure at several iterative stages: ex ante disclosure requirements, ongoing technological scrutiny in 
patent committees and ex post dissemination through the standards publication and the creation of standard 






calculation, it is still an important element of the negotiations as it predetermines whether those 
negotiation will be constructed on an upward or downward basis. The upward basis placing the 
burden on the owners to justify why the reasonable royalty should be higher than that proposed 
by the user, and the downward basis placing the burden on the user to justify why the royalty 
should be lower than that suggested by the owner.  
In addition to this one common methodological analysis included in one article is another 
point of potential commonality which had not been used in the correlated rights analysis. That 
methodological challenge questioned the timing of the ex-ante period used when establishing a 
reasonable royalty. This challenge which was included in Epstein, Kieff and Spulber’s paper, 
noted that if an ex-ante period was to be used when calculating reasonable royalties, that period 
should be before either the inventor or the potential user made any investments in developing 
the technology.1151 Their point being that the sunk research and development costs, are just as 
sunk as manufacturing costs. Not only are they just as sunk, they are much riskier, because unlike 
manufacturing investments there is no certainly that the product development will be successful 
or that a successful development will be adopted in a standard. While defining the ex-ante 
period in this manner would be contrary to the proposed pricing principles under an application 
of the correlated rights doctrine, it may not matter because it would appear to be an unworkable 
proposal. It would appear to be unworkable because there is no way to anticipate how much 
investments in research and development is necessary, or to tell which investments will be 
successfully incorporated into the standard.1152 Not to mention that it is unlikely that an 
agreement could be reached on dividing up the rewards before there are any rewards to divide 
up. Given the impracticality of such an ex ante definition, this challenge to the patent holdup 
definition, can be interpreted as a challenge to any discounted ex ante definition. If this is the 
case, this would be entirely in keeping which correlated rights methodology which is based upon 
the ex post value of an IP. 
As with the general methodology, there are both common and discrete reasons why the 
reasonable royalty calculations proposed under the patent holdup solution are rejected by the 
respective analysis. With respect to commonality, each analysis takes issue with the proposed 
discount based upon bargaining power. Both these rejections being based upon lack of a 
discriminatory statutory provision which would allow for such a discount.1153 The next closest 
thing to a common rejection revolves around the proposition that the calculation should 
somehow be based upon the incremental value the selected IP has over the next best unselected 
IP. In the patent holdout analysis this rejection is made based on the expectation that there will 
never be agreement on how much incremental value should be attributed to the standardised 
IP.1154 While this would appear to be a valid point, under a correlated rights analysis incremental 
value is rejected because it assumes that the unselected IP has zero value. There is of course no 
reason why the patent holdout reason for rejection could not be included in a correlated rights 
analysis and as such could be considered common. The unanswered question is whether the 
“zero value” rejection rational would be regarded as valid by patent holdout scholars. Equally 
unknow is whether they would consider; the rejection of the invalidity discount, and the Nash 
                                                          
1151 See for e.g.: Epstein et al, Replacing Private Coordination, at 6 
1152 Golden, Patent Trolls and Remedies, at 2125 
1153 Id. at 2141 






Equilibrium misuse critique, to be valid.1155 While these particular reasons are not raised in the 
holdout articles, what is raise is the notion that the proposed patent holdup calculation methods 
result in substantial under valuation of standardised IP, which would suggest that the authors 
would be open to an analysis the which explains that undervaluation.1156  
Another common reason for rejecting the proposed patent holdup solutions is that the 
solution both argue that statutes covering intellectual property law do not support the 
curtailment of royalties in the methods proposed by patent holdup articles. More specifically 
Geradin and Rato claim that even FRAND commitments do not curtail exclusive rights provided 
under IP law,1157 Golden claimed that the ‘Patent Act itself decrees that reasonable royalty is the 
minimum, rather than the maximum, that a patent owner should obtain through court 
proceedings’,1158 and Epstein, Keiff and Spulber argued that the 1952 Patent Act strengthened 
patent rights against encroachment by anti-trust law.1159  
 Because the aggregate innovative value provided by correlated technological product is 
dependent upon IP contribution from multiple owners, the individual value which individual 
owners are entitled to; must be correlated to the value that their properties contribute to 
that aggregate value. (i.e.: as required by an application of the correlated rights doctrine)  
The final correlated rights proposition is perhaps the most controversial with respect to 
patent holdout articles. This controversy is in full display in the sections of the articles which 
specifically condemn proposals for royalty caps and proportionate royalty allocations.1160 While 
this condemnation is quite forceful, included in it are seeds which could be used to secure 
support for this proposition.  
What needs to be recalled is that the condemnation was directed at a very specific 
proportional distribution process. Under that process it was the SSO that established an 
aggregate royalty cap, which through numerical proportionality would apportion that aggregate 
royalty to the respective IP holders. In the articles both elements of this proposal are rejected. 
The royalty cap is rejected because it is anticipated that the SSO members who would have a 
vested interest in the lowest possible royalty rates, (vertically integrated firms, manufacturing 
only entities and technology distributors) would ignore the desires of the few “pure innovators” 
who only source of income would be royalties. This they argue would be nothing more than a 
form of price fixing which would transfer wealth from “pure innovators” to those engaged in the 
manufacturing process.1161 The rejection of the numerical proportionality being based upon; an 
objection to inherent requirement that all patent would be valued equally when not all patent 
have equal value, an expectation that such a system would incentive the filing of marginal 
                                                          
1155 See Chapter 3 Rebutting Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking 
1156 See for e.g.: Geradin, Reverse Hold-Up, ‘Instead of being over-rewarded, as holdup theorist claim, essential 
patent holders would be under rewarded.’ at 8; Heiden and Petit, The Royalty Gap, ‘ a systemic effect can be 
envisioned as a tax on R&D and patents that decreased the incentive of patent owners to invest into future 
technologies’ at 51  
1157 Geradin and Rato, A Dissonant View, at 8  
1158 Golden, Patent Trolls and Remedies, at 2123 
1159 Epstein et al, Replacing Private Coordination at 3 
1160 Geradin and Rato, A Dissonant View, Cumulative Royalty Caps and Allocative Mechanisms, at 33, and  Geradin, 
Reverse Hold-Up, Proposals to reinterpret the notion of FRAND as a tool to constrain the ability of patent holders to 
monetize their innovations, at 17 






patents, and require the impossible task of actually determining how many patent are read on 
to a technical product.1162 
Given that an application of the correlated doctrine would require the establishment of an 
aggregate royalty rate and a proportional distribution of that aggregate, it would appear that 
the very same criticism could be levelled at it. However, most of this criticism can be avoid by 
changing the methodology for determining the aggregate royalty rate and the proportionality 
calculations. Indeed, as this process has yet to be implemented, it would make sense that the 
methodology follows more traditional practices in IP disputes, as opposed to operating on 
untested theoretical conjectures. This at least is the approach that was anticipated would be 
used under an application of the correlated rights doctrine  
Like under historical patent dispute; it was anticipated that after an infringement was found 
the patent owner (plaintiff) would make a claim for damages based upon; what they believed 
was the appropriate aggregate patent level for the relevant technology, and what they felt their 
proportional share of that aggregate ought to be. These claims would have to be backed up by 
evidence and expert testimony. With respect to the aggregate patent level this would initially 
have to be based upon on economic analysis of the product demand curve drawn for 
information on current sales of the product. After a few cases in a relevant technology were 
heard, the aggregate rates adjudicated in those case could also be used as evidence. With 
respect to the proportionate share being claimed, while this would likely commence with some 
form of numerical proportionality, there is no reason why it would not be possible for the owner 
to claim a higher proportional share based upon evidence of the properties providing higher 
value that than an average patent which is read on to the technology.  
Also, like historical patent dispute; the infringer (defendant) would have the burden of 
proving that the plaintiff’s aggregated royalty and proportional share claims were false. This 
would be done with their own set of evidence and expert witnesses. In the case of the aggregate 
royalty this would involve disputing the economic analysis provided by the plaintiff or point to 
aggregated royalty rates adjudicated in other cases involving the same set of intellectual 
properties. When it came to proportionality it would be up to them to prove that the plaintiff’s 
properties were not as valuable as claimed. Once the parties had presented their cases it would 
be up to the judge or jury to decide whose case was the most compelling.  
If this methodology was use it would obviously blunt much of the criticism included made 
by Geradin and Rato. The SSO would not have the authority to dictate aggregate rates which 
were below what “pure innovators” could prove in the courts. There would be the possibility of 
valuing different patents according to the own unique characteristics. And there would be little 
incentive to file marginal patents as they would drive down the perceived value of the owners 
more valuable properties. The only criticism that would remain would be question about the 
impossibility of doing the calculations. It could be argued that it is a criticism which could be 
made in almost every case involving a patent dispute. This because in every patent case which 
involves damages, there will exist a requirement to make subjective decision as to the 
appropriate level of damages to be awarded. While this subjective decision making would be 
more demanding in the first few cases involving a correlated technological product, after an 
aggregate rate and promotional claims have been adjudicated a few times, further cases will 
                                                          






tend towards more empirical analysis than subjective analysis. That empirical analysis being 
based upon finding in previous case involving the same technology. 
12.3 Summary of Patent Holdout Literature and Correlated Rights  
The first conclusion which can be drawn from this chapter is that many notable scholars 
take a contrarian view to the prevailing views on patent holdup and patent holdout. Most 
suggesting that finding solutions to patent holdup, does not means that the traditional patent 
rights afforded to innovators should be abandoned. The second conclusion being that that legal 
thinking on the problems patent holdout and holdup continues to evolve as scholars continue 
to develop greater insights these problems. From a correlated rights’ prospective the most 
important conclusion which can be drawn is that; many of their arguments are similar to or 
consistent with those presented in this thesis. And even those that are not can be interpreted 
in a manner which would provide indirect support for the application of the correlated rights 
doctrine. 






13. Advantages and Disadvantage of applying the Correlated 
Rights Doctrine 
The primary objective of this thesis has been to focus attention on how the current 
implementation of intellectual property law has facilitated the unjust appropriation of rewards 
from intellectual property owners and to provide a compelling argument in favour of using an 
application of correlated intellectual property right to solve the problems of patent holdup and 
patent holdout. While preventing these appropriations will certainly benefit those IP owners 
whose rewards are currently being appropriated, any argument in favour of an application of 
correlated intellectual property rights would be incomplete if it did not include a consideration 
of the spillover effect that an application of the correlated rights doctrine would have on all 
parties which would be affected by its application. As such this chapter will provide a broader 
assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of applying the doctrine. 
13.1 Intellectual Property Owners and Users 
As to as assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of applying the correlated rights 
doctrine to all intellectual property owners; it is indisputable that ensuring that the value of IP 
properties is properly considered and rewarded by the courts without unnecessarily protracted 
litigation, would provide a tremendous advantageous to intellectual property owners. Indeed, 
the only intellectual property owners which would be disadvantaged by its application would be 
those who are currently using the courts as a tool to force integrated technology manufacturers 
to pay excessive royalties to avoid injunctive actions. More particularly this benefit would accrue 
to all innovators regardless of their nationality, location, or employer. Whereas under the 
current application of IP law it is essentially only the fortunate few who are employed by 
successful technology companies (often located in the Silicon Valley) which are assured of being 
properly rewarded for their innovations. However, if the correlated rights doctrine is applied all 
innovators regardless of location or employer would have a better chance of being properly 
compensated. This opportunity being open not only to innovators located elsewhere in the US, 
but to innovators located and working for entities in Europe, Japan, Israel, China and or indeed 
any country in the world. All of this would mean that innovators would not have to move 
locations to be properly compensated for their creative efforts and could remain in their local 
communities if they so desired. 
For users of intellectual properties, the advantages and disadvantages are of a more mixed 
nature. The main advantage is that integrated technology manufacturers would no longer 
subject of excessive royalty demands based on threats of injunctive actions. In addition, there 
may also be an advantage in the fact that the competitive environment for technological 
products would become more even; as large entities would no longer derive a competitive 
advantage by being able to lower licensing cost through legal attrition. If this happens it would 
mean that innovation would be reinforced as the primary method of competition, which is 
beneficial to integrated entities who are developing their intellectual property and would tend 
to disadvantage entities which are totally reliant on common external intellectual property. A 
further advantage to entities which develop and contribute intellectual property essential to the 
manufacturing of an integrated technological product, is that they too will receive a proportional 






where their proportional intellectual property contribution to the technological product is 
greater than their market share of the technological product, those entities should be financially 
better off under an application of the correlated rights doctrine than they are under the current 
application of intellectual property law. An example of how this might happen can be found in 
the field of smartphones. In 2016 it was estimated that Apple held a 12.9% market share of 
smartphone market,1163 while there is every possibility that they have contributed in excess of 
the 20% of the IP incorporated into a smartphone. As such; if their competitors properly 
compensated them for the use of their technology, and even though they would need to pay 
proper compensation for the 80% of external intellectual property that they use, they would still 
be better off.1164  
Another advantage for users of applying the correlated rights doctrine is that they will no 
longer feel obliged to feign ignorance of the intellectual properties incorporated in their 
products for fear of being declared a wilful infringer. This is advantageous not only because it 
allows users to avoid increased damages, but because it liberates their ability to closely examine 
new patented innovations to see if they can build upon them. The final advantage for users of 
integrated intellectual property is that it would clarify the obligations they have with respect to 
paying for the use of intellectual property, which should reduce the level of litigation required 
to conclude licensing agreements. Although it must be admitted that this advantage is 
somewhat nullified by the disadvantage that they would no longer be able to drive down 
licensing costs by engaging in excessive litigation.  
This increase in licensing cost is clearly the biggest disadvantage which intellectual property 
users will face with respect to an application of the correlated rights doctrine. This because users 
will no longer be able to rely on legal attrition and/or their or appeals to their national 
competition authorities to drive down licensing rate. Returning to the smartphone industry, it is 
estimated that in 2016 the licensing cost for smartphone technology represented 3.3% of 
operating cost,1165 which would be equivalent to about 2.5 % of the industries sales revenue. 
This would appear extremely low for an industry which almost entirely reliant upon newly 
created innovations which are covered by enforceable patents. To visualise how low this rate is, 
just imagine what the licensing rates would be if a single entity owned every patent related to 
smartphones and was negotiating a license with a manufacturer which own which had no 
intellectual property. To be sure the first number to be considered would not be 2.5% of sales, 
but more likely 20% to25% of sales. Certainly, in fields where there is only one owner of a highly 
desirable technological product like in the pharmaceutical industry even these aggregate rates 
would be considered at the lower end of the range of possible rates. This conclusion being 
supported by the price differential reported between patented and generic pharmaceutical 
products.1166 As mentioned in the previous paragraph higher royalties do not create a 
disadvantage for integrated manufacturers that contribute sufficient essential intellectual 
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1164 Doing calculations based on Apple's 2015 Annual report and assuming that Apple's share of the common IP used 
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property to integrated technological product, as such it is only those manufacturers which do 
not contribute their proportionate share of the intellectual property to the integrate product 
which will be disadvantaged. However, as it can be argued that not paying for, or at least not 
paying a reasonable price for the use intellectual property provides those entities with an unfair 
competitive advantage, this disadvantage can be regarded as merely a correction of market 
failure which created an unfair advantage, rather than a real disadvantage. In addition to the 
disadvantage of paying higher royalties, another disadvantage is that all users will likely have to 
pay those royalties to a larger number of intellectual property owners, which may increase 
transaction costs. This disadvantage is however mitigated by the fact as the correlated rights 
doctrine requires establishing aggregated royalty rates for an industry, and once those rates are 
established this would greatly simplify the negotiation process and may bring down transaction 
costs. 
13.2 Legal Sytems  
With respect to the advantages and disadvantages to the courts of applying the correlated 
rights doctrine, any assessment must take into consideration the current state of intellectual 
property litigation. Frequently this litigation currently involves excessively long and expensive 
procedures which produce unpredictable results which too often are inequitable. The length 
and expense of current legal procedures can be directly attributed to the expansion of legal 
attrition from a defensive strategy against patent holdup, to an offensive strategy designed to 
lower royalty claims. It can also be attributed to the fact that integrated intellectual property 
cases represent an unresolved quandary which is not capable of being resolved by applying the 
same historical legal practices which were used for resolving standalone intellectual property 
cases. This lack of an appropriate doctrine for integrated intellectual property cases means that 
it will necessarily take judges longer to decide, as they must struggle with reaching an equitable 
decision without clear guidance. This lack of an appropriate doctrine is also the reason why 
decisions are so unpredictable and often inequitable. While some judges may choose to follow 
the precedents, which applied the absolutist doctrine in standalone intellectual properties 
disputes, others recognise that integrated intellectual property disputes are sufficiently 
different that the doctrine does not apply and should not be applied as it will result in inequitable 
decision. Clearly this decision as to whether to apply the absolutist doctrine will result in 
different outcomes as without a governing doctrine or precedent judges will tend to make 
decision bases on their own personal ideological beliefs regardless of equity. Given this current 
situation the advantage or disadvantage to the courts of applying the correlated rights doctrine 
should really be focused on whether its application will assist in making intellectual property 
trials shorter, less expensive, more predictable and more equitable.  
Examining these issues in a reverse order, because an application of the correlated rights 
doctrine dictates that intellectual property owners should be rewarded according to the value 
of their contribution to the integrated technological product, it must inherently result in 
equitable decisions. By the same logic if the value of the contribution becomes the determining 
factor, this should also decrease the unpredictability of the decisions. Both of which would make 
its application advantageous to the courts. As to the length and expense of litigation, assuming 
the equitable results produced by applying the doctrine remove the tolerance for legal attrition, 






also necessitates an assessment of both, the aggregate value of the integrated innovations 
included in the technological product, and the proportional value attributed to the disputed 
intellectual property, these assessments will require greater levels of analysis which will tend to 
increase both the initial time and cost of the litigation. That said after the analysis is done for 
the first case of a technological product, that same analysis can be used for subsequent cases, 
which will once again reduce both the time and expense of the procedure. Indeed, to the extent 
that after a few cases involving specific technological products are heard, it is entirely possible 
that the evidence would become so standardised, it should be possible to eliminate the need 
for extra time and expense. While shorter cases would certainly be advantageous to the 
workload of the court system, the fact that the correlated rights doctrine would encourage more 
intellectual property owners to seek appropriate compensation for their properties could 
increase the number of suits brought to court. The prospect of more cases coming to the court 
should however not be considered to be a disadvantage, because it is simply an indication of a 
recovering faith in the judicial system to deal with intellectual property cases in a quick, 
inexpensive and equitable manner.  
When considering the advantages and disadvantages of application of the correlated 
intellectual property rights for competition authorities, the biggest advantage would be that it 
would free up resources that are currently utilized in respect to patent holdup. This because the 
application of the doctrine would effective resolve this problem, making the need to use 
competition law to solve this problem redundant. This should not in any way be viewed as a 
disadvantage, asuming competition law is viewed as a backstop to prevent anti-competitive 
behaviour which is not otherwise proscribed in othere bodies of law. Indeed, the fact the that 
correlative rights can be extracted from the application of competition law in IP cases, would 
indicate that the use of this backstop has served its purpose by providing a structure for ensuring 
IP law is less suspetible to abuse.  
The only way that it could be viewed as disadvantagious is if competition law is viewed as 
means for protecting local manufacturers or ensuring discounted consumer prices for 
technological products. These roles would naturally be curtailed by an application of the 
correlated rights doctrine. However, given that these roles are contradictory to international 
trading agreements and constitutional protected property rights, this disadvantage would 
appear to be moot. 
13.3 Consumers 
With respect effect that an application of the correlated rights doctrine would have on 
consumers. It is self-evident that if owners of intellectual property are to be properly 
compensated for their contributions to a technological product, this will raise the cost of 
manufacturing that product. Whether all those increased cost will be passed on to consumers is 
not so self-evident, but it is certainly likely that it will result in higher product prices. Obviously 
higher prices would be a disadvantage to consumers. However, if those lower prices are the 
result of under paying intellectual property owners, this is not really a benefit but an abuse. 
Indeed, it is not that dissimilar to preventing consumers for purchasing low cost products which 
have been stolen. Given this disadvantage can be justified and there does not appear to be other 
disadvantages to consumers, consumers acceptance of the doctrine should rely on the 






rewarding innovation. Second there is the increases in innovation which should occur from 
freeing users from feigning ignorance about the intellectual properties incorporated in their 
products, and which allow them to more easily improve or build on those properties. Finally, 
there is the advantage of knowing that only reputable entities, (i.e.: ones that are willing to 
properly pay for the intellectual properties they use) will be allowed access to the markets and 
this should mean that they can rely on their product guarantees.  
13.4 Societies 
Finally, there is the effects of applying the correlated rights doctrine will have on societies at 
large. What needs to be understood in this context is that there were not one, but rather two 
huge changes which have shaped societies over the last three decades. Although from an 
intellectual property prospective the focus has been on the information revolution and the 
development of an information economy, the change which has had a far greater consequence 
for societies has been the globalization of trade and commerce. The most significant 
consequence of this globalization there has been a huge shift in manufacturing activities from 
high wage to low wage countries.1167 While this shift has allowed manufacturers to increase 
profitability, it has created a number of economic problems for high wage societies, the most 
significant of which are; higher unemployment, increased trade deficits, increased budget 
deficits, greater income inequality and anaemic GDP growth rates.1168 Although globalization is 
most likely irreversible, this does not mean that the problems experienced as a result of it cannot 
be resolved. Indeed, just as during the 18th century when farm labourers were forced off the 
land during the agricultural revolution and the industrial revolution provided a solution, the 
problems of globalization may well be solved by the information revolution. That this has not 
happened to date can be directly attributed to the under valuation of intellectual property in 
the information economy. Assuming that an application of the correlated rights doctrine will 
resolve this undervaluation, provided below is an explanation of how properly compensating 
inventors for their innovation will help to address each of the economic problems faced by high 
wage societies.  
As far as increased unemployment is concerned clearly providing inventors with proper 
compensation does not mean that manufacturing jobs will not continue to be outsourced in low 
cost countries. However, it will mean that more employees can be hired by innovators, which 
will have both a direct effect on employment rates and an indirect effect on employment rates 
as those employees purchase services in their local community.  
With respect to trade deficits, given that the bulk of the intellectual property is owned by 
entities in high wage societies, an increase in royalty payments to them from low wage 
manufacturers, should automatically reduce trade deficits. This is particularly true because the 
                                                          
1167U.S. Department of Commerce records indicate that from 1980 to 2015 manufacturing's percentage share of 
U.S. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) shrank from 20.5 % to 12.1%. http://www.bea.gov/industry/gdpbyind_data.htm 
1168Higher unemployment occurs when domestic manufacturing operations close. Trade deficits increase when 
product previously made in a domestic economy now need to be imported from another country. Budget deficits 
increase because companies are better able to keep their profits offshore therefore avoiding taxes, and 
manufacturing employees who previously paid taxes now have to claim unemployment benefits. Greater income 
inequality develops as the owners of the now more profitable manufacturing companies become wealthier and 
their former employees are forced to take lower paying service industry jobs or live off unemployment benefits. 







bulk of the trade deficits between low wage and high wage societies are primarily the result of 
difference between exports and imports of manufactured goods. Carrying this presumption to 
its natural conclusion this would suggest that any general increase in royalty rates would reduce 
global trade deficits by the same amount assuming prices remain constant. However even if 
prices were to rise because of increased royalty cost, this also will decrease the trade deficits as 
it will lower demand for the imported manufactured goods. 
Budget deficits will be reduced by the application of the correlated rights doctrine in several 
ways. The first and most obvious way is that because intellectual property owners will have more 
income they will pay more taxes. Second there is the multiplier effect that will occur as those 
same intellectual property owners spend their taxed income in the domestic economy, providing 
those who they purchase goods and services from with a higher taxable income. Finally, there is 
a presumption that smaller intellectual property owners are less likely to keep that income in 
offshore accounts to avoid taxes, something which is all too common among many modern 
multinational technological entities.  
These advantages to society cannot be over emphasised, as without the application of the 
correlated rights doctrine, many societies will continue to lose money on their investments in 
education. While education in science technology engineering and math clearly has its own 
value, if societies are not able to capitalize on that efforts of those that they help to educate, 
that education itself becomes under threat. 
To the extent that an application of the correlated rights requires a more equitable 
distribution of the rewards from innovation, it is self-evident that this wider distribution should 
reduce levels of income inequality. This conclusion is based not just on common sense but on 
historical evidence. It should be recalled that during the early stages of the industrial revolution 
factory workers were severely mistreated and underpaid, with most of the profits from those 
factories going to the factory owners. This created income inequality of Dickensian proportion. 
Indeed, that inequality to a large extent persisted until governments took actions to protect the 
rights of factory workers, after the Great Recession of the 1930's. Just as it was the protection 
of worker's rights that created the middle class, so to the protection of inventor’s rights should 
help to revitalise today's middle class and reduce income inequality. 
In terms of assisting economic growth while it is clear that the initial increase in royalty 
payments will boost the economic growth of the societies where those IP owners live, this is not 
the only effect that applying the correlated doctrine will have the economic growth of a society. 
Societies should also feel a longer-term effect as properly rewarded  innovation should create a 
multiplier effect when those increased royalties are spent in the local economy. It is through this 
multiplier effect that countries can also be assured that they are also properly rewarded for 
educating those innovators. Such effects would not in any way be limited to high wage societies, 
as innovators living in low wages societies would have an even greater opportunity to improve 
their financial positions. This possibility of improving long term economic growth in every global 
economy plainly means that applying the correlated rights doctrine represents a universal 
advantage. 
In summary what this assessment of the advantages and disadvantage of applying the 






 Innovators can choose to live where ever they want and still be properly 
compensated for the value of creativity they have developed through years of hard 
work and dedication in developing their skills. 
 Integrated technology manufacturer will no longer be forced to pay unreasonable 
royalties but will lose the competitive advantage provided by having unlimited legal 
resources which allow them to avoid properly compensating intellectual property 
owners through legal attrition. 
 The Courts will be able to reduce the time and expense of hearing cases while at 
the same time facilitating more predictable and equitable outcomes. 
 Consumers will likely face higher prices for integrated technology products, which 
will be offset by increases in innovation and the elimination of disreputable 
technological manufacturers. 
 Societies at large will benefit from; higher employment, decreased trade deficits, 
decreased budget deficits, lower income inequality and stronger GDP growth rates. 
All of which provides a compelling argument for changing the legislation so that applying 
the correlated rights doctrine is a specific mandatory requirement when adjudicating cases 
involving integrated intellectual properties. A position that this author would certainly 









14. A Theoretical Property Continuum 
This research on the history of property law was undertaken in an effort to understand how 
absolute property rights had become the foundation for intellectual property law. Its objective 
was to show that absolute property rights are merely one form of property rights which can be 
shown to have existed over the course of human history, which could be used to rebut the 
assertion the absolute intellectual property rights were an unassailable and essential 
component of intellectual property law. When doing this research on these various forms of 
property rights, it became evident that there was a fascinating continuum which could be 
constructed which illustrated the evolution of property rights over time. A continuum which in 
many ways constitutes a path towards universal correlated property rights. Because showing 
property rights on a continuum, enhanced the argument against absolute intellectual property 
rights, and supports the application of correlated intellectual property rights it was constructed 
and included as part of the thesis.  
To build this property continuum it was essential to first identify the various changes in 
property and property rights that have occurred in various societies. The next challenge was to 
find a coherent way of grouping them into an actual identifiable phases or stages that reflect 
trend in the evolution of property and property rights. The phases representing the seismic shifts 
in the nature of property rights and the stages being the more nuanced changes within those 
shifts. While there can be no correct way of grouping these shifts and changes, it is hoped that 
the method chosen by the author provides a coherent and credible explanation of the ongoing 
evolution in property law.  
It should be noted for the most part these property phases and stages described in this 
evolutionary analysis represented a common form of property ownership but were not an 
exclusive form of property ownership during the respective phases and stages. The fact of the 
matter is that many of these phases and stages overlapped both time and territory because like 
any evolutionary process there will always competing aspects in any evolutionary advances. 
Despite this caveat it is the author’s belief that there is a definitive trend in the phases and stages 
of property ownership that can be presented as an evolutionary path that tends to explain most 
forms of property ownership encountered over the span of human history. 
In defining the phases, the approach which has been adopted is to use as broad definition as 
possible in order to minimize the complications. To this end three broad phases have been 
identified as being in existence in some form or another during the history of almost every 
society. These phases correspond to a difference in the distribution of property throughout the 
evolutionary development phases of most societies. The three identified phases are; a common 
phase, a concentrated phase, and a universal phase. For the purposes of providing a contextual 
understanding of the more detailed discussion of each phase and their respective stage it is 
perhaps useful to first provide a summary of each phase in this introduction.  
The common phase is identified and defined as a phase in a social development where there 






property rights. While common property is frequently regarded as an invention of the 
communist regimes of the 19th century, the truth is that this phase was and is the oldest of the 
property phases. In fact, it was the dominant property phase in early human societies and lasted 
longer than any other phase in the evolution of property rights. Whether this phase commenced 
3.0 million years ago with the evolution of Homo species, or 200 thousand years ago with the 
evolution of Homo sapiens, the duration of this phase is extraordinarily long and by far surpasses 
in duration any other property phase.1169 Viewed in this light the communist manifestation of 
this phase was nothing more than a brief rebellion against the evolutionary path of property 
rights and an attempted to return to an earlier developmental phase. It should be noted that 
some legal scholars represent this early development phase a period when natural law was the 
dominate legal structure. However as will be shown this representation is little more than 
sophistry designed to justify their subsequent property phases. 
The next broad phase identified and defined is the concentrated phase. This phase is defined 
as concentrated because it is the phase where property and property rights were held and 
controlled by small centralized bodies within a society. At its height this might have meant that 
all property was considered to be owned by one individual leader, but most stages of this phase 
usually involved the ownership of property being distributed between an individual leader and 
a select group of loyal supports. The formalization process involved not only the development 
of the rights of property owners, but also the outset of the development of relationship between 
property owners themselves and the relationship between property owners and non-property 
owners. 
The final phase identified and defined is the universal phase. This phase can be defined as 
the expansion of ownership and property rights to the entire population of a society. Inherent 
in the expansion of universal property rights was the complications related to the increase in 
the number of relationships between property owners. Clearly when a society moves from a 
concentrated property ownership structure to universal ownership structure this massive 
increase in owners, must inherently generate an exponential increase in the potential for conflict 
between property owners with respect to their individual property rights. As such the critical 
stages of development in this phase primarily revolved around the different understands of 
definition of property rights, with respect to property rights of others. 
Included in this paper will be a discussion of each phase which will begin with an explanation 
of how and why the phases are divided into stages. This will be followed by a more detailed 
examination of each stage. The examination of the stages will begin with discussion of the nature 
and justification of property circumstance including specific examples of the stages in history. It 
will then move on to a more detail examination of the relevant legal conditions of the stage. 
Where possible this will also include representative examples of the legal manifestation of the 
legal condition by providing information on specific legal cases that reflect the legal condition. 
Central to this legal discussion will be an examination of the legal treatment of conflicting 
property rights. The concluding analysis of the individual stages will be an explanation of the 
broad consequence of the property stage in terms of how it affected history and why it ended.  
                                                          
1169 Given the common environment of all the homo species, it is entirely possible that the social skills that allowed 
for shared common property created the advantage that enabled Homo Sapiens to continue along the evolutionary 
path, sparring us from the fate of extinction which was to befall our ancient cousins. However, because so little is 
known about what causes the extinction of other homo species this argument is perhaps too contentious to be 






Obviously, the information on, and the relevance of the various phases and stages to our 
modern understanding of property and property rights increases dramatically as one progresses 
through the evolutionary spectrum. As such the extent of the examination of various phases will 
reflect the relevance of each. The common phase being the most distant and least relevant will 
be examined mainly for the purposes of setting the narrative for the subsequent stages. The 
concentrated phase will be more thoroughly examined because aspects of it pertaining to 
ownership rights are still relevant. The universal phase will be the most closely examined as is 
not only relevant but reflects the reality of property circumstances in most modern societies. 
14.1 THE COMMON PROPERTY PHASE 
A mentioned in the introduction to the property continuum, the common property phase 
relates to the property phase where there existed common ownership of property with perhaps 
some measure of ambiguous individual property rights. This lack of individual property rights 
should however not be presumed to imply that the land was not being utilised, in certain cases 
there was extensive use of the land. Nor does it mean that there were not divisions and use of 
property resources that were regulated by some sort of governing body during the period. 
Studies have shown that even in the most rudimentary of societies there were rules governing 
both the use of property and the distribution of bounty resulting from the property. As such 
rather than being regarded as some form of unregulated free for all, the common property 
phase should instead be regarded as a phase in early society where the land was considered to 
be a common heritage of all the people which reflected their shared existence as a group.  
The first stage of the common property phase can be called the communal property stage. It 
can be called the communal stage because it does not exhibit a clearly defined hieratically 
structure but rather an arbitrary arrangement whereby members of the community are involved 
in the decision and no one having any more formal authority than anyone else. In this communal 
stage, decisions with respect to the use of property are taken jointly, every member of the 
society is tasked with some form of work and the bounty from that work is shared in the 
community. The tasks being performed by each respective member being determined by ability 
or tradition. If one was to attempt to place this stage in an anthropological context it could 
generally be depict as the spanning the period usually referred to as the stone age which 
commenced at the beginning of human history and ended at the beginning of the bronze age. 
As different societies exited the stone age at different times it is impossible to put a specific end 
date on this period, but it is safe to say that for most societies this period probably ended 
sometime between 6500 BC and 1700 BC which is the time that much of humanity which lived 
in North Africa, Asia and Europe transitioned into the bronze age. The duration of this period 
therefore representing between 1.9 million and 194 thousand years of human history.1170 
What inevitably followed any communal stage was something that could be called a tribal 
stage. In a tribal stage the relatively flat hierarchical structure of the communal stage is replace 
by a more formalized hierarchical structure that has a clearer defined leadership functions and 
subordinate responsibilities. This change in structure does not however substantially change the 
common nature of ownership. Property is still held by the community at large, and the bounty 
the that it provides is still shared by the community. However, the decision-making process is 
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now more concentrated in addition to the functional roles of the individual members of society 
are becoming more specialized. This specialization being evident not only in the leadership 
function but also in the more mundane work engaged in by the community. Certain individuals 
having been delegated by the leadership as the ones responsible for certain tasks, necessary for 
the survive of the community. There is no definitive archaeological period for stage although it 
could be thought to transcends both the bronze age, and the early iron age in Europe. In America 
it can be argued that this stage persisted until the colonial period and the loss of native American 
property to the European settlers. 
It is worth emphasising that this definition of common property should not be consider 
equivalent to the definition of common property often referred to under the tragedy of the 
commons. This was not free for all, where individual members of society could do whatever they 
wanted with the common property. Rather in both stages it was the communal property that 
was managed by the community for the benefit of the entire community. 
14.1.1 Communal Property Stage 
Because communal property is the first stage of evolutionary property spectrum it is easily 
overlooked in any discussion about property. This despite the fact that communal property 
probably represents the longest stage in the process. The central characteristics of the stage 
were and are relatively small group of people joining together for the mutual benefit of each 
other. The justification for this stage was nothing less the survival of the group. 
In the earliest societies common property could be described as a common hunting ground. 
Depending on the size of the population and the productivity of nature, these hunting areas 
could last for a few years or millennium. In situations where populations grew too quickly, or 
nature was less abundant the communities would simply move on to the next hunting area once 
animal resources were depleted. This search for food, being one of the primary explanations for 
the migration of the human species during the earliest stages of human society. 
In other situations where population remained relatively stable and nature was abundant the 
communities settled down into a relatively stationary pattern of existence. As these stationary 
communities experimented with animal husbandry and horticulture it was the whole society, 
not just individual members of the community that took responsible for these activities. For 
although individual members were undoubtedly delegated certain roles depending on their 
ability or tradition it was common for the whole group to participate in the building of the 
enclosures and cultivation of fields essential to success of the activity. Given common 
participation in and common dependence on the animal husbandry and farming activities it is 
hardly surprising that that property was considered to be a common resource.  
It should be noted that this stationary existence based upon common development and 
dependence was usually limited to small areas and small communities. When the communities 
grew too big to be able to sustain themselves on the property that they inhabited, the 
communities would split, usually along a family basis, with one part of the community moving 
to adjacent property and setting up a new community. This is yet another primary explanation 
for the migration of the human species. 
Clearly for as long as there was uninhabited property available this process of communal 
expansion could continue without serious confrontation between the communities. However, 






between communities for the precious resources. As such, whereas inside these communities 
the property would have been considered communal, this was not the case with respect to 
external relationships. As time progressed it be almost inevitable that the exclusive utilisation 
of property by these independent and isolated communities would be interrupted by the 
encroachment external communities. In these circumstances, because the very survival of the 
community was dependent on the access to the bounty of the property that they inhabited, 
there would inevitably be fights over the property between the communities. If the existing 
stationary community won the fights, they could maintain their communal ownership of their 
property and the interloper would be forced to seek property elsewhere. If they lost the fights, 
the exiting community would be forced to move on to other property.  
While examples of communal property can be found throughout the stone age because there 
are little written records for this stage evidence of it must be extrapolated from archaeological 
records. Of those archaeological records a good example can be found on the west coast of 
Orkney in Scotland at place called Skara Brae1171.  
Skara Brae is a large stone-built settlement dating back to 3180 to 2500 BC which makes it 
Europe’s most complete Neolithic village.1172 This village consisted to ten dwellings clustered 
around a central common space. The village itself is built into the surrounding landscape of 
mounds with each individual dwelling consisting of stone slabs stacked together but sunk into 
the ground to provide shelter from Orkney's harsh winter climate. For the most part the 
dwellings abut one another, with common stone walls separating one dwelling from another. 
Each dwelling incorporated a large square room of the about 40 square meters containing a 
hearth which would have been used for heating and cooking. The dwellings also contain a 
number of stone-built pieces of furniture, including cupboards, dressers, seats, and storage 
boxes. A sophisticated drainage system was even incorporated into the village's design, one that 
included a primitive form of toilet in each dwelling. Seven of the houses have similar furniture, 
with the beds and dresser in the same places in each house. Given the size of the rooms and 
number of homes, it appears likely that between fifty to sixty people lived in Skara Brae at any 
given time. In the common area is not only a larger hearth, but stone tanks that were thought 
to be used to keep the small fish bait they used for fishing. In addition to fishing it was thought 
that the people who inhabited Skara Brae were pastoralists, who primarily raised cattle and 
sheep, although excavations in 1972 unearthed seed grains in several of the dwellings suggesting 
that barley was also being cultivated. The total size of the actual village is little more than the 
size of a large putting green, but as no other village have been found in the area it’s pastures 
and fields may have been extensive.  
Given the similarities between the dwelling, density of their construction and the common 
infrastructure, (the fish-bait tanks and plumbing), it appears reasonable to assume that this was 
a closely-knit community that worked together and was highly dependent on each other for 
their existence. Whilst there were clearly individual dwellings, because they are so close and so 
similar, it is likely that even these were built on a communal basis. Given these archaeological 
records it does not take a great leap of faith to assume that communal property was the norm 
in Skara Brea. Indeed, to assume anything else would be counter intuitive. If instead of a 
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communal society, it was just an aggregation of individual inhabitants there would be greater 
diversity in the dwellings and less common infrastructure.  
Radiocarbon results obtained from samples collected during various excavations indicates 
that occupation of Skara Brae began about 3180 BC and continued for about six hundred years. 
It is believed that Skara Brea was abandoned around 2500 BC, which was the time when the 
climate in the Orkney was thought to have changed into much wetter and colder conditions. 
After it was abandoned, it was eventually covered with sand and peat and remained hidden for 
four thousand years, until a particularly severe winter storm exposed the site in 1850 AD. 
Because there are no written records covering this stage it is impossible to definitively say 
what the relevant legal condition of property was during the stage. One can only make 
assumptions based on the archaeological evidence that is available. That archaeological 
evidence clearly points to a primitive property stage which consisted of communal property 
developed and maintained by small communities for the benefit to the entire community. This 
communal assessment of primitive property is of course diametrically opposed to the 
conception of primitive property that has been advocated by later scholars to justify subsequent 
property stages. That is to say that the idea that primitive property was dominated by individual 
ownership resulting from individual discovery or individual labour is simply not credible.  
So, what are the consequence for history of this of this property stage? It certainly did not 
result in property being viewed as an individual private asset to be used by an individual in 
whatever way the individual saw fit, nor did not result in property being viewed as a common 
asset to be shared by all humanity. Rather the main and most important consequence of this 
communal property stage was that it resulted in the creation of separate communal property 
that was under the control and use of a specific community. This separation of property into 
distinct units, is undoubtedly the most significant consequence of this property stage. For if at 
the dawn of mankind, the whole world belonged to all mankind, at the end of the communal 
stage the whole of the known world was divided between the multitude of individual 
communities that made up mankind.  
What separates this earliest phase from the following phase is not a change in these 
community’s communal rights to the inhabited property, but rather a change in the hierarchy of 
the communal society and the individual community member’s right to the communal property. 
For it appears, whenever a community grew beyond a certain size they tended to replace the 
communal decision-making process, with a leadership-based decision-making process. The key 
factors driving this evolution appeared to be efficiency and survival consideration. Both of which 
are classic evolutionary factors, in every field of evolution. This next stage being defined here as 
the tribal stage. 
14.1.2 Tribal Property Stage 
The point where communal property ends, and tribal property begins, is the point in time in 
a society when they create a formal hierarchical structure with specialized functions for 
leadership. Whereas: in the communal property stage each member of a community has a 
relatively equal status and decisions with respect to property are primarily determined on a 
group basis; in the tribal property stage those same decisions are made by the leadership 
structure. That leadership structure could take many forms, the most common of which would 






select group of societies members, that were considered by the society to have the best 
knowledge about what was good for the society. Not the least of these being the religious 
leaders that were to emerge as the community leaders because they could explain the uncertain 
aspects of life as some form of supernatural event. 
In addition to having specialized leadership functions it was generally the case that that other 
functions also became more structured and formalized. This was only natural as delegating 
responsibilities for certain activities to those members of a society that were more capable of 
those activities, provided the greatest advantage to the society as a whole. Thus, societies would 
be divided into hunter, gatherers, farmers, fisherman, tool makers, cooks, priests and warriors, 
as an example. Obviously, this division of labour was a gradual process and initially there would 
be a significant overlap in functions. For example, the hunters may well have also been the first 
and best warriors and the gathers, may well have also been first farmers. But over time as the 
tribe grew; it is clear that the need for and the ability to specialize would become more and 
more evident in the society. Eventually at some point in time those specialized functions would 
become the accepted norm for the society.  
When specialization became the accepted norm of the society, it is not unreasonable to 
assume that the tribal councils would recognise this reality and delegate stewardship of the 
tribal property, to those that had the ability to derive the greatest benefit from the land. If this 
stewardship remained in place for extended generations of families, it is reasonable the assume 
that those families began to believe that they had certain usage rights with respect to the land. 
Which is to suggest that while the property may still be considered to be communal, they came 
to believe that they had a particular right to hunt, forage, farm or fish in their specifically 
designated tribal property. This would be the first steps on the way towards private property. 
Another obvious consequence of this stewardship would be that new members of society would 
be excluded from the already utilized property and would have to practice their activities on 
new property. However, this is not to say the development of new property would be a strictly 
an individual effort. As with communal property, this development would often require a 
communal effort. Once again, the community would get together to clear the fields or build the 
enclosures necessary to utilize the new property. This new property being added to the 
communal property, with the usage being delegated to the newest members of the community. 
In the best cases, as land usage expanded and the specialization intensified, the communities 
would experience an ever-increasing food production surplus. 
Like the communal property stage, determining the relevant legal condition of property for 
tribal societies often can be done by interpreting archaeological records. However, these 
archaeological records can be supplemented by both ancient and modern written records. The 
ancient written records being persevered because they were literally written in stone and the 
modern written record being provided by tribal societies continued to exist into the modern era.  
Without going into too many details it is reasonable to state that the archaeological records 
almost universally indicate that tribal property was viewed as having a significant communal 
element. The conclusive evidence of this are the remains of religious monuments that the 
ancient tribal societies created. Remains, that could have only been built by the combined effort 
of the entire society. One of the best examples of which is the great stone circle at Stonehenge. 
While origin and purpose of Stonehenge remain shrouded in mystery, there is no denying that 
it is a colossal structure, that required the combined efforts of a large community to move and 






With respect to ancient written legal text, the oldest that can be found are those that belong 
to the ancient societies that were a little bit further along the property continuum. A prime 
example of this is the Sumerian Code of Ur-Nammu written in 2100-2050 BC which included 
articles defining and quantifying private property rights. At the time the code was written it is 
speculated that over 70% of the land was considered private property with less than 30% being 
communal property. In the Sumerian Code can be found the following articles; 
“30. If a man stealthily cultivates the field of another man and he raises a complaint, this 
is however to be rejected, and this man will lose his expenses.  
31. If a man flooded the field of a man with water, he shall measure out three kur of barley 
per iku of field. 
32. If a man had let an arable field to another man for cultivation, but he did not cultivate 
it, turning it into wasteland, he shall measure out three kur of barley per iku of field.”1173 
There are three significant and interesting aspect about this ancient law. First the articles are 
applicable to “a man” which one can take to mean not just “a” man but “any” man. This is 
significant in that it clearly indicates an equality of legal standing before the law. Further there 
is a clear concern about damage to property that would render it unproductive. This is significant 
because it indicates a concern about efficiency, but also codifies a respect for third party 
property rights. Finally, there is a fixed compensation for damage to land, which appears to 
signify an attempt to regulate the value of awards from property damage, if not property value 
itself. This is significant because the regulation of the value of property, reflects a legal condition 
which corresponds to a communal interest in property as opposed to an absolute individual 
interest in property. This equality, efficiency, and communal interest, representing a natural 
evolution from the tribal property stage to a universal private property phase.  
It is possible that evidence of this prosperity and harmony inspired the ancient philosophers 
to imagine ideal societies constructed around this frame work. Perhaps the most well know of 
which was Plato; who in his most famous work “The Republic” outlined an imaginary society 
called “Kallipolis” that bears a remarkable similarity to an ideal tribal society.1174  
For more modern written records it is possible to find similar sentiments. One example of 
which would be the legal text belonging to the Haida Tribe of British Columbia which represents 
the very essence of a modern tribe that is still living on their ancestral homelands. The Haida are 
tribe of the indigenous people who inhabited and still inhabit the Queen Charlotte islands 
located on the northwest coast of Canada. For thousands of years the remoteness of the islands 
protected them from the encroachment of other societies. This does not mean that the Haida 
were a totally isolated people, in fact the opposite is true. There is abundant evidence to suggest 
that the Haida had a long history of trading with their neighbouring tribes and it is almost 
inevitable that over the course of history that there would have been conflicts between those 
tribes and the Haida. However, none of the incursions by other tribes on their tribal property 
appears to have been successful, nor does it appear that the Haida had any interest in expanding 
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into areas inhabited by their neighbours. As such the Haida represent an ideal example of the 
tribal property stage and lifestyle.  
The fact that the Haida represent a tribal property stage and not a communal property stage 
is evident in the fact that their society includes a hierarchical structure. The Haida like so many 
indigenous North American groups had and have, what is commonly referred to as tribal councils 
that were and are the central decision-making bodies for the people. These councils usually were 
and are made up of the older members of the tribe. The decisions tribal council govern all aspect 
of tribal life, including both the use of tribal property and the allocation of the of the bounty 
form those properties. Much of the bounty being consumed in community feast and elaborate 
ceremonies. 
In addition to the established customs and traditions of the Haida, their written records on 
the legal condition of tribal property verify this archaeological assessment. A very clear and 
concrete enunciation of this communal commitment can be found in the existing written 
constitution of modern Haida Nation. Included in the Constitution is the following: 
“ARTICLE 3 RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 
A3.S1 Collective Haida Rights: 
The Haida Nation collectively holds Hereditary and Aboriginal Title and Rights to Haida 
Territories. 
A3.S2 Individual Rights: 
Every Haida Citizen has a right of access to all Haida Gwaii resources for cultural reasons, 
and for food, or commerce consistent with the Laws of Nature, as reflected in the Laws of 
the Haida Nation.” 1175 
Clearly this constitutional construct portrays a society that is deeply committed to communal 
property while also recognising the rights of its individual tribal members. To the extent that 
communal ownership incorporating individual usage rights, resulted in an efficient utilization of 
resources and this provided sufficient bounty to be distributed amongst the tribal members, it 
is hardly surprising that the tribal stage could survive for thousands of years in societies that 
were not prone to external disturbances.  
However, there is no disguising the evolutionary trend which was changing legal condition of 
property from common property towards private property. Even without external disturbances 
it appears evident that private property would become the norm in societies. That the general 
evolutionary property trend would be driven by the efficiency of allowing those who were more 
skilled at specific activities to specialize in those activities. It was not just that those that were 
good at farming and herding should focus on farming and herding, but also that for a society to 
develop and prosper new skills needed to be learned. Skills like tool making, minerals mining, 
metallurgy, trading and public administration were but a few of the additional activities that 
could improve the condition of a society. If each member of a society was allowed to make the 
most of on his own particular skill, it is clear that society, as an aggregate, would be better off. 
In fact, if the society could adopt a fair exchange mechanism, there is no reason to believe that 
all individual members would not be better off as well. Further while the farmers and herders 
                                                          






might inevitably become the owners of the fields, the craftsmen and other tradesmen might just 
as well inevitably become the owners of their particular manufacturing operations.  
Another subset of society that developed in this stage were the religious orders. The 
evolution of the priest or religious leaders can be attributed their ability to predict the 
occurrence of certain event that were essential to the well-being of societies. It should be 
remembered that events; as commonplace as the movement of the sun and the seasonal 
changes in weather, were mysterious in the ancient societies. This ability to be able to anticipate 
events made them indispensable to the tribal societies. From a positive prospective, priest can 
be considered as the earliest scientists who used their thinking skills, to acquire the knowledge 
which allowed them to anticipate events critical to their societies. However, there was a very 
negative side to these early religious activities, which made them the opposite of scientists. That 
negative side was the way in which priests abused that knowledge for their own personal gain 
and to the detriment of their society. They usually did this by keeping their knowledge on how 
to predict events secret and pretending that they had some ability to influence events. As a 
result of this deception; these early priests become venerated members of society, who could 
demand disproportionate rewards for themselves. While these disproportionate rewards and 
extravagant religious ceremonies were a major contributing factor to the demise of tribal 
property, it was perhaps their jingoistic promotion of wars with neighbouring societies that had 
the most negative impact on tribal societies.  
All that is required to understand this conclusion it is understand how war and the rise of a 
warrior class in the tribal societies resulted in the evolution of a new property phase. Inherent 
in the process of increased functional specialization and an increasing population is the 
supposition that there existed in close proximity to the tribal base, sufficient uninhabited land 
available the meet the demands of the growing society. If this was the case; simply; clearing a 
new field, hunting more distant forests, or fishing longer stretches of water, were sufficient to 
meet those needs. Indeed, when this was the case, tribal societies could extend the tribal 
property stage for centuries, if not millenniums. However, when growing tribes ran out of 
uninhabited property, they could only acquire additional property by taking it from their 
neighbouring tribes.  
This would almost inevitably put the tribes in conflict with each other; a conflict that would 
usually result in the expulsion or subrogation of the weaker tribe. There are two aspects to this 
conflict scenario that worked against evolution of universal property rights from common 
property rights. The first is the fact that the conflict in and of itself was direct challenge to 
universal property rights. The property rights of the neighbouring tribes being totally 
disregarded by the invader. But it was not the actual conflict itself that was the most important 
factor that eliminated tribal property and the evolution to universal property phase. The most 
important factor was the development of a specialized warrior class within the society. 
History shows that once tribal societies began to come into conflict with each other, the more 
successful tribes set up specialized warrior class to both protect their lives and property. 
Naturally these same warriors could be used not only to defend the tribe, but also to acquire 
property from other tribes. It is not unreasonable to speculate that it was the forced 
appropriation of other tribe's property that was the catalyst for the concentrated property 






the field of battle, sitting together and discussing the conflict and the property captured from 
the defeated enemy. It takes little imagination to construct a scenario where these warriors 
would come to believe two ideas which would drive the concentrated property phase. First; that 
the defeat of their enemies in battle extinguished any rights that the conquered may have had 
towards their property, if not requiring them to be subservient to the victorious. Second; that 
that their risks and efforts as warriors entitled them to a greater share of the spoils of war, then 
the non-warriors in the society.  
This division in status between those that were worthy of owning property and those that 
were unworthy represented the founding legal principle of the concentrated property phase. 
The concentrated property phase representing a two thousand plus year violent detour from 
the peaceful evolutionary path, between common property rights and universal property rights.  
14.2 THE CONCENTRATED PROPERTY PHASE 
The concentrated property phase is herein defined as the property phase where property 
came to be owned by an elite segment of a society, as opposed to the communal ownership that 
had prevailed during the common phase. In the conclusion of the of the previous section simple 
necessity was identified as the initial driving force behind this evolutionary phase. This 
contention being based on the premise that in order for tribes to develop and prosper they were 
forced to acquire property from neighbouring tribes through conflict; and that this conflict 
resulted in a warrior class who felt they were more entitled to ownership of the conquered 
property, than those that had not engaged in the battle. Whilst this can explain the initial stage 
of the concentrated phase it cannot explain the most concentrated property stages of the 
concentrated property phase. For although survival may have been the driving force in the initial 
stage, latter stages appeared have less to do with survival of the tribe and more to do with 
individual egotism and greed. 
Perhaps the best description and explanation of this behaviour was something that the 
famous political philosopher Rousseau1176 called “Amour-propre”. For Rousseau amour-proper 
represents psychological characteristics which are described as pride, vanity, or conceit in 
English. It is that thing which moves every individual to value “him (or herself) more than any 
other, which inspires all of the evils in society ... the desire to be recognized and esteemed by 
others.". The manner in which Rousseau speculates that amour-propre began to arise and 
develop fits very well with the description of earlier communal and tribal societies. He suggests 
that as soon as people began to gather around a hut or a tree and to look at one another, as 
soon as we became conscious of the gaze of another, and it is from that gaze, from the look or 
gaze of another, that the passion of vanity was born. He says: 
'Each one, began to look at the others and to want to be looked at himself and public 
esteem had a value. The one who sang or danced the best, the handsomest, the strongest, 
                                                          






the most adroit or the most eloquent became the most highly regarded and this was the 
first step toward inequality.' 1177  
While this idea of a desire for respect is clearly visible in man, the problem is the personal 
characteristics that were first used as a proxy for respect were subjective and difficult to 
measure. As such a better proxy for respect was required and there could be no better proxy 
than the acquisition and accumulation of property. Obviously, the ability to quantify property 
holdings made respect measurements easier; as a simple correlation between the extent of 
property held and the respect due appeared logical. The greater the property held the greater 
the respect due, particularly if the exploitation of the property could be delegated to 
subordinates that would also be dependent on the owner for their livelihood. 
That is not to say that amour-propre is strictly a negative characteristic, in certain ways it 
could be a positive characteristic. In its most positive form the desire for respect can result in 
people striving to work harder or do thing better in order to earn the respect of their peers. In 
this positive form; the evolution of property ownership would be based on merit or the ability 
to maximize the benefits to society from their particular activity. For example, farmers that could 
generate the higher yield from their fields, or craftsman that could more efficiently manufacture 
the equipment necessary to cultivate the fields, could both use the profits from their activities 
to purchase and accumulate property. In this way their property ownership is derived from 
beneficial services to their society; which usually would create little in the way of adverse effects 
for their society or humanity as whole. This form of property accumulation representing a 
positive contribution to society could quite justifiability be viewed as an appropriate proxy for 
respect. 
The trouble is that once property began being used as proxy for respect, it could and would 
replace respect as the objective. To the extent that acquisition and accumulation of property in 
and of itself becomes the objective, the necessity of having as much property as possible can 
drive people to extremes in behaviour to accumulate property regardless of the net positive or 
negative effect to society or humanity. This very concern was voiced by Rousseau in the very 
first sentences of his second discourse, which reads as follows; 
'The first man who, having enclosed a piece of ground, bethought himself of saying 
This is mine, and found people simple enough to believe him, was the real founder of civil 
society. From how many crimes, wars, and murders, from how many horrors and 
misfortunes might not any one have saved mankind, by pulling up the stakes, or filling up 
the ditch, and crying to his fellows: Beware of listening to this imposter; you are undone 
if you once forget that the fruits of the earth belong to us all, and the earth itself to 
nobody.'1178  
However, to be fair to Rousseau, it should be acknowledged he lived in a time before the 
universal phase of property truly began and even in the grip of the concentrated property phase 
he realised that:  
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'But by that point things had changed so drastically that there was no turning back, for 
this idea of property'1179.  
So even though he saw the harm that could result from an obsessive desire to accumulate 
property, he was not so foolish to think that it was possible to turn back the evolutional clock to 
the common property phase. 
As mentioned earlier the concentrated property sage can be viewed as a two-thousand-year 
violent detour in the peaceful evolution from the common property phase to the universal 
property phase. A “detour” because it is clear from historical records that there was a direct 
path from the common property phase to a universal property phase and there was movement 
along that path before it was interrupted by the concentrated property phase. A “violent 
detour” because efforts to first centralize and then to decentralize property and property rights, 
would cause conflict in the world for over twenty centuries. In these conflicts millions would die 
and vast swaths of a society’s population were literally and figuratively enslaved for the benefit 
a few elite rulers. Such was the lure of accumulating property that nothing moral or immoral 
was impervious to the desire. While some men became tyrants, others that wanted nothing 
more than to live their lives in peace were forced into abject poverty and servitude. 
In terms of stages involved in the concentrated phase it could be tempting to differentiate 
only between the trend when property ownership was being concentrated and when the 
concentrated property was being dispersed. However, this would require far too great of degree 
of generalizations for the legitimacy of either stage to be certified. Instead it is necessary to 
divide the concentrated phase into four somewhat distinct stages which can be defined as 
follows. First there was the warlord stage, where warlords were accumulating property on the 
basis of conquest and plunder. This accumulation of property set the scene for the royal stage, 
when the warlords sought to secure their accumulated property through the introduction of 
legal framework that legitimised their holdings on the basis of a divine providence. What 
followed was the nobility property stage, which was a stage that commenced the eventual 
decline in concentrated property, as it secured the property rights of nobles against the whim 
of the monarchy. The final stage of the centralised property phase being the aristocratic stage, 
where property and property rights were further dispersed to the larger group of elites within a 
society, but still kept out of the hands of the majority of the population. 
14.2.1 Warlord Property Stage 
The end of the tribal stage can be defined as occurring at the time when tribes began to 
acquire property from neighbouring tribes through the use of force. At first these conflicts may 
have been driven by a simple lack of sufficiently productive uninhabited land, which meant that 
if tribes wanted to continue to develop and expand they had no choice but to fight over property 
with their neighbours. However, over time it appears that some tribes became so specialized in 
warfare, that taking property by warfare became an accepted development method for the 
society. 
In those conflicts over property, it was no surprise that the tribe which was more prepared 
for the conflict that usually prevailed. Further it is self-evident that tribes that had specialised 
functions dedicated to fighting conflicts, would be the best prepared for battle. Given this 
                                                          






dynamic, the creation of a warrior class in a tribal society, became a matter of self-preservation. 
If tribes did not have a dedicated warrior class, they were susceptible to defeat by tribes that 
had warrior class. Defeat could mean not only loss of property, but also the loss of liberty, as it 
was common for the victors to turn the vanquished into slaves or servants. If societies had 
warrior class, they could not only ward off incursion by other tribes, but they could also initiate 
conflict with other tribes in an effort to secure more property for their tribe. And so, the stage 
for warlord property was set. 
As was discussed in the introduction it doesn’t require much imagination to come up with a 
scenario whereby a group of warriors after successfully defeating a neighbouring tribe agree 
amongst themselves to keep the newly acquired property for themselves, instead of turning the 
property over to the communal ownership. Particularly if the tribe already had some form of 
individual usage rights for the communal property, a usage right that had disassociated the 
warriors form the existing communal property. Would this not be a just reward, for their efforts 
in battle? Were they any less deserving than the farmers and fisherman who had a limited form 
of hereditary claim to communal property? Besides even if the community disagreed, what 
could they do? These after all were the warrior class, the segment of society specifically 
responsible for defending and fighting battles for their society.  
One critical aspect of the warlord property that should not be overlooked, is that the 
population of the defeated tribe could be made to provide the labour required to work the 
property. A servitude which became so common that it began to be endorse by leading 
philosophers like Aristotle; 
'For that some should rule and others be ruled is a thing not only necessary, but 
expedient; from the hour of their birth, some are marked out for subjection, others for 
rule.'1180  
This subservient workforce meant that the warriors were not reliant on the voluntary efforts 
of other members of their society to secure to the bounty of the newly acquired property. Not 
only did this reduce the potential for internal tribal conflict over the ownership and development 
of the captured property, it also allowed for unlimited property accumulation on the part of the 
warriors. Property now being defined not only by physical land but also the slave under their 
control. Further this subservient or slave labour workforce almost certainly contribute to the 
warrior’s sense of superiority with respect to other tribal members.  
Over time the feeling of superiority of would inevitably lead to authoritarian tendencies in 
the warrior classes. If one accepts the assumption that the warriors began to feel superior to 
everyone who was not a warrior, it is easy to imagine that they would quite easily begin to resent 
the authority of inferior non-warriors on the tribal councils. While this resentment might not 
result in any action during periods of peace, it would not be surprising that during periods of 
warfare, the tribal council would see the replacement of non-warrior council members with 
warriors. Certainly, the warriors would believe that only the warriors would be able to anticipate 
and plan for the war. Indeed, in a time of war, most of societies tend to recognise the necessity 
of having the best warriors in leadership positions. However, once the councils became 
dominated by a warrior class, it is unlikely that they would return the leadership positions to the 
                                                          






non-warriors after the war had been successfully concluded. For the successful conclusion of the 
war would only reinforce their sense of superiority.  
If having the warrior class take control of the tribal councils was not enough, the other 
dynamic that would lead to authoritarian tendencies would be the structure of the actual 
warrior class. In matters of war it has long been understood that military success is dependent 
upon a strict hierarchical command and control structure. To the extent that a warrior 
hierarchical structure has been ingrained in the warrior class, it is not unreasonable to assume 
the that the same hierarchical structure would be evident in the operation of the warrior based 
tribal councils. This hierarchical structure once again reinforcing the feeling of superiority held 
by the warrior leaders. So, given these dynamics it was only natural that the warrior leaders or 
warlords would ultimately wind up as authoritarian leaders of their respective societies, with 
their respective share of the property acquired through conflict being disproportionate to even 
the other warriors. 
This then is the essence of the warlord property stage. Property being acquired through force 
and being unevenly distributed to the warrior classes. The inequality of property ownership 
reinforcing perceptions of superiority and sustaining the inequitable distribution. The warlords 
of the warrior class receiving both the greatest property and being regarded as the most 
important members of society.  
To the extent that this was what happened, the justification for property in this stage can be 
thought to have changed from one of efficiency and equity, to one of superior force. Externally 
the tribe with the strongest warrior class, would seize property from those tribes with a weaker 
warrior class. Internally the warrior class itself would accumulate disproportionate amounts of 
seized property and even appropriate property from other tribal members by force. Much of 
seized property becoming owned directly by the warrior leaders or warlord.  
There are no shortages of examples of warlord property. The most visible examples of this 
type of property, being the foundations of many of the major empires that proliferate through 
the history of mankind. While it would be convenient for modern man to believe that this type 
of forceful appropriation is a relic of the past this, is simply not the case. While there is little 
doubt that this was the justification that was used by ruthless warlords thousands of years ago, 
similar justification and practices are evident in many of the modern dictatorships we see around 
us today. However, for the purposes of illustrating this type of property, the Spartan property 
regime, has been selected, because it is an almost perfect embodiment of this type of property 
stage.  
The Spartan society came to prominence during the first Messenian War which lasted from 
743 BC to 724 BC. This war was a direct result of Spartan overpopulation. In an effort to expand 
their territory the Spartan army went to war with the neighbouring Messeinians. After two 
decades of battle, the Spartans eventually defeated the Messeinians and the Messenian people 
became enslaved by the Spartans. This conquest and enslavement of the local population, was 
to be the hallmark of Spartan society for the next 600 years. The society itself come to end in 
146 BC, when Greece was conquered by the Roman General Lucius Mummius. The principle 
reason for their demise being a very real shortage of Spartans, as citizenship was inherited by 
blood, a shortage which resulted from too many of Spartans were being killed in battle. 
Historical records show that the Spartans were and probably still are the most specialised 
warrior class society that ever existed. This was a society, where the entire Spartan population 






through most of their adult life. Spartan men were encouraged to marry at age twenty but could 
not live with their families until they left their active military service at age thirty, and even then, 
they remained in the active reserve until age sixty. Since all young Spartan men were full-time 
soldiers, they were not available to carry out manual labour. As such the more mundane 
activities of farming and manufacturing were performed by subservient populations who they 
had conquered in battles. The subservient population be divided into the Perioiki, who were 
non-citizens, and the Helots, who were actual state-owned slaves. For the most part the Perioiki 
were the craftsmen and the Helots the labourers.  
Sparta was ruled by two hereditary kings and the duties of the kings were primarily religious, 
judicial, and militaristic. The judicial functions of the kings being restricted to cases dealing with 
heiresses, adoptions and the public roads. Civil and criminal cases were decided by a group of 
officials known as the ephors, as well as a council of elders. The council consisted of 28 elders 
over the age of 60, elected for life and usually part of the royal households, and the two kings. 
High state policy decisions were discussed by this council who could then propose action 
alternatives to the Damos, the collective body of Spartan citizenry, who would vote on the 
alternatives. 
While Sparta would appear to represent an extreme of warrior class, their property regime 
only became centralised in the later centuries of the society. Initially there were not extreme 
variation in property ownership between the actual Spartans themselves, because upon release 
from military duties warriors were given a similar sized piece of land that was cultivated and run 
by the helots. It could even be suggested that the allotted property was more communal than 
private, this because much of the bounty generated from granted property was utilised to satisfy 
the needs military and there were no inheritance rights.  
However, over time three things changed this relatively equal distribution. First, some 
property was simply more productive, and this provided greater wealth to those that held the 
most productive property. Second, sometime during the fourth century inheritance rights were 
granted to the Spartans allowing land accumulation within families. And finally, large Persian 
grants of gold and silver to military leaders and the ruling families at the end of the 
Peloponnesian War, allowed those same elites to purchase even greater and more 
disproportionate amount of property.1181 
This disproportional distribution of property amongst Spartan citizens being significantly 
magnified in the entire Spartan empire, because the Spartans themselves constituted an ever 
decline percentage of the total population. Whereas there were some 10,000 Citizens at the 
beginning of the 5th century BC, by Aristotle's day (384–322 BC) they had decrease to less than 
1,000. In the same time frame, it is estimated that the population of subservient Perioiki and 
Helots went from 100,000 to 150,000. This means that the Spartan citizens represented less 
than one percent to the total population in their final days. This concentration of conquered 
property ownership in the leadership of an elite warrior class representing the very model of 
warlord property. 
While the warlord property regimes of various societies sometimes lasted for centuries, all 
of them eventually came to an end. And they came to an end for one of two reasons. The first 
and most obvious reason was that they were simply conquered by a militarily superior regime. 
It needs to be remembered that the vast majority of warlord property were not grand empires 
                                                          






but instead rather small isolated societies. These small societies were naturally susceptible to 
defeat by larger or better equipped forces. To the extent that the invading forces justified their 
property rights on the basis of superior force the previous owners had no reason to protest, as 
this was ultimately their own justification for their property holdings. Even in cases where it was 
a grand empire that was defeated by a stronger military force the same logic would apply.  
Of course, for the non-property owning population of any given society it mattered little who 
was the owner of the property, what matter to them was how they were treated by the owners. 
If the new owners treated them better than the old owners, why should they fight to support 
the rights of their old masters. This attitude is the main thing that explains the dramatic 
expansion of the early Mongol empire. As the Mongols moved in to the middle east the majority 
of the opponents that they faced were smaller societies, which had entrenched warlord 
property regimes. To the extent that the Mongols could convince the subservient population 
that they would be better off under Mongol leadership, the only forces they would have to fight 
would be those of the ruling elite. And while the ruling elite represented the warrior class of the 
society, the difficult was that without the support of the general population, there was no way 
that they could effectively resist the advance of the Mongol armies. And so it went, with one 
small society after another surrendered or defeated by the Mongols, who for the most part did 
improve the conditions of the subservient classes.  
The other major way in which warlord property ended was through the evolution of warlord 
property into royal property. This evolution was not as dramatic a conversion as the conversion 
from tribal property into warlord property, for quite often it would not even require a change in 
property ownership. Given that a change in ownership was not required for this evolution, it 
may appear the that the royal property stage could be considered to be redundant. However, 
there was one significant difference between the two stages which validates its separation and 
that difference was the justification for the property ownership. As discussed above, the 
justification for warlord property was brute force, however with royal property, the justification 
changed to one of divine providence. That is not to say that brute force was no longer the 
underlying methodology of appropriating and securing property, but rather that the brute force 
justification could be veiled in the cloak of God’s will. To the extent that brute force was the 
initial underlying justification, divine providence could be considered an additional justification, 
which as time progressed often become the primary justification. 
The reason for the evolution from a warlord property to royal property is easy to understand. 
If the brute force is the principle justification for property ownership, property ownership is only 
protected only so long there is sufficient brute force available to secure it. There are two aspects 
to this contention that would be troubling to any warlord. First, as mentioned above, their 
property ownership is vulnerable to superior external forces, but second and perhaps of greater 
concern would be the vulnerability of their property holdings to superior internal forces. 
Warlords after all are only human, and inevitably the passage of time will diminish their own 
personal strength and with it their ability of defend their property rights. Should this happen, 
and if their heirs not be able to defend the families' property with the same vigour as the 
warlord, under a warlord property regime their property will be lost to another stronger leader 
in their own community. It was most likely this internal vulnerability, which was the main reason 
for the evolution towards royal property. For unlike brute force which is ultimately a very 






favour a warlord and his heirs, in a manner that allows for their continued ownership claim 
regardless of their physical capacity.  
14.2.2 Royal Property Stage 
'For if there is no justice, what are kingdoms except large robber bands? For it was 
elegant and truthful reply that was made to Alexander the Great by a certain pirate he 
had captured. For when the king asked the fellow, why it was that he should torment 
the sea, he replied with defiant outspokenness: "For the same reason that you torment 
the world! I do it with a little ship, and so am called a pirate. You do it with a large fleet, 
and so you are called a king"'1182 
The royal property stage represents the most highly concentrated ownership structure of the 
concentrated property phase. This stage was almost always a direct evolution from a warlord 
property stage, as it usually resulted from warlords seeking to justify their ownership of 
relatively vast amounts property acquired as a result of brute force, by something other than 
brute force. The primary justification for property ownership in this stage being divine right.  
While often the actual property ownership did not alter during the evolution between the 
warlord and royal stages, the exploitation of divine justification for property holdings had major 
benefits for former warlords. First and foremost, if the warriors, as a class, accepted this 
justification it greatly reduced the warlord’s internal vulnerability to property claims from his 
fellow warriors. Clearly for a up and coming warrior, challenging a current warlord would be 
become much more difficult, if the other warriors accepted the current warlord’s divine rights 
to rule. No longer would it be sufficient to demonstrate superior fighting ability or military 
prowess. To become leader, the pretentious warrior would also have to demonstrate superior 
religious standing. This of course was a much more subjective measure of leadership and could 
not be realised if the religious authorities were unwilling to change their allegiances.  
In addition to strengthening the allegiance of the warrior class, this practice of claiming divine 
rights also had tremendous benefits to the warlords if the overall population could be convinced 
to accept these claims. While the general population may be indifferent to which warlord 
subjugated them, and owned the property on which they laboured, this all changed if a religious 
component could be invoked. At the very least, the free population might be more reluctant to 
assist external forces in replacing their divinely chosen ruler. In the best case, they could now be 
relied upon to fiercely defend them. Depending on how strongly the claims of divine providence 
were held, the same support might even be provided by the subrogated population. Of course, 
for any claims of divine leadership to have societal legitimacy they must first be accepted by the 
religious leadership. 
In order to ensure acceptance or at least compliance of the religious leaderships, the military 
leaders had three options. First, they could obtain the religious leaders support, by providing 
substantial support for their religious order. This would usually be the case if the warlord truly 
believed in the religion. Alternatively, they could coerce their support through threat to their 
order. And if all else failed, they could simply declare themselves leaders of the religious order. 
One, or all of these practices, have been used by all royal property regimes. 
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Acceptance of the divine leadership rights by the warrior class however was another matter. 
Whenever the warrior class accepted the divine right of a leader this would generally be 
interwoven with their and more particularly their leader’s success in battle. If a military leader 
was successful in a conflict with their enemies, this was taken as a sign that the leader did indeed 
have divine support. If a military leader was unsuccessful in battle, the opposite belief was 
fostered. The instances in history where either of these conclusions were drawn are numerous, 
as almost every side in every conflict has believed that their respective deity was supporting 
them, and their victory was dependent on that support. 
However, for the general population, acceptance of a divine leadership would more be more 
dependent on the overall acceptance of the religion, then the success of warlord in battle. 
Although the overall acceptance of the religion, was obviously closely interlinked with the 
success of the wars endorsed by the religious leaders. Such was nature of Royal claims of divinity, 
if the Royals are successful they tend to get the support of the religious leaders, which in turn 
encouraged the support of their population, which in turn tended to ensure their continued 
success. However even if the general population did not accept or adopt the religion, it was 
enough that they would provide it with sufficient deference to ensure that claims of divine 
providence were respected. The key to this respect being the ability of the royalty to provide 
the security from external threats, essential to create a productive society.  
It should be noted that for the royal leaders there was another major advantage of claiming 
divine rights that was lacking in other property regimes. This advantage was the ability to claim 
absolute dominion over the property under their control. Clearly if the royal leaders were able 
to establish themselves as god’s representative on earth, or in the extreme actual god’s 
themselves, this gave them an authority comparable to that the gods. Such omnipotent 
authority gave them much more flexibility to decide not only; on the use of their own property, 
but also on the use of their subject’s property. While it has been argued that this authority could 
and was used for the good of the entire society, more often than not it was eventually used for 
wasteful aggrandizement of the royals themselves. 
With the concentration of property in the hands of the royals and their absolute dominion 
over that property, the royal property regime was and is clearly the most centralised of all the 
property regimes. As such it represents the apex of not only the concentrated property phase, 
but also the antithesis of common or universal property. In no other property regime would so 
few control so much, nor so many control so little. Under this regime, the mere whim of a royal 
leader could change not only the use of a property, but even the ownership of the property. 
Examples of royal property regimes are extremely diverse and can be found throughout 
history. One of the oldest and most sacred Royal regimes being the pharaohs in ancient Egypt, 
who were thought to be not representatives of the gods, but gods themselves. There were also 
the Ancient Greek and the Ancient Romans, both of which claimed some sort of divine 
justification for their leadership and property ownership. Alternatively, one could look at the 
Islamic regime that existed during the second Abbasid caliphate in 7th century in Bagdad. This 
Islamic regime being based on the leadership claims of blood relations with the Prophet 
Mohammad. Even today there are Royal families in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia which claim 
royal property as a result of some divine right.  
However, all of these regimes pale in comparison the most ambitious Royal property regime 
that ever existed. That regime being the Spanish Monarchy of the 16th century, which claimed 






Christopher Columbus in 1492. The King that claimed that ownership was King Fernando of 
Castile (Spain) who financed Columbus’ voyages. The religious authority that confirmed the royal 
ownership was the Pope Alexander the VI, who in an Inter caetera bull drew a line down the 
Atlantic Ocean giving everything west of the line to the Castilian King. The story of this regime 
having such scope and significance, it is only fitting that it be used as the example of royal 
property in this stage. 
Whilst the Spanish King’s Royal ownership claims were made in 1492, there was a thousand 
years of precedent which lead to this particular claim of Royal property. The link between this 
claim and these precedents was that all of them were sanctioned, if not promoted, by the 
Catholic Church. A quick review of the major Royal property claims sanctioned by the Church, 
which facilitated this claim are as follows. 
The Catholic intervention in property matters can be considered to have commenced with 
the founding of the Catholic Church in 33 BC when Peter became the first Pope. According to 
the bible he is commanded to spread the word to all non- believers.  
“Thou art Peter, and on this rock I will build my church. I will give to thee the keys of the 
kingdom of heaven. And whatsoever thou shalt bind upon the earth it shall be bound in 
heaven.... Go ye therefore and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, 
the Son and of the Holy Ghost.”1183 
This passage has been interpreted by the Catholic church to suggest that the church, not only 
has absolute dominion over all religious matters on the earth, but also has a say in the secular 
matters of all nations. 
In 313 BC Emperor Constantine granted toleration to the Christians and eventually converted 
to Christianity. As such Emperor Constantine can be considered the first to establish a Christian 
based, royal property regime. However, this regime was rather short lived, as not long after the 
Roman empire crumbled, with Europe being torn into a multitude of smaller Kingdoms ruled by 
the barbarian Kings. 
Then about 800 BC, the Frankish King Charlemagne, converted to Christianity and was 
declared Holy Roman Emperor by the Pope. Charlemagne’s success induces other barbarian 
kings to become Christian, resulting in the majority of land in Europe falling under some form of 
Catholic church endorsed royal property regime.  
In 1095 Pope Urban II declared that spreading Christianity is a duty of the Royalty and the 
first Crusades commenced shortly thereafter.1184 Under the guise of a holy war, the killing of 
infidels and taking of their property is accepted as a knight’s profession. There were nine 
Crusades in total, the combination of which institutionalise the right of the European royalty, to 
take property from infidels as their divine right. 
While the main focus of the Crusades was on the Holy Lands, there was a similar battle 
between Christians and Moslems happening on the Iberian Peninsula. Ever since the conquest 
of Andalucía by the Moors in 711 BC, there had be ongoing conflict between the two sides. In 
1085, Alfonso VI of León and Castile captured Toledo, precipitating a gradual decline of the 
Moslem empire. By 1236, with the fall of Córdoba, the Emirate of Granada was the only 
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remaining Muslim-ruled territory on the peninsula.1185 After their conquest, Moorish property 
becomes part of the Christian based royal property regimes of the Portuguese and the Spanish. 
Not long after the defeat of the Moors, Marco Polo returned from his travels in the Orient in 
1295 and wrote about a land that had an abundance of wealth and splendour previously 
unknown to the Europe.1186 The desire to access these treasures, created a huge incentive for 
the Portuguese and Spanish Kings to begin voyages around the coast of Africa attempting to get 
to the Orient. Because of the length and expense of these expeditions the Portuguese wanted 
to secure a share of any profits from other European countries that use the routes. To this end, 
the Portuguese negotiated with the Pope for religious recognition of their rights.  
The result was Romanus Pontifex, a papal bull written in 1455 by Pope Nicholas V to King 
Afonso V of Portugal, which was one of the first properly documented and specifically 
sanctioned royal property rights granted by the Catholic Church. The bull encouraged the King 
to propagate the Christian faith in the new countries, in return for dominion over all lands 
discovered or conquered. Along with encouraging the seizure of the lands of Saracens, pagans 
and other enemies of Christ, it repeated the earlier papal permission for the enslavement of 
such peoples. The bull's primary purpose was to forbid other Christian nations from infringing 
on the King of Portugal's rights to trade and colonisation in these regions. 
From a royal property regime perspective, the most notable clause of the Romanus Pontifiex 
is translated as follows: 
'since we had formerly by other letters of ours granted among other things free and 
ample faculty to the aforesaid King Alfonso -- to invade, search out, capture, vanquish, 
and subdue all Saracens and pagans whatsoever, and other enemies of Christ 
wheresoever placed, and the kingdoms, dukedoms, principalities, dominions, 
possessions, and all movable and immovable goods whatsoever held and possessed by 
them and to reduce their persons to perpetual slavery, and to apply and appropriate 
to himself and his successors the kingdoms, dukedoms, counties, principalities, 
dominions, possessions, and goods, and to convert them to his and their use and profit 
-- by having secured the said faculty, the said King Alfonso, or, by his authority, the 
aforesaid, justly and lawfully has acquired and possessed, and doth possess, these 
islands, lands, harbours, and seas, and they do of right belong and pertain to the said 
King Alfonso and his successors, nor without special license from King Alfonso and his 
successors themselves has any other even of the faithful of Christ been entitled 
hitherto, nor is he by any means now entitled lawfully to meddle therewith.'(italics 
added)1187 
While the papal bull sought to legitimise the property rights claimed by the Portuguese 
Monarchy as a result of their navel expeditions, this does not mean that all other Royalty 
accepted this theological status. The rational for rejecting the Portuguese’s claims generally 
revolved around the very practical consideration that the Portuguese did not have actual 
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possession of the lands they claimed. For example, while the Portuguese claimed ownership of 
the Canary Islands, it was the French Nobles Bethencourt and La Salle in 1402, who physically 
conquer the Canary Islands in the name of the Castilian King, Henry III. This dispute in ownership 
was not resolved until it was settled by the Treaty of Alcáçovas in 1479. 
Under the Treaty of Alcáçovas the Portuguese were granted free rein to continue their 
exploration along the African coast, in return for guaranteeing Castilian sovereignty in the 
Canaries. To the extent that this treaty between two nations divided up the world between 
themselves, it can be viewed as a significant legal landmark in the history of colonialism. For it 
was one of the first international documents formally outlining the principle that European 
Royalty are empowered to divide the rest of the world into "spheres of influence" and colonise 
the territories located within such spheres, regardless of the desires and without the consent of 
any indigenous peoples. This treaty is later ratified by the Papal bull Aeterni Regis issued by Pope 
Sixtus IV in 1491 which clearly places the Treaty into the Royal property agreement.  
All this brings us to Columbus’s discovery of America when both the Portuguese and the 
Spanish, claimed ownership of the newly discovered lands, after Columbus returned from his 
voyage in 1493. The Portuguese according to the Treaty of Alcáçovas, and the Spanish because 
they had financed Columbus’s trip. Typical of a royal property dispute while the Portuguese and 
Spanish were engaged in bilateral negotiation to resolve the dispute, the Spanish secretly 
petitioned the new Spanish Pope, Alexander VI to support their claims. Not surprisingly this 
native of Valencia and a friend of the Spanish King, viewed the Spanish claims favourably and 
issued five new papal bulls in their favour. The most important of these bulls was the Inter 
Caetera Divinai dated the 4 May 14931188. This papal bull essentially drew a line down the middle 
of the Atlantic and apportioning the discoveries west of the meridian to the Spanish and while 
apportioning discoveries east of the meridian to the Portuguese.1189 
As with the Romanus Pontifiex, these papal bulls justified the granting of these ownership 
right to the respective royalties as a means of spreading the Catholic religion. The relevant royal 
property clauses of Inter Caetera Divinai being: 
'by the authority of Almighty God conferred upon us in blessed Peter and of the 
vicarship of Jesus Christ, which we hold on earth, do by tenor of these presents, should 
any of said islands have been found by your envoys and captains, give, grant, and 
assign to you and your heirs and successors, kings of Castile and Leon, forever, 
together with all their dominions, cities, camps, places, and villages, and all rights, 
jurisdictions, and appurtenances, all islands and mainlands found and to be found, 
discovered and to be discovered towards the west and south'1190 
The observance of the papal bull being backed up with the threat of excommunication. 
'Let no one, therefore, infringe, or with rash boldness contravene, this our 
recommendation, exhortation, requisition, gift, grant, assignment, constitution, 
deputation, decree, mandate, prohibition, and will. Should anyone presume to 
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attempt this, be it known to him that he will incur the wrath of Almighty God and of 
the blessed apostles Peter and Paul.'1191 
In this papal bull is found the very essence of a royal property regime. First, there is the 
religious aspect that differentiates royal property from warlord property. Next, there is an 
extreme concentration of ownership in the hands of a few royals. And finally, there is the 
concept of absolute dominion which entitle the royals to do whatever they wish with their 
dominion. It should be mentioned that this particular example of royal property did not survive 
for long and the principle reasons for its demise, were representative of the demise of royal 
property in general. 
The great irony is that the three elements that define royal property regimes: divine 
justification, highly concentrated ownership and absolute dominion; each contain in them the 
seed of evolutionary change that can bring an end to any royal property regime. All that is 
required is for any one of these three elements to be taken to an extreme, which would result 
in it becoming unacceptable for the cohesion of the society as a whole. Certainly, taking all three 
of the elements to an extreme almost always will result in a destruction of the regime. 
Beginning with the first element, extreme belief in divine justification can result in 
evolutionary change for a number of reasons. In the first instance it can result in an undue 
reliance on deities for protection, which may result in an unpreparedness with respect to 
attacks. Alternatively, it may result in the wasting of essential resources in celebration of the 
deities or the royalty. Finally, it can result in the preoccupation with religious matters to the 
detriment of public administration. The most dramatic example of which would be the instances 
where the royalty become so consumed by religious matters that they ignore the very real 
material needs of their people. 1192 
With respect to both highly concentrated property ownership and absolute dominion, the 
reasons why extreme adherence to these elements caused evolutionary change is closely 
related. In both cases there is first and foremost competence issues. While it might be entirely 
possible for a royal leader to know enough about a small estate to make effective decisions as 
to use and therefore maintain absolute dominion, at some point this becomes impossible when 
property holdings are expanded. Even in cases where royalty has shown an outstanding 
management capacity and is able to manage an astonishing amount of property, there is nothing 
to suggest that such a capacity can be passed on to future generation of the royalty. In fact, the 
opposite is often true, as Royal property regimes often collapse simply because hereditary royals 
are not as capable as their predecessors.  
Assuming that royal leader accepted their fallibility and decide not to exercise personal 
authority over their dominion this would necessary require delegating some of the decision-
making authority to subordinates. This reliance on subordinates carries with it the most common 
cause for internal disruption of a royal property regimes. For once those subordinates realise 
that it was them and not the royalty that were creating the wealth, they tend to want to have a 
share of the rewards or even outright ownership the resources. It is this dilution in ownership 
of property that is by far the most prevalent and enduring source of the evolution from the royal 
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property regime. While over time this dilution would eventually result in universal property 
rights, in the first instance this dilution usually only went as far as the Monarch’s loyal 
subordinates, which is why the next stage of the property rights continuum is named the Nobel 
Property Stage. 
Before going into the next stage of property evolution, this would appear to be the 
appropriate point to insert a piece of historical writings which was extremely critical of royal 
property regimes. Although this particular writing is from a period fairly far removed from the 
worst excesses of the royal property stage because it represents a such a clarion call for the 
abolition of the royal property stage it is provide here. The voice is that of John Adams, the 2nd 
President of the United States of America, who was also the lawyer which drafted the American 
Declaration of Independence. Ten years before the American revolution in his “Dissertation on 
Cannon and Feudal Law” 1193he wrote the following;  
'But another event still more calamitous to human liberty, was a wicked confederacy 
between the two systems of tyranny (Canon “Catholic” Law and Feudal “Royal” Law) 
above described. It seems to have been even stipulated between them, that the 
temporal grandees should contribute everything in their power to maintain the 
ascendency of the priesthood, and that the spiritual grandees in their turn, should 
employ their ascendency over the consciences of the people, in impressing on their 
minds a blind, implicit obedience to civil magistracy.'1194 
'Thus, as long as this confederacy lasted, and the people were held in ignorance, 
liberty, and with her, knowledge and virtue too, seem to have deserted the earth, and 
one age of darkness succeeded another, till God in his benign providence raised up the 
champions who began and conducted the Reformation.'1195 
From this except and indeed the entire dissertation it is clear that Adams had nothing but 
contempt for the confederacy of religious and royal authority, which generated the royal 
property stage. It was the spread of this attitude that was to result in the evolution from the 
concentrated phase to the universal phase, relegating most concentrated property regimes to 
annals of history. However, this is getting ahead of the story, first we must examine the Noble 
and Aristocratic stages.1196  
14.2.3 Noble Property Stage 
The big difference between a royal property regime and a noble property regime is that the 
common practice of property ownership under noble regime results in noble ownership, rather 
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than royal ownership. That is to say under a royal regime most of the property was owned by 
the royal families and managed with some sort of revenue sharing arrangement with loyal 
subordinates. Under the noble regime often that same property is owned by the same loyal 
subordinates, with the royalty receiving some sort of tribute, tax or profit share. Both these 
arrangements can be represented as a feudal system of government, with royal property 
representing the earliest form of feudalism and the noble property representing the later forms.  
While this stage results from a modest evolution towards a more widely dispersed form of 
property ownership, it still maintains a highly concentrated ownership structure because 
ownership still rests with a tiny minority of the population. Further although ownership was 
marginally diluted, the concept of an owner’s absolute dominion of their property remained 
intact. As such, for the general population the change meant very little. The only real difference 
between the two stages being that the nobility was no longer subject to the whim of the royalty, 
when it came to their property rights. Assuming that such differentiation is accepted, then 
clearly one of the first documents which led to the creation of Noble property would be the 
English Magna Carta of 1215.  
Although the Magna Carta is frequently referred to as the first charter of individual rights, 
this is a romantic notion that significantly overstates its contents. Rather than being a charter of 
individual rights, the Magna Carta was for all intense and purposes simply a list of constraints 
on royal authority. The document itself resulting from grievances that the Barons of the England 
had against King John, who had either appropriated their property or interfered with their 
position in society. To understand the contents of the Magna Carta it is useful to first understand 
a little background to the document. 
The Kingdom of King John was created by his father King Henry II, who ruled the Kingdom 
from 1154 to 1189. That Kingdom not only included all of England, but also much of western 
France. King Henry II had secured much of the French territory through marriage to Eleanor of 
Aquitaine and England territory through invasion in 1153. The Kingdom was governed based on 
a feudal system where the King granted fiefdoms to his vassals, in return for their oaths of fealty 
to him. The vassals (Earls and Barons) for the most part were able to manage their fiefdoms as 
they wished subject to providing taxes and military forces to the King according to their 
individual agreements with the King. The actual ownership of the fiefdoms while nominally 
belonging to the King, were in reality held by the barons, and only belonged to the King so long 
as he had the forces necessary to enforce his claims of ownership. In 1189 King Henry II was 
overthrown by his third son who was crowned King Richard (Richard the Lionheart). This coup 
being supported by the majority of Barons who were tired of King Henry’s continual conflict with 
the Catholic Church. Two days after the coup, King Henry II died and within a year King Richard 
left to join the Third Crusade to Jerusalem. Left behind was Richard’s younger brother John, who 
was to take care of the administration of the Kingdom. 
While on his return from the crusades, King Richard was captured and ransomed. It was at 
that time, that John first tried to have himself proclaimed King. However, this did not happen, 
because the Queen paid the ransom so that King Richard could be released and return to 
England. Fortunately for John, after King Richard returned he not only forgave his brother but 
left him his Kingdom when he was subsequently killed attempting to recapture continental 
property. Property which ironically had been lost in revolts against the rule of John, while King 






Unlike King Richard, who was respected and admired by the Barons, King John was 
considered to be untrustworthy. This feeling was mutual, as King John also considers the Barons 
to be untrustworthy. As a result of this mistrust King John ruled through fear and intimidation 
rather than seeking to maintain their loyalty through favours and promises as his father and 
brother had done. During the early part of his early reign; fiefdoms were appropriated from 
Barons, Barons were put in jail on a whim, and heirs to fiefdoms disappear without a trace. 
Unsurprisingly this mistreatment of the Barons led precisely to the disloyalty that King John 
feared. The epoch of this disloyalty cresting in 1214 when the French King Phillip Augustus attack 
the continental parts of King John’s kingdom and his continental Barons abandoned him 
resulting in the lost his continental property. But this was not the final disloyalty, for after this 
defeat and in his weakened state; 24 of the remaining 45 English Barons, initiated a baronial 
rebellion which ended when King John was forced to sign the Magna Carta.  
The original 1215 Magna Carta had no paragraphs, but historians have subsequently divided 
it into sixty-three paragraphs. Of these, the first fifty-nine; either seek redress for perceived 
misbehaviour on the part of the King, or place constraints on future behaviour. The last 
paragraphs deal with how any breaches of the commitments will be resolved. With respect to 
property there are clear contradictions between the various paragraphs which portents a shift 
in the property stage. For example, while in the second paragraph the reference is to the “land 
of the crown”1197, in another paragraph there is a clause that requires the king to seek 
permission of the owners.1198 No clearer indication of a change of status, from a royal to a Noble 
stage could be desired. 
In addition to the ownership contradictions, there are also included in the document 
numerous clauses regarding the hereditary rights of the Barons and their families.1199 Such 
clauses clearly assume that possession is an inheritance, which cannot be disturbed by the King, 
and make the King’s claims of ownership a royal delusion. 
This rise of Noble power is also reinforced in the conflict resolution clauses. According to 
these clauses if any Baron should feel that the King has breached the constraints of the Magna 
Carta, they had the right to appeal to a council of 25 Barons for redress. The Baron’s council 
would notify the King or his representative and if redress was not forthcoming within forty days, 
the Magna Carta authorised the “seizing our (the King’s) castles, lands, possessions, or anything 
else saving only our own person and those of the queen and our children, until they have secured 
such redress as they have determined upon.” Of note is the fact that the council of 25 Barons 
would be elected by majority vote of all the Barons and that decisions of the council would 
establish that “the verdict of the majority present shall have the same validity as a unanimous 
verdict of the whole twenty-five”. What this meant was that the 20 Barons that supported the 
King, were effectively excluded from the council and that even if one or two should wind up on 
the council, their votes would be overridden by the majority.  
Although King John signed the Magna Carta, there is ample evidence to show that he had no 
intention of complying with it and viewed the Charter simply as a tool for providing the breathing 
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space he need to assemble a more formidable military force. King John’s contempt for the 
document was shared by Pope Innocence III, who one month after its signature, annulled the 
document and released him from his oath to obey it. The Pope declaring that the Magna Carta 
was a; “shameful and demeaning agreement, forced upon the King by violence and fear”1200. So 
it was that in September of 1215, after regaining his strength, King John renewed hostilities and 
took the nation into a Civil War. In the first year of this war, King John died while on campaign 
in eastern England. In the second year the Civil War won by the supporters of his son, King Henry 
III. This victory over the rebel Barons likely delayed the evolution of a truly Nobel property stage 
for a century, but the Magna Carta did mark the beginning of the end of the royal property stage 
in England, as it forever ended any royal claims to absolute authority over all the land in the 
realm. 
For the proposes of defining a property stage, it needs to be mentioned that while the noble 
stage did see a dilution of ownership from the royals to the nobles, this did not necessarily mean 
that there was a corresponding diminution in claims of absolute authority. It was just that rather 
than the Royals claiming absolute authority over their kingdom, it was now the turn of Barons 
to claim absolute authority over their particular fiefdom. For an understanding of how this stage 
operated in practice one of the most interesting examples can be found on the River Rhine 
during the Holy Roman Empire.  
Because of European geography the River Rhine has always played a major role in the flow 
of goods and services on the continent. However, in the Middle Ages, during a period that 
epitomized the Noble property stage, that that flow was virtually eliminated. The story of why 
this happen is included in a thesis written about tolls on the Rhine1201. According the thesis 
during the period covering the 8th to the 18th century there were up to 57 different Rhine 
customs and tolls stations located on the river. The customs and tolls from these stations being 
a major source of revenue for the Holy Roman Empire which dominated central Europe from 
892 to 1802. Throughout most of this period the Emperors closely controlled the right to collect 
tolls by personally setting and selling the right to collect tolls to the local Barons. This right to 
collect a toll was not however automatic and had to be renewed every time the Emperor was 
changed. From a practical prospective having the authority to set and sell tolls was extremely 
important to the Emperors because, although it was an important source of revenue; they also 
knew that if the aggregate amount of tolls charged at the various tolling stations was too great 
this would dramatically restrict the flow of goods on the river, which would in turn reduce the 
economic activity in the Empire. As such most Emperor tended to keep the number of tolling 
stations to a minimum and the toll charged reasonable. For example, in 1250 AD there were 12 
stations on the 180 kilometres stretch of the river between Mainz and Cologne.1202 The standard 
toll for an average ship being 8 denari (0.68 grams of silver) with larger ships paying a higher 
toll.1203 The aggregate toll from all 12 stations adding up to 96 denari for the entire journey 
between the two cities. The interesting thing from a Noble property perspective is what 
happened when this centralized authority was lost and absolute decisions over the tolls moved 
from the Emperor to the Barons that lived on the river.  
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This occurred between 1250-1273 during the Great Interregnum, which marked the end of 
Hohenstaufen rule and the beginning of Habsburg rule. During this period disagreements on 
succession plans prevented the coronation of a new Emperor, creating a power vacuum in 
centralized authority. As such changes in the tolling operations were driven by the local Barons, 
operating on their own authority. While this did not represent a negotiated shift from a Royal 
to Noble property stage, it was none the less a shift, as the local Barons assumed absolute 
authority over the tolls charged on the sections of the rivers they controlled. What happened 
during this period is quite reviling, as it demonstrates what happens when too many parties 
claim absolute property rights over property that has both figuratively and literally, downstream 
implications for other property holders. During the first four year of this Nobel stage, Barons 
who previously did not have toll stations build new ones, effectively doubling the number of toll 
stations on the river. In addition, all of the Barons significantly raised the price of the tolls that 
they charged.1204 But this was not enough for some Barons. The greediest Barons went so far as 
to steal the ships and their cargo, as well as kidnapping both crew and passengers. Perhaps the 
most notorious incident being when Baron of Rietberg kidnapped of the wife of the King of 
Holland. Given this behaviour it is hardly surprising that transport on the river experienced a 
dramatic decline, resulting in severe economic hardship for the towns that depended on the 
river for their goods and services. 
While the individual Barons claimed that they had every right to exercise their absolute 
authority over the part of the river they controlled, the society did not accept this proposition. 
Because the combined effect of these separate act was detrimental the Empire at large, both 
the act of building unauthorised tolling stations and charging unauthorized higher tolls became 
known as “thelonia injusta” (unjust tolls). The other more aggressive acts were considered 
capital crimes and resulted in the Barons that practiced them, being called “Robber Barons”1205.  
The response of the communities affected by this behaviour is as notable, as the behaviour 
itself. A coalition of interested parties was created to deal with the Robber Barons, which called 
itself the “Rheinischer Bund”, the Rhine League. A declared purpose of the League was to 
promote a general peace along the Rhine, by providing security of trade routes and suppression 
of unjust tolls. This League had three distinct types of members; Cities, Princely Members, and 
Knightly members. The cities had a hundred members in the League, of which two were the 
founding members Mainz and Worms. The city members represented the interests of the 
merchants who were mainly interested in restoring the flow of goods on the river from a strictly 
commercial prospective. Combined the Princely and Knightly participation in the League was 
about thirty members. These members were all part of the higher and lower nobility, most of 
which controlled castles on the Rhine which were authorised to collect tolls and were intent on 
returning to the previous more prosperous toll collecting practices. The relative size of the two 
different groupings of members was significant as it is indicative of the changes in local power 
and military might.  
Immediately after the League was established in July of 1254, it set about putting an end to 
the practices of the Robber Barons. Initially four major Robber Barons and their respective 
castles were attacked and destroyed by the League. Within three years ten Robber Barons were 
put out of commission and the Rhine was once again opened up to river traffic. Although this 
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was an impressive list of successes, the League fell apart shortly thereafter. There were two 
reasons for this. The first of which was the failure of an extensive and costly siege at Rheinfels 
which failed to force the Count of Katzelnelnbogen to yield.1206 The second was a disagreement 
within the League, as to the choice of a new Emperor. Because of this collapse, the flow of traffic 
on the river was once again threatened and this threat remained in place until a new Emperor 
was eventually established in 1273.  
Notwithstanding the collapse and the return of the Emperor, the League did establish the 
practice of regional formations of interested parties, that continued to pursue mutually 
beneficial objectives long after its demise. In fact, it be credibly argued that this coalition of 
Nobles and merchants, was representative of the movement along the property continuum 
which lead to the demise of the Noble property stage and the establishment of the Aristocratic 
property stage. The catalyst to this movement being the merchant’s discovery that when they 
acted together; the Nobles were more dependent on them, than they were on the Nobles. Such 
a dramatic enlightenment would have much more significant implications for the evolution 
property rights, than had occurred during the shift from Royal to Noble property. For this 
enlightenment was to result not only in a further dilution of the concentrated ownership, but 
also restricted the concept of absolute authority. As the misbehaviour of the Robber Barons 
proved, the Nobles could no longer assume that they could exercise absolute authority over 
their property regardless of the consequence to their society. Now they had to take into 
considerations the trading interests of the merchants. The merchants themselves, fighting 
alongside the Noble against the whims of the more authoritarian Nobles, forever changed their 
perception of who was entitled to the protection provided by the state.  
The establishment of a principle that the protection of property rights was not a right just of 
royals and nobles, resenting a watershed moment in the history of property rights. For once the 
rights of merchants were acknowledged it provided some of them with opportunity of achieving 
even greater prosperity which eventually lead to an aristocratic class.  
14.2.4 Aristocratic Property Stage 
While during the Aristocratic property stage there was a significant increase in the ranks of 
Aristocratic property owners, it remains classified as part of the concentrated ownership phase 
because the vast majority of population were still excluded from the possibility of owning 
property. As pointed out earlier, it should be understood that this generalization does not mean 
that during an Aristocratic property stage, there was no one outside the Aristocratic class that 
owned property. Rather the contention of this generalization is that the Aristocratic property 
represented the dominate form of ownership during the Aristocratic stage. Further like any 
evolutionary process, there can be significant overlaps between stages. These overlaps not only 
transcend one stage but can transcend multiply stages. As such in any given stages there may 
coexist; the dominate form of the stage, as well as several residual forms from previous stages 
and newly evolving forms of future stages. Nowhere is this more evident than in this stage. For 
it is in this stage that not only were there significant remnants of previous stages, but more 
importantly, it was during this stage that the subsequent stage was to slowly evolve into a critical 
                                                          






mass that eventually replaced it.1207 This does not mean that there are not reasonably clear 
aspects of this stage that make it a distinctive stage on the property continuum. And as 
mentioned above the most significant aspect was the concentration of ownership of land in the 
hand the aristocracy. 
Regardless of the limited extent of property owners in this stage there was a fundamental 
change in the justification for property owner that makes this stage one of the most important 
stages on the evolutionary path of property rights. Prior to this stage the justification for 
property ownership for the most part was driven by conquest or divine providence. In the 
aristocratic property stage this changed with the addition and eventual replacement of those 
justification with a justification based on natural rights, a concept that will be explained below. 
Although the aristocratic stage can be generally viewed beginning when the Nobility accepted 
the trading rights of merchants in the 13th century, it was not until the late 17th century that this 
justification was clearly articulated in the writings of scholars and philosophers the most 
important of which revolved around the works of John Locke. His writings are so central to the 
justification of this stage that an examination of them and their implications is required before 
continuing the discussion of this stage.  
To put John Locke’s work in perspective it is first necessary to provide a brief history as to his 
background. Locke was born in 1632 into a wealth family, his father was a was a country lawyer 
and clerk to the Justices of the Peace, who had over the course of his life acquired significant 
properties upon which the family’s wealth was based. In his youth he went to the prestigious 
Westminster School in London with the aid of a sponsorship from a member of Parliament who 
was his father's former commander. After completing his studies there, he was admitted to 
Oxford where he studies medicine and was introduced to experimental philosophy. In 1667, he 
met Lord Anthony Ashley Cooper, 1st Earl of Shaftesbury, and in that same year he moved into 
Shaftesbury's home at Exeter House in London, to serve as Lord Ashley's personal physician. 
Shaftesbury was a founder of the Whigs, a movement which sought to limit the use of absolute 
rule through the promotion of constitutional monarchism. More specific the movement was a 
primarily focused on protection of the assets of wealthy Protestant families from appropriation 
by a Catholic Monarchy, by limiting the absolute authority of the Monarch. Locke himself 
became involved in politics when Shaftesbury became Lord Chancellor in 1672. Following 
Shaftesbury's fall from political favour in 1675, Locke spent some time travelling across France 
as tutor and medical attendant for another member of Parliament. He returned to England in 
1679 when Shaftesbury's political fortunes took a positive turn. Around this time, Locke 
composed the bulk of the Two Treatises of Government1208 which included his work on property 
rights. What can be surmised from this background is first that Locke was clearly a member of 
the Aristocracy, second that Shaftesbury had a tremendous influence on Locke's political ideas.  
Given his background and the context of his situation it can be reasonably presumed that the 
objective of his writing was two-fold. The obvious first presumption is that he wanted to find a 
way to delegitimize the claims of the Monarchy on the property of the nation. The second 
equally obvious, but more difficult task, is that he wanted to find a way of justifying the 
                                                          
1207 This simultaneous evolution actually reflected two contemporaneous stages in two different forms of property.  
However, because the other stage was more inclusive it will be included in the universal property phase.  






accumulated wealth of the Aristocracy in a society where the majority of citizens were poor, 
property-less peasants that struggled on a daily basis to provide their families with basic food, 
clothing and shelter.  
In order to achieve these goals Locke advocated the concept of natural law, rather than divine 
intervention, as a justification for property rights.1209 It is worth noting that the notion of divine 
intervention was used by the Catholic Royalty for centuries and so to a certain extent promoting 
the notion of natural rights was an attempt a discredit not only the notion of divine rights, but 
also the legitimacy of the Catholic Monarch, King James II.  
According to Locke, natural law represented a fundamental law that was in existence in 
primitive societies, it was the state of nature before the advent of government, money or trade. 
His natural law is based on the notions that the most basic property which all members of a 
society own is their own labour1210 and that in all individuals have an equal claim to unused 
natural resources and it would become the property of the first person that mixed their labour 
with unused resources.1211 The analogy that Locke used to explain this concept began with a 
discussion of wild produce available in nature. 
'He that is nourished by the acorns he picked up under an oak, or the apples he 
gathered from the trees in the wood, has certainly appropriated them to himself. 
Nobody can deny but the nourishment is his. I ask then, when did they begin to be his? 
when he digested? or when he eat? or when he boiled? or when he brought them 
home? or when he picked them up? and it is plain, if the first gathering made them not 
his, nothing else could. That labour put a distinction between them and common: that 
added something to them more than nature, the common mother of all, had done; 
and so they become his private right.'1212 
He then goes on to explain how the same principle of mixing labour with wild produce can 
also be used to justify the appropriation of land by individuals.  
'But the chief matter of property being now not the fruits of the earth, and the beasts 
that subsist on it, but the earth itself: as that which it takes in, and carries with it all 
the rest: I think it is plain, that property in that too is acquired as the former. As much 
land as a man tills, plants, improves, cultivates and can use the product of, so much is 
his property. He by his labour does, as it were, enclose it from the common.'1213 
According to Locke this unilateral appropriation of property through labour was justified for 
four reasons. First, because the most basic possession an individual can have is their labour and 
when they mix that possession with an un-owned thing, the inability of separating their labour 
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1210 It is worth noting that Locke’s did not apply the fruits of labour argument to his own slaves, which suggest that 
it was more of an apology than a principle.   
1211 This assumption ignores the possibility of communal property as described in this thesis common phase. 
1212 Locke, Two Treatise of Government, sec. 28 






from the un-owned thing must imply that that thing also now becomes their property. Second, 
the actual labour improves the land and accounts for the majority of the value inherent in the 
land. Third, individuals are entitled to an unconditional right to provide for their subsistence, 
and if they were not allowed the appropriation process they quite simply would not survive. And 
finally, appropriation is justified because improving resources effectively makes more resources 
available to for others. 
At the same time as providing a justification for the unilateral appropriation of property Locke 
suggested that there were three provisos that limited the amount of property that anyone 
individual could appropriate. First there was a no waste proviso. This proviso stated that no 
individual should appropriate more property than they could use, for to do so would result in 
the waste of that resource. This proviso is hugely significant, as it was no doubt intended as a 
justification of the limitation on the ability of the Royals to claim possession of vast quantities of 
land. Land that was held under absolute authority but was wasted because it was not fully 
utilized. The second proviso was a subsistence proviso, that required that everyone was entitled 
to sufficient resources to maintain their subsistence. This proviso was closely linked to his third 
proviso which required that any appropriation should leave sufficient resources available to 
others so that they too could mix their labour with resources in order to achieve the same level 
well-being as the initial appropriators. Once again it can be reasonably assumed that these later 
provisos were intended to justify the limitation of Royal appropriation. Taken together these 
provisos achieve his first main objective which was to delegitimize the claims of the Monarchy 
of absolute authority over all the property.  
In attempting to achieve his second objective of justifying the accumulated wealth of the 
Aristocratic class, Locke relied on the introduction of a monetary system. Whist his natural law 
proviso could equally be applied to the inequitable asset accumulation of the Aristocratic class, 
he argued that they should not apply because the introduction of a monetary system eliminated 
or moderated their limitations. With respect to the no waste proviso he argued that because 
the monetary system allowed Aristocrats to convert their resources into money and money can 
be stored without wastage, the no waste proviso only becomes relevant when people hold their 
wealth in idle, non-productive, non-financial assets, such as fallow land. The subsistence and as 
good as provisos were also resolved by the introduction of the monetary system, as the 
property-less peasant that could sell their labour to the landowners, which was would allow 
them to sustain their existence with the ability to sell their labour represented as being as good 
as having access to the resource that had been already appropriated. Further Locke argued that 
when property-less peasant took jobs working for those with property, they had in essence 
provided implied consent to the current property arrangements, regardless of how 
disproportionate or unequal they might be.1214 This analysis of the effect of the monetary system 
on property rights, represent the very foundation for the concept of Aristocratic property, as it 
justifies the disproportionate accumulation of assets without assuming or addressing any 
historical property disparities. Indeed, he blithely assumes a state of equity amongst all men 
stating; 
                                                          
1214 Locke never explains how landless peasant should have communicated their dissatisfaction with his analysis of 






'all men are naturally in, and that is, a state of perfect freedom to order their actions, 
and dispose of their possessions and persons, as they think fit, within the bounds of 
the law of nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the will of any other 
man'1215  
It should be noted Locke’s thoughts on property were included in his thoughts on 
government and the role of government. With respect to government, his view was that one of 
the primary purposes of government was to protect property.1216 Given that during his time 
most property was owned by the Aristocracy, this can be interpreted as an endorsement of the 
existing concentrated property ownership of the Aristocracy. The implications of all this being 
that there was an implicit assumption; that the "landed gentry" had gained that property 
through the fruits of their labour and ownership of property is de facto evidence that they 
deserve to own it.1217  
While the tautology, that property ownership was de facto evidence a superior right to own 
property was only articulated by Locke in 1689, it is evident that this belief in the superiority 
right of the Aristocracy to own property pervaded every Aristocratic society which ever existed. 
Evidence of this can be found not only in the way the Aristocracy, consolidated their control over 
European property but also the in the way in which the Aristocracy acquired vast swaths of 
property in new world and monopolized world trade.  
The manner in which the Aristocracy consolidated control over European property was 
through a process called enclosure. The manner in which they acquired vast swaths of land in 
the new world was through Royal Charters and Petitions. The manner in which they 
monopolized trade were through the Government granted monopolise to Charter companies. 
An explanation and examples of each of these is provided below.  
The enclosure process can be defined as a process whereby formally feudal land owners 
forced their traditional tenants off the land in order to fence in the that same land, primarily for 
sheep grazing or other private purposes. In England this enclosure process originated as early as 
the 13th century and peaked in the 17th century.1218 Prior to enclosure, land utilization under a 
feudal system generally involved the land owner providing common land to their subservient 
labours to allow then to grow their own crops, graze their animals or to hunt. This utilization 
was consistent with traditional social obligation on the part of the land owners to take 
responsibility for the general welfare and well-being of their resident populations. The 
fundamental and most contentious part of the enclosure process was the abandonment of this 
social obligation, which led to the creation of an underclass of displaced landless labourers, 
forsaken by their previous benefactors. 
From Locke's prospective the enclosure process was viewed as an effort to improve the 
productivity and profitability of their property holdings. Rather than allowing land to be used for 
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subsistence farming by their tenants, they could be used to raise sheep, which reduced the 
labour requirements and increased the revenue generated on the land. The social obligation to 
their resident population being superseded by newer notions of absolute private property 
rights, which entailed a right to use the property in any what that the owner saw fit, regardless 
of the consequence to third parties or society as a whole. That notion of absolute property rights 
should be inherited by the Aristocratic property stage is both, predictable and ironic. 
Predictable, because it was an established property norm. Ironic, because it was a central cause 
of the demise in both the Royal and Noble property stages.  
Given the social upheaval that the enclosure process generated, it is not surprising to find 
that there were legislative attempts against enclosure. In the 1489 the Tudors, who were 
supposedly concerned about a decline in taxes revenues from the villagers and worried that 
villagers who lost their home and livelihoods might become criminals, enacted the first anti-
enclosure laws1219. Over the course of the next 150 years, there were 11 more Acts of Parliament 
and eight commissions of enquire on the subject.1220 Curiously, none of these laws forbid 
enclosure. Instead they placed financial penalties of landowners that either demolished housing 
or converted cultivate land into grazing land. For example, under the 1489 Act, half of the profits 
from enclosure would go to the Crown if a house was demolished. Similarly, under the 1515 Act, 
conversion of arable land to pasture became an offense but was permitted if half the profit from 
the enclosure would go to the crown. The distribution of the profits to be monitored by a 
commission established by the Crown. So while they were call Anti-Enclosure Acts; these Acts 
appear to be less about preventing enclosure, than they were about ensuring that the Royals 
got their share of the benefits. 
The disingenuousness of the concern is supported by the fact that in the centuries that 
followed their enactment, the enclosure process continued apace despite protest and riots.1221 
This process ultimately reached its peak in the period between 1760 and 1820, when the 
government rather than pretending to resist enclosure, introduced Acts promoting 
enclosure.1222 Under these Inclosure Acts the government was essentially attempting to 
eliminate the common right to land, by joining them together with the “Property of the Soil”.1223 
While there is substantial verbiage included in the Inclosure Acts that purport to protect the 
common rights of the tenants, history shows that their interests were not were protected, as 
the inclosure acts literally threw millions of labours off the land and forced into them into urban 
squalor. 
For a more specific example of how aristocratic property benefited the aristocracy and 
resulted in severe hardship to the tenant farmers, one need look no further than Ireland. 
Without going into the historical details of how it happened, what is clear is that since the 
beginning of 17th century the vast majority of Irish property was owned by the English and Irish 
aristocracy.1224 This ownership structure, in no small part due to the laws which prohibited the 
80% Irish Catholics population from owning or leasing property, as well as prohibiting them from 
obtaining an education or from entering a profession that would have provide them with the 
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resources they needed to purchase property.1225 While the Irish aristocracy may have managed 
their property, most of the English aristocracy did not. Rather they remained absentee landlords, 
relying on local (almost exclusively protestant) middlemen to manage their property. Under this 
middle man system, the English aristocracy were effectively relieved of any responsibility for the 
well-being of their tenants, as they were both physically and managerially distant from their 
property, and the middlemen were given a free hand to exploit them as they saw fit. 
The way this system usually worked was that the middlemen would lease tracts of the land, 
for long terms, at fixed rates, from the landlords. They would then split up the leased property 
in much smaller parcels and sublet them to tenant farmers, keeping the any amounts above 
their leasing cost for themselves. The tenant farmers would raise cash crops like corn and wheat 
which they would sell to pay the middlemen and grow gardens to feed themselves. Like the 
landlords, the middlemen felt that they too were relived of any responsibility for the well-being 
of the tenants, as they considered themselves simple businessmen who were trying to maximise 
their profit. All this meant that the interests of the tenant farmers were protected by no one, 
making the terms of their occupancy very harsh indeed. They had no security of tenure on the 
land; being tenants "at will" they could be turned out whenever the landlords or middlemen 
chose. They were regularly evicted for reasons such as; none payment of rents, or because a 
decision was made to raise sheep instead of cash crops. Even if they were able to maintain their 
tenancy, the size of their farms was so small that the cash crops necessary to pay the rent left 
little land on which to grow gardens to feed their families.1226 
The tenants of the Irish aristocracy fared no better, as the Irish management usually involved 
providing labourers with a parcel of land on which to grow crops as payment for their labour. 
And just as with the tenant farmers of the English owned property, the size of the land provided 
was too small to allow for anything but the bare survival of a family. Further, the only crop which 
could produce sufficient quantity of food in these small allotments was potatoes. This 
dependency on potatoes was to have severe consequences in the years 1845- 1848, because it 
was during those years that the disease commonly known as potato blight struck Ireland, 
creating the Great Famine. 
In 1845, between one third to one half of the potato crop was lost. In 1846, it is estimated 
three quarters of the harvest was lost. Although the blight ended in 1847, the shortage of seed 
crops hampered production for an additional year. All this meant that great numbers of the Irish 
poor who depended on the potato for survival, were quite simply dying of starvation.1227 It 
should be noted that during this same period, there was an abundance of other crops that were 
being successfully cultivated in Ireland and the island itself was producing significantly more 
food than was needed to feed its population. The problem was that these crops did not belong 
to the poor, they belong to the Aristocracy and as the poor had no money to pay for them, they 
were being sold for export. This irony was immortalised in one of the most insightful political 
comments of the period, which stated that:  
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'Potatoes failed in like manner all over Europe; yet there was no famine save in Ireland. 
The Almighty, indeed, sent the potato blight, but the English created the famine'1228  
To be fair while this comment would tend to suggest that the English aristocracy and its 
government were totally indifferent to the plight of the Irish poor, this is not entirely true. In 
1845 Prime Minister Peel secretly arrange for the importation of £100,000 worth of corn meal 
from America. He also established a number of emergency public work programs, none of which 
were anywhere adequate to the crisis. In 1846 his government repealed the tariffs on grain 
which kept the price of bread artificially high. Although this had little effect on the poor, who 
had no money to buy wheat at any price, it did have the effect of bringing down his 
administration. 
The new Lord John Russell Whig’s administration, halted government food aid and public 
works programs, leaving many hundreds of thousands of people without any work, money or 
food. This decision can be seen as the flip side of the natural rights beliefs. Just as those that 
have property deserve to have it, those that don’t have property don’t deserve to have it. The 
view being clearly articulated by Sir Charles Trevelyan, the man put in charge of the new 
administration’s Irish Famine relief program, who said;  
'The judgement of God sent the calamity to teach the Irish a lesson, that calamity must 
not be too much mitigated.... The real evil with which we have to contend is not the 
physical evil of the famine, but the moral evil of the selfish, perverse and turbulent 
character of the people.'1229  
Instead to helping the poor in Ireland through food aid and public works, this new 
administration instead relied, on the imposition of Poor Laws Acts. These Acts required that local 
community to set up work houses, where the poor were required to work in order to obtain any 
relief. The relief itself to be determined at the discretion of the guardians, who were generally 
the local landowners who had to pay the cost of setting up the work houses. Because the Poor 
Laws forced landlords to provide workhouses and relief, based on the number of tenants that 
had on their land, this provided an incentive for the landlords to evict tenants from their lands. 
These evictions were greatly increased after the English government amended the Poor Laws, 
with the passage of the “Gregory Clause.”1230  Under this clause anyone who held more than a 
quarter of an acre of land, was prohibited from receiving relief. In practice, the Gregory clause 
effectively forced the poor to turn over their very limited property rights over to his landlord. 
This left the now landless poor, with two choices. Either they could be reduced to virtual slaves 
in the work houses or they could emigrate. The emigration option provides a useful transition 
to how Aristocratic property evolved in the New World. 
The evolution to Aristocratic property in the New World can be most easily illustrated by 
comparing the method in which Aristocrats and landless peasants gained property rights in 
America. Whereas the Aristocrats gained vast properties and property rights under Royal 
Charters and Petitions, the landless peasants often had to endure years of unpaid servitude 
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before they were allowed to acquire even minor pieces of property. This difference is on full 
display if one compares the Royal Charters for the Province of Virginia, 1231 with the agreements 
for indentured servitude that the landless peasant had to accept. 
 In the first Virginia Charter1232, King James granted to two companies1233 set up by “Sir Thorn 
as Gales, and Sir George Somers, Knights, Richard Hackluit, Clerk, Prebendary of Westminster, 
and Edward-Maria Wingfield, Thomas Hanharm and Ralegh Gilbert, Esqrs. William Parker, and 
George Popham, Gentlemen, and divers others of our loving Subjects”, land encompassing 
almost the entire east coast of America from Newfoundland to Florida. Under the Charter these 
it was agreed that these Aristocrats “shall have all the Lands, Woods, Soil, Grounds, Havens, 
Ports, Rivers, Mines, Minerals, Marshes, Waters, Fishings, Commodities, and Hereditaments, 
whatsoever, from the said first Seat of their Plantation and Habitation” in return for one fifth of 
any gold, silver and one twentieth of any copper mined in the colonies. This was typical for an 
Aristocratic property transaction, the land was to be theirs with no money down, in return for a 
promise to provide a share of future mineral wealth to the Monarchy. 
Despite this rather generous first grant, within three years it was amended to offer even 
greater inducements to the Aristocracy to take over ownership of the property in the new world. 
In the second and third Virginia Charters, the size of the land granted increased from being 
limited to one hundred miles inland from the east coast to one that went from coast to coast 
and covered most of continental North America. 1234 (See Illustration) As with the previous grant 
this grant too required no money down and had a commitment to provide the Monarchy with a 
similar share of the resources mined in the country.  
 
The basic operating model of these 
companies being that they would 
establish colonies on the lands 
granted and sell parcels of lands to 
new emigrants in order to recoup 
any investments they may have had 
during the initial establishment of 
those colonies. This model made 
two main assumption that proved 
false. The first of which was that it would be easy to colonize the new land, which it was not. 
The second and more important from a property prospective, being that the new emigrants 
would have the resources to pay for the parcels of land that the companies wished to sell, which 
they did not. 
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Not only did the majority of the potential emigrants not have resources to pay for new land, 
most did not even have the resources to pay for transportation to the new colonies. As a result 
from the beginning; the most common way for emigrants to America to get to the colonies was 
through a system of indentured servitude. It has been estimated that the indentured servants 
comprised almost 80% of the total British and continental emigration to America, prior to the 
American Revolution.1235 A typical example of indentured servitude would involve the father of 
a teenage child making a deal with a ship’s captain to provide transportation to the colonies in 
return for a commitment that the teenage would work off the transportation cost when he got 
to there. Generally speaking the legally binding terms of indentured servitude would range from 
3 to 7 years depending on the skills of the teenager.1236 The reasons why a parent of a teenage 
child would agree to such an onerous obligation on the part of their child was because it 
represented the best of three bad options; the other two being, starvation or the virtual slavery 
of a workhouse. Once the captain arrived in America he would sell the indentured servitude 
papers to local plantation owners to recover his costs.1237 The plantation owners, who were 
generally Aristocrats, depended on this cheap labour to both cultivate their fields and serve in 
their households. Even after this period of servitude, many of these immigrants would still have 
no resources to purchase land of their own. As such further years of work would be required 
before they could join the ranks of the landowners,1238 although some indentured servant 
contracts did provided land to newly indentured servants once they completed their contracted 
period of indentured servitude.1239   
While there is no doubt that the demand for European indentured servants was significantly 
reduced by the rise of the African salve trade and the use of indentured Chinese servants, it can 
be credibly argued, that it was the lack of supply of European indentured servants that created 
a need for alternative sources of labour. This reduction in the supply of European indentured 
                                                          
1235 Richard B. Morris, Emergence of American Labor, (U.S. Department of Labor, 2005) 
1236 A typical example of such a indentured servitude contract would be the following contract between Elizabeth 
Adams and Captain William Peice (1635): “This Indenture made the fourteenth day of April 1635 in the tenth yeere 
of the raigne of our soveraigne Lord King Charles I, etc. between Elizabeth Adams of the one party and Captain 
William Peirce on the other party. Witnesseth, that the said Elizabeth Adams doth hereby promise the said Captain 
William Peirce to serve him from the day of her first arrival in Virginia for and during the terme of sevene yeeres. 
The said Captain William Peirce hereby promises to imploy the said Elizabeth Adams as a poultress and not to 
imploy her in the Common workeing in the Grounde. In consideration whereof, the said Captain William Peirce doth 
promise the said Elizabeth Adams to pay for her passage from England to Virginia, and to find her with Meat, 
Drinke, Apparell and Lodging, with other necessaries during the said terme; and at the end of the said terme, to give 
her one whole yeeres provision of Corne and one cast irone pott. In witness whereof the said Captain William Peirce 
hath put his hand and seale, the day and yeere above written.” 
1237 A typical example of such a process is demonstrated in the following advertisement in the Pennsylvania Gazette 
(weekly Philadelphia newspaper), August 17, 1774. “Just imported, on board the Snow Sally, Captain Stephen Jones, 
Master, from England, A number of healthy, stout English and Welsh Servants and Redemptioners, and a few 
Palatines [Germans], amongst whom are the following tradesmen, viz. Blacksmiths, watch-makers, coppersmiths, 
taylors, shoemakers, ship-carpenters and caulkers, weavers, cabinet-makers, ship-joiners, nailers, engravers, 
copperplate printers, plasterers, bricklayers, sawyers and painters. Also schoolmasters, clerks and book-keepers, 
farmers and labourers, and some lively smart boys, fit for various other employments, whose times are to be 
disposed of. Enquire of the Captain on board the vessel, off Walnut-street wharff, or of MEASE and CALDWELL.”  
1238 An Act for all Servants Comeing into the province with Indentures: “That all Servants at the Expiration of their 
Severall times of Service (if there be no other agreement) besides their old Cloathes shall be allowed one Cloth suit 
one pair of Canvis Drawers, one pair of Shoes and stockings one new Hatt or Capp, if he hath not one Sufficient at 
that present, one falling Axe one weeding Hoe, two Shirts and three Barren's of Corne.” 
1239 Indentured Servant Contract between Edward Hurd Citizen and Iron monger of London and Richard Lowther:  
“But alsoe at the expiration of the said terme shall and will graunt assign and allott unto him the said Richard 






servant was a natural reaction to the news of deaths and mistreatment which were filtering back 
to Europe. Unsurprisingly, the prospect of dying in virtual slavery in the new world became a 
less desirable option, than living in virtual slavery of the European workhouses.  
It was only after this decline in the supply of European indentured servants, that the Colonies 
began to provided land as an incentive to immigrate. This change in incentives can be viewed as 
the beginning of the end of Aristocratic property stage. For once the privileged land grants were 
no longer the exclusive domain of the aristocrats, it only was a matter of time before the whole 
concept of aristocratic property would be called into question.1240 Generally these questions 
resolved around the status of the both the landless peasant and the merchants in a society and 
the rising expectations of both groups. From the context of attempting to define a time frame 
for the end of the aristocratic property it is worth noting that indentured servitude was still 
practiced in America up to 1885 when it was outlawed.1241 That this date was twenty years after 
the American Civil War which abolished slavery, speaks volumes about Aristocratic resistance to 
an evolution from an Aristocratic property stage. 
As far as the merchants were concerned it should be recalled that the rise of the merchant 
class began during the noble property stage when the merchants, nobles and aristocrats came 
to realize the importance of the merchants in the social, economic and military affairs of the 
society. This importance was driven by the expansion of trade between societies. As societies 
became more dependent foreign goods, not only did these merchants became a more critical 
component in the local economy because of their trading activities, but also because of the 
wealth that those trading activities generated. As was discussed in the noble property stage it 
was this wealth that financed the military and gave the merchants a seat at the table when policy 
was being decided in any given society.  
To the extent this rise in the merchant class expanded dramatically during the aristocratic 
property stage it could be said the it was part of the that stage. Alternatively, it could be said 
that because the people and property involved in the rise of the merchant class were so different 
from those directly associated with the aristocratic property stage, it should be treated as 
separate stage. This second approach would be supported by the traditional analysis that 
identifies a new economic model called mercantilism, which arose towards the end of the 
aristocratic property stage. This second approach is also supported by a growing recognition 
that property, was not just land but anything which could produce profits for its owners. 
Despite the merits of this second approach, there is one particular aspect of the rise of the 
merchant class that would appear to place it firmly in the aristocratic property stage. That aspect 
being that a significant part of the mercantile activities, involved the granting of privileged 
trading rights to government-chartered trading companies. For so long as trading rights were 
limited by these government granted monopolies, and those monopolies provided 
opportunities to only a few select merchants, there can be no doubt that it represented another 
form of aristocratic property. For proof of these aristocratic tendencies one need only look at 
the largest and most important trading companies that dominated the so called mercantile 
                                                          
1240 An interesting side note to this point is that both Benjamin Franklin and Andrew Johnson were bound 
apprentices, who came from circumstances similar to indentured servants. Bound apprentices were bound out to 
work as an apprentice until a certain age. Usually they either were orphans or from an impoverished family who 
could not care for them. Both Franklin and Jackson fled their apprenticeships before they were over. Benjamin 
Franklin went on to become a founding father of the United States, while Andrew Johnson became America’s 17th 
President.  






economic period. While the list of these companies is long,1242 there are a two that stand out 
from the others in terms the magnitude of their operations and the exclusive nature of their 
ownership and these are; The (English) East India Company (1600), and The Dutch East India 
Company (1602). 
The East India Company was granted a Royal Charter under the name “Governor and 
Company of Merchants of London Trading into the East Indies”, by Queen Elizabeth I, on 31 
December 1600. As the name indicates, the company was formed by a group of London 
businessmen who came together to make money importing spices from South Asia. Under the 
charter its 215 original shareholders were granted a 13-year monopoly on trade Southern Sea 
Routes with territories or countries east of the Cape of Good Hope (the southern tip of Africa) 
and west of the Straits of Magellan (the southern tip of South America).1243 
The objective of the Charter was to facilitate a secure supply of goods from the Far East for 
England. The new secure supply of goods was needed because during the Protestant 
Reformation; the Catholic countries who dominated the trade, cut off the supply of Far Eastern 
goods to England. 1244 The Charters themselves were consider by the Monarchy to be a natural 
and inexpensive solution to this problem. It was natural because monopolies were at that time, 
considered to be a normal practice as far as commerce was concerned. This is evident not only 
in the monopolies that were granted to various trade guilds, but also in the monopolies granted 
by Papal Bulls as a result of discover and monopolies derived from effective occupation after 
                                                          
1242 Significant Charter Companies: English and British; Company of Merchant Adventurers to New Lands  (1553), 
Muscovy Company (1555), Spanish Company (1577), Eastland Company (1579), Turkey Company (1581), Morocco 
Company (1588), East India Company (1600), New River Company (1604), Levant Company (1605), Virginia 
Company (1606), French Company (1609), London and Bristol Company (1610), Somers Isles Company 
(1616),Massachusetts Bay Company (1629), Providence Island Company (1629), Royal West Indian Company 
(1664),Hudson's Bay Company (1670), Royal African Company (1672), Greenland Company (1693), 1711  South Sea 
Company (1711), Sierra Leone Company (1792), African Company of Merchants (1752-1821), Van Diemen's Land 
Company (1824), South Australian Company (1835), New Zealand Company (1839), Eastern Archipelago Company 
(1847), British North Borneo Company (1881), Royal Niger Company (1886), British South Africa Company (1889). 
Scottish; Guinea Company of Scotland (1634), Company of Scotland (1698). French; Company of One Hundred 
Associates (1613), Compagnie des Îles de l'Amérique (1635), Compagnie de Chine (1660), Compagnie de l'Occident 
(1664), Compagnie des Indes Orientales (1664), Compagnie des Indes occidentales (1664), Compagnie du 
Mississippi (1717). German; Brandenburg African Company (1682), Emden Company (1752), German West African 
Company (1882), German New Guinea Company (1884), German East Africa Company (1884), Astrolabe Company 
(1891). Portuguese;  Companhia da Guiné (1482), Portuguese East India Company (1628), Companhia de 
Moçambique (1888), Companhia do Niassa (1891). Dutch;  1602 Dutch East India Company (1602), Nordic 
Company (1614), New Netherland Company (1614), Dutch West India Company (1621), Ostend Company (1717). 
Scandinavian; Stora Enso (1347), Danish East India Company (1616), New Sweden Company (1638), Swedish Africa 
Company (1649), Danish West India Company (1671), Swedish East India Company (1731), Swedish Levant Company 
(1738), Royal Greenland (1774), Swedish West India Company (1786). Russian; Russian American Company (1799).  
1243 Other trade routes including northern sea routes or overland routes through Turkey were not restricted by this 
the grant of this monopoly. However northern routes proved infeasible and the overland routes were restricted by 
Portuguese and Spanish control of the Mediterranean. 
1244 The Catholic domination of the Far East trade and American trade was initiated when Portugal was granted a 
monopoly on Far East trade by the Romanus Pontifex, a papal bull written in 1455 and expanded when Spain was 
granted a monopoly on American trade by the Inter Caetera Divinai dated the 4th May 1493. (both papal bulls are 
discussed in the earlier in the Royal Property stage). These monopolies were combined under one authority in 1580 
when the Portuguese King died without a successor, and Spain and Portugal were merged under a single Monarch. 
During most of the intervening years both Portugal and Spain maintained their monopolies as a result of other 
European Monarchs respecting that papal authority in this matter. This all changed during the Protestant 
Reformation. Because of the Reformation, Protestant nations no longer recognised the authority of the Pope.   
Further after the defeat of the Spanish Amada in 1588 the Catholic Monarchs ability exert military control over sea 






discovery. It was inexpensive in that the enterprise was financed by private parties and not the 
Monarchy. 
However, despite the objective or the reasons for establishing the Charter, it had to be 
considered an aristocratic enterprise for three reasons. First the initial share price for the initial 
investors was so high that only the very wealth could participate.1245 Second the ability of 
subsequent potential investors to join the enterprise was limited.1246 And finally and most 
importantly the extension of the Charter by subsequent Monarchs and Parliament,1247 which 
allowed one company to maintain an effective trade monopoly, representing 15% of British 
trade, for 250 years. That such a huge trading opportunity should be granted to a single company 
for such an extended period of time can only be describe as an aristocratic property structure, 
even if it had not resulted in the company becoming the corporate sovereign ruler of India. 
A similar analysis can be used to describe the Dutch East India Company. It too had a Charter 
from a Protestant nation seeking to avoid the Far East trade restrictions imposed by the Catholic 
Monarchs of Spain.1248 Under that Charter it too was granted a monopoly for trade between the 
countries east of the Cape of Good Hope and west of the Straits of Magellan. The main 
differences between the (English) East India Company and the Dutch East India company were 
the initial size and scope of its initial share offering. Unlike the English, the Dutch company was 
set up on a much more inclusive basis, with all Low country merchants involved or interested in 
Far East trade being offered an opportunity to participate. This allowed the company to raise 
significantly more capital, an enormous 6,500,000 florins, (£540,000)1249 which was eight times 
the initial English offering. The company used this money not to finance single voyages to the 
Far East but to set up a nationalized Far East trade conglomerate that would oversee all aspect 
of trade with the Far East. Which under the terms of the Charter, provided them with the 
authority to not only trade but to; establish colonies, construct forts, to make peace treaties 
with friendly Far East rulers, to make war with unfriendly Far East rulers, and to seize foreign 
ships that attempted to break their monopoly. While the initial offering of the Dutch East India 
Company was more inclusive; it is still fair to say that given the broader scope of the Charter, 
this too has to be considered a privileged property grant which would meet the definition of 
aristocratic property. 
Further it should be noted; given the overlapping nature of the two Charters it was inevitable 
that the English and Dutch would come into conflict over Far East trade.1250 While these disputes 
                                                          
1245 The initial price for the shares was £200, which adjusting for earnings would be roughly equivalent to £400,000 
in 2010 currency. Using the same adjustments this would make the entire initial offering of £68,373 worth £ 
136,740,000 in 2010 currency.   
1246While the profits from the voyages were extremely high subsequent offering were needed as each voyage was 
treated as a one off investment. It was anticipated that investors would use the profits from earlier voyages to 
finance future voyages. Participation in the subsequent offerings were initially not public and usually limited to 
previous participants or their male children, although this did change in later decades.  
1247 Charter which was renewed for an indefinite period by King James I in 1609, and British Crown finally took over 
rule of the India from the company in under the Government of India Act 1858. 
1248 Holland and the other Low countries had formed part of the Spanish Empire prior to the Reformation and were 
fighting Spain for Independence. They were particularly concerned because until the restrictions were imposed 
Amsterdam and Antwerp were the principle ports used by the Spanish to import to Far East goods into mainland 
Europe. The restriction of these imports therefore represented a very real threat to their economies.  
1249 Adjusted for earnings this would equate to £1.08 billion in 2010 currency. 
1250 In anticipation of this inevitability conflict the second Dutch Charter included specific clause which detailed the 
government’s military response to it. Charter of the Dutch East India Company (1621), Article XL “And if by a violent 
and continued interruption of the aforesaid navigation and traffic, the business within the limits of their Company 






were not immediate, they certainly were a major underlying factor in the first Anglo Dutch war 
of 1652, and a significant contributing factor in the following three Anglo-Dutch wars.1251 That a 
nation should go to war over the privileged trade monopolies granted to the aristocratic 
members of its society, provides fairly conclusive evidence that of the existence of an aristocratic 
property.  
In so far as; all of the aristocratic property examples presented provided special privileges to 
the aristocracy, usually to the detriment of the non-aristocratic members of society, it could be 
assumed that overall society benefited little from its evolution. This assumption would be false. 
It is false because of the overall advances in the productivity of in all forms of property was so 
great during this stage; that it was inevitable that some of the benefits from that productivity 
increase would flow to all members of society. In the agricultural property these productivity 
increases came from things like better crop rotations and mechanization. In merchant property 
the development of extensive trading activities carried on by the trading houses, allowed for 
greater specialization of manufacturing activities which in turn allowed for mechanization and 
the division of labour in a manner that dramatically increase productivity.1252 To the extent these 
increase in productivity were made possible by the creation and adoption of legally protected 
private property rights, the aristocratic property stage certainly has to be considered a positive 
influence on societies.  
                                                          
their assistance sixteen ships of war, the least one hundred and fifty lasts burthen; with four good well sailing 
yachts, the least, forty lasts burthen, which shall be properly mounted and provided in all respects, both with brass 
and other cannon, and a proper quantity of ammunition, together with double suits of running and standing rigging, 
sails, cables, anchors, and other things thereto belonging, such as are proper to be provided and used in all great 
expeditions; upon condition, that they shall be manned, victualled, and supported at the expense of the Company, 
and that the Company shall be obliged to add thereto sixteen like ships of war, and four yachts, mounted and 
provided as above, to be used in like manner for the defence of trade and all exploits of war: Provided that all the 
ships of war and merchant-men (that shall be with those provided and manned as aforesaid) shall be under an 
admiral appointed by us according to the previous advise of the aforesaid General Company, and shall obey our 
commands, together with the resolutions of the Company, if it shall be necessary, in the same manner as in time of 
war; so notwithstanding that the merchantmen shall not unnecessarily hazard their lading.”  
1251While the 1st War (1652–1654) was principally about trade conflicts, the 2nd (1665–1667), 3rd (1672–1674) and 
4th (1780–1784) were principally about conflicting claims to the Monarch of England and Holland, although there 
was a significant underlying trade dispute.  
1252 Adam Smith described an example of this in  The Wealth of Nations (Book l, Ch. 1) when he described the 
change brought about by the division of labour for the production of pins: “To take an example, therefore, from a 
very trifling manufacture; but one in which the division of labour has been very often taken notice of, the trade of 
the pin-maker; a workman not educated to this business (which the division of labour has rendered a distinct trade),  
nor acquainted with the use of the machinery employed in it (to the invention of which the same division of labour 
has probably given occasion), could scarce, perhaps, with his utmost industry, make one pin in a day, and certainly 
could not make twenty. But in the way in which this business is now carried on, not only the whole work is a 
peculiar trade, but it is divided into a number of branches, of which the greater part are likewise peculiar trades. 
One man draws out the wire, another straights it, a third cuts it, a fourth points it, a fifth grinds it at the top for 
receiving the head; to make the head requires two or three distinct operations; to put it on, is a peculiar business, 
to whiten the pins is another; it is even a trade by itself to put them into the paper; and the important business of 
making a pin is, in this manner, divided into about eighteen distinct operations, which, in some manufactories, are 
all performed by distinct hands, though in others the same man will sometimes perform two or three of them.  I 
have seen a small manufactory of this kind where ten men only were employed, and where some of them 
consequently performed two or three distinct operations. But though they were very poor, and therefore but 
indifferently accommodated with the necessary machinery, they could, when they exerted themselves, make 
among them about twelve pounds of pins in a day. There are in a pound upwards of four thousand pins of a 
middling size. Those ten persons, therefore, could make among them upwards of forty-eight thousand pins in a day. 
Each person, therefore, making a tenth part of forty-eight thousand pins, might be considered as making four 






However, it also must be acknowledged that these increases in productivity were significantly 
delayed by the very concentration of property ownership, that was inherent in the aristocratic 
property right stage. This because highly concentrated wealth during the stage, not only limited 
the economic development opportunities of the rest of the population, but it requires that those 
that have the wealth to be actively engaged in trying to achieve economic development. 
Unfortunately, the reality of the aristocratic life during this stage was that most were more 
concerned with maintaining their superior living standards, rather than furthering the economic 
well-being of society as a whole. Further because the aristocracy was based on birth and not 
competence, this also contributed to a general lack ability of innovation during this stage. Taken 
together the lack of interest and the lack of ability, explains why innovation took so long to be 
developed and be adopted during the 200 odd years when the aristocratic property stage was 
the principle ownership structure. 
As mentioned in previous stages although the aristocratic property described in this stage 
were representative of the principal ownership structure during the stage, this should not be 
mistaken for an assumption that the aristocrats owned all property in the aristocratic property 
stage. This clearly was not the case. Regardless of whether it was the tenant farmers in Ireland, 
indentured servants in America, or the general merchants during the mercantile period, many 
others owned or after much struggle were able to own increasing amounts of property. This 
gradual change in the nature of property ownership is why the property continuum is presented 
as an evolutionary and not revolutionary change in property structures. That being said, after 
these non-aristocratic property owners eventually reached a critical mass, the shift from the 
concentrated property phase to a universal property phase did have certain revolutionary 
components. Not the least among these were the political revolutions that took place in America 
(1775–83) and the France (1789–1799).  
Ironically these political revolutions sought inspiration from the very same writing of John 
Locke, that were used to justify the aristocratic property stage. It has to be remembered that his 
thoughts on property were contained in his Treatise on Government,1253 which challenged the 
legitimacy of the absolute authority of the Monarchy. While these views resonated with the 
landed aristocracy they had an even greater impact on the merchants and landless peasant. If 
the Government was truly to represent the will of the majority,1254 why should the majority will 
be limited to the Aristocracy? It was the merchants that were able to exploit this contradiction, 
by pointing out that as wealth generators they deserved to have a greater say in Government. 
And once they had a say in government, it became inevitable that the demands of the rest of 
the people would also have to be heard. In the case of both the French and the American 
revolutions, when the aristocrats refused to hear the people, the people simply got rid of the 
aristocrats. 
Of course, it could be argued that this preferential treatment of aristocrats in both Europe 
and the New World was only a reflection of the reality that the accumulated wealth of the world 
was in the hands of the aristocrats and as such it was not aristocratic property stage but rather 
of some sort of new economic property stage. This assessment might be appropriate if one were 
to ignore; the legal privileges that encouraged concentrated property ownership under the 
                                                          
1253 Locke, Two Treatise of Government 
1254 Id. para. 96 “For, when any number of men have, by the consent of every individual, made a community, they 
have thereby made that community one body, with a power to act as one body, which is only by the will and 






aristocrats, the legal structures that maintained that concentrated property ownership, the legal 
restrictions on property ownership faced by certain non-aristocrats of society, as well as the 
practical obstacles to property ownership faced by the emerging non-aristocratic.  
As the earlier examples illustrate, the legal privileges were the exclusive property deals which 
provided aristocrats with property in return for some vague commitment to develop it and 
provide a share the future wealth with the monarchy. Once the practice of giving property to 
encourage development was expanded to all citizens, it could be argued that this was a clear 
indication of an evolution away from the aristocratic property stage. The legal structures that 
maintained aristocratic property stage included the special tax dispensations, the favouritism 
provided to aristocrats by the court in property disputes and the inheritance practices regarding 
aristocratic property called primogeniture. Of these legal structures the one that had the greater 
practical impact had to be the practice of primogeniture.  
Primogeniture is a system of inheritance commenced in the middle ages, where all property 
is handed down to the first-born, usually a first-born son. The aristocracy adopted this practice 
and laws as a means to prevent the splitting of estates, titles and privileges that went with them. 
Not only did this prevent the splitting of estates in the initial inheritance process, this same 
system often prevented subsequent disposal of property by requiring the beneficiary to ensure 
that he pasted on the same sized estate to his eldest child. All this meant that the property 
remained firmly entrench in the hands of one aristocratic owner for centuries. Adam Smith1255 
explained the rationale behind primogeniture as follows: 
'When land was considered as the means, not of subsistence merely, but of power and 
protection, it was thought better that it should descend undivided to one. In those 
disorderly times, every great landlord was a sort of petty prince. His tenants were his 
subjects. He was their judge, and in some respects their legislator in peace and their 
leader in war. He made war according to his own discretion, frequently against his 
neighbours, and sometimes against his sovereign. The security of a landed estate, 
therefore, the protection which its owner could afford to those who dwelt on it, 
depended upon its greatness. To divide it was to ruin it, and to expose every part of it 
to be oppressed and swallowed up by the incursions of its neighbours. The law of 
primogeniture, therefore, came to take place, not immediately indeed, but in process of 
time, in the succession of landed estates, for the same reason that it has generally taken 
place in that of monarchies, though not always at their first institution.'1256 
The primogeniture system itself came under attack from several quarters in the Western 
world in the latter part of the eighteenth century as a result of a growing resistance against the 
privileges of the landed aristocracy and a desire to release land into the open market. It was first 
abolished in New England and then in the United States following the American Revolution. The 
French Revolution brought the system to a halt in France, and the Napoleonic Code, which 
specified minimal amounts of estates to be given to each child, prevented its resurrection. In 
England the British Parliament finally abolished the intergenerational mandatory primogeniture 
                                                          
1255 Adam Smith was an 18th century Scottish social and economic philosopher. 
1256 Smith, Adam, An Inquiry Into The Nature And Cause Of The Wealth Of Nations, originally (London W. Strahan 






in 1925,1257 although even today it is still practiced on a voluntary basis. Only after these changes 
to inheritance rules were enacted can it truly be said the legal structure designed to maintain 
aristocratic property came to an end. 
With respect to the legal restrictions these involved specific restrictions against certain 
segments of society which prohibited them from participating in property ownership. As 
mentioned in the Irish example this could involve prohibiting Catholics from owning 
property.1258 These artificial legal barriers to property ownership were easily be rectified by 
abolishing the laws that enacted and enforced them. 
The practical obstacles however were more challenging. As long as the economic activity of 
a society was primarily base on agriculture and ownership of that land was concentrated and 
controlled by the aristocracy; there was little opportunity for others to participate in the 
economic development of that society. Further to the extent that the landed aristocracy were 
more concerned with maintaining their privileged position than with expanding economic 
opportunities for the society as a whole, there would be only be limited possibilities others to 
benefit from the what little economic development that existed. It was this general lack of 
economic development and the possibilities to participate in that economic development that 
was the greatest practical obstacles to the evolution from the aristocratic stage. However, that 
would all change with the growth of merchant activities, the coming of the industrial revolution 
and the vast quantities of property which became available in the New World. 
14.3 THE UNIVERSAL PROPERTY PHASE 
The universal property phase is the last evolutionary phase on the property continuum. This 
phase was only possible after the creation and adoption (evolution) of legally protected private 
property rights that took place under the previous noble and aristocratic property stages.1259 
What differentiates the universal property phase from the final stages of the concentrated 
property phase is that in this phase it became legal and practical possibility of all individuals in 
society to own property.1260 The key conditions that made this evolution possible were changes 
in the law which recognised the right of all members of society to participate in property 
ownership, a change in the availability of property, as well as the creation of private resources 
sufficient to allow individual property acquisition.  
The first of these conditions was driven by the political change that recognised the equality 
of individual in society and therefore the required the provision of equal property rights under 
the law. This political change was most clearly demonstrated in the American and French 
                                                          
1257 The Law of Property Act (1925), sec 161 Abolition of the double possibility rule. “The rule of law prohibiting the 
limitation, after a life interest to an unborn person, of an interest in land to the unborn child or other issue of an 
unborn person is hereby abolished, but without prejudice to any other rule relating to perpetuities.” 
1258 Prohibitions on Jewish property ownership could provide other examples.   
1259 It should be noted that private property rights were in the process of evolving during the early common 
property phase but that evolutionary process was interrupted by the concentrated property phase.  As such while 
the noble and aristocratic property stages certainly do deserve recognition for creating and adopting private 
property rights, that recognition needs to be tempered with an additional recognition that the concentration of 
property ownership under the concentrated property phase in many ways represented an unnecessary, 
counterproductive detour in the evolutionary process. 
1260 It should be noted that such a differentiation does not require the additional conditions that all individuals own 
property, nor that property ownership be evenly distributed amongst those that do own property.  All that is 







revolutions, both of which sought to over throw aristocratic government authority and the 
aristocratic property structures that supported them. In America this meant rejecting the 
aristocratic rule of England and its imposition of unjust taxes and trade policies on American 
colonies by fighting for independence. In France this meant eliminating feudal, aristocratic and 
religious privileges by eliminating the entire ruling class. In both cases the new constitutional 
foundations included a recognition of obligation of government to protect the right of all citizen 
to private property. In America this protection was enacted under “The Bill of Rights”1261 and in 
France in the “Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen”.1262 The property rights 
included in these foundational liberal documents being spread to other societies over time. 
As far as availability of property was concerned, there was of course a dramatic increase in 
traditional real property that became available in with the discovery of the Americas,1263 
however the more significant change in the availability of property came from the development 
of new forms of commercial property resulting from both trade and industrial development. 
While the expansion of trade related properties continued its rapid expansion which began at 
the end of the previous stage, it was the explosion of new forms of property resulting from the 
industrial revolution that represented the most significant increase in available property. 
Indeed, so dramatic was the increase in industrial property, that it forced a dramatic redefinition 
of the very notion of property. No longer was property primarily the physical land used for 
agriculture and mining, but instead it became any assets that were capable of generating income 
or providing other benefits for its owners. 
Of course, it was not only the dramatic expansion of new commercial property that was 
significant. Of at least equal significance was that fact that this property was to a large extent 
created and owned by people that did not belong to the traditional aristocratic class. The 
significance of the more pluralistic property ownership participation cannot be over 
emphasised. Obviously, it was very significant from the practical prospective of providing non-
aristocrats with the resources to participate in property ownership, while raising the 
productivity and welfare of society in general. However, the perhaps the most important 
significance was that it demonstrated the unrecognised and underutilized capability of ordinary 
citizen. It has to be remembered that the entire concentrated property phase had as its 
foundations, the concept that only the elite were capable of managing property productively. 
Once the dynamic entrepreneurial energy of ordinary people was released from the constraints 
of the privileged property rights, the myth of aristocratic superiority was shattered. This change 
in perspective was in essence an act of creative destruction, forever eliminating the possibility 
of returning to the old concentrated property stages. 
Central to this new phase was a change in the underlying justification of property rights. This 
justification came from the nothing less than the capitalistic market ideas that was to 
revolutionize commerce in societies that adopted it. Under the capitalist system the justification 
for property rights became one of "economic efficiency" and it is this new justification that 
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became the corner stone of all the various stages in the universal phase. The difference in the 
various stages representing little more than the difference on how best to achieve this economic 
efficiency. Because this justification was interpreted differently in the various stages that make 
up the universal property phase it only makes sense to explain the nuances of the justification 
in the actual stages.  
As to the actual stages it should be mentioned at the outset that in essence there were really 
only two stages in this phase, the "free market" stage and the "regulated market" stage. 
However, because regulated market stages evolved over time the regulated stage will be divided 
in sub-stages that will be represented as separate stages in order to facilitate a better 
understanding of their implication for property rights. Using this form of categorisation, it is 
possible to derive the following stages in the universal property phase.   
The first stage of the universal property phase can be described as the free market property 
stage. It can be described as the free market stage because it was based on rigid concepts of the 
free market which were adopted in early capitalistic models. These concepts basically allowed 
property owners absolute authority over their properties in the belief that such absolute rights 
would ensure they had both the tools and incentive to maximum economic efficiency. From 
historical prospective this stage probably started sometime around the beginning of the 
industrial revolution although it could be argued that it really began after Adam Smith penned 
his revolutionary works on the Wealth of Nations.1264 It is during this stage of the universal 
property phase, that property owners have the greatest flexibility of do whatever they want 
with their property regardless of the consequence for other members of society. The end of this 
stage can be reliably identified as happening in the fall of 1929 with the stock market crash that 
originated in America and quickly spread to almost every country in the world, resulting in the 
Great Depression. At the time it was thought the crash and consequent depression were a direct 
result of an over reliance on free markets forces and it was that belief resulted in the end of the 
free market property stage. 
What followed the free market property stage were a series of three regulated property 
stages, with incrementally decreasing levels of regulation. The first regulated property stage can 
be defined as a "directed property" stage. Under this stage governments took a much more 
direct and active role in management of property. While the catalysts for this stage were the 
economic failures that resulted from the free market stage, there was also a new economic 
theory that provided its inspiration and justification. Because this new theory has been primarily 
attributed to John Maynard Keynes1265 it is usually referred to as Keynesian Economics. The just 
of Keynes economic theory was that by using technical analysis it was possible to identify 
business cycles, which the government could mitigate through the use of fiscal and monetary 
measures, thereby avoiding recessions and depressions.1266  
Inherent in this theory was the notion that government was a better director of 
macroeconomic affairs than the private markets. A notion that was later distorted into one that 
suggested that government could also be a better director of micro economic affairs. 
Specifically, that government had an obligation to direct the affairs of industries critical to 
economic efficiency. In the extreme this meant the nationalization of industries, but other more 
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moderate measures included things like price controls, and production quotas. In order to 
facilitate these micro economic controls numerous commissions or committees were establish 
run by a bureaucracy of public servants.  
The problem with this stage was that it turned out that this government bureaucracy was 
less capable of managing industries than they thought they were. A point which had been 
claimed and promoted by another prominent economist of the time called, Friedrich August 
Hayek.1267 While the challenges to economic efficiency of stage was the primary reason for the 
evolution to a lower level of regulation, another reason was the fear that this form of regulation 
would inevitably lead to Fascism or Communism, was also a significant factor. 
The next stage on the evolutionary continuum saw a lessening of government regulations 
which can best be described as switching regulatory practices from; telling property owners 
what to do, to telling property owners what they could not do. It is because of this change in 
regulatory practices, that this stage can be defined as the "restricted property" stage. From a 
property prospective this stage is notable in that it advanced the concept of property ownership 
representing a bundle of rights.1268 This conception reframed the dynamics of government 
intervention in property from one of violating property right, to one of rearranging or redefining 
the bundle. In this stage a major part of the regulatory restrictions involved new competition 
rules, although there were also significant increases in regulatory restriction other areas like; 
health and safety and the environmental concern. These restrictions formed what has been 
described as black letter law, and from a jurisprudence prospective it was the letter of this law 
became the dominate factor in determining ownership rights. While restrictions might have 
been compulsory, if any right was not restricted that right still remained within the absolute 
dominion of the property owner. In the first half of this stage the number and scope of 
restrictions was expanded as regulators sought to correct perceived market failures as they 
arose. However, in the second half of this stage the number of restrictions declined as under 
certain circumstances those same black letter restrictions were shown to be economically 
inefficient. It was the eventual demise of these black letter restrictions that marked the end of 
the restricted property stage and the evolution to a new stage.  
The next stage on the property continuum can be defined as the "supervised property" stage. 
This stage was notable by the aggressive attacks that were made on regulations and specifically 
"per se" regulations. The proposed replacement being government supervision and action only 
against abuses which were determined according to the "rule of reason". To the extent that the 
proponents of these attacks were un-abased supporters of a free market ideology, it was in 
many ways represented a revival of the free market stage which had existed earlier. There were 
two reasons why this revival was possible.  
The first was that fifty years had elapse since the end of the last free market stage and there 
was a new generation who too far removed from the great depression to recognise the dire 
consequences free market abuses can have on a society. Second there can be little question that 
during the restrictive stage regulators and their proponents had overextended their reach and 
were attempting to regulate too many aspects of the economy with rules which were too rigid. 
The greatest overreach being evident in competition law where they were using per se rules; 
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which automatically deemed unlawful certain activities regardless of the fact that in certain 
circumstances these actions had little anti-competitive effect. It was this specific incongruity that 
the neo-classical free market proponents used to discredit, not just competition regulations, but 
all regulations.  
As mentioned the success of these attacks led to the replacement of "per se" rules with the 
"rule of reason", which in and of itself can be considered a good thing. For rather than declaring 
a whole category of activities as unlawful, each individual case should have been judged on its 
own merit. However, problem was that it this stage did not change competition law, it 
eviscerated it without allowing other safeguards to be instituted in other bodies of law. Which 
to a large extent converted this supervised stage into an "unsupervised property" stage. For 
while this allowed companies to become more profitable, it also produced many of the same 
negative by-products which were experienced in the previous free market stage. Specifically, it 
created entities which were too big to fail and dramatically increased income inequality. The net 
result of this stage, as could be expected, was the massive recession which occurred in 2008. 
While it appears that the worse of that that recession has been overcome, it did prompt a 
revaluation of neo-classical ideology which is yet to acted upon. If and when it is acted upon it 
will likely mean the end of the supervised stage. 
Assuming that this (un)supervised stage comes to an end it may be replaced by a stage based 
not on increased government regulation, but on respect for the property rights of others. which 
will personify the Latin maxim "sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas" (Don't use your property to 
harm the property of others). If this stage does develop the most appropriate name for it will be 
the "correlated rights property" stage. 
14.3.1 Free Market Stage 
Whereas under the previous stages, property ownership was largely defined by ownership 
of land, under this stage new forms of property became the dominate form of wealth. The first 
new form of property being the trading houses that were able to provide their owners with 
profits from trading activities and second new form of property being factories that provided 
their owners with profits from manufacturing operations. This represented a dramatic and 
significant shift in the nature of property which involved an equally dramatic shift in justification. 
There was however one aspect of the nature of property that did not change with the evolution 
of this stage. This was the absolute nature of property rights that was established in the 
aristocratic property stage and subsequently entrenched during the free market stage. 
The establishment of absolute property rights during the aristocratic property stage can be 
seen most clearly in the enclosure example which was presented. Whereas under previous 
stages the owners of property were bound by divine social convention to look out for the welfare 
of their tenants and servants, during the aristocratic property stage these conventions were 
abandoned. This shift towards absolute property rights was made by the possible by the 
adoption of the natural right justification. Whereas previous justification of divine rights 
included an inherent moral obligation to look after the welfare of the poor, this new natural 
right justification contained no such obligation.  
To the extent that natural rights justification implied any moral requirements it was to the 
ensure that the property was to be used to advance the political and economic standing of the 






go un-noticed and resulted in a new justification for property rights. Under this new justification, 
the cause and effect of this observation were simply inverted. Rather than self-interest being 
the natural outcome of serving the national interests, self-interest was portrayed as serving the 
national interest. The most important difference of new justification was that; the former 
implied that the state should play a centralized role in property matters, whereas the later 
assumed that there was no need for this centralized role. The absolute right of property owners 
being common to both justifications.  
This new justification was initially enunciated by the father of modern economics, Adam 
Smith in his “Inquiry into the Nature and Wealth of Nations”1269 which was published in 1776, 
the year of American independence. In this work Smith explains how the welfare of a nation is 
best advanced by allowing the free market to determine optimal levels of production and 
consumptions of goods. The most famous concept included in this, and his earlier works, was 
the idea of an "invisible hand" which is interpreted as a free market providing the self-regulating 
measures necessary to guide the markets towards ever increasing prosperity. Specifically, the 
theory of the invisible hand suggests that that if consumers are allowed to choose freely what 
to buy and producers are allowed to choose freely what to sell and how to produce it, the market 
will settle on a product distribution and prices that are beneficial to all the individual members 
of a community, and hence to the community as a whole. This reasoning being articulated by 
Smith in his most famous quote; 
“Whoever offers to another a bargain of any kind, proposes to do this. Give me that 
which I want, and you shall have this which you want, is the meaning of every such 
offer; and it is in this manner that we obtain from one another the far greater part of 
those good offices which we stand in need of. It is not from the benevolence of the 
butcher, the brewer or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to 
their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, 
and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantage”1270  
Smith uses the actual term invisible hand in a later quote when he wrote: 
“As every individual, therefore, endeavours as much as he can both to employ his 
capital in the support of domestic industry, and so to direct that industry that its 
produce may be of the greatest value; every individual necessarily labours to render 
the annual revenue of the society as great as he can. He generally, indeed, neither 
intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it. By 
preferring the support of domestic to that of foreign industry, he intends only his own 
security; and by directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the 
greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, 
led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. Nor is it 
always the worse for the society that it was no part of it. By pursuing his own interest 
he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really 
intends to promote it. I have never known much good done by those who affected to 
trade for the public good. It is an affectation, indeed, not very common among 
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merchants, and very few words need be employed in dissuading them from it.” [Italic 
Added]1271  
According to this theory because the butcher, the brewer and the baker have to provide their 
goods and services in a free market, they will have to produce them in an efficient manner and 
sell them at a fair price, otherwise their customers will buy their products from their competitors 
who provide the same products at better prices either because they produce them more 
efficiently and/or price them more competitively. Further because these competitors are 
constantly competing for customers they will continuously seek more efficient methods of 
producing their products which will result in better prices for consumers therefore benefiting 
the entire community. Finally, because the most efficient commercial enterprises will earn the 
highest returns for their owner’s investors, they will provide them with necessary financing to 
enable further efficiencies. This dynamic and automatic market adjustment power representing 
the invisible hand of capitalism.1272 
While the theory of an invisible hand represented the core of justification for free markets 
and it should be noted that Smith was not without concerns about viability. Particularly he was 
concerned about the potential power of market participants to avoid the free market through 
collusion and the ability of government to warp the market through unfair regulation. With 
respect to the market collusion he warned; 
“People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, 
but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to 
raise prices. It is impossible indeed to prevent such meetings, by any law which either 
could be executed, or would be consistent with liberty or justice. But though the law 
cannot hinder people of the same trade from sometimes assembling together, it ought 
to do nothing to facilitate such assemblies; much less to render them necessary.” 1273 
Included in this quote is an expression of the inability of government to prevent market 
collusion and a hint of its tendency to exacerbate it. These sentiments toward government 
regulation were expanded in his specific quotes on regulation which were; 
“The proposal of any new law or regulation of commerce which comes from this order, 
ought always to be listened to with great precaution, and ought never to be adopted 
till after having been long and carefully examined, not only with the most scrupulous, 
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but with the most suspicious attention. It comes from an order of men, whose interest 
is never exactly the same with that of the public, who have generally an interest to 
deceive and even to oppress the public, and who accordingly have, upon many 
occasions, both deceived and oppressed it,"1274 and “To give the monopoly of the 
home-market to the produce of domestic industry, in any particular art or 
manufacture, is in some measure to direct private people in what manner they ought 
to employ their capitals, and must, in almost all cases, be either a useless or a hurtful 
regulation.”1275 
That Smith should be predisposed to a negative view government regulation should not be 
surprising given the blatant biases shown by government interference during the previous 
aristocratic property stage. And there can be little dispute that the initial removal of privileges 
created through governmental interference in many ways did open up the markets and allow 
for dramatic increases in efficiency of producers and markets in general. However, this one-
dimensional preconception of governmental interference had another unintended 
consequence. For while the advocates of free market may have believed that the invisible hand 
would produce the best outcomes, they failed to recognise that the absence of government 
involvement in the markets, do not necessarily result in free markets. Indeed, it was the very 
fear of government involvement in markets that restricted the ability of government to protect 
employees, consumers and investors from markets abuses that resulted in restricted markets 
that were anything but free. The restrictions being imposed not by government regulations; but 
by powerful property owners that sought to control the markets for solely for their own benefit 
and to the detriment of society as a whole.  
It is the understanding of this dynamic that not only explains the rise of the free market 
property stage, but its decline. For although the introduction of the free market economy 
facilitated a huge increase in the productivity, it was the ever-increasing abuses of the free 
market system for purpose of diverting those same benefits in to the possession of a few 
powerful property owners that resulted in its ultimate demise. 
There are innumerable examples which illustrates this paradox, not the least of which would 
be the operations of the industrial revolution factories that abused their employees so badly 
that it lead to calls for a revolution that would abolish private property all together.1276 However 
perhaps the most interesting and educative example of the advantages and abuses of the free 
market property can be found through an examination of the history of the railway industry in 
America during the free market stage. 
Before getting into operational advantages and abuse there is a major qualification 
regarding American railway networks being represented as free market property that must be 
conceded. The qualifications have to do with the initial foundations of the railway networks. 
While these railway networks were certainly established and operated as a private enterprise, 
they were created in the same way that the Charter companies of the aristocratic stage were 
created. This is particularly true with respect to the first two transcontinental railways 
companies that constructed their railway networks 1864 and 1873. Like the old Charter 
companies; the Union Pacific Railroad Company and Central Pacific Railroad Company (later 
renamed the Southern Pacific Railroad Company) were created as a direct result of property 
                                                          
1274Id.; Book I, Chapter XI, Part III, 292 
1275Id.; Book IV, Chapter II, 489 






grants made by the Government under a series of Act called Pacific Railway Acts.1277. Under 
these Acts the companies were granted tracks land on which to build the actual railways, 
government funding to finance their construction and additional land which they could sell to 
repay the government funding. 
The land grants themselves were enormous, amounting to some 21 million acres and at the 
time had an estimated pre-construction value of 40 million dollars.1278 The biggest proportion of 
this land was not the actual land on which the railroad would be constructed, but rather the land 
adjacent to the railroad, that would ultimately be sold to repay the government financing. This 
adjacent land worked out to about 10 square miles of public land surrounding every mile track 
that they constructed.  
The financing was provided through 30-year government financed bonds which eventually 
totalled over 90 million dollars.1279 These bonds were secured by a lien upon the railroads and 
all their fixtures, with the funds being provided to the companies on a per mile of tracked grade 
completed. This would represent a relatively straight forward banking transaction, but for the 
fact that the companies themselves were not required to provide hardly any capital.1280 This 
meant that the government was initially the sole financer of the companies and the 6% interest 
that was charged to the companies represented tremendous bargain for the owners. Particularly 
when compared to the 24% interest local banks in San Francisco were charging at for loans at 
the same time. 
The governments stated rational for providing these huge land grants and cheap financing to 
the companies were many. First, they argued that the construction of the transcontinental 
railway was of critical importance for unifying the country. Second, they said that it would assist 
in the transfer of new immigrants, which would in turn allow for the development of the 
interior’s agricultural and other natural resources. Finally, they proposed that those same 
natural resources would be brought to market more cheaply and efficiently on the newly 
constructed lines. 
These sentiments were articulated by numerous Senators during the course of discussion on the 
Pacific Railway Acts. For example, Senator Henry Wilson of Massachusetts is reported to have 
said: 
'I give no grudging vote in giving away either money or land. I would sink $100,000,000 
to build the road and do it most cheerfully, and think I had done great thing for my country. 
What are $75,000,000 or 100,000,000 in opening a railroad across regions of this continent, 
that shall connect the people of the Atlantic and the Pacific, and bind us together.... Nothing! 
As to the lands, I don’t begrudge them”.1281 
 
To the extent that this initial government support resulted in the rapid construction of the 
two transcontinental railroad it can and has been portrayed a success. Within ten years the 
railroad networks were in place that were capable of doing all that the politician had desired. 
The country was united from coast to coast by a transportation network, immigration into the 
interior could be accelerated, the interior resources developed, and products more easily be 
brought to the market. All of which should have been a tremendous benefit to the entire nation 
and all its people.  
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The problem with this assessment is that the owners of the railroads had a very different idea 
about who should the benefit from the railroads; and it is because those owners adhered so 
strongly the underlying principle inherent in free market property stage that the railways 
represent a quintessence example of that stage. The free market principle being adhered to 
suggested that individuals were free to pursue their naked self-interest, because doing so would 
ultimately be in the public interest. To the railway owners this meant that the railway properties 
should be primarily be utilized to advance their own self-interests and they ruthlessly 
maintained that position in every aspect of their business; from the initial construction, through 
the financing and everyday operation of the railways. So, despite the largess of the government 
in helping to build the railroads, the railroad owners under the guise of the free market system 
sought, (and to a large extent succeeded) in securing the bulk of the benefits for themselves. 
While the method used in the various aspects of their business changed, each serve as an 
example of how self-interest were not always in the public interest, and further prove that the 
assumption that any behaviour not in the public interest would be automatically rejected by the 
market was mistaken. Given this is such a clear contradiction of the primary free market 
principle, it is worth going into actual specifics as to the owner’s behaviour in each aspect of the 
railroad business.  
With respect to the first aspect of the business which was the construction of the railway 
line; there were a number of business practices were beneficial the owner’s self-interest and 
detrimental to public interest. Of these there were three that stand out. First there was the 
practice of setting up separate construction companies owned by the directors of the railroad 
companies to build the railways. The second had to do with the employment policies of the 
railroad construction companies. And the third had to do with practices related to determining 
the location of tracks and train stations along the intended path of the railways. 
The insider dealing that resulted in the setting up of separate construction companies owned 
by the directors of the company was beneficial to the self-interests of the directors; because it 
allowed them to amass huge personal fortunes by overcharging the railway companies for their 
construction work. For example, in the case of the Union Pacific the construction of the railway 
was contracted out at a rate that rose from $80,000 to $90,000 and $96,000 a mile, so that the 
total construction cost was $94,000,000. This despite the fact that the actual construction cost 
was estimated at below $30,000 a mile; which would result in a total construction cost of some 
$44,000,000. This implies that the owners of the construction company made around 
$50,000,000 on the construction contract.1282 This over charging of by the construction 
companies was detrimental to the public interest because those cost were paid; first by the 
government through the construction bond program, then by shareholders through the issuance 
of additional shares in the railway company and ultimately to the public through higher shipping 
charges.  
With respect to the employment policies of the railroad construction companies. It should 
be remembered that a huge percentage of the workers that were hired to build the railroads 
were Chinese collies that were willing to work for a fraction of the wages of local workers. This 
benefited the self-interest of the construction company owners because it kept down actual 
construction cost, enabling them to make a greater profit on their construction activities. This 
harmed the public interest in a more general sense, because it deprived the local community of 
                                                          






higher paying jobs that would have contributed to their economic activity. Not only did it 
dampen demand for goods it also provided an obstacle to higher wages in other sectors of the 
economy, because it forced greater completion for jobs in those sectors.  
The methods for deciding the route of the tracks and location of the stations on the intended 
path of the railroad was expected to be done on the basis of simply finding the shortest and 
most easily constructed route and placing the stations in all the populated communities on that 
route., However this is not what happened. Instead the railway companies decided the route, 
and station locations based on the subsidies that the communities were prepared to pay to the 
railway for the privilege of having the railway run through their town. San Francisco for example 
was forced to contribute $3 million to Central Pacific even though it was the largest town on the 
Pacific Coast and the obvious terminus for the railroad.1283 While the threat of bypass may not 
have been that great for San Francisco, for little towns along the path it was very real and much 
more ominous. For example, the small town of Paradise, in Stanislaus County became a ghost 
town virtually overnight when Central Pacific located the track and station four miles outside of 
its border, after it refused to pay a sufficient subsidy to the railway company.1284 This practice of 
extorting subsidies from the towns along the path was good for the interests of the company 
directors because it meant that there was more money to pay their inflated construction 
charges. It was bad for the public good because in effect the public were paying twice for the 
railway. First in the form of the initial land grants provided under the Charter and second 
through community subsidies. While the cost of the first two practices were to remain hidden 
from view during the actual construction phase, the demands for subsidies were not. It is 
therefore not surprising that this practice was the most contentious of the construction phase. 
However contentious the practice; it was still utilized because there were no market forces to 
prevent it. In fact, this practice was based on the market principle of providing the product or 
service to those that valued it the most, a principle that is best articulated in the sentiment of 
charging “whatever the market will bear”. 
The reliance on market forces to adopt contentious practices did not end with the 
construction phase, they were used even more ruthlessly in the actual operation of the railway. 
This ruthless being embodied in the principle of basing transportation charges on what the 
maximum price that the market would bear rather than on the actual cost of providing the 
transportation service. Given that the railway networks had a monopoly on transportation 
service for decades after their completion, what the market would bear turned out to be much 
more than anyone had anticipated. In simple terms the price that the market would bear was 
the difference between the cost of production for the resource and its value once the product 
was delivered to the market. By using this pricing principle, the railway companies were 
effectively appropriating the potential profits of their customers for themselves. 
Not the least of those which would be burdened by the highest price the market would bear, 
were the farmers of America. It has been estimated that the farming population increase in 
numbers from 10.0 million in 1865, to 22.0 million in 1880, with most of these new farmers 
immigrating to the interior of the country on the same trains that would be used to transport 
their agricultural goods to the markets. For the railway companies, the price that these new 
farmers would bare was anything below the price that it would cost to take their products to 
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the market using alternative means of transportation. The obvious alternative being horse 
drawn wagons. To the extent that farmers were able to make a profit on their production using 
the alternative transport methods these somewhat lower charges were initially welcomed by 
the farmers. What the farmers did not know is that the actual cost to the railway of taking their 
products to the market was substantially lower than any other alternative because the railway 
network was a much more efficient means of transportation. Another thing that the farmers did 
not realize was that as their numbers grew the price of the goods they produced would fall; 
because of the increase in supply was not matched by an equivalent increase in demand. As such 
when the prices fell and while transportation charges were held constant, this created an 
unbearable price squeeze for the farmers. A price squeeze which would not have happened; if 
the railway companies had honoured their obligations to provide honest cost-based pricing.  
It would not have happened under an honest cost-based pricing formula because the variable 
cost of shipping an additional unit of agricultural product was practically nothing for the railway 
companies. All it required was connecting an additional grain car to a train that was already 
providing the service. What this meant is that all other fixed costs could be divided between a 
larger number of units, therefore reducing the average combine fixed and variable costs of the 
individual units of goods being transported. So, to the extent that the railway companies 
maintained a constant tariff for agricultural transport during a period when these huge volume 
increase reduced their marginal operating cost this can only be viewed as excessive, if not 
extortionate pricing on the part of the railway companies. 
However even the extortionate transportation charges were sometimes not sufficient for the 
railway directors. In some cases, the director’s used the very access to the networks as a means 
of gaining control of the resources that the networks were supposed to transport to the market. 
This type of insider dealing being even more insidious, than the setting up of independent 
construction companies, because it involved the depriving external property owners of their 
property rights, on top of depriving their shareholders of their rightful returns. An excellent 
example to this behaviour involved a company called Pennsylvania Blue Stone Company and the 
Eire Railroad.  
The Pennsylvania Blue Stone Company was one of a number of successful mining company 
that had a quarry in Pike County, Pennsylvania which produced building materials for the 
distribution throughout the states. As can be imagined a major operational cost of each of these 
company was transporting their products to market. When the Erie Railway company built a 
railway line to serve Pike County, it can be assumed that all local business anticipated that they 
would now have a cheaper method of getting their goods to market. However, this was not to 
be the case for the Pennsylvania Blue Stone company. Initially the Erie railway refused to carry 
the company’s products to New York at any price. What the railway company wanted in return 
for transporting the company’s products and what they eventually received was a share of the 
company’s profits in the shape of a partnership interest. While this initial demand clearly 
represents a blatant abuse of monopoly power, this was only the beginning of the abuse related 
to this transaction. For as a result of now having a partnership interest in the Pennsylvania Blue 
Stone company, the Erie railway refused to carry the stone of any other producer in the region. 
Needless to say, this railway embargo provided Pennsylvania Blue Stone with a significant 
advantage over its competitors. 1285 
                                                          






It should be noted that both the insider dealing, and the pricing principle adopted by the 
directors was in direct contradiction to both the spirit and the operating principles anticipated 
under the Pacific Railway Act. Under the act the railway companies were to base their charges 
on the costs of providing the service and earn no more than a 10% profit from those services. 
Repayment of the government financing was to be included in the cost calculation, but not to 
exceed more than 5% of the total charges per annum. The clearly stated objective of the act 
being to promote the public interest and not the private interests of the directors and 
shareholders.1286 The method that the directors of the railway companies used to get around 
this obligation was simple, they just inflated their costs. For the most part this was done by 
overcharging on the construction cost, which as detailed earlier would eventually have to be 
paid by the consumers. But it was also done with respect to the actual operating cost. This was 
done through extravagant salaries and insider dealing which for example required the railway 
companies to purchase overpriced transportation equipment from companies owned by the 
directors.  
This inflation of the construction and operating cost were of course part of the financial 
activities of the railway companies. However, the insider dealing that created this inflation was 
not the only financial activity that was the serve the self-interest of the directors, which were to 
the detriment of public interest. Of equal significance was the insider trading that they 
participated in with respect to the shares of the companies, the bribes that they paid to public 
officials in order to facilitate their disproportionately self-enriching activities and the fraudulent 
accounting they use to cover it all up. 
The initial instances of insider trading, were really insider dealing as they involved directors 
being allowed to purchase shares and bonds at par value, that they could sell on the open market 
at a huge profit. More traditional forms of insider trading involved the actions of selling shares 
when in possession of secret inside news that is bad for a company and buying shares when the 
opposite was true. The most blatant practitioner of this was probably Thomas C. Durant, the 
vice president and general manager of Union Pacific. Duran’s insider trading involved, running 
up the value and selling of his stock in the Mississippi and Missouri Railroad by promoting the 
idea that it was going to connect the Union Pacific, while at the same time secretly buying 
competing rail line stock that he knew was going to be the real partner in Union Pacific’s 
transcontinental plans. While these two insider transactions involved shares in external 
companies, the directors also had no hesitation in using insider information to their benefit 
when trading on their own companies shares. The most tangible evidence of this practice being 
the surprising low levels of share ownership that the directors of railway companies tended to 
have, whenever the companies got into financial trouble. 
Duran was also a leading participant involved in the bribery of public official. He did this 
through the company, “Crédit Mobilier of America”. This was a company that was set up to be 
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the principal construction contractor and construction management firm for the Union Pacific. 
In 1867, Congressman Oakes Ames replaced Thomas C. Durant as head of Crédit Mobilier. After 
his appointment Ames offered other members of Congress shares of stock in Crédit Mobilier at 
a substantially discounted value rather than market value. In the eyes of the railroad barons this 
was a perfectly legitimate financial activity as it ensured the continued support of the 
government for their endeavours. This support being initially facilitated by greed on the part of 
the politicians and subsequently ensured through fear of exposure. One of the subtlest masters 
of this practice was another railway baron named Collis Huntington who would secure signed 
evidence, such as cancelled checks, to ensure in his own words that that the men involved were 
“ever afterwards my slaves”1287.  
Needless to say, that all the construction, operational and financial actions that 
disproportionally benefited the self-interests of the directors would be a problem for the 
directors if they became public. To avoid this happening much of it was hidden using what can 
only be described as questionable, if not fraudulent accounting practices. In the case of bribes 
paid to politicians and judges they were listed in the books of the railway companies as “General 
Expenses” or “Legal Expenses” or "Extra Legal Expenses”. In the case of the independent 
construction companies, the invoices provided to the railway companies were intentionally 
vague and misleading. In the construction companies it can be assumed that the accounts were 
simply fabricated because there was no documentation to support the various expense claims 
made by the them. A fact that was not discovered until some 20 years after the fraud was 
perpetrated.  
The reason that the any of the questionable self-enriching activities were ever investigated 
and confirmed is ironic, because it resulted from efforts to promote naked self-interest of 
another railway executive. The first step towards an investigation came when Henry Simpson 
McComb, a future executive of the Illinois Central Railroad, had a dispute with Congressman 
Ames over government support for his railway. Because Ames refused to grant the same support 
to Illinois Central that Pacific Railways enjoyed, McComb leaked a compromising letter to the 
newspaper detailing how the $72 million in contracts had been given to Crédit Mobilier, really 
only cost $53 million. This leak resulted in the so called Crédit Mobilier scandal, when it became 
known that several congressmen had shares in Crédit Mobilier. In addition to exposing the 
complicity of the politician, the scandal also brought to the attention of the public the precarious 
financial conditions of the actual railway companies. Once this condition was public, it caused 
the collapse in the price of railway stock which was in large part responsible for the panic of 
1873. The depression that resulted from this panic which lasted for nine years was so severe, 
that it eventually forced the Government to establish a Federal Commission to investigate what 
had gone wrong. 1288 
Under its charter the commission was empowered to; 
'examine into the working and financial management of all of the railroads that 
have received aid from the Government in bonds; to ascertain whether they have 
observed all the obligations imposed upon them by the laws of the United States...and 
complied will all other obligations to the United States...also whether such system of 
constructive mileage  is fair and usual, and in practical operations has resulted 
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adversely or otherwise to the aide roads and the interests of the United 
States...whether the proceeds of any trust funds or lands loaned, advanced or granted 
have been diverted from their lawful use'1289 
Within a year the commission issued a nine-volume report on the activities of the railway 
companies. With respect to the financing affairs of the railway companies the commission 
concluded: 
'The construction companies or inside combinations that built five of the six roads 
have destroyed or concealed their books ... and the Commission has been embarrassed 
in its work by the refusal or failure of the companies to produce the accounts relating 
to the actual cost of construction, or to exhibit any paper or documents that would 
enable the Commission to ascertain the truth as to this most important factor in the 
investigation. ...From the minutes and accounts of the railroad companies, and from 
fragmentary information gathered from various sources, it is disclosed that the officers 
of at least three of these companies made false statements under oath, in affidavits 
now on file in the Interior Department... The managers were acting as trustees of a 
national highway, and they cannot plead any lawful justification for making false 
affidavits, which state that $97,098,690 of stock was actually paid for, when in fact less 
than two million had been so paid for. 1290 
With respect to the relationship between the railways and the public the commission 
concluded: 
'The original purpose of Congress, as set forth in the act of July 1862, in granting 
subsidies for the construction of the pacific Roads, was to promote public interest, and 
the companies were made trustees for that purpose; but the public interest has been 
subordinated by the companies to the shareholding interest, upon the claim that the 
stockholders owned the railroads and could manage their own business in their own 
way. Nearly every obligation which the corporations assumed under the law of the 
United States, or as common carriers, has been violated. Their management has been 
a national disgrace. Since the date of their inception they have been conducted upon 
a purely speculative basis. Their permanent prosperity has been lost sight of, while 
their managers greedily strove for temporary advantage. For fourteen years the Union 
Pacific was practically free from competition for a stretch of 1,800 miles across the 
continent....The aided companies combined with others to tax the communities which 
they served, and they forced the consuming classes in all sections of the country to 
contribute to the payment of interest and dividends upon factitious capital which they 
had created....They attempted to dictate the channels that trade should follow and 
fixed rates of transportation that were extortionate. They charged all that the traffic 
would bear, and appropriated a share of the profits of every industry by charging the 
greater part of production and the price of the article in the market. ... They favoured 
particular individuals and companies. They destroyed possible competitors, and they 
built up particular localities to the injury of other localities, until matters had reached 
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such a pass, that no man dared engage in any business in which transportation largely 
entered without first soliciting and obtaining the permission of a railroad manager. 
They departed from their legitimate sphere as common carriers and engaged in mining 
articles for transportation over their own lines. They exerted a terrorism over 
merchants and over communities, thus interfering with the lawful pursuits of the 
people. They participated in election contests. By secret cuts and violent and rapid 
fluctuations in rates they menaced business, paralysing capital, and retarding 
investment and development.”1291 
By detailing the questionable business practices of insider dealing, insider trading, false 
accounting, bribery and abuse of monopoly power, the commission report highlighted the 
general lack of ethical business practices on the part to the railroad barons. In response to this 
questioning of their business ethics the railway barons basically suggested that there are no 
ethics in business, that the free market dictated that any behaviour which benefited their self-
interest was inherently a good thing. Examples of this attitude can be found in an 1877 letter 
from Southern Pacific Director Huntington explaining why bribery of public officials was justified; 
'If you have to pay money to have the right thing done, it is only just and fair to do 
it ... If a man has the power to do great evil and won’t do right unless he is bribed to 
do it, I think the time spent will be gained when it is a man’s duty to go up and bribe 
the judge. A man that will cry out against them himself will also do these things himself. 
If there was none for it, I would not hesitate.'1292 
To be clear this attitude was not just idol philosophy on the part of Huntington, 
documentation proves that both he and his fellow directors were actively engaged in buying 
both political and judicial support as a standard business practice for the railway.1293 This 
contempt for any moral or ethical restriction on their business activities was of course what 
allowed them to maximise their own self-interests, often to the detriment of public interest. 
The net result of this free market behaviour was that; despite the intention that the railway 
networks were to serve the public good by providing the nation with an efficient, cost effect 
means of transportation, they were operated to disproportionately benefit of the railway 
company directors in particular and the railway company owners in general. The similarities 
between this behaviour and the behaviour of the robber barons on the Rhine is striking. For by 
taking their tributes large and small from all members of society, the railway barons rather than 
providing a backbone for independent economic development in America, actually became a 
barrier to independent economic development. This is not to say that there was no independent 
economic development during this period, but rather to say that the development that did occur 
often occurred in spite of the best efforts of the railway directors, and that had the directors not 
behaved in this manner independent economic development may have been much greater. 
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To the extent that the commission report described the very real harm done to the public 
interest it ought to have served as a cautionary tale illustrating the limitations of market 
discipline and the reality of market failure, when a lawless free market system was adopted. The 
problem was that even when some politicians tried to protect the public interest; they were 
often prevented from doing so by the judicial establishment that was either committed to or 
corrupted by the free market ideology and which used narrow interpretations of the laws to 
protect the railway companies. This can be seen in the initial judicial reaction the commission 
investigation and the general lack of judicial support for any legislative measures adopted to 
restrict the freedom of the railway conduct their affairs.  
The initial judicial reaction to the commission involved a ninth circuit court decision 
restricting the commission ability to investigate any alleged wrong doing; by ruling that the 
commission had no right to have access to the railroad companies underlying 
documentation.1294 Nor was this the first time that the judiciary protected the interests of the 
railway barons to the detriment of public interest. Even before the issuing of the report; public 
sentiment had changed with respect to the railways and public calls for regulation of the railway 
baron’s behaviour were being heeded by the politician. In the 1870’s a series of laws called the 
Granger laws were passed by various western State to regulate grain elevator and railway freight 
rate. In Munn v Illinois1295 the Supreme Court in majority opinion upheld the right of the States 
to regulate the prices charged by a grain storage facility.1296 However it quickly reversed itself in 
another case which involving regulating a railway company. In Wabash v Illinois1297 the Supreme 
Court ruled that held that the  States had no authority of regulate outside of their borders. 1298 
In response to this decision the U.S. Congress passed the Interstate Commerce Act1299 which 
required that the railway companies set interstate rates that were non-discriminatory, 
reasonable and just and made the setting of discriminatory, unjust and unreasonable interstate 
unlawful.1300 This Act also set up a new federal committee, the Interstate Commerce 
Commission (ICC), to oversee these new laws. 1301 However even this new interstate commission 
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was prevented from fulfilling its mandate by the courts. In the first instance the lower courts 
rejected the ICC complaints and eventually the Supreme Court neutered the ICC; by ruling it 
could only monitor the rates set by the railway companies for breaches of the Act and had no 
power to proscribe rates.1302 This ruling effectively confirmed the status of the ICC as a toothless 
bureaucracy, which the railway companies paid lip service to in their public rate setting, but 
ignored in their secret discounting operations.   
Unsurprisingly as the competitive advantages became more obvious, other industrialist 
entered the railway industry in an effort to use those competitive advantages of owning a 
railway, to maximise the profits in their own industries. The most notable examples of which 
were Andrew Carnegie in the steel industry and John Rockefeller in the oil industry. It was the 
consolidation of the railway industries with other industries and the market power that it 
generated; which finally forced the government to come up with a more general restriction on 
free market property rights. That general restriction took the form of the Sherman Act,1303 
passed by the Congress in 1890, which was the first modern competition law passed by a 
democratic society. While this Act represented a huge milestone in restricting of free market 
property rights it was not passed without controversy. First there was the disputes in Congress 
over the passage of the bill and then there were dispute on the Supreme Court over its 
implementation. In both cases the ideological divide was substantial and remained unresolved 
for decades, splitting both the politicians and the judiciary into warring factions. 
On one side were the free market proponents that advocated the idea that the freedom to 
contract was a fundamental right protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
guarantees of “life, liberty and property”. On the other side were the competitive market 
proponents that saw the concentrated economic power of the big trust as threatening the 
“industrial liberty” of the nation. This was not a dispute over capitalism per se, only the form of 
capitalism and existential threat that each side thought threatened their particular form. 
As far as the free market proponent were concerned the market should almost always 
operate free from government interference and if that resulted in a concentration of industrial 
enterprise in the hands of a few individual, this by default, must be the way that the capitalistic 
market was supposed to operate. Their overall argument being bolstered by the technological 
and economic advances that had occurred under conditions of highly concentrated industrial 
power. For them any concentration was just a natural part of an industrial evolution which 
provided the economic advances that society sought, the products that consumer demands 
while at the same time avoiding ruinous competition. They thought the greatest threat to the 
market came from government interference; which they believed would ultimately result in 
government taking control of the market, if not private property. This was a perfectly 
understandable concern given that the previous property stage had involved a great deal of 
government control of the markets. This however was a backward-looking view; which was not 
capable of addressing the immediate concerns about the power of the new industrialists and 
the growing resentment towards their increased prosperity in times of great hardship for 
ordinary citizens.  
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On the other side the competitive market proponents; thought that the market should 
provide an opportunity of for all citizens and that when private transactions prevented that 
possibility, the government needed to step in to prevent their exclusion. For them their greatest 
fear was that the defeated tyranny of the government, was being replace by a tyranny of 
industrialist. This sentiment being clearly articulated by original author of the bill, Senator 
Sherman when debate on it began: 
'This bill, as I would have it, has for its single object to invoke the aid of the courts 
of the United States ...in dealing with combinations that affect injuriously the industrial 
liberty of the citizens ... It is the right of every man to work, labor, and produce in any 
lawful vocation ... This is industrial liberty and lies at the foundation of the equality of 
all rights and privileges  ...  The sole objective of ... [a trust] is to make competition 
impossible. It can control the market, raise and lower prices, as will best promote its 
selfish interest, reduce prices in a particular locality and break down competition and 
advance prices at will where competition does not exist ... The law of selfishness, 
uncontrolled by competition, compels it to disregard the interest of consumers.” 1304 
It is a testament to the public support for the competitive market proponents, that after two 
long years of debate, the 1890 version of the bill was passed in both chambers without debate. 
However, this was only half the battle, once passage was achieved of the battle shifted into the 
hands of the federal judges and this was to proof a much more difficult battle for the competitive 
market proponent. One of the main difficulties faced by the competitive market proponents in 
getting the courts to implement the Sherman Act was the nature of its language. The language 
eventually adopted being simultaneously too strict and too vague. That the Act contained such 
difficult language was the result of the alterations done in the Committee of the Judiciary. As a 
result of these changes it could be argued that; while the competitive market proponents won 
the battle of passing the Act, they lost the war over its implementation, because of the language 
that was included. 
Of particular concern was the exclusion of the language included in the initial version that 
sought to protect both the competitive market and consumers. The initial version of the Act 
introduced by Senator Sherman containing the following language:  
'Sec. 1 That all arrangements, contracts, agreements, trusts, or 
combinations...made with a view, or which tend to prevent full and free competition... 
or which tend to advance the cost to the consumer ... are hereby declared ... are 
hereby declared to be against public policy, unlawful and void”1305  
In the 1890 bill this was changed to:  
“Sec. 1. Every contract, combination in the form of trust or other- wise, or 
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign 
nations, is hereby declared to be illegal ... 
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Sec. 2. Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine 
or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or 
commerce ..., shall be deemed guilty.'1306 
By excluding Senator Sherman’s language of “full and free competition” and “cost to the 
consumer” and replacing it with “contracts...in restraint of trade” and “monopolize, or attempt 
to monopolize trade” the Committee of the Judiciary both obfuscated the core purpose of the 
Act while making its literal implementation impossible.  
It obfuscated the core purpose of the act by removing the goals of the Act; which was 
protection of the competitive market place and consumer protection and replacing them with a 
strict definition of the tactics to be used in the pursuit of those goals. This significance of this 
change was not lost on Senator Sherman who claimed that it would be:  
'totally ineffective in dealing with combinations and Trusts. All corporations can 
ride through it or over it without fear of punishment or detection. ... if any relief is to 
be had it must be the result of ... the actions of the House, where amendments may 
be provided which will restore in substance the original design of the bill.”1307 
It made literal implementation impossible; because a literal reading of the Act would outlaw 
much more than price fixing cartels and attempted monopolisation by industrial giants. A literal 
interpretation of "any agreement in the restraint of trade" would also include everything from 
a partnership agreement, to a simple contract for the sale of goods. This because a partnership 
agreement would restrain the ability of the partners to enter into other agreements with third 
parties. A sale of goods would also represent a restraint of trade because it would remove the 
goods from the market. In fact, to the extent that all business transaction of any sort involves 
some restraint of trade, a literal interpretation of the Act would outlaw all business transactions. 
Clearly this was not what Congress intended, so the courts were left with a law that was literally 
unenforceable. To get around this literal interpretation the courts felt that they had the 
discretion to determine not what was a restraint of trade, but what was an unreasonable 
restraint of trade. 
Whether by design or accident the net result of this language was the when the battle moved 
to the courts; the proponents of competitive markets were at a severe disadvantage when the 
judges who were free market proponents claimed that the Act breached the constitutionally 
protected property rights. An earlier indication of the court’s response the Sherman Act was 
demonstrated; in their refusal to restrict exclusive dealing transactions commonly used by 
various whiskey trusts which controlled 75-100% of the distilled products in various regions of 
the United States. In the first of these so-called whiskey trust cases, re Corning,1308 the 
government challenged the defendant’s exclusive supply agreements that required that their 
agents; to sell only their products, at resale prices set by the defendants. The court ruled that 
the indictment “wholly fails to charge a crime” as the defendant had “legally purchased with 
their own capital three fourths of the distilleries in the United States” and had not “obliged the 
vendors not to build other distilleries” and further had not in “attempted in any manner... to 
control the business of the remaining one fourth of the distilleries”. Because vendors were not 
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forced to enter into the exclusive agreements and free to purchase from the other one fourth 
of distillers that courts ruled that this was not an unreasonable restraint of trade. In another 
whiskey trust case which involved a similar indictment Supreme Court Justice-to-be Howell E. 
Jackson went beyond attempting to define reasonable restraint by suggesting that the Sherman 
Act could not regulate property of corporations in any manner, as to do so would be to threaten 
the destruction of an essential right protected by the constitution.1309 His view being that such 
regulation represented a unconstitutional taking of property that had to be rejected regardless 
of the effect on trade or prices.  
Although these strident free market decisions were eventually constrained by the Supreme 
Court’s decisions on how to interpret the Act in the price fixing cases of Trans-Missouri1310 and 
Joint Traffic,1311 the initial antipathy of the court towards the Act, was all that the industrialist 
needed to continue with their free market practices. Indeed, even after the Supreme Court had 
made its ruling in Trans-Missouri many free market practices; like exclusive dealing were still 
held to be reasonable by a later Supreme Court. The most well-known examples of which were 
the 1913 decisions which implicitly upheld the exclusive dealing practices of the United Shoe 
Company in United States v. Winslow1312 and which was upheld even more explicitly by the Court 
five years later in United States v United Shoe Company. 1313 
Of all continuing free market practices that promoted the self-interest of the industrialist, 
the one that had the most detrimental effect on to society was their insider trading activities. It 
was the most detrimental because it undermined the public confidence in the stock market 
which was the main reason for the market crash of 1927, which in turn led to the great 
depression of the 1930’s. It should be noted that for year before the crash and even before the 
panic of 1873, there was public condemnation of the practice. For example, in 1871 Charles F. 
Adams Jr., the great grandson of John Adams the second American President, Grandson of John 
Quincy Adams the sixth American President, explained the damage done by insider trading as 
follows;  
'Our whole system rests upon the sanctity of the fiduciary relations. Whoever 
betrays them, a director of a railroad no less than a member of Congress or the trustee 
of an orphans’ asylum, is the common enemy of every man, woman, and child who 
lives under representative government. The unscrupulous director is far less entitled 
to mercy than the ordinary gambler, combining as he does the character of the traitor 
with the acts of the thief.”1314 
However, like so many other free market practices the Congress and judiciary was either: so 
corrupted by, or committed to the free market; that they were either complicit with or 
indifferent to insider trading.1315 Not until Strong v. Repide1316 in 1909, did the U.S. Supreme 
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1312 United States v. Winslow, 227 U.S. 202 (1913) 
1313 United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co., 247 U.S. 32 (1918) 
1314 Charles F. Adams JR., A Chapter of Erie, (Boston, J.R. Osgood and Company, 1871) 
1315It is worth noting that the questions of corruption were not only at the lower levels. In 1923, the Hearst papers 
reported that the former President and current Supreme Court Chief Justice William Taft was receiving $10,000 a 
year from an annuity left to him by Andrew Carnegie and paid by the United Steel Trust.  






Court rule that a company official had any obligation to disclose their identity and non-public 
information they possessed when they traded company stocks. And even in that case the Court 
went out of its way to suggest directors were not under a fiduciary duty to disclose to 
shareholders any knowledge potentially affecting the value of company shares.1317 Not only did 
this unchallenged freedom to behave like a card cheats effect the public confidence in the 
market; it also created an atmosphere of impunity for all manner behaviour some of which went 
well beyond insider trading and involved out and out fraud on the part of the directors. The most 
notorious example of which was the 1920’s scheme used by Charles Ponzi, a property developer; 
who used the money from new investors to pay huge fictitious profits to old investors. The 
fictitious profits initially being considered realistic, because of they resembled the profits that 
directors earned on their insider trading operations. 
Although the great depression followed the crash of 1927, it does not necessarily mean that 
the crash was the cause of the great depression. Whilst the crash was indicative of a general lack 
of confidence in the stock market and by proxy a lack of confidence in the economy, the severity 
of the ten years depression that followed was indicative of a much greater problem. Indeed, 
given that there was little reason to believe that the stock market was significantly overvalued 
at the time of the crash, there must be another explanation. The most logical explanations had 
to do a general market failure that resulted in too high a concentration of wealth in the hands 
of too few individuals. This was the explanation that was provide by the renowned economist, 
John Maynard Keynes. According to Keynes, 'when wealth is too unevenly distributed those that 
have too much don’t spend enough or spend it unwisely, while the poor have nothing to spend, 
all of which lead to a drop in aggregate demand.'1318 This drop in aggregate demand then leads 
to a vicious cycle of lowers sales, which leads to layoff which leads to lower sales, and further 
layoffs.  
This was clearly what happened during the great depression; as a result of all the various free 
market practices utilized by the industrial barons, a handful of individuals controlled a great deal 
more of the nation’s wealth than they would have in a more honest and ethical business 
environment.  And this disproportionate accumulation of wealth continued right up to up the 
market crash. The proof of this can be found in the Federal Reserve Bulletin of 1929 which 
confirms that although industrial productivity grew by 25% in the five years prior to the crash, 
industrial payrolls stagnated.1319 What this meant is that although the workers were more 
productive, they were not sharing in the economic prosperity that resulted from that increased 
productivity. Because they were not sharing in that economic prosperity, they obviously did not 
have the money to buy the extra good that they were producing. That this stagnation of wages: 
which resulted in a stagnation in aggregate demand would inevitably lead to a depression not 
only appears logical it was also observable in the country at large. To that end an article in the 
Time on October 5, 1931 described the situation as follows: 
'This depression ... is a panic of plenty. There is too much of everything except 
buying power. There is so much wheat that people are hungry. So much cotton that 
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folks are half naked. So much housing that in Chicago women are sleeping in parks. ... 
Too much of the national income goes into the hands of a few. ... A handful of men 
with their spare cash could buy the output of all the gold and silver mines of North 
America and many a sovereign State has a smaller income than the net profit of a single 
industrial magnate."1320  
As inevitable as it was that the free market property stage should result in a depression, it 
was even more inevitable that depression should result in the demise of the free market 
property stage. For while the majority of citizens were willing to tolerate the huge disparities in 
wealth; when it produced an overall increase in national economic efficiency and individual 
economic well-being, they were not so tolerant when the opposite was true. That a handful of 
people should so disproportionally and unjustly enrich themselves, to the detriment of the 
public at large was simple unacceptable in a democratic society. It was for this reason that 
shortly after the beginning of the depression societies chose a new model. One that would put 
restrictions on the market abuses which were practiced so commonly during the free market 
property stage. 
14.3.2 Directed Property Stage 
Because the free market stage resulted in such huge social and economic disasters it is hardly 
surprising that the stage that followed it would involve a dramatic shift in the evolution of 
property rights. While inequities of property ownership resulting from the free market stage 
were tolerated as a necessary evil of economic efficiency, once the efficiency justification of the 
free market proved to be an illusionary, the largest inequities were no longer considered 
necessary or acceptable. What was needed was a new more modern economic model that 
would both drive economic efficiency and provide greater social equity. In some parts of the 
world this new model would be based on the communist ideology of Karl Marx, under which all 
property would be removed from private ownership and transferred into public ownership. This 
reaction to the failings of the free market property was however at the extreme end of the 
evolutionary change and in reality represented an attempt to return to the earliest stages of 
property rights on the property continuum. Another extreme response to the failings of the free 
market property stage was transfer of ownership of critical industries to the public under a 
process referred to as Nationalization. This process can also be considered to be an attempt to 
return to an earlier common property phase of property rights although it only involved change 
in the ownership structure of a minority of the property in a society. Because ultimately both of 
these changes resented an unrealistic and unsustainable attempt to turn back the clock in the 
evolutionary process of property ownership they will not be considered part of the evolutionary 
continuum. What will however be considered a stage on the evolutionary continuum is the first 
of three regulatory stages that changed the nature of property rights in an effort to both improve 
economic efficiency and provide greater social equity while maintaining universal property 
rights. 
The first of these stages can be defined as the directed property stage. Under this stage 
ownership remained in the hands of private parties but the government attempted to directly 
manage the economy through coercive application of laws directing how those properties 
                                                          






should be used. As with other property stages this stage relied on a new justification for property 
rights.1321 This justification came from new economic philosophers the most notable of which 
was John Maynard Keynes. The fact that that the new justification came from economics should 
not be surprising as the objective of ever-increasing levels of economic efficiency was still the 
goal and it was just a shift in the methods of achieving this efficiency that was altered.  
According to Keynes the free market on its own was subject to a continual series of business 
cycles and the government had an important role to play in the stabilization of the economy. He 
advocated that the government use both fiscal and monetary measure to mitigate the adverse 
effect of business cycle downturns in order to avoid turning recessions into depressions. The 
fiscal measure that he advocated involved increasing the supply of money during a downturn 
which of course was consistent with the prevailing concept of quantity theory of money.1322  
The fiscal measure he advocated were however not consistent with the prevailing economic 
theory.1323 The prevailing view implied that the most critical aspect for economic development 
is the increase in the flow or supply of goods to the market. Keynes challenged this view by 
suggesting that it was aggregate demand that was the driving factor. He argued that without 
increases in demand, any increase in the supply of goods to the market mainly result in a 
decrease in the price of goods. Based on his analysis he suggested that in a recession of 
governments should increase, rather than decrease, their spending in order to maintain 
aggregated demand in the economy.1324 By doing this governments would not only avoid the 
cost of a recession but the actual cost of the spending would be less it appeared because of the 
multiplier effect.1325 The spending to be financed through increased government borrowing, 
which would be repaid once the economy recovered and tax revenues returned to their pre-
recessionary levels. He further suggested that economies are susceptible to the concept of price 
stickiness, the recognition that in reality workers often refuse to lower their wage demands even 
in cases where a classical economist might argue it is rational for them to do so. Partly as a result 
of price stickiness, he felt that the interaction of "aggregate demand" and "aggregate supply" 
may lead to stable unemployment equilibrium above that which was desirable.  
As could be anticipated this avocation of government interference in the macro-economy 
were mistakenly interpreted as a justification for government interference in the micro-
economic aspect of business. After all, if the government was a better and more knowledgeable 
manager of macro-economic affairs; why would they not also be a better and more 
knowledgeable manager of micro-economic affairs. Keynes however did not advocate such 
micro-economic management and he was directly opposed to any government attempts 
interfere in the private market by regulating the supply of goods as a means of increasing 
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that the most critical aspect for economic development is the increase in the flow or supply of goods to the market. 
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prices.1326 Indeed as will be demonstrated in the example of directed property included in this 
stage, he thought that such actions would be ineffective.  
Notwithstanding Keynes objections; the sentiment of his arguments that the government 
was the best placed to manage the economic affairs of a nation resonated with those that felt 
that an unfettered and absolute free market was unsustainable and government regulation was 
not only desirable but absolutely necessary, if the capitalistic model was to survive. The only real 
question was the extent of those regulations or how intrusive a role the government should 
play. If the chaos reaped by the free market stage had not been so overwhelming, it is possible 
that the initial government reaction would not have been so intrusive.1327 However because the 
carnage reaped by the Great Depression was so immense, it is hardly surprising that the 
regulatory reaction was bound to be an overreaction. 
One of the best and most ambitious examples of government regulation of property during 
this stage must be the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), which was initiated by President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) in 1933 as a response to the Great Depression. The NIRA created the 
National Recovery Administration (NRA), a New Deal agency which was mandated with the task 
of eliminating destructive competition in the economy which was perceived to be the main 
obstacle to ending the Depression. The primary activities of the agency were the establishment 
of price controls for products, and the imposition of fair codes of conduct for competition and 
labour contracts. The new law was limited to two years from the date of its enactment. The 
thought was that: if industry could charge higher prices for their products without fear of 
competitive retaliation, they could afford to treat their workers better, which would mean that 
the workers could then afford their products. To facilitate the Act Anti- Trust laws were 
suspended for industries that adopted the new codes. 
President Roosevelt called the NRA a partnership in planning between government and 
industry. It’s goal to speed recovery by establishing profit levels for business and wage levels for 
labour. In an address to the nation President Roosevelt explained the NIRA as follows:  
'On this idea, the first part of the NIRA proposes to our industry a great spontaneous 
cooperation to put millions of men back in their regular jobs this summer....if all 
employers in each trade now band themselves faithfully in these modern guilds--
without exception-and agree to act together and at once, none will be hurt and 
millions of workers, so long deprived of the right to earn their bread in the sweat of 
their labour, can raise their heads again. The challenge of this law is whether we can 
sink selfish interest and present a solid front against a common peril."1328 
The first Section of the NIRA read as follows: 
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'A national emergency productive of widespread unemployment and 
disorganization of industry, which burdens interstate and foreign commerce, affects 
the public welfare, and undermines the standards of living of the American people, is 
hereby declared to exist. It is hereby declared to be the policy of Congress to remove 
obstructions to the free flow of interstate and foreign commerce which tend to 
diminish the amount thereof; and to provide for the general welfare by promoting the 
organization of industry for the purpose of cooperative action among trade groups, to 
induce and maintain united action of labor and management under adequate 
governmental sanctions and supervision, to eliminate unfair competitive practices, to 
promote the fullest possible utilization of the present productive capacity of industries, 
to avoid undue restriction of production (except as may be temporarily required), to 
increase the consumption of industrial and agricultural products by increasing 
purchasing power, to reduce and relieve unemployment, to improve standards of 
labor, and otherwise to rehabilitate industry and to conserve natural resources.”1329 
The NIRA authorised the NRA to arrange public hearings which would set prices, develop fair 
codes of competition and develop voluntary agreements with industry regarding work hours 
and pay rates. The first director of the NRA was Hugh Samuel Johnson, a retired United States 
Army general and a businessman, whose pursuit of the aims of the NIRA resulted in him being 
named Time magazine's "Man of the Year" in 1933.1330 As head of the NRA one of Johnson’s first 
actions was to call for the establishment of a "blanket code": a minimum wage of between 20 
and 45 cents per hour, a maximum workweek of 35 to 45 hours, and the abolition of child labour. 
Both Johnson and Roosevelt contended that the "blanket code" would raise consumer 
purchasing power and increase employment. 
In a clever plan to mobilize support for the NRA, Johnson launched the "NRA Blue Eagle" 
publicity campaign. Under this campaign businesses that supported the NRA codes of conduct 
were encouraged to put the Blue Eagle (A blue-coloured image of the American thunderbird) in 
their shop windows or on their packages. Though adoption of NRA codes was voluntary, 
businesses that did not display the symbol were often boycotted, which meant that refusal to 
adopt the codes could threaten the very existence of a business. Using this increased bargaining 
position; in a remarkably short period of time (six months) the NRA were able to adopt over 242 
administrative orders detailing agreed codes of practices in most of America’s major industries 
covering 70% of the American work force. The most important provisions of these orders were 
anti-deflationary floors, below which no company would lower prices or wages, and agreements 
on maintaining employment and production.  
Typical provision of the codes which were agreed can be found in the agreement regarding 
U.S. steel and coal industries. In the steel industry labour was an offered a forty-hour week with 
minimum pay ranging from $10 in the South to $16 in the North and West. Child labour was not 
an issue as there were no workers under the age of 16 at the time. Collective bargaining was 
provided by means of company unions set up for that purpose. Manufacturing operations were 
to be limited to two eight-hour shifts per factory and no new factories were to be constructed 
without prior Presidential approval. Steel prices were to be based on government mandated 
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new district quotations which were to be review every ninety days.1331 In the coal industry the 
code provided for a maximum eight-hour day and an average 40-hour week. Minimum pay: $5 
per day for underground workers; $4 per day for outside men. Employees did not have to live in 
company houses or trade at company stores. No workers under the age of 17 were permitted 
inside the mines and no workers under the age of 16 were permitted to work outside the mine. 
Selling coal under the fair market price was declared to be an unfair competitive practice. The 
fair market price to be determined by five regional coal marketing agencies made up of trade 
associations in their local coal industry. All fair market prices were subject to review by the NRA. 
Coal exported by American producers was exempted from these price restrictions.1332 
Despite the success of imposing new codes, there were numerous critics of the NRA. Part of 
this was because the authoritarian leadership style of Johnson upset many people. Instead of 
creating a harmonious corporate state, Johnson was berating both business and labour, 
attempting to force upon them his ideas of what a code should contain. Of particular 
consequence and concern to Johnson; was the fact that the boards were dominated by big 
business, who drafted codes that benefited their interest over those of smaller competitors and 
consumers.1333 Generally this meant that codes mandated price increases greater than the salary 
increases receive by labour and establishing minimum working conditions that many small 
businesses were unable to provide. It appeared like the government was authorizing the boards 
to establish monopolies and in many instances this is exactly what was happening.1334 This 
analysis was on display at the major newspapers like the Chicago Tribune and Hearst papers 
which attacked the NRA in their editorials by stating:  
'The Government, undertaking to control American industry and business by codes 
enforced in minute detail by Federal authority over all phases of American production, 
has failed to meet the expectations of the administrators, failed to satisfy the 
economic requirements of the country, to fit in congenially with the American 
temperament, and to remedy the ills for which it was used as a cure.'1335  
From the left: labour argued that the provisions of the codes did not provide sufficient wages 
to labour to cover the cost of the simultaneous price increases. Even though the codes created 
the precedent covering minimum wages, maximum hours, abolished child labour, as well as 
boosted the labour movement by drawing large numbers of unskilled workers into unions. Even 
those that were intellectually assumed to have supported the program were critical. For 
example, John Maynard Keyes said;  
'There is no conceivable way of putting more purchasing power into use except by 
increasing loan expenditure. ... President Roosevelt put it in the forefront of his 
program. Nevertheless, I fear that the hesitation in American progress today is almost 
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entirely due to delays in putting loan expenditure into actual effect. ... Little has been 
spent though much has been planned. ... It seems to have been an error in choice of 
urgencies to put all the national energies into the National Recovery Act. The most 
urgent problem was to expedite capital expenditure."1336 
Although these criticisms dealt with the ineffectual nature of the NRA, ultimately the more 
critical criticism came from the courts. The first of these came in December of 1933 when a 
Federal Court Judge in Florida handed down a decision that questioned the constitutionality of 
the NRA.1337 In this case several cleaners and dryers asked the court to restrain one of their 
competitors, Samual Bazemore, from charging prices lower than those in force by that trade 
area and forcing his employees to work 60 hour weeks instead of the code mandated 40 hours 
per week. The Judge denied the motion to enjoin Bazemorer because; only the Federal District 
Attorney has authority to appeal to the courts for enforcement of the Recovery Act, Samuel 
Bazemore was not engaged in interstate commerce and Congress therefore had no 
constitutional authority to regulate his business. The judge justified his ruling by suggesting that 
if Congress claims such authority by reason of a "national emergency," that is a pernicious 
doctrine which would upset the Constitution and lead directly to anarchy and despotism. 
Although this case was to go no further because Bazemore subsequently voluntarily changed his 
practices to conform with the local trade rules, it set the stage for future constitutional 
challenges.  
Criticism also came from the Congress which, when it returned from recess in January of 1934 
began to voice its objections to the NRA and their codes. During their months of recess 
Congressmen had writing to the President protesting that the NRA was driving small business to 
the edge of bankruptcy and that it was creating trusts that were engaged in price fixing. What 
they wanted was that the Federal Trade Commission be given the power to protect small 
businessmen, i.e.: to restore the Anti-Trust laws. However, nothing happened, so in the first 
session of the new Congress they established a review board that would listen to the complaints 
of the small business and offered an amendment to the Recovery Act that would end the 
suspension of the Anti-Trust laws.  
In an effort to mollify this criticism, President Roosevelt issued an executive order that 
directed the Federal Trade Commission to look out for the interests of any small business which 
appealed to it for help against code-born monopolies, he further directed that, if the Trade 
Commission could not help, the case should be passed along to the Department of Justice. The 
president also used an executive order to appoint Clarence Darrow1338 to the National Review 
Board which would review the work of the NRA.1339 These executive orders were effectively a 
repudiation of the bargain that the NRA represented and the beginning of the end of the 
program. If big business could not be protected from anti-trust laws, they saw little benefit in 
abiding by other parts of the code. Particularly as from an economic prospective the program 
was not producing the intended results. Six months after the NRA went into effect, the cost of 
doing business had increased dramatically, which drove down industrial production by twenty 
five percent.  
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Despite these criticisms and comprises, General Johnson and the proponents of the NRA 
pressed on. By the end of February, there were more than four thousand staff in the NRA which 
were each day turning out reams of decision and orders that affected every industry in the 
nation. Each decision having the authority of substantive law. However, as the decisions and 
orders multiplied, so too did the criticism and eventual legal challenges. Not the least of these 
came in May of 1934 when the much-awaited National Review Board issued the first of three 
reports. To understand the impact (or lack thereof), of these reports on the NRA a brief 
discussion of the review process is warranted.  
Over the period of four months the Board held 57 public hearings, reviewed 3,375 
complaints, and investigated thirty-four codes. These codes covered over half of the total 
employed labour that worked in industries that operated under the NRA codes. During the 
review period, in which the Board was hearing numerous complaints from small business, the 
NRA continued to enforce the codes in a draconian manner. For example, in April 1934 a New 
Jersey court fined a tailor, Jacob Maged, $100 and sentenced him to thirty days in jail for 
charging thirty-five cents, instead of the code minimum of forty cents, to press a suit. While he 
served only three days and was apparently not required to pay the fine after agreeing to adhere 
to the cleaners and dryers code, it clearly had an impact on both the Board and public opinion. 
The first report1340 of the Board was completed on May 3 and it was sent directly to the 
president along with a minority report written by a dissenting Board member. On May 9th 
President Roosevelt said the report was too bulky to be published and he was sending the it 
along with dissenting minority report to the Federal Trade Commission, the Department of 
Justice, and the National Recovery Administration so they could be studied and summarized. 
Once the summary was produced it would be made available to the public. The withholding of 
the first Board report created even greater public interest in the report and the administration 
finally forced to release both it and minority report to the public on May 20. Once it was released 
it became clear why the President tried to have its publication delayed. The conclusion of the 
report was that the NRA codes promoted monopolies and hurt small businesses. That it was 
unrealistic to believe that business could regulate itself for the benefit of all. Of particular 
significance was the report’s scathing denounced the big businessmen’s domination of the 
codes. 
In addition to the initial report; William O. Thompson another member of the Board, perhaps 
in anticipation that the President’s summary process was going to result in a distortion of the 
report’s conclusions, produced his own five-page summary which he managed to get Darrow to 
sign. This summary that was released on the same day as the reports and to the surprise of those 
who advocated socialism to fix the economic ills of the country, the summary stated,  
 
'The choice is between monopoly sustained by government, which is clearly the 
trend in the National Recovery Administration, and a planned economy, which 
demands socialized ownership and control, since only by collective ownership can the 
inevitable conflict of separately owned units for the market be eliminated in favour of 
planned production.'1341 
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Because the public believed that the special report came from the full Board and reflected 
the Board’s views, General Johnson and other NRA supports used it to discredit the full report. 
This despite the fact that the summary was totally contradictory to the full report. In a full-on 
public relations assault on the Board, Johnson advocated that the Review board be abolished 
because it advocated socialism. While Darrow tried to distance the Board form the summary, 
the damage had been done. The spectre of socialism had effectively eliminated any constructive 
criticism of the NRA from the review board.  
 
While the Review Board sent and publish its second report on the June 8th and its third on 
June 28th its criticism was no longer effective. Included in the third was a section for conclusions 
that the board thought important enough to emphasize. The first of these conclusions was that 
in virtually all of the 34 codes examined  
 
'one condition has been persistent, undeniable and apparent to any impartial 
observation. It is this, that the code has offered an opportunity for the more powerful 
and more profitable interests to seize control of an industry or to augment and extend 
a control already obtained.”1342  
 
But these conclusions did not matter, the Board had already been discredited and on June 
30, 1934 President Roosevelt issued Executive Order 6771 abolishing the National Recovery 
Review Board. 
 
After the emasculation and abolishment of the Review Board the work of the NRA continued 
apace. More staff were hired, and more codes enacted. This process was however not without 
other obstacles, the greatest of which came from the increasing demands of labour for a greater 
share of the benefits of the program. In September the NRA faced one of its greatest challenges. 
The cotton textile industry which prided itself on being the biggest single industry in the U.S. and 
the first to enact a code, was being threatened with a general strike called by the United Textile 
Workers of America. In response the President ordered that the NRA cut hour of the Textile 
workers and grant a wage increase to offset the shorter hours. The garment executives called 
the President’s demands unjustified, unwarranted, burdensome and inequitable, but the NRA 
was unresponsive to their pleas, which only increase business apathy toward the program.  
This business apathy was only increased in the Spring of 1935 when the NRA’s new 
Chairman,1343 Samuel Williams, announced that they would cease setting price controls which 
the business community had come to rely on. Time magazine reported: 
'Of the 2,000 businessmen on hand probably 90% opposed Mr. Williams' aim. To 
them a guaranteed price for their products looks like a royal road to profits. A fixed 
price above cost has proved a lifesaver to more than one inefficient producer. Lazy 
producers have found that a fixed price, below which their smartest competitors 
cannot go, leaves them more time for golf than when they have to spend long hours 
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at the office wracking their brains for ways to hold their markets. In fact, to most 
manufacturers guaranteed prices promise heaven on earth so long as the public does 
not find such prices a barrier to buying. Hence man by man, hour by hour, Business 
rose to argue and protest against what the NRA proposed.'1344 
In the end it was not the labour’s or businesses criticism of the NRA that led to its downfall 
but rather the decision of the court. As time progressed more and more court case were being 
filed challenging the constitutionality of the NRA and it codes. While in the lower court some of 
these challenges were being lost, the administration appeared reluctant to appeal to the 
Supreme Court for legal legitimacy. Finally, because the NIRA was coming up for renewal of its 
two-year mandate and the Congress refused to renew the mandate without clarification of the 
NRA legal standing, the administration was forced to go to the Supreme Court.  
The case chosen by the new NRA chairman, Donald Richberg, to take the Supreme Court was 
the case involving sale and distribution of chickens by Schechter Poultry Corp.1345 The 
Department of Justice announced that it would hurry the case to the Supreme Court. The goal 
being to have the case heard and decided before the initial mandate of the NRA was set to 
expire.  
The facts of the case were as follows: Schechter Poultry Corp company operated the two 
largest jobbing plants in the $60 million-a-year poultry industry in Brooklyn. In the previous year 
they had been indicted on 19 counts of violation the Live Poultry Code. Seventeen of the code 
violations had to do with fair trade provision in which they were accused of; selling diseased and 
uninspected chickens, providing special buying privileges to certain butchers, and filing false 
reports on sales and prices. The two other counts charged the company with working employees 
longer that code hours and paying them less than code wages.  
The case against this the company had moved through both the District Court and Circuit 
Court. Just prior to the NRA selection for its Supreme Court case, the Circuit Court on Manhattan 
had made a ruling which differentiated between the fair-trade practices and the employee 
practices. With respect to the fair-trade practices it ruled that because some of their chickens 
came from outside New York they constituted merchandise in interstate commerce which were 
subject to NRA regulations, therefore upholding the trial court’s decision that the company had 
been guilty of unfair trade practices. However, with respect to employment practices the 
majority of the Circuit Court ruled that the working conditions in the company’s plants did not 
involve interstate commerce and therefore not subject to NRA codes. In effect this decision 
called into question the legitimacy of all of the NRA’s labour and wage provisions. 
At the Supreme Court the government argued that the Constitution’ commerce clause1346 
empowered Congress to regulate both intrastate and interstate business; if the intrastate 
business would have an effect on interstate business. The defendant’s argument was that if the 
Government could regulate one intrastate business, it could regulate all businesses and if carried 
to the extreme this would mean that Congress could find itself in charge of all human activity. 
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1345 Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) 
1346 United States Constitution (Article I, Section 8, Clause 3). The clause states that the United States Congress shall 







In attempting the define the limits of the Government’s regulatory authority the Justices 
asked how the NRA arrived at “fair trade” and “fair labour” standards. The Government’s 
response was that it was the standards which the industry considers unfair, as amended by the 
judgement of the President, which was established according the “common law”. After the 
arguments the Court closed its hearings and recessed to study the problem of reconciling the 
NRA with the Constitution.  
On June 3 the Supreme Court provided its decision. Chief Justice Hughes stated that it was 
the unanimous opinion of the Court that the method of code making was an unconstitutional 
delegation of legislative authority by Congress. That while it was one thing to seek voluntary 
cooperative effort, it was quite another to use the coercive power of the government to force 
compliance. In order to turn the codes into law, it was not sufficient to have NRA codes backed 
by Presidential executive orders. That only the Congress had the authority to create law and it 
could not delegate its authority to the President and the NRA. With respect to the employment 
side of the question the Court said; if the Federal Government had the authority to determine 
wages and hours of employee work in the intrastate commerce because their indirect effect on 
interstate commerce, it could enable them to excerpt control over other elements of 
production. And while it is not within the Courts province to consider the economic advantage 
of a such a centralized system, it was sufficient to say the Constitution does not provide for it 
and as such to fix the hours and wages of the employees of the defendants in their intrastate 
business was not a valid exercise of Federal Power.1347  
This decision meant that all 557 NRA codes backed by executive orders were no longer legally 
applicable. It further implied that even if the codes had been enacted by Congress, regulating 
intrastate commerce issues was beyond the scope of Federal powers as defined by the 
constitution. Although Congress acceded to the president's wish for renewal, the NRA had lost 
its powers and was terminated on 1 January 1936. But it should be pointed out that decision did 
not constitute a repudiation of the regulations, but rather questioned the method in which the 
regulations were imposed.  
While the decision might have effectively been the legal death of the NRA many people saw 
another reason for its demise. That reason being that the program had been failed to achieve 
its objectives. The recovery had effectively stalled in 1934 and 1935 and as such the 
administration shifted its attention to other programs that they thought could achieve better 
results. That is not to say it abandoned efforts to regulate business, indeed in 1935, Congress by 
an overwhelming margin ratified the so-called Wagner Act1348 which recognised the right of 
workers to form unions and prohibited employers from interfering with operations of unions or 
discriminating against the union members. The difference between this and the NRA codes was 
that rather than telling businesses what they had to do it told businesses what they could not 
do.  
This shift in regulations in this example is emblematic of decline of the directed property 
stage and the rise of the restricted property stage. As mentioned in the introduction to the 
universal property phase the demise of the directed property stage was largely a result of a 
recognition by governments that they were not as capable of managing the micro-economic 
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affairs of business as they thought they were. At times this recognition was as a result of 
thoughtful economic analysis, but more often than not it was the negative outcomes that 
resulted from these directed regulations or some other external event that was the catalyst for 
change. That is not to say that all directed regulations have had a negative economic effect. In 
certain industries directed government regulation appears to provide both better economic and 
better social outcomes.1349 But the exception to the inefficiency of directed regulation do appear 
to be just that, exceptions. Unsurprisingly generally the stronger the commitment to directed 
government regulation the longer it took for the recognition of an inefficient outcome to 
become recognised and excepted.1350 However regardless of the method or time frame in which 
this recognition was achieved; the net result was that if governments did not want to return to 
the free market chaos, they had to find a find new better methods of regulating industry and 
the economy. And what more logical way could there be, than to change from telling property 
owners what they had to do, to telling them what they could not do.  
Before moving on to the next stage, an alternative explanation or reason for the demise of 
the directed property needs to be examined. Unlike the very real questions about the economic 
efficiency of directed regulation, this alternative reason was more contrived than real. It can be 
called contrived because it involves invoking a threat that directed regulations were just the first 
step in imposition of fascism or communism, even thought this was not the case.1351 There are 
three great ironies to this fear mongering, the first is that the very business that were conjuring 
up the threat of communism or socialism to scare societies into return to a free market system, 
were at the same time negotiating secret deals with those same fascists and communists in 
order to enrich themselves.1352 The second is that all fascist states have relied upon the support 
of their own major industrialist to come to power and stay in power.1353 The third and perhaps 
greatest irony is that but for the extreme social chaos that resulted from unfettered free 
                                                          
1349 A prime example of this would be the healthcare industry where the government directed healthcare 
traditionally has resulted in much lower costs and better overall health outcomes that non-directed healthcare. 
1350 While both Communism and Nationalization can be classified as not belonging to this stage, if one was to view 
them as an extreme example of directed property, it is clear that the commitment to these absolute government 
directed properties lasted long after their inferior economic outcomes were recognised.  
1351 At most major western governments were exploring the potential benefits of socialism but at no time was any 
leading politician seriously proposing the abolishment of democracy and the imposition of an authoritarian 
dictatorship, which is the predominate feature of both fascism and communism.   
1352 Charles Higham, Trading With the Enemy: the Nazi-American Money Plot 1933-1949 (Book Reader 1983) Cover 
Flap “Standard Oil of Jersey shipped the Nazis precious oil through Switzerland...Ford Motor Company trucks were 
built for Nazi troops...ITT supplied much of Hitler’s communications system...Throughout World War II, the list of 
those who chose business as usual even when the business was conducted with their country’s enemy during a war-
is as extensive as it is shocking.” 
1353William Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, A History of Nazi Germany (Simon & Schuster 1960), p143-
144 “In the summer of 1931, the Fuehrer suddenly decided to concentrate systematically on cultivating the 
influential industrial magnets...What magnets were they?...Their identity was a secret which was kept from all but 
the inner circle around the leader. It had to ...beguile the masses with the cry that the National Socialist were truly 
“socialist” and against the money barons. On the other hand, money to keep the party going had to be wheedled 
out of those who had an ample supply of it. Throughout the latter half of 1931, ... Hitler traversed Germany from 
end to end holding private interviews with prominent [business] personalities.  ...We know ...at least some of the 
“influential industrial magnets” whom Hitler sought out were.   Emil Kirdorf, the union hating coal baron...Fritz 
Thyssen, the head of the steel trust...Albert Voegler, also a power in Untied Steel Works... Georg von Schnitzler, a 
leading director of I.G. Farben a giant chemical cartel...August Rosterg and August Diehn, of the potash 
industry...Cuno, of the Hamburg-Amerika line... the Conti rubber interests... Otto Wolf, the powerful Cologne 
industrialist...Baron Kurt von Schroeder, the Cologne banker...one of Hitler’s economic advisers, brought in a 
number of South German industrialist and a peculiar society of businessmen devoted to the S.S. chief, Himmler, 







markets, there would not have existed the fertile ground of social unrest in which both 
communism and fascism were allowed to take root. 
However irrespective of the contrived nature or the ironies, the fact of the matter was and 
is that because both fascism and communism represented spectres of enormous dimensions 
they provided, and continue to provide, free market proponents an extremely effective tool to 
use to discredit any government interference in the economy.1354 Undeniably the most 
successful articulation of this argument has to be a work by the Austrian Economist Friedrich 
August Hayek titled the “Road to Serfdom”. 1355 The premise that Hayek advanced in this work 
was as simple as it was effective. He theorised that; government interference always leads to 
greater government interference and because this greater interference is doomed to failure, 
this failure would result in the public turning to a strong leader to sort out the mess, which in 
turn would result in that strong leader establishing an authoritarian dictatorship, which would 
reduce the population to role of serf. The short version of his message being that any 
government interference in the markets, inevitably results in either fascism or communism. This 
work, coming out as it did in 1944, was clearly a reference to Nazi Germany and relied on the 
rise of Hitler as a model. Given that the Second World War, had just been fought against an Axis 
of Fascist States this message resonated with many people and could have led to a return to the 
free market property stage but for the fact that his presumptions and overall premise were 
simply wrong. Not only was and is it perfectly possible for government regulation and a strong 
and stable democracy to co-exist but is also entirely common for democracies to replace or 
reduce regulations, which are shown to have had a detrimental effect on a nation. The 
abandonment of detrimental directed regulations in most of the western world being the 
strongest evidence of the fallacy of Hayek’s theory.1356  
A final point about this fear mongering, which has persisted since the evolution of directed 
property stages. Not only have the effort to conflate government regulation with fascism and 
communism continued, but there has also been an effort to conflate the administrators of 
government regulations with the supporters of fascism and communism. The effect of this 
conflation is that public servants are often thought of as closet fascists or communists by the 
free market proponents. This invention of an enemy, is as unfair as it is effective. By portraying 
public servants in such a negative manner, free market proponents have successfully created a 
very negative connotation for the term “bureaucrat” which still survives today. How and why 
government employees can be viewed having such anti-democratic motives and low social 
worth; is as perplexing as it is irreconcilable particularly given the fact that many them transit 
between the public and private sector. To suggest the moment that a private employee enters 
public service they become authoritarian menace, instead of a someone dedicated to working 
for the public good, at best indictates wilful ignorance. Of course, for anyone who is prevented 
from unjust enriching themselves by a bureaucrat, it is possible that such a portrayal would be 
driven by intentional malice rather than wilful ignorance. 
It should be noted that the regulatory authorities that were looking to find new more efficient 
methods of regulating the market were not oblivious to the fear mongering efforts of the free 
                                                          
1354 It goes without saying the after the atrocities of both Hitler’s and Stalin’s authoritarian rule were exposed this 
spectre grew even larger. 
1355 Friedrich August Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, (Routledge Press, UK, University of Chicago Press, US, 1944) 
1356 That this proof should have been so evident to Hayek when he wrote the “Road to serfdom” it would seem to 






market proponents. Even before Hayek wrote his book, regulatory proponents were attempting 
to counter this perception. In 1937 Thurman Arnold,1357 wrote “The Folklore of Capitalism”1358 
in which he tried to expose the myths being promoted by the free market proponents. In his 
final sentence of his book he writes:  
'The greatest destroyer of ideals is he who believes them so strongly that he cannot 
fit them to practical needs.'1359   
It was this effort to find a practical solution to practical needs that allowed the directed property 
stage to evolve into the restricted property stage. A stage in which Thurman Arnold was to play 
a key role in U.S. regulation. 
14.3.3 Restricted Property Stage 
The restricted property stage can be defined as the stage in which governments placed 
specific normative restrictions on the property rights. These restrictions replaced the directed 
regulations that were first utilized in response to the failure of the free market property stage. 
Unlike the directed regulations, these regulations did not tell property owners what they had to 
do with their property, but rather what they could not do. The evolution to this property stage 
being driven by two practical considerations and two theoretical considerations. The first 
practical consideration was a recognition by governments that they were not as capable of 
directing property utilizations as they had initially believed. The second practical consideration 
was the success of the legal challenges that questioned the constitutionality of the directed 
regulations. The first theoretical consideration involved a change in economic theory which saw 
classical economics, which had been challenged by Keynesian economics in the previous stage, 
being replaced by a more nuanced neo-classical economics in this stage. The second theoretical 
consideration was change in the legal understanding of property, which instead of defining 
property as a single element, defined it as a bundle of rights. While the practical considerations 
effectively brought about an end to the directed property stage, it was the theoretical 
considerations that allowed for an evolution to as new property stage, rather than a devolution 
back to the previous stage.  
The recognition by governments that they were not a capable of directing property utilization 
was in some nations quite rapid and in others it quite slow. In America this recognition came 
quickly. As discussed in the National Industrial Recovery Act example used in the previous stage, 
within a matter of a few years the Roosevelt Administration recognised that their directed 
regulations were not working. There were two reasons why it was not working. The first reason 
was that the industrial committees were co-opted by big business to make rules in their favour. 
However, the second and more fundamental reason was that centralised decision making was 
never going to be as responsive and efficient as entrepreneurial decision making in most 
industries. To the extent that any industry was dynamic, any centralized process was obviously 
at a disadvantage to the actual industry participants in terms of deciding how best to make and 
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General, in charge of the Anti-Trust Division, of Department of Justice from 1938 to 1943. More of him in the 
following stage.  
1358 Thurman W. Arnold, The Folklore of Capitalism (New Haven, Yale University Press,1937) 






sell their products or services to consumers. However, a recognition of the limitation of directed 
property did not mean that the Roosevelt Administration was willing to return to the chaos of 
the free market that had ended so badly with the great depression. It was for this reason that it 
tried to forge a new regulatory route that relied on restricting rather than directing the 
behaviour of property owners. The idea being that; if the worst abuses of the free market could 
be constrained by restrictive regulations, the entrepreneurial energy of the nation could be 
harnessed in the interest of all citizens and not just a few powerful industrial barons.  
In Europe the first nation to discard the major aspects of directed property was surprisingly, 
West Germany.1360 This was surprising because after their defeat in the WWII, the allies who 
controlled the western part of the nation were for the most part committed to a directed 
property stage not only in Germany, but also in their home countries. They believed that only a 
strict enforcement of wage and price controls would keep this part of Germany from the 
economic ruin, which would result in it falling into the hands of the communists. To this end the 
Allied forces put in place a of model of a centralized directed economy after the end of the war, 
which remained in place until June of 1948.  
Despite the conviction of the Allies, after a few years it was widely recognised that this model 
was failing to provide the desired recovery of their economy and was in fact driving much of the 
economy into the much less efficient underground market. To their credit, it was the Germans 
that came up with their own solution. Rather than returning to a free market economy or 
adopting a communist economy; they instead choose what they termed the third route, a 
capitalist-based economy with a social conscience. It was on June 21st, 1948 that this choice was 
implemented. On that day the West German authorities not only replaced the devalued 
currency, but they also abolished all wage and price controls. This action was not entirely 
supported by the Allies, who while approving the currency replacement had not endorsed the 
removal of the wage and price controls. While both the Americans and the British acquiesced to 
the removal of wage and price controls, the French did not. The result of these action was that 
almost overnight, goods that had been missing from the shelves of the stores suddenly 
appeared. Only in the French quarter did conditions not improve as rapidly, which went a long 
way to proving the efficiency of a regulated free market, over a directed market and is why the 
reforms were adopted for all of West German after its formal creation in 1949. 
In the much of the rest of Europe elements of a directed economy were maintained for a 
longer period; with many industries that were nationalized under the directed property stage 
remained in government ownership well into the 1980’s. This does not however mean that the 
directed property stage was the dominate stage during that time. Rather it was a combination 
of directed and restricted property with restrictive regulations being the dominate form of 
governance. 
In terms of the legal challenges, by far the most important challenges occurred in the United 
States of America. It has to be recalled that during the directed property stage, many of the 
American courts were hostile to this form of government interference in the economy. On the 
Supreme Court this hostility took the form of four Justices, Pierce Butler, James Clark 
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independent acts of the new West German government. West Germany or more accurately the Federal Republic of 






McReynolds, George Sutherland, and Willis van Devanter, who were ideological protagonists 
opposed to any New Deal legislation. Usually they based their opposition on the premises that 
directed regulations infringed on constitutional protected property rights1361 or alternatively on 
constitutionally protected freedom to contract rights. 1362 These justices were later joined in 
their opposition by swing voters Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes and Justice Owen J. Roberts, 
who tended to oppose the legislation of efficiency grounds rather than on ideological grounds. 
The remain three Justices, Louis Brandeis, Benjamin Cardozo, and Harlan Stone were generally 
more ideologically supportive of New Deal legislation but also joined in opposition to certain 
overreaching elements of it. 
After initially providing majority support for certain parts of the New Deal legislation1363 the 
Supreme court swung into opposition in 1935 as it become clear that the legislation it was not 
having the desired economic effect. The most obvious and defining evidence of this hostility was 
Schechter Poultry,1364 in which a unanimous Supreme Court rejected as unconstitutional the 
administration’s  authority to impose its definition of unfair competition, which was the centre 
piece of the National Recovery Act.1365 However there were a number of other cases that 
demonstrated the judiciary’s hostility towards directed regulations.1366 A good summary of the 
Supreme Courts opposition in these cases can be found in the majority opinion written by Justice 
Sutherland in Carter v Carter Coal Company1367: 
'The ruling and firmly established principle is that the powers which the general 
government may exercise are only those specifically enumerated in the Constitution 
and such implied powers as are necessary and proper to carry into effect the 
enumerated powers. Whether the end sought to be attained by an act of Congress is 
legitimate is wholly a matter of constitutional power, and not at all of legislative 
discretion. Legislative congressional discretion begins with the choice of means, and 
ends with the adoption of methods and details to carry the delegated powers into 
                                                          
1361 United States Bill of Rights, Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, “No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation.”  
1362 United States Constitution, Article l, section 10, clause 1, “No State shall... pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post 
facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts,” 
1363 In Home Building & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell 290 U.S. 398 (1933) the Court recognised that legality of 
administrative powers in an emergency. "While emergency does not create power, emergency may furnish the 
occasion for the exercise of power." Hughes, 290 U.S. 398, 426. In Nebbia v. New York 291 U.S. 502 (1934) the Court 
recognised the right of the government to regulate property in the public interest. "neither property rights nor 
contract rights are absolute, for government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property to the detriment 
of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm. Equally fundamental with the private right is 
that of the public to regulate it in the common interest." Roberts, 291 U.S. 502, 523 
1364 Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) 
1365 National Industrial Recovery Act, P.L. 73-67, 48 Stat. 195 (1933) 
1366 Before Schechter the Court in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan 293 U.S. 388 (1935) decided that the delegation of 
powers under the National Industrial Recovery Act were unconstitutional. In the next New Deal related case after 
Schechter a majority of the Court decided in the United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) that processing taxes 
instituted under the Agricultural Adjustment Act, 48 Stat. 31 (1933) which was intended to reduce an oversupply of 
farm goods was unconstitutional.  In Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935) a unanimous 
Court ruled that provisions of the Federal Farm Bankruptcy Act, 48 Stat. 1289 (1934) which provided farm owners 
with a five year grace period to recover their land from bankruptcy represented an unconstitutional taking of 
property from the mortgage lenders in violation of the Fifth Amendment.  In Carter v. Carter Coal Company, 298 
U.S. 238 (1936), a five justice majority found that legislation included in Bituminous Coal Conservation Act, 49 Stat. 
991 (1935) was unconstitutional as it violated private property rights. 






effect. The distinction between these two things — power and discretion — is not only 
very plain, but very important. For while the powers are rigidly limited to the 
enumerations of the Constitution, the means which may be employed to carry the 
powers into effect are not restricted, save that they must be appropriate, plainly 
adapted to the end, and not prohibited by, but consistent with, the letter and spirit of 
the Constitution. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 421. Thus, it may be said that, 
to a constitutional end, many ways are open, but to an end not within the terms of the 
Constitution, all ways are closed. 
The proposition, often advanced and as often discredited, that the power of the 
federal government inherently extends to purposes affecting the nation as a whole 
with which the states severally cannot deal or cannot adequately deal, and the related 
notion that Congress, entirely apart from those powers delegated by the Constitution, 
may enact laws to promote the general welfare, have never been accepted, but always 
definitely rejected, by this court.'1368 
To the extent that this quote represents the general attitude of the Supreme Court with 
respect to directed regulations intended to promote the general welfare of the nation, it is fairly 
clear that the continuation of such a regulatory regime was “closed” as far as this Court was 
concerned. 
Before moving on to the theoretical rational for the adoption of the restricted property stage, 
it is important to note that this Supreme Court did not exhibit the same consistent hostility 
towards restrictive regulations. For example, in Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo1369 the 
Court decided that State governments had no right to interfere in wage contracts by setting 
minimum wage regulations for women working in a laundry. However, one year later in West 
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish1370 they ruled that a State could interfere in wage contract if it was to 
protect the health and safety of its people. To the extent that these two wage cases appear to 
be in direct contradiction with one another, the Court justified it decision in the previous case 
by suggesting that minimum wage legislation was more arbitrary than the one they ruled 
acceptable.  
In reality the decision in the latter case was more than likely influenced, not by the merits of 
the case, but by the threat from the Roosevelt Administration to enlarge and stack the Court 
with progressive justices if the Court continued to invalidate legislation intended to promote the 
general welfare of the nation. This and subsequent decision supporting restrictive regulations 
appear to represent a compromise between the Court and the Administration, in which the 
                                                          
1368 Id. Sutherland, 298 U.S. 292 
1369 Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo 298 U.S. 587 (1936) "The right to make contracts about one's affairs is a 
part of the liberty protected by the due process clause.... In making contracts of employment, generally speaking, 
the parties have equal right to obtain from each other the best terms they can by private bargaining." Butler, 298 
U.S. 587, 610 
1370 West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish 300 U.S. 379 (1937) " But it was recognized in the cases cited, as in many others, 
that freedom of contract is a qualified, and not an absolute, right. There is no absolute freedom to do as one wills or 
to contract as one chooses. The guaranty of liberty does not withdraw from legislative supervision that wide 
department of activity which consists of the making of contracts, or deny to government the power to provide 
restrictive safeguards. Liberty implies the absence of arbitrary restraint, not immunity from reasonable regulations 







Administration abandons directed regulations and the Court is more cautious about invalidating 
restrictive regulations. 
In terms of a shift in the economic theory underlying this new property stage it has to be 
recognised that Keynesian economics was at the heart of both the directed property stage and 
the restricted property. However, it also has to be recognised that the interpretation of 
Keynesian theory was very different during these two stages. For the most part this change in 
interpretation reflected a much humbler approach to the ability of government to manage the 
micro economic affairs of industries.1371 While Keynesian economics may have been at the 
forefront of the economic thought there were a number of other economists that provided 
important contributions to this property stage. One of the most important of which was Wilhelm 
Röpke1372. Röpke was a German National who took refuge in Switzerland during the Nazi regime. 
It was while he was in Switzerland that he developed what he referred to as a “Third Way” for 
pragmatic economic development. According to Röpke, nations did not have to make the false 
choice between communism and free market capitalism, both of which he viewed as having 
substantial shortcomings when it came to protecting the welfare of ordinary citizens. On 
communism (or socialism as it was called in his day), he wrote;  
'Socialism can be nothing but destructive of freedom in the widest sense of the 
work. It wants to crown the work of emancipation, yet can result in nothing but the 
most abject subjugation of the individual.'1373 
On free market capitalism he wrote: 
'Yet there can scarcely be any doubt that sooner or later man would have revolted 
against an economic system which...has unfortunately been allowed to develop: its 
instability; its lack of social justice; the growing opportunities for monopolistic 
enrichment and the blackmailing policies of special interests; the faulty functioning of 
many individual  markets; proletarization, commercialization and concentration of 
power, excess of speculation and destruction of capital; the insensate and unnatural 
way of life imposed on men against which they finally rebel, driven by a vague feeling 
of discontent and lured by nebulous goals.”1374  
For Röpke the problem with the free market advocates was that they; 
'refused to see that a market economy needs a firm moral, political and institutional 
framework (a minimum standard of business ethics, a strong state, a sensible “market 
police,” and well weighed laws appropriate to the economic system), if it is not to fail 
                                                          
1371 Something which Keynes never advocated in the first place. 
1372 There were of course other economists that held similar views, but had have such a dramatic influence on the 
economic affairs of a nation during this stage and many were considered economic practitioners focused on 
developing models that explaining the intricacies of modern neo-classical economics rather than economic 
theologians.  However, it is simply impractical to detail all of these economists and their contributions here.  
1373 Wilhelm Röpke, The Social Crisis of Our Times first published (Switzerland, Eugen Rentsch Verlag 1942), Chicago 
University of Chicago Press 1960) p 87 






and at the same time destroy society as a whole by permitting the unbridled rule of 
vested interests.'1375  
Instead of advocating for one of these two false choices Röpke advocated for a more 
companionate or Christian form of capitalism, that recognised the rights of all members of a 
society. What this meant in practical terms was ending the “industrial feudalism” of big business; 
not by replacing it with “state feudalism”, but rather by breaking up those businesses and 
replacing them with smaller enterprises. His belief was that a return to smaller enterprises 
would create an environment where businesses would be forced to compete for customers, 
rather than having a monopoly that allowed them to avoid competition. To be clear this view 
did not in any way advocate regulating big business using directed regulation. As far as directed 
regulation was concerned Röpke viewed this as just another weaker form of a planned economy 
that he so harshly condemned in its more extreme communist form. For him the only 
appropriate regulation were ones that were comparable to traffic rules; which rather than 
dictating where drivers should be on the road, only provide rules for driving on the road that 
ensured the safety of other drivers and pedestrians. While the model for his theory was the 
economic environment that he observed in Switzerland, it was his advocacy for and the eventual 
the adoption of this Third Way in West Germany, that made his one of the most important 
economists in Europe.1376 Indeed it was mainly as a result of his work that West Germany 
abandoned directed regulations and adopted a restrictive regulatory regime intended to 
prevent monopoly abuses, while protecting the inherent benefits of the capitalistic system. 1377  
While the advances in economic theory supported an evolution towards a restrictive 
regulatory regime, there was also was a change in the legal conception of property that 
enhanced the possibility for such a change to be accepted by the Courts. This change in legal 
perception shifted the court’s interpretation of property from one that revolved around the idea 
that property represented an item of unitary ownership with an implied understanding of 
absolute dominion, to one that interpreted property as a bundle of legal relationships that could 
be separated into individual rights and duties. One of the most significant contribution to this 
new theory of property was from a professor at Stanford Law School, Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld. 
In a famous article “Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied Judicial Reasoning” 
published in 1913, he argued that property does not consist of things but rather a distinct set of 
legal relationships. While Hohfeld’s article was primarily intended to differentiate between the 
legal terms used to describe various legal relations, it was perhaps more significant in that it 
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1376 Wilhelm Röpke, “The ending of industrial feudalism west of the Elbe means today the same as in 1918—the 
ending of the monopoly of the heavy industries and a radical change in the economic policy (Customs, cartel law, 
and so on) to which the German heavy industries owed their morbidly monstrous growth and their monopoly 
position. Similar steps are required for the other powerful elements in German industry” Die Gesellschaftskrists der 
Gegerm art (4th edition, pp. 364) and Civitas humana (Zurich edition, pp. 293). 
1377 It should be noted that Röpke has often been referred to as part of the Austrian School of economics which 
adamantly advocates for the free market. However, his views on big business and the need to provide a 
companionate form of capitalism definitively place him on the fringes of the School if not outside its ideology. He 
certainly did not agree with the notion of the neo-classical school which seen to believe in an absolute right to profit 
maximisation. Which is just as well because Röpke was much more of a pragmatist than an ideologist, for as far as 
ideology was concerned Röpke consider it to be a tool for enabling the willing participation of those that were being 
subdued. “Since they [tyrannies] cannot rely on naked force alone, they require for their existence an uncritically 
accepted system of ideas (an ideology) which, extending subjugation to the soul, turns the oppressed into willing 






crystallised the notion of that property was not a unitary concept but rather a complex set of 
relationships which could be separated into individual rights and corresponding duties.  
The significance of this new paradigm from the context of the regulated property stage was 
twofold. First by defining property as a bundle of individual rights; it allowed some rights to be 
negated, while whilst keeping the majority of rights intact. This to a large extent extinguished 
the ability of previously absolute right property holders to claim that any restrictive regulations 
were violations of the very essence of their property. Second correlative duties associated with 
property rights could be expanded to include a duty to protect the interest of both other private 
parties and the public. To the extent that restrictive government regulations were framed as an 
attempt to protect the public, they could therefore be viewed not as negation of a right, but 
rather the enforcement of an inherent duty.  
It is worth noting that although Hohfeld published his work in 1913, it was not until 1938 that 
the American Law Institute adopted the bundle of rights concept in its Restatement of Law which 
defined property defines “real property” as one of a number of present possessory estates and 
an “owner” as the person who has one or more interests. 1378 Given that the American Law 
institutes’ Restatements purport to state the law as it exists in the United States, 1938 would 
appear to be a watershed date for this interpretation of property. This timeline matches nicely 
with the ongoing evolution from the directed to the restricted property stage in America as it 
was like about this time that restrictive property became the dominate form of property in the 
country.  
While it might have been in 1938 that regulated property became the dominate form of 
property in America, this does not mean that it did not exist before that date. On the contrary 
there have been both common law and statutory restriction placed on the use of property in 
most countries for centuries. However, it was at this time, or shortly before it that governments 
began to actively develop and implement statutory law with the specific intention of using such 
laws to advance the economic efficiency of the nation. 
The least controversial of these regulations were those that prohibited what can only be 
described as corrupt capitalism. Behaviour falling into this category would be activities like, 
corporate fraud,1379 insider trading,1380 and bribery.1381  Next category of restrictive regulations 
which had broad, but not universal support, were the regulations restricting the mistreatment 
of workers. These include regulations governing minimum wage and working conditions,1382 
including the protection of unions.1383 The final much more controversial set of regulation 
involved the restricting the actual behaviour of the business firm in the market. Sometimes this 
was done with industry specific regulation such as those applied to the banks under the Glass–
Steagall Act.1384 But the bulk of these restrictions came through rules made by competition 
authorities like the Antitrust Division at the United States Department of Justice.  
In America, no one was more central to this rise of the regulation of business behaviour than 
Thurman Arnold, who was tasked by President Roosevelt to head the Antitrust Division of the 
                                                          
1378 Restatement of the Law of Property of 1938 (§ 7, § 10) 
1379 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 USCA §§ 78a et seq.) 
1380  Securities Act of 1933, Ch. 38, Title 1, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) 
1381 Surprisingly insider dealing (self-dealing) that was the heart of the corruption was not criminalized during this 
period. 
1382 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) 
1383 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 






Justice Department in 1938. During the next five years as Assistant Attorney General in charge 
of the Antitrust Division, he practically single handily revived antitrust laws and enforcement 
which had been neglected in the 1920s and abandoned in early part of the New Deal. Thurman 
Arnold was convinced that the great depression was caused by property owners that distorted 
the market for their benefit by restricting the distribution of goods.1385  It was this restraint of 
trade that he was determined to bring to an end and he would do this by using the antitrust laws 
to protect the ideals of a free market from the power of “private feudal combinations”. To the 
extent that Thurman Arnold maintained his unequivocal resolve to enforce antitrust laws 
throughout his tenure as head of the Antitrust Division, he must be viewed as a pioneer and 
central contributor to that creation of the regulated property stage. 
This belief in the necessity to "free the market" from trade restraints was not the only thing 
that made Thurman Arnold different from previous heads of the Antitrust Division. What made 
him different and ultimately much more effective was his conviction that whenever antitrust 
laws were enforced they had to be enforced simultaneously on all parties, at all levels of an 
industry.1386 This conviction was not based on the belief that all property owners in a given 
industry were guilty of criminal intent, but rather a practical recognition that restraints on trade 
were so pervasive that restricting one parties and not the others would be unfairly 
discriminating against that party and more importantly not have the desired effect of changing 
the mindset of industry players. The major problem he faced in instituting this broad level of 
enforcement was the limited resources available inside the Division, so rather than examining 
all industries at the same time he began by focusing his recourses on one industry at a time. The 
idea being that once the antitrust laws had been successfully enforced in one industry, the 
Division could move on to another industry, and more importantly the prosecution in that first 
industry would serve as a cautionary tale for similar behaviour in other industries. 
Another important aspect of Thurman Arnold’s approach was that the proper method for 
removing trade restrictions was to have the Division act as a public prosecutor using the courts 
to uphold the law rather than setting up a new Agency making law.1387 This of course was a 
dramatic shift from the previous actions of the National Recovery Agency. It was through the 
use of the courts that he hoped to legitimise the regulatory restrictions which he wanted to use 
to prevent private restraint of trade practices, while at the same time avoiding the inevitable 
accusation of political partisanship. When enforcing the antitrust laws through the courts it 
made no difference the size of the organization. To be clear the objective of his enforcement 
actions was intended not to eliminate big business, but rather to enhancing the efficiency of the 
marketplace for the benefit of the nation at large.1388 Indeed this objective of enhancing 
                                                          
1385 Thurman W. Arnold, The Bottlenecks of Business, (Washington, Reynal and Hitchcock, 1940) 9: “Ten years of 
experience since the beginning of the great depression have demonstrated that we have made extraordinary strides 
in invention and in efficiency of organised production. It is the economic machinery of distribution which is stalled.”   
1386 Id. 191: “The most effective antitrust enforcement consists in prosecuting simultaneously all of the restraints 
which hamper the production and distribution of a product from raw material to consumer.” 
1387 Id. 144: “At this point it should be emphasised that the Antitrust Division has never been delegated quasi-
judicial power. It cannot make a decision which will have in court even prima facie bearing on what the law is. It has 
no authority to approve anyone’s plans for combination. That power lies only in the courts.”  
1388 Id. 3-4: “Most books in the past on the antitrust laws have been written with the idea that they are designed to 
eliminate the evils of bigness. What ought to be emphasised is not the evils of size but the evils of industries which 
are not efficient or do not pass efficiency on to consumers. If the antitrust laws are simply an expression of a 
religion which condemns largeness as economic sin they will be regarded as an anachronism in a machine age. If 
however, they are directed at making distribution more efficient, they will begin to make sense, and, incidentally, 






efficiency through the enforcement of antitrust laws was equally available to big business, when 
they were threatened by illegal restraint of trade behaviour.1389  
As to the actual regulatory restriction included in the antitrust laws during Thurman Arnold’s 
time, these simply involved enacting existing regulations set out in the Sherman Act of 1890,1390 
the Clayton Act first enacted in 1914,1391 and significantly amended in 1936 by the Robinson-
Patman Act1392; and the Federal Trade Commission Act1393 of 1914. Of these the Acts, Thurman 
Arnold was most focused on was the Sherman Act, which was the first and most significant of 
the antitrust laws. 
To understand the Sherman Act; it has to be understood that the Act itself does not prohibit 
specific business practices, but instead instituted a general regulation prohibiting; agreements 
in the restraint of trade and monopolize or attempt to monopolize trade. The actual language 
of the Act with respect to these prohibitions are as follows: 
'Sec. 1. “Every contract, combination in the form of trust or other- wise, or 
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign 
nations, is hereby declared to be illegal.” 
Sec. 2. “Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine 
or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or 
commerce... shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanour.”'1394 
As discussed earlier the problem with this language is that it is so broad that if taken to 
extremes it could make illegal all business agreement, because inherent in every business 
agreement at least a minimal restraint of trade. To resolve this problem the courts interpreted 
the Act as forbidding only unreasonable restraints of trade, 1395 and instituted a practice called 
the rule of reason to determine which restraints of trade were unreasonable. Under the rule of 
reason, the courts were supposed to consider the makeup of the industry, the defendant’s 
position in the industry, the defendant’s purpose for engaging in the behaviour and the ability 
of the defendant’s competition to respond to their challenged behaviour. While the rule of 
reason represents a practical solution to an overly general regulation it too had problems 
                                                          
1389 Id. p 118-120 In these pages Thurman Arnold illustrated the potential of antitrust laws to be used by big 
business by illustrating the concerted industry action against Henry Ford when he first started to make cars using 
assembly line production. This restrictive trade practice being evidenced in a letter from the Automobile Association 
to Ford. “Mr Ford, we are not going to let you make cars. In the first place you have every appearance of being a 
ruinous price cutter.... I you start a price war you will destroy the confidence of the splendid business leaders who 
now dominate the industry and who are all for one and one for all.” For Thurman this restraint of trade against 
Ford’s car business was just as illegal as if it had been perpetrated against a smaller competitor.  
1390 The Sherman Antitrust Act, 26 Stat 209 (1890) 
1391 The Clayton Antitrust Act, 38 Stat. 730 (1914)   
1392 The Robinson-Patman Act or Anti-Price Discrimination Act, 49 Stat. 1526 (1938) 
1393 The Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) 
1394 Id. Note 835 
1395 United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897) “Its title is, "An act to protect trade and 
commerce against unlawful restraints and monopolies." The word "unlawful" clearly distinguishes between 
contracts in restraint of trade which are lawful and those which are not -- in other words, between those which are 
unreasonably in restraint of trade, and consequently invalid, and those which are reasonable, and hence lawful.” 
166 U.S. 328; Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States 221 U.S. 1, 31 S. Ct. 502, 55L Ed. 619 (1911) “The Anti-
Trust Act contemplated and required a standard of interpretation, and it was intended that the standard of reason 
which had been applied at the common law should be applied in determining whether particular acts were within 






because initially, it was so subjective that it allowed courts to find all restraints of trade 
reasonable. For example, in the 1933 Appalachian Coal case, 1396 the Supreme Court found that 
a price fixing scheme organized by Appalachian coal mines which represented 74% of production 
in the region, was reasonable because it prevented destructive competition between the 
miners. If such clear restraint of trade was not a breach of the Sherman Act, then the Act itself 
would represent little more than an inkblot in the Code of Laws of the United States. While lack 
of specificity may have hindered the Sherman Act’s implementation in prior decades, Thurman 
Arnold believed that the flexibility of a regulation providing general principles was a good thing. 
1397 This because the same flexibility which allowed earlier courts to eviscerate the Act, provided 
the flexibility needed to adapt the regulation to the constantly evolving methods of restraining 
trade in later courts, once they became less sympathetic to the free market ideology.  
Ironically Arnolds efforts to revive antitrust law were greatly assisted by the non-
enforcement in the previous decades as few businesses felt the need to hide their 
anticompetitive activities. This meant that when he took office there were several openly 
anticompetitive activities that he could immediately take to the courts without extensive 
investigation efforts. His first industry wide large case involved the big car companies who had 
were coercing their dealers to finance car purchases through their own finance companies, 
rather than through independent finance companies. While a judge in Wisconsin threw out the 
first attempt to bring an action, Thurman Arnold had a much better response from a grand jury 
which issued an indictment in five days. Included in the indictment were a total of 86 firms the 
most important of which were the big three car companies; Ford, Chrysler and General Motors. 
When these indictments were made public the Department of Justice announced that they were 
willing to listen to voluntary offers to resolve the anticompetitive behaviour under a consent 
decree. Within a few weeks all but one of the major companies approached and negotiated with 
the Antitrust Division civil consent decrees, that ended the anticompetitive behaviour without 
having to prosecute behaviour in court.1398 This was to prove the model for future antitrust 
investigations initiated by the Antitrust Division. For it was through consent decrees, (which 
were always subject to court approval), that the majority of the antitrust actions during Thurman 
Arnold time at the head of Antitrust Division were resolved. 
However, in the absence of a court approved consent decree Thurman Arnold’s Antitrust 
Division had no hesitation in pursuing prosecutions. Such was the case in another early industry 
investigation of the motor fuel industry. In that industry the Antitrust Division investigation 
revealed that through the use of a patent on a fluid called Ethyl,1399 a combination of the Ethyl 
Corporation1400 and various refineries were able to control the price and distribution of over 85% 
of motor fuel. They did this by restricting ethyl sales to refiners that were willing to follow the 
marketing practices and posted prices set by the major oil companies. In 1940 this blatant price 
                                                          
1396 Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933) 
1397 Arnold, The Bottlenecks of Business, 132: “Nor can the Sherman Act be a catalog of specific rules... This means 
we must have a clearly defined general principle which is understandable to layman and which is elastic enough to 
be applied to different industrial situations in a common sense way.”  
1398 The one holdout was General Motors which was convicted by a district court of violating the Sherman Act on 
November 17, 1939. General Motors appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, United States 
v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376 (1941) On May 1, 1941, that Court affirmed the conviction, and on July 2, 
1941, denied rehearing. A petition for certiorari was denied on October 13, 1941. 314 U.S. 618. 
1399 Ethyl is added to gasoline enhance the make it more efficient for high compression engines. 
1400 The Ethyl Corporation being jointly owned by the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, the General Motors 






fixing scheme was declared illegal by the Supreme Court.1401 This Supreme Court decision in the 
Ethyl case had an even greater impact than the auto financing consent decree, because it helped 
to illustrate to the both industries, and the general public at large, the fact that there were laws 
in place that could and would be used to prevent illegal restraint of trade. As such the case not 
only provided a cautionary tale for all other industries and their lawyers, it also encouraged 
victims of those practices to stand up to fight against them.  
This is precisely what happened in the eyeglass industry, after the Ethyl decision was 
announced. Like in the motor fuel industry the price of spectacle was controlled through patent 
holders refusing to licence distributors that engaged in price competition. This had meant that 
the average cost of a pair of spectacles prior to the Ethyl decision was about 20 dollars. However 
almost immediately after the Ethyl decision, some spectacle distributors began to advertise 
those same spectacles for $7.50. The fact that these new prices were related to the Ethyl 
decision was clearly evident in fact that the same advertisements that promoted the new prices, 
specifically attributed their ability to offer these new lower prices to the Supreme Courts Ethyl 
decision.1402   
But it was not just in a few industries that the effects were evident. Throughout the country 
literally hundreds of industries began reconsidering their behaviour in light of the active 
enforcement of antitrust laws. Often that reconsideration was driven by actual 
investigations,1403 but just as often it was done simply because there was now a credible legal 
threat to anticompetitive behaviour that could no longer be ignored. The net effect of these 
enhanced enforcement efforts was as dramatic, as it was immediate. Thurman Arnold explained 
the effects as follows: 
'Figures on what antitrust enforcement actually saves are necessarily based on an 
estimation of what the prices would have been without an investigation. They are useful 
only as guesses. However, it is significant that during the period when all communities 
the supply of which is affected by the war were rising, the particular war products under 
investigation by the Department did not increase in price. It is estimated that 
investigations of newsprint, potash, nitrogen, and steel which cost $200,000 have saved 
the consumers of this country $170,000,000.'1404 
Thurman Arnold’s analysis was of course looking only at the benefits of this new regulatory 
environment during the first two years of its enforcement and as such it may have simply 
represented a short-term economic anomaly. To truly determine the true economic impact of 
this regulatory environment it is necessary to examine a much lengthier period of time.  
It can be argued that the most appropriate period for judging the economic efficiency of 
regulated property stage would be the first 15 years after the end of the WWII. This post war 
period is the most appropriate because during the period; antitrust laws continued to be actively 
                                                          
1401 Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436 (1940) “Agreements for maintaining prices of articles moving 
in interstate commerce are, without more, unreasonable restraints within the meaning of the Sherman Act because 
they eliminate competition, and agreements which create power of such price maintenance, exhibited by its actual 
exertion for that purpose, are in themselves unlawful restraints within the meaning of the Sherman Act. P.” 309 U.S. 
458. 
1402 Arnold, The Bottlenecks of Business, 29 
1403 During Thurman Arnold’s first year as the head of the Antitrust Division the Division had received 1375 
complaints, had 213 cases pending involving forty industries, with 185 continuing investigations in process.   






enforced, and the economic effects of the “Great Society” were yet to be felt. Before discussing 
the economic development during this period, it should be noted that there was a great fear 
that the end of World War II and the subsequent drop in military spending might bring back the 
hard times of the Great Depressions. This fear was not without merit, as during the war the 
military expenditure exploded from 2% of GDP in 1940, to a peak of 42% in 1945 and then back 
down to 7% by 1947.1405 That there was such a dramatic decline in military expenditure could 
have on its own precipitated an overall decline in the economic activity of the country. However 
much to the surprise of many, this economic decline did not happen. Instead between 1945 and 
1960 the overall economic activity of the country expanded dramatically, with the gross 
domestic product of America growing from about $200 billion in 1945, to almost $300 billion in 
1950, and to more than $500 billion by 1960.1406 While there were other policies that 
contributed to this rise,1407 there can be no denying that the elimination of the restrictive trading 
practices that had kept the prices of houses, cars, and other household items out of the reach 
of ordinary Americans had a significant and positive impact on the overall economy. That 
ordinary Americans were now able to afford the products that they produced meant; increases 
in demand, that required additional production, which required more workers, and once again 
stimulated demand. This virtuous circle of competitively priced products, and people being paid 
enough to afford them, was the opposite of the circumstance that led to the Great 
Depression.1408  
14.3.4 Supervised Property Stage 
This stage is called the supervised stage because in this stage the "per se" rules which 
prohibited certain form of behaviour, were replace by "rule of reason" which was intended to 
punish abusive behaviour. The idea being that governments would supervise industries but not 
interfere with them so long as there was no abusive behaviour. The history of its development 
is as follows. 
Given the enforcement of anti-trust regulation had such a positive effect on the American 
economy, it is no wonder that the vast majority of democratic countries in the world instituted 
similar legislation. However, this new restricted property stage was not without its critics. First 
and foremost amongst those critics were the free market proponents and large property owners 
that lamented the loss of their absolute rights to property which had so dominated the free 
market property stage. For them the government interference in even one stick of their bundle 
of rights was ideologically unacceptable regardless of whether the restricted property stage was 
more economically efficient than the free market stage. However, because, at least initially the 
restricted property stage was so much more economically efficient, their influence on 
government policy had to wait until the abuses of the free market stage were forgotten by the 
public at large. In terms of successful attacks on the actual antitrust regulations, this meant they 
had to wait until the late 1970’s. By that time not only were the abuses of the free market stage 
                                                          
1405 U.S. Census Bureau, Historical Statistics of the United States: From Colonial Times to 1970 (1975) 
1406 Id. F 1-9 
1407 The most notable policy would have to be the Montgomery G.I Bill which was passed in 1944 that gave 
government grants to any returning service man that wanted to return to school.  
1408 This comparison being based on the fact that in the five years before the Great Depression wages stagnated 






forgotten, but the proponents of the restricted property stage had overextended the reach of 
restrictive regulations in a way that did not always enhance economic efficiency.  
The most successful critic of antitrust regulations was the federal judge, Robert H. Bork. In 
1978 he wrote “The Antitrust Paradox”1409 which was to become a standard free market 
proponents reference book for refuting the advantages of antitrust regulations. In this book 
Judge Bork acts not as an unbiased judge but rather as a free market apologist who is bent on 
discrediting any benefits resulting from antitrust laws. The way in which he does this is to first 
describe an idealized free market world where antitrust laws are unnecessary and then provided 
isolated instances in this idealised world where antitrust rules are harmful to efficiency. An 
example of the idealized free market world that Judge Bork and other free market proponents 
use can be found in his description of the financial industry. On this industry he writes; 
'The general idea that of the capital market being more imperfect than other 
markets is, of course, patently implausible, ... imperfection theorists would have to 
explain why capital will not flow to profitable uses, ... Nobody has troubled to explain 
that form of irrationality in capital suppliers, and we are justified in believing that it 
does not exist'1410 
This quote is typical of the idealized concept that the free market proponents have with 
respect to market forces, and indeed if they were correct it would be a valid argument for the 
redundancy of antitrust laws. However, as history has shown, time and time again, the capital 
markets are far from perfect and they regularly make significant mistakes that can act to the 
determent of society as a whole. The latest example of this imperfection was of course the 
recent subprime lending fiasco which put threatened entire world economy in 2008.1411 To the 
extent that Judge Bork and other free market proponents wilfully ignore real world facts in 
favour of their ideological beliefs, this should have been sufficient to disqualify their contribution 
to regulatory debate as mere apologists for a free market belief system. However it did not, and 
it did not because they rely on the same wilful disregard for real world facts which was in the 
examples that Bork used in demonstrating ineffectiveness of specific antitrust rules. With 
respect to these specific rules Bork and the other free market proponents found isolated 
examples of the ineffectiveness of individual rules, and then inferred that because these rules 
were not effective in certain circumstances, they were not valid in any circumstances. 
An example of this type of logic can be found in Judge Bork’s discussion of product tie-in 
restrictions usually considered illegal under antitrust rules. Tying exists when a seller of product 
“A” requires that any if its customers that want to purchase product “A” also agree to purchase 
product “B”. The purchase of product “A” is therefore “tied” to the purchase of product “B”. On 
this behaviour Judge Bork argued that there are instances where tying might not result in 
anticompetitive efficiency losses. These include cases where tying was used to; '(1) avoid price 
regulation, (2) price discrimination, (3) non-discriminatory measurement of use, (4) economies 
                                                          
1409 Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, A Policy at War with Itself, (Free Press, 1978) (Simon & Schuster, 1993) 
1410 Id. p 147 
1411 It is interesting to note that after the 2008 crisis, one of Judge Bork’s most dedicated followers and the present 
day free market champion, Judge Richard Posner, had to admit that free market had failed. “The mistakes were 
systemic — the product of the nature of the banking business in an environment shaped by low interest rates and 







of scale, and (5) technological interdependence or the “protection” of goodwill”.'1412 While his 
analysis of the efficiency of tying in these situations may have some merit, even that merit can 
be disputed because it relies on the existence of a nonexistence perfect market. However, there 
is a bigger dispute which results from the conclusion that he draws from these isolated 
examples. For after describing these disputed examples he goes on to condemn all antitrust 
tying restriction. He does this by inferring that like his analysis, all analysis of tying restrictions 
have concluded that tying restrictions have come to the same conclusion. 
'The law’s theory of tying arrangements is merely another example of the 
discredited transfer of power theory, and perhaps no other variety of theory has been 
so thoroughly and repeatedly demolished in the legal and economic literature.'1413  
This inference is misleading both on a practical and theoretical basis. From a practical 
prospective; it is misleading because there are numerous examples of how tying can foreclose 
competition in a market1414 and there are a range of court cases that determined that tying was 
inefficient.1415 From a theoretical basis there are numerous others that would dispute the 
analysis of free market ideologists relied on by Judge Bork.1416  
Regardless of the criticism of Bork's ideological bias there can be no denying that with that 
with one book he changed the entire trajectory of anti-trust law. Whereas prior to his work it 
was commonly excepted that the various anti-trust/competition authorities would protect the 
markets through the implementation and enforcement of "per se" restrictive regulations, after 
the its publication these "per se illegal" regulations were no longer acceptable or enforceable. 
A typical and particularly relevant example of a "per se illegal" regulation would be the so 
called "nine no-noes" which were intended to restrict abuses of intellectual property rights by 
making certain kinds of behaviour automatically illegal regardless of their economic 
consequences. 1417 These "per se illegal" activities being; 
1) Requiring licensees to purchase additional unpatented products. 
2) Require licensees to purchase a bundle of patents. 
3) Requiring the licensee to grant back subsequent patents. 
4) Requiring the licensee to adhere to minimum resale price provision with to the patented 
product. 
5) Requiring the licensee to impose conditions on customers who purchase the patented 
product form them. 
6) Restricting the right of the licensee to deal in products outside the scope of the patent 
7) Restricting the licensees use of a product made through a patented process.  
8) Imposing royalty provision unrelated to the patented product. 
                                                          
1412 Bork Antitrust Paradox, 376 
1413 Id. 81-89 
1414 An extreme example would be a monopolistic electrical utility tying the supply of electricity to the purchase of 
electrical appliances from its stores. This would foreclose that possibility competitive electrical appliance retail 
business in its markets.  
1415 International Salt Co., Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) being the first such case. 
1416 See e.g.: Donald F. Turner, The Validity of Tying Arrangements under the Antitrust Laws, Harvard Law Review, 
Vol. 72, No. 1. (Harvard Law Review Association 1958), 50-75. 
1417 Bruce B. Wilson, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Remarks before the Fourth New England Antitrust Conference, 






9) Forcing licensor to accept an exclusive licensing agreement.  
The reason why these per se rules were instituted was because each of them could be and 
had been used to reduce competition. The problem was that there were also real life and 
theoretical circumstances in which most of these behaviours would not reduce competition. For 
advocates of per se rules the benefits of applying the rules outweighed the cost of false positives. 
'Per se rules always contain a degree of arbitrariness. They are justified on the 
assumption that the gains from imposition of the rule will far outweigh the losses and 
that significant administrative advantages will result. In other words, the potential 
competitive harm plus the administrative costs of determining in what particular 
situations the practice maybe harmful must far outweigh the benefits that may result. 
If the potential benefits in aggregate are outweighed to this degree, then they are 
simply not worth identifying in individual cases.'1418 
For the ideological critics of per se rules, the cost of the false positives not only outweighed 
the positive benefits, but lead a rejection of the rules in total. The problem with both these 
approaches is that neither maximise the economic efficiency. When arbitrary rules are used as 
a proxy for true efficiency analysis, it is bound to result in the restriction of behaviour that would 
otherwise be efficient. Alternatively, an ideological based denial of the existence of efficiency 
harming behaviour, obviously ignores that anticompetitive behaviour. The question then 
become one of which is the least bad option. 
A major factor in the outcome of this dispute was the economic situation which the western 
world was facing at the time. To put this rise into context it must be remembered that the 1970's 
was marked by a difficult recession, caused by among other things, the 1973 oil crisis,1419 the 
collapse of the Breton Woods Agreement1420 and the emergence of increased competition in the 
steel industry as a result of the increased production from emerging markets. The recession itself 
was notable because it resulted in something called stagflation, which became short hand for 
the increases in both unemployment as well as inflation.  
Unsurprisingly this recession challenged the economic theory which had prevailed under the 
regulated markets, and nowhere was it more actively challenged than at Chicago School of 
Economics. While this School was established in the in the 1940's; its school of "laissez affaire" 
theories, remained relatively unattractive as long as the economies of the world were 
performing well under the regulated market theories. When the 1970's recession occurred, the 
Chicago School Economist advocated not just an adjustment to regulation, but rather a full-
frontal attack on the economic efficiency of all regulations. In the front lines this attack were; 
Friedrich Hayek, Ronald Coase, and Milton Friedman, who under the guise of a rebranded free 
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market ideology called "neo classical economics" disparaged all government regulations. Even 
the works of economists who were against deregulation, had their theories used against them 
was the case with George Stigler.  
Friedrich Hayek started teaching in the University of Chicago in 1950, which was six years 
after the publication of his most famous work 'The Road to Serfdom'. In this book Hayek 
advanced the notion that the roots of the National Socialism (Nazism) was socialism and 
predicted that if Western Countries did not abandon their social involvement in society it would 
eventually lead them to the same fate as socialism had in Germany. The path of this eventual 
outcome being the demand of Society for a strong leader after the inevitable failures of society, 
due to ever expanding for social programs which could not work. The underlying premise being 
that the only way "to improve the general level of wealth" was via the activities of free 
markets.1421 Ironically, Hayek also acknowledged that government could and must play a 
constructive role in restricting the abuse of business.  
'The successful use of competition as the principle of social organization precludes 
certain types of coercive interference with economic life, but it admits of others which 
sometimes may very considerably assist its work and even requires certain kinds of 
government action.'1422 and 'In no system that could be rationally defended would the 
state just do nothing.'1423 
However, because such nuance did not and does not appear to fit into the ideological 
philosophy of the neo-classical mainstream, it was and is generally ignored. For his part in the 
anti-regulation campaign, Ronald Coase promoted the theorem that all that was required for 
markets to maximise efficiency were clearly defined property rights.1424 Obviously as this 
theorem it supports their beliefs in market omnipotence, it helps promote their objective of 
eliminating that governments interfere in the market. What is not so obvious is how this 
theorem can be manipulated to protect the privileged property rights of a few, whilst damaging 
the universal property rights of the many. Unfortunately for the neo-classical economists, this 
theorem can be challenged on moral grounds, easily rebutted on theoretical grounds, and 
discredited in terms of real world applications. 
Even George Stigler, who was against deregulation, had his work theory of "regulatory 
capture" turned into a tool against government regulation.1425 Regulatory capture involves 
regulatory agencies, advancing the commercial or political interests of special interest groups 
that dominate the industry or sector which they are regulating, rather than protecting the public 
interest which they were intended to protect.  
'The idealistic view of public regulation is deeply imbedded in professional 
economic thought. So many economists, for example, have denounced the ICC for its 
pro-railroad policies that this has become a cliche of the literature. This criticism seems 
to me exactly as appropriate as a criticism of the Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea 
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Company for selling groceries, or as a criticism of a politician for currying popular 
support. The fundamental vice of such criticism is that it misdirects attention: it 
suggests that the way to get an ICC which is not subservient to the carriers is to preach 
to the commissioners or to the people who appoint the commissioners. The only way 
to get a different commission would be to change the political support for the 
Commission, and reward commissioners on a basis unrelated to their services to the 
carriers. 
Until the basic logic of political life is developed, reformers will be ill-equipped to 
use the state for their reforms, and victims of the pervasive use of the state's support 
of special groups will be helpless to protect themselves. Economist should quickly 
establish the license to practice on the rational theory of political behavior'1426  
This was turned against all regulations by implying that; if it is inevitable that regulators will 
be captured and therefore run their agency in a manner which harms the public interest, public 
interest is better served by not having the agency and simply relying upon the unregulated 
markets to product the best outcome. Unsurprisingly this interpretation theory of captured 
regulators totally ignores any negative consequences which can arise from an unregulated 
market, or any good that comes from regulations, or the possibility that not all regulators are 
captured.  
Finally, there was Milton Freidman who was perhaps the School's strongest proponent of 
free markets and greatest opponent of government regulations. He did this by claiming that 
societies had a binary choice in how they were governed. 
'Fundamentally, there are only two ways of co-ordinating the economic activities 
of millions. One is central direction involving the use of coercion the technique of the 
army and of the modern totalitarian state. The other is voluntary co-operation of 
individuals the technique of the market place.'1427 
As well as disparaging any government interference in the market. 
'I think the government solution to a problem is usually as bad as the problem and 
very often makes the problem worse.'1428 
This despite the fact that his expertise, and indeed the reason why he won the Noble 
prise for economics was his work on monetary policy, and not political theory. To a large 
extent it was his work on monetary policy which coloured his attitude towards 
government as clearly demonstrated in his analysis of the Great Depression. 
'The Great Depression, like most other periods of severe unemployment, was 
produced by government mismanagement rather than by any inherent instability of 
the private economy.' 1429 
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This quote like so many others indicates a wilful ignorance of any abusive behaviour by 
industrialist that actually caused the market crash of in September 3, 1929 and the bank failures 
that followed.  
Needless to say, these economic arguments deriding regulation would have a major impact 
on regulatory policies, if they were embraced by the politicians with the power to change the 
policy. Which is what happened with the election of Prime Minister Margret Thatcher in the UK 
and President Ronald Regan in the U.S. For her part Prime Minister Thatcher became a fervent 
follower of Hayek, and Friedman.  
'the most powerful critique of socialist planning and the socialist state which I read 
at this time [the late 1940s], and to which I have returned so often since [is] F.A. 
Hayek's The Road to Serfdom.'1430  
President Reagan on the other hand appeared to capture the ideas of Friedman both 
amusingly and succinctly when addressing an America farmers forum;  
'There seems to be an increasing awareness of something we Americans have 
known for some time: that the 10 most dangerous words in the English language are, 
"Hi, I'm from the Government, and I'm here to help."'1431  
Obviously once the leadership of the western world started adopting the neoclassical 
ideology which held that regulations were the cause of economic problems, rather than a 
solution to market abuses, it was inevitable that those regulations would play a much less 
significant role in society.  
However, to be fair the neo-classical economist, while "per se" rules may have prevented 
some income appropriation, it is entirely valid to suggest that expecting anti-trust/competition 
authorities to police every kind of abusive behaviour was always unfair and unrealistic. It is unfair 
because the only practical way that those authorities would have the capacity to do so was by 
implementing "per se" rules which would inevitable result in unjust prosecutions, as not every 
breach of those "per se" rules was or is anti-competitive. It is unreasonable because by expecting 
those same authorities, with or without out the use of "per se" rules, to be responsible for 
preventing income appropriation throughout the economy, places an impossible burden on 
those authorities. Particularly given the fact that most authorities are not only constrained by 
their own resources but could be subject to substantial financial judgements when the courts 
determine that they are mistaken in their assessment. In short, these authorities were lacking 
in the necessary tools, skills, staff or authority to prevent to every form of economic abuse that 
would result in unjust enrichment and it is perhaps better that they primarily focus on a few 
forms of anti-competitive behaviour where they have established a high level of competence 
and are granted the authority that they need to prosecute behaviour which involves collusion 
between competitors. 
One of the consequential results of this change in policy had to do with the partial repeal of 
the Glass-Steagall Act1432 which had governed banking in the United States since 1933. At its core 
the Glass-Steagall Act did two things. It set up a federal deposit insurance scheme and attempted 
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to protect against insecurity in the financial markets by restricting the right of financial 
institution to engage in both lending (commercial banking) and investment activities (security 
firms). This second aspect being driven by the lending on stocks and other securities which had 
created the financial bubble that collapsed in 1929, wiping out millions of investors and 
bankrupting thousands of banks. Although criticised by conservatives since its enactment it was 
not until 1999 under the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act,1433 that the barriers between banks, security 
companies, and insurance companies were removed. Not only did it remove the barriers to 
consolidation; it also it failed to give to the SEC or any other financial regulatory agency the 
authority to regulate the new larger investment bank holding companies that resulted as from 
that consolidation. This of course made a mockery of the purported notion of supervision which 
was supposed to prevent abuses. All of which mean that these large financial institutions were 
free to engage in unfettered financial actives on a scale never seen since before the Great 
Depression. The net result of this unfettered freedom was the sub-prime mortgage crisis, in 
which that the unregulated greed of a few came close to destroying the global financial 
markets.1434  
A similar change in policy can be seen within the field of patent rights. For rather than 
providing companies with the option of defending behaviour which breached one of the nine no 
noes, the U.S. Department of Justice essentially abandoned all rules altogether, and instead 
placed the burden on Anti-Trust division to prove that a company's actions were anti-
competitive under a "rule of reason". Under the rule of reason approach there are no absolutes 
and it is left to the courts to assess whether any specific behaviour on the part of any particular 
property owner is anticompetitive. This change in policy would be analogous to the traffic 
department abandoning all speed limits and road signs and instead insisting that in order for any 
motorist to be convicted of a traffic offence, the government would have to prove that they 
were driving dangerously. The net result of this policy change was that the patent owners could 
now engage in any of the previously prohibited activities, without fear of automatic prosecution. 
Indeed, as things progressed it became clear that only illegal tying, still maintains anything like 
a "per se" rule status.1435 Using the same analogy about traffic laws this would be equivalent to 
suggesting that after abandoning traffic rules, it was decided that drink driving would remain a 
"per se" violation, that did not need to be litigated to determine if dangerous driving had 
occurred. 
Unsurprisingly; the evolution from a regulated property to a supervised property stage has 
had a significant effect on the behaviour of patent owners. The most significant effect was that 
the lack of defined rules allowed for the rise of the so-called patent trolls who became free to 
abuse intellectual property law to appropriate as the rewards of other inventors for themselves 
by threatening injunctive action against manufactures of integrated intellectual products, i.e. 
patent holdup.  
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The second effect; legal attrition/patent holdout was a response to first. This was the same 
thing that happened during the earlier free market stage. When companies were facing 
unreasonable licensing demands from patented owners they resorted to any legal manoeuvre 
available, to avoid those unreasonable demands. In the modern context this meant engaging in 
excessive depositions as well as challenging every aspect of a patent validity and infringement. 
After legal attrition became an acceptable means of defence against patent holdup, its use was 
expanded to also avoid reasonable licensing offers by intellectual property owner who did not 
have the unlimited financial and legal resources of the large technology manufactures. The net 
result of using legal attrition against reasonable licensing offers was that over time, smaller 
patent owners with limited financial and legal resources were unable to afford the litigation 
required to enforcing their rights. All of which meant that today large technology companies are 
able to avoid paying fair market value for the use of integrated innovations. This naturally 
provided them with higher profits than they would otherwise earn, all to the determent of 
smaller innovators. It is this appropriation of small innovator’s rewards which has significantly 
contributed to a concentration of wealth in many high-tech industries. 
A situation which is directly comparable to the earlier free market stage, where robber 
barons hid their abusive behaviour behind the claims of technological superiority. Given this 
outcome it could be argued that the supervised stage is in essence a return of the free market 
stage. However, while the evolution from a regulated stage to a supervised stage clearly 
facilitated the possibilities to engage in patent holdup, and patent holdout; this did not mean 
that a supervised stage is incapable of resolving these problems.  
All that is require is for the rules needed to avoid such abuses to be just properly; located, 
calibrated and monitored in the body of law which covers that the field where it is occurring. 
While this would appear like a rational proposal it has been frustrated by three obstacles. The 
first of these is that the neo-classical proponents were so successfully in perpetuated that the 
notion that the efficiencies of an unregulated market so overwhelmed any inefficiencies cause 
by potential abuses, many societies came to believe the abuses should be ignored. The second 
obstacle was that they have so discredited government regulations, that the changes needed in 
other bodies of law could not happen. The third obstacle was there was no new ideological 
arguments or legal doctrine which could be used to counter the ideological arguments of neo-
classical proponents. It is third obstacle which is perhaps the most significant reason why the 
application of the "rule of reason" in the supervised stage has failed to restrain abusive 
behaviour. Obviously if there is no rational or doctrine which can used to argued argue against 
abusive behaviour which creates harm, the harm will be seen as a marginal and unavoidable 
consequence of the free market. 
To a greater or lesser extent it was the neo-conservative notions; that free markets work 
better than any alternative and any harm it is a marginal and unavoidable consequence which 
have curtailed the potential of the supervised stage and transformed it into a free market 
revival. However just as with the end of the last free market stage it can be expected that; 
when the gap in income equality becomes too large and/or there is another major recession, 






14.4 The Next Evolution and Intellectual Property 
The presumption that the revival of the free market stage during the supervised stage will 
come to an end, assumes that the neo-classical ideology continues to maintain its dominance in 
the field of law and economics. The logic behind this statement being as follows: an evolution 
will likely occur if there is another major recession, and a major recesssion will certainly occur if 
too few people have the resources necessary to sustain economic growth, and too few people 
will have economic resources if the neo-classical ideology which is indifference to wealth 
concentration and income inequality is maintained.  
The expectation that eventually too few people having the resources to sustain economic 
growth, being supported by statistics which show that over the past decade wages have 
stagnated even though productivity has increase.1436 In industries which focus on the 
manufacturing of high technology products, this wage stagnation is exacerbated by the 
disproportionately low royalty payments which have been facilitated through the legal attrition 
practiced by major technology firms. What this means is unlike previous recession; traditional 
employees, independent engineers and inventors all will be experiencing wage stagnation. It is 
worth noting that this situation can be compared to the situation factory workers faced in the 
free market stage during the industrial revolution. During the industrial revolution because 
factory workers did not have adequate legal protection; factory owners appropriated most of 
the value created by their workers for themselves, providing their employees with the lowest 
possible compensation for their work, and thereby creating extreme inequity in wealth. So, to 
the extent that the current information revolution represents another transformation in the 
global economy; paying intellectual property a small fraction of the value which their properties 
contribute, should be considered an appropriation of a similar nature. Particularly as the 
creation of intellectual property, is the driving force of current economic growth. 
Whilst it is likely that a reactive backlash against further increases in income inequality will 
be responsible for the next evolution on the property continuum, that evolution could also occur 
as the result of a proactive recognition of the failures of the supervised stage. If this proactive 
recognition were to occur, it could be expected that societies would have concluded that the 
pendulum of economic activity had swung too far in favour of free markets, and a return to one 
of previous stages needs to be considered. The question would then become which of the earlier 
stages would be the most logical to pursue. To answer this question, it is perhaps useful to 
review what lessons can be drawn for the various stages, particularly as they relate to 
intellectual property rights.  
With respect to the communal property stage, it should be noted that communal property 
presumes that all participants are engaged in communal activities, with only a limited division 
of labour. Another significant aspect of the stage was the aggregate production of the society 
was shared among all members of society, which meant there was no need for an exchange 
mechanism. While this lack of an exchange mechanism can be misconstrued as suggesting that 
members of a society contributed their labours for free, in fact everyone was paid for their 
contribution by receiving their share of the society’s aggregate production.  
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The primarily lesson from this stage for intellectual property must be that even in the most 
primitive societies, there was never an instance where members were unrewarded for their 
efforts to support the society. A lesson which would appear to contradict the message of the 
free intellectual property supporters, who propose that everybody has the right to a reward for 
their labour, except innovators who are only entitled to some form of indirect reward. In 
communal society this would be equivalent to suggesting that a spear maker could only share in 
a feast, if it was his spear that was used to kill a deer.  
Moving to the tribal property stage, what differentiates this stage form the communal 
property stage is the division of labour. Under this stage societies recognised that some 
members were better at certain activities than others, and by dividing up the tasks according to 
competence, a higher level of production could be attained. In addition, this stage saw the 
introduction of a limited forms of private property rights as farmers, fishermen and hunters 
began to espouse a sense of entitlement towards the property that they and their forebears had 
been working. Finally, this stage also saw the introduction of exchange and/or pricing 
mechanism. This mechanism being required as introduction of limited forms of property rights, 
eroded the concept of communal property. 
The primary lessons which can be drawn from this stage is that specialization improves 
productivity, and differences in productivity will motivate a movement away from an equal 
sharing of rewards and towards some form of ownership of those rewards. Property ownership 
of the means of production representing the most logical method for dealing with the ownership 
of rewards. From an intellectual property perspective these lessons clearly suggest that allowing 
inventors to specialise on inventing will result in higher levels of innovation. Further just as any 
other members of a society, they will want to be rewarded for the value that they create. This 
naturally would require some measure of property ownership and protection of property rights.  
When it comes to the stages included in the concentrated property phase, the dominate 
feature of these stages were that property and near absolute property rights were taken and 
granted by the rulers; to a privileged few in return for their loyalty. While there can be no doubt 
that the stages in this phase entrenched private property rights, because ownership was so 
limited and absolute, it clearly and disproportionality benefited the privileged few to the 
exclusion of others. What was is also evident in this phase was the that those owners, whether 
rulers or loyal supporters often did not have the capacity to properly or efficiently manage their 
property.  
This same dynamic is also visible in the intellectual property rights established by letters 
patent during the noble property stage. Not only were letters patent granted to parties favoured 
by the crown, they also were absolute in nature. Although the justification for granting patent 
rights changed during the aristocratic stage, the rights provided still remained relatively 
absolute, even if they were limited in duration. That said the change in justification was truly 
dramatic; in that the deciding factor in determining whether individuals would be granted 
patent rights became inventiveness rather than loyalty. This meant that any member of a society 
which created an invention was entitled to seek patent protection, and if successful this would 
provide them with ownership rights over their invention. The universality of this merit-based 
system representing a huge step forward in the evolution towards universal property rights, 
before universal property rights in traditional property was fully accepted.  
Given the significances of this change to intellectual property and the evolution of the 






advocating that this merit based intellectual property ownership should not be maintained. That 
intellectual property ownership should be restricted, whenever intellectual properties represent 
a small part of a larger invention. Although supporters of these restrictions are justifiably 
concerned about the abuses of intellectual property rights, a return to a privileged ownership 
society would appear to run counter to the advances in universal property rights. Not to mention 
that limiting intellectual property ownership in any given industry to one entity, would likely 
hinder the economic development, just as granting sole ownership of large parts of North 
America to single entities limited the initial development of that continent  
While the evolution to universal property rights dramatically increase the possibility of 
owning property to ordinary citizens, the absolute nature of property rights was still maintained 
in the free market stage. The absolute nature of property rights during this stage can 
extrapolated from the lack of restrictions placed on a property owner’s use of their property. 
This allowed some property owners to abuse their property in a manner which took extreme 
advantage of their employees and appropriated the property of others. Their absolute property 
rights being used as a shield with which hide or justified those abuses. The net result of these 
abuses was a dramatically increase in income inequality, with the rewards of industry being 
captured by the most abusive. Although contested, there is significant evidence that the Great 
Depression resulted from this income inequality. 
From an intellectual property prospective these abuses involved anticompetitive measures; 
like requiring exclusive purchase deals or tying the purchase of a patented product to an 
unpatented product or attempting to monopolize a market through by seeking injunctive actions 
against other patent owners who have also contributed to a technological product. The fact that 
these abuses were facilitated and largely ignored in this stage, being consistent with the neo-
classical notion that the efficiencies of a free market so overwhelmed any inefficiencies cause 
by potential abuses, those abuses should be ignored. Regardless of whether the current abuse 
of patent holdup occurred during this stage, the fact that this stage facilitated and ignored 
abuses of injunctive relief, indicates that it provides no lessons for dealing with patent holdup. 
In fact, the lesson to be drawn from this stage is that a return to it, would almost certainly mean 
a return of patent holdup, as a customary practice in integrated technology industries. 
For the most part the directed property stage can be defined as an overreaction to the Great 
Depression, which was blamed on abuses committed during the free market stage. Although 
short-lived: in most Western societies this stage involved; the nationalization of properties, and 
government agencies telling property owners how they could use their properties, including 
defining the prices which would prevail in the market. The reason why this stage was so short-
lived was because it soon became clear that; government control over industry resulted in 
greater inefficiencies and was extremely susceptible to agency capture. While the inefficiencies 
of this stage are recognised and appreciated by societies, the agency capture side tends to 
receive less attention. This despite the fact that agency capture played a significant role in 
creating the inefficiencies, as large vested interest successfully sought to protect their profits 
through influencing the government agencies which regulated them. 
From an intellectual property prospective, it was the agency capture consequences which 
had the greatest impact were the price fixing rules. Many of these rules dispropotionately 
favoured large manufacturers while others significantly undervalued the contributions of 
intellectual property owners, by limiting the roylaties they could charge for the use of their 






predated the Great Depression, its contents provide an excellent example of the potential 
discriminatory effects of directed property regulations. It should be recalled that under that 
government coerced agreement, only the two largest intellectual property contributors were 
granted the right to charge royalties, with the other contributors being forced to provide their 
intellectual property for free. 
It is worth noting that although the lessons about inefficiency and agency capture are 
acknowledged in modern economics, they appear to have been forgotten with respect to 
regulations on intellectual property rights. The return of directed intellectual property being 
pursued by various competition authorities, who have decided that it is up to them to direct the 
royalties which can be charged on correlated intellectual properties. The justification for a return 
of the directed regulations being based on an effort to avoid patent holdup and ensure the 
provision of inexpensive technological products for consumers. Unsurprisingly, just as in the 
directed property stage, these agencies have to a large extent been captured by large multi-
national technological companies who want to lower their royalty costs. The evidence of this 
capture is in full view; in that the royalties which these agencies have directed are a fraction of 
the value which is provided by the intellectual properties, and the fact that those same agencies 
appear to have no problem with large technology companies charging consumers the full value 
which can be attributed to their brands. If the agencies were truly concerned with patent 
holdup, they would merely ensure that intellectual property owners do not use their market 
power to charge more than the value contributed by their intellectual properties. If they were 
truly concerned about consumer prices, they would require discounts on both royalties, and 
brand value. 
In terms of the lessons which can be drawn from the restricted stage, it should first be noted 
that initial “per se” prohibitions adopted under this stage produced record economic growth in 
many countries, and dramatically reduced income inequality by helping to create a growing 
middle class. The problem was that; just as the current supervised stage has permitted a revival 
of free market stage, this stage permitted a revival of the directed stage. It was under this revival 
in the latter parts of this stage, legislators and regulators over extended themselves to the point 
where the prohibitions themselves became a barrier to economic development. Additionally, 
because these prohibitions also caught innocent victims, it was inevitable that the “per se” 
nature of them would eventually be challenged. What is unknown is what would have been the 
economic results and social consequences of this stage, if the over regulation had not occurred. 
Assuming that the early economic and social development would have been maintained, it is 
possible that the challenges to the legitimacy of the prohibitions would have been unsuccessful.  
In the field of intellectual property those “per se” prohibitions were best represented by the 
“nine no-noes” which were enforced under antitrust rules in America. As with other 
prohibitions, because it was possible to show that there were situations where their 
enforcement would prohibit innocent behaviour, these too were abandoned. This despite the 
fact that included in those nine no noes, was at least one prohibition which might have been 
effective in preventing patent holdup.1437 To the extent that this prohibition could have 
prevented patent holdup, and the patent holdout response to patent holdup, it would appear 
self-evident enacting a similar prohibition in patent law would represent the most logical 
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solution to those problems. Particularly if the enacted prohibition were to be worded in a way 
which would avoid enforcement of the prohibition against innocent actors. For example: the 
wording could be as follows: 
When multiple parties have individual property claims on an inherently integrated 
property each is legally entitled to their proportional share of the total value of that 
property and a prohibited from requiring royalties which are in excess of that value. 
While such a prohibition would undoubtedly solve the problem of patent holdup and 
therefore remove the justification for patent holdout, there are two problems related to this 
solution. The first is that attempting to enact this prohibition in existing patent legislation in 
multiple jurisdictions would be incredibly difficult. This because political pressure from those 
that benefit from the status quo would be enormous and potentially fatal. The second 
problem is that; it would open up the door to the same over regulation risks which ended the 
restricted property stage. 
While neither of these problems should be under-estimated, it should also be noted that 
returning to prohibitions would represent a step backwards on the property continuum. This 
raises the question as to whether there might exists potential solutions which have been 
developed and proposed since the end of the restricted property stage, that would be a step 
forward on the property continuum. In particular whether an application of the correlated 
rights doctrine in intellectual property law might be a better solution.  
What makes the application of the correlated rights doctrine different from a return to one 
of the regulated property stages, is that it abandons the medieval notion of absolute property 
rights as its foundation. Obviously because absolute property rights are abandoned, it is not 
necessary to impose regulatory limitations on those absolute property rights. This because 
inhernet in the doctrine is the protential that the property rights of others can be used to limit 
the abuse of individual property rights. This doctrine being articulated by the latin dictum “sic 
utere tuo ut alienum non laedas”. In its simplest application what this would mean is that all 
property owners, should recognise and respect the property rights of other property owners, 
when excercising their rights.  
While few people have heard of correlated property rights, as described earlier it is an 
established legal doctrine which has been applied in two bodies of law for more than a 
century.1438 It has been applied in water law, where surface property owners have individual 
ownership claims on common underground aquifers, and it has been applied in oil and gas laws 
when surface property owners have similar claims on similar underground oil and gas reserves. 
The basic premise of the doctrine is that as individual users have similar claims on a share 
resource, they are prohibited from taking more than their proportionate share of that common 
resource. In water law this means that surface owner can only extract and used an amount of 
water, which is equal to their proportionate share of the water that replenishes the aquifer. That 
proportionate share being equal to the share of the land above the aquifer that they own. The 
same rules are followed when the correlated rights doctrine is applied to oil and gas reserves. 
The surface owners also are only entitled to their proportionate share of the value of the oil and 
gas reserves which under the surface property that they own. In both cases the application of 
                                                          






the doctrine has resulted in a more equitable of distribution of the value of the property they 
own and has significantly enhanced the productivity and sustainably of the underlying resource. 
If it is viewed in a more general manner this doctrine could be used to protect owners of one 
form of property, from being abused by owners of another form of property, whenever those 
two forms of property come into contact. For example, it could be used to protect employees 
(who own their labour) from being abused their employers (who own the business). Such an 
application would ensure that employees receive a proportional share of the value which they 
contribute to the business. Alternatively, it would protect business owners from wage demands, 
which exceed that value that employees contribute to the business.  
While such a generalised application may appear idealistic, the fact is there is already exists 
in Europe a hierarchically superior law which appears to require such an application.1439 That law 
takes the form of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights which protects; property1440 
employment,1441 and business rights1442, in addition to declaring that: 
'Enjoyment of these rights entails responsibilities and duties with regard to other 
persons, to the human community and future generations.'1443 
and  
''Nothing in this Charter shall be interpreted as implying any right to engage in any 
activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and 
freedoms recognised in this Charter or at their limitation to a greater extent than is 
provided for herein.'1444 
All of which means that applying something like the correlated rights doctrine is already a 
legal requirement in European Union Member States. 
In terms of applying this doctrine in intellectual property law, this would constitute a simple 
migration of the doctrine from the existing bodies of law where it is applied to integrated 
properties, to a new body of law where are also integrated properties. The specific definition of 
correlated intellectual property rights which is proposed in this thesis is as follows: 
'When separately owned intellectual properties are determined to be inherently 
integrated with other intellectual properties, the individual property owners shall have 
proportional property rights with respect to the whole property and shall not 
disproportionately enrich themselves to the detriment of the other intellectual 
property owners.' 
It should be noted that this definition matches the proposed prohibition which was suggested 
if a return to the restricted stage was to be considered. This match can be attributed to the fact 
that the proposed prohibition was intentionally drawn from this definition. The difference 
between applying the correlated rights doctrine and adopting the prohibition is that, an 
application of the doctrine avoids the two problems identified with respect to the prohibition. 
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1440 EU Charter, Article 17 The right to property 
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1442 Id. Article 16 Freedom to conduct a business 
1443 The Charter, Preamble 






The problem of getting the prohibition enacted is eliminated because the doctrine can be 
applied without changing or breaching existing legislation. The problem with respect to the 
opening the door to future over-regulation is also avoided because inherent in the doctrine is 
all the limitation which are needed to resolve most correlated intellectual property disputes. 
Equally important is the fact that an application of the doctrine would avoid the problem of 
agency capture, which will always be a risk in any regulated solution. 
While the migration of the correlated rights doctrine into intellectual property law (or any 
other body of law) may not face the same problems as would be faced by returning to some 
form of prohibition, it should still be anticipated that there will be significant ideological 
resistance its application. This because a shift away from the notion that property owners have 
an absolute right to maximise their profits, contradicts the central beliefs of the free market 
proponents in the neo-classical school. Given these anticipated challenges it is worth examining 
why such challenges are unlikely to be as successful as the challenges against the directed, 
regulated and supervised property stages.  
What makes the success of these challenges less likely is that defender of correlated property 
rights; will not be encumbered by disadvantages and will have advantages which regulated 
property defenders did not have. The most important disadvantage which they will not have to 
defend; is the proposition that government bureaucracy knows what is better for the economy 
than private business owners. The second disadvantage that they will not have is the problems 
inherent in the free market ideology; are not part of a distant past which has been forgotten and 
which can be easily dismissed. The first and most significant advantage that they will have is that 
they will be advocating for property right and not against property rights. The second advantage 
that they will have will be that they will have doctrine that they are fighting for (the correlative 
rights doctrine), not one that they are fighting against, (the absolutist doctrine). The final 
advantage that they will have the small business on their side, as small business will be the 
primary beneficiaries of correlated rights.  
Taking each of these disadvantage and advantages in turn, not having defend government 
bureaucracy is a tremendous advantage, because of the contempt that has metastasized, either 
rightly or wrongly, against government interference in the economy. This does not have to be 
defended because correlated property rights disputes represent disputes between two private 
parties, rather than a dispute between a private party and the government. In these disputes 
the private parties will have to present evidence in support of their positions, with the courts 
determining how equity is best served. While the courts are a part of government, they are held 
in a much higher regard and assuming they use their discretion of avoid inequitable outcomes, 
they will continue to be held in high regard. 
Not having the problems inherent in the free market ideology as distant and forgotten 
memory, obviously removes the disadvantage of having to explain to those who have not 
experienced what can go wrong when free market ideologies are dogmatically pursued. The 
most prominent of these problems being those which revolve around the growth of income 
inequality which is considered by many to be the most serious issue facing modern societies. 
As to advantages. Because of the evolution of universal property rights most people own 
property, and as such it can be expected that these expanded ownership ranks will be more 
receptive of arguments which protect those rights, than they would be to arguments which limit 
them. While it is entirely reasonable to suggest the property limits inherent in the correlated 






property rights, the fact that it is a positive rather than a negative argument which can be made, 
totally changes the dynamics of perception. By adopting an argument in favour of property 
rights, opponents must adopt a position against those same rights. This therefore turns the 
tables on the neo-conservatives, which for the last 40 years have been arguing in favour of 
property rights. Further this should eliminate their ability to engage in the sophistry, which 
equates limiting property rights to confiscating property as part of some notorious socialistic 
plot. 
The advantage of having a doctrine to fight for rather than against, has the same perception 
dynamics. More importantly it provides a clear rebuttal to the often-repeated assertion that 
while free market may have their problems, they are better than any other system.1445 Obviously 
without a compelling alternative doctrine, regulatory stage proponents could be portrayed as 
merely critics who complained for the sake of complaining. With the correlated doctrine, 
supporters of the doctrine can stand for something, rather being defined as standing for nothing. 
The final advantage of having small business on their side, was not described as the most 
significant advantage, but it could be. The reason why it is not described as the most significant 
advantage is because small businesses will likely have to experience the benefits of an 
application of the correlated rights before they are supportive of it. However, once they do 
experience those benefits, the fact that they represent between 60 to 70% of all economic 
activity will make their support decisive in the evolution towards a correlated stage. 
From a pragmatic prospective it must be admitted that a correlated stage may be prevented 
from evolving in the short-term future. Particularly as agency capture is such a dominate force 
in the current social structure and large property owners, who enjoy disproportionate rewards 
from the supervised stage, will oppose a peaceful transition in any way they can. However, if the 
past is any prelude, events will eventually overcome their opposition and an evolution of 
property rights will continue. Even if this belief is mistaken, proponents of correlated property 
rights can take comfort in the knowledge that: 
'A good will isn’t good because of what it effects or accomplishes, it is good in itself. 
Even if by upmost effort the good will accomplishes nothing it would still shine like a 
jewel for its own sake as something which has its full value in itself.'1446 
  
                                                          
1445 Curiously this assertion is derived from Prime Minister Winston Churchill's famous quote which was "Many 
forms of Government have been tried, and will be tried in this world of sin and woe. No one pretends that 
democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of Government except 
for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time". (House of Commons, 11 November 1947) Of 
course when Churchill made this quote he was arguing against communism, and not for unrestricted capitalism. 









Included in the introduction was Judge Richard Posner’s description of task of legal scholars, 
which he described as involving; ‘Developing the theories related to fundamental changes in the 
underlying subjects and "extracting" a doctrine from those judicial decisions’ This description 
was based upon the his view that unlike judges, legal scholars have the luxury of time and 
resources to dedicate to developing the theory, in particular they have the opportunity expand 
their research well beyond the specifics of individual cases in the search for a more 
comprehensive understanding of the situation. That in the best research the scholars will 
identify the underlying changes which has driven the reactive change in the law and uncover 
established doctrines in parallel bodies of law which can be migrated to or "extracted" from 
existing case law. It is this description of legal scholarship which has been followed in thesis.  
With respect to the underlying change it was pointed out that there has been an evolutional 
change in the inventive process from one where the majority of inventions were of a standalone 
nature, to one where the majority of are of a correlated nature.1447 A standalone intellectual 
property being defined as: a patented innovation which is developed solely by a single entity and 
which requires no integration with any other entities' valid and enforceable intellectual property 
to fulfil its claims. Whereas a correlated intellectual property being defined as: a patented 
innovation which have been built upon exiting intellectual property and which must be integrated 
with other entities' valid and enforceable intellectual property to fulfil its claims.1448 
With respect the researching beyond the specifics of individual cases, the thesis included an 
explanation of the effects of “patent holdup” and “patent holdout”,1449 a historical example to 
demonstrate that it is not a new phenomenon,1450 as well as a review of the anticipated solutions 
to these problems.1451 However, when it was determined that none of these anticipated 
solutions could provide an equitable solution, it was expanded to search for solutions in other 
bodies of law. It was during this expanded search that the correlated property rights doctrine 
was discovered.1452 That doctrine being defined as follows:  
“When multiple parties have individual property claims on an inherently integrated 
property each is legally entitled to their proportional share of the value of the property 
and the law should protect that share from being appropriated by others, including other 
owners and users.’ 
Although discovering this doctrine would have been sufficient to meet the criterium laid 
down by Posner. It was recognised that because this doctrine represented such a contrarian 
position to the absolute property right foundation of intellectual property law and the dominate 
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solutions to current intellectual property problems, merely identifying it would not be sufficient 
to ensure its application. Particularly as the doctrine also contradicted the neo-conservative 
ideological so prevalent in the field of law and economics. As such the research was expanded 
to include a review of how property ownership rights have evolved over time, in an effort to 
demonstrate that absolute property rights represent an antiquated doctrine which has only 
limited application in the modern world.1453 Also included was a review of the justifications for 
intellectual property rights,1454 an analysis of the underlying ideological justifications for both 
absolute and correlated property rights.1455  
Further research focused on how recent changes in the application of intellectual property 
law can be represented as milestones on the path towards an application of the correlated rights 
doctrine. It was in this research which most closely complies with the methodology suggested 
by Posner, however it goes further by advancing an assessment as to whether those judgements 
and other recent judgements represent steps backwards or forwards on the path to an 
application of the doctrine. 1456 
The final bit of research focused on the compatibility of the existing legislation with the 
application of the correlated rights doctrine,1457 and a potential legal requirement for the 
correlated rights doctrine to be applied under European Union Treaty and Fundamental Rights 
Law.1458 This material was included to show that an application of the correlated right doctrine 
did not require changes existing legislation and may be required by existing legislation. 
The single chapter which does not include extensive research is the one which anticipated 
the potential advantages and disadvantages of applying the correlated rights doctrine in 
intellectual property law.1459 It is this analysis which provides the non-doctoral justification for 
applying the correlated rights doctrine.  
Taken together what this research indicates is that there are significant advantages of 
replacing current restriction on absolute property rights with an application of the correlated 
rights doctrine. The most significant is that it restricts the potential for patent holdup, while 
ensuring that all intellectual property owners regardless of their size, location or the fact that 
they are non-practicing entities, will be able to receive reasonable royalties for the use of their 
intellectual property. Reasonable royalties being defined herein as a rate which is proportional 
the value which their intellectual properties provide to an integrated technological product. This 
value being determined by a holistic apportionment approach, which begins with an assessment 
of the total value that the aggregate value of integrated intellectual properties provided to a 
technological product, which is subsequently apportioned to individual intellectual property 
owners according the proportional share of the value which their properties provides to the 
aggregate value. 
The second significant advantage is that it eliminates the judicial justification for allowing 
patent holdout, by restricting the potential for patent holdup. In addition to eliminating the 
justification for patent holdout, it also provides the courts with a means to dis-incentivise the 
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both patent holdup and holdout. This because it recognises that there exists a reasonable royalty 
range, which can be used to punish or reward abusive behaviour.  
The third significant advantage is that to a large extent eliminates the risk of agency or judicial 
capture, which should reduce inconsistent and sometimes arbitrary restrictions imposed on 
intellectual property rights. An application of the correlated rights reduces these inconstancies, 
by providing a doctrine which incorporates the restrictions necessary to avoid the appropriation 
of the value of intellectual property owners by either other owners (patent holdup) or patent 
users (patent holdout). Having those restrictions already inherently incorporated in the doctrine, 
obviously eliminates the need for further restrictions of an arbitrary nature. 
Yet another significant advantage is the it should speed up innovation, by allowing all 
innovators to thoroughly research all existing innovations without facing the potential of being 
categorised as a wilful infringer. Such unencumbered research also benefiting existing 
intellectual property owners, because it should facilitate greater recognition and respect for 
their intellectual properties. 
The final significant advantage is the it is an established legal doctrine, rather than a 
normative legal principle. The fact that is a legal doctrine is important because; legal doctrines 
provide relatively clear and authoritive legal guidance, whereas normative principles are more 
subjective and more easily neglected. The fact that it is an established legal doctrine is also 
important because this means that can be migrated to intellectual property law in the 
knowledge that it has already successfully withstood constitutional challenges. 
Finally, it should be mentioned that these significant advantages, as well as those listed in 
chapter 12, can be realised without changes to existing legislation and this thesis is not 
advocating changes to exiting legislation. It is merely pointing out that the correlated rights 
doctrine which has been successfully applied for over one hundred years in two other bodies of 
law, can be extracted from the judicial efforts to restrict absolute property rights and will likely 
achieve better results than restricting absolute property rights.1460 
 
                                                          
1460 Posner, How Judges Think, at 221 "The most effective method of arguing a case, ... is to identify the purpose 
behind the legal principle and then show how that purpose would be furthered by a decision in favor of the 
advocate's position. Having done this, he will have to show that the position does not violate settled law, and this 
will require a further discussion of the cases. So precedent will enter at two stages in the argument: as a source of 
governing principles and as a constraint on efforts to realize those principles in the novel setting of the case at hand. 
At neither stage, however, will the good advocate be arguing that the result for which he is contending is already 






IP Categories and Suggested Doctrines Summary 
 
Standalone Discretionary  
Definition: patented innovations which are developed by a single entity which do not require 
integration with enforceable patents owned by others to fulfil their claims and are not essential 
to the well-being of society. 
Suggested Doctrine: Absolute doctrine which provides the owner with unrestricted exclusive right 
to the use of their property, including the right to exclude others from using their property. 
Justification: Historical IP rights for historical innovations. 
Standalone Essential  
Definition: patented innovations which are developed by a single entity which do not require 
integration with enforceable patents owned by others to fulfil their claims but are essential to 
the well-being of society. 
Suggested Doctrine: Restricted absolute doctrine which provides the owner with the exclusive 
right to the use of their property, subject to the possibility of a compulsory license being granted. 
Justification: Ensures the well-being of society. 
Correlated Discretionary 
Definition: patented innovations which have been built upon exiting patented properties and 
which must be integrated with enforceable patents owned by others to fulfil their claims but are 
not essential to either the technical or commercial viability of the integrated technological 
product. 
Suggested Doctrine: Limited absolute doctrine which provides the owner with unrestricted 
exclusive right to the use of their property, until it is defined as market essential. 
Justification: Maintains product differentiation competition. 
Correlated Essential 
Definition: patented innovations which have been built upon exiting patented properties and 
which must be integrated with enforceable patents owned by others to fulfil their claims and are 
essential to either the technical or commercial viability of the integrated technological product. 
Suggested Doctrine: Correlated rights doctrine which provides that when multiple parties have 
individual property claims on an inherently integrated property each is legally entitled to their 
proportional share of the aggregate value of the combined properties and the law should protect 
that share from being appropriated by others, including other owners and user. 
Justification: An equitable and efficient distribution of rewards from integrated innovations. 
